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Abstract: 
 
The research employs historical institutionalism, amplified by ideas to explain path 
dependent political behaviour. The theoretical framework is applied to explain political 
behaviour in the Balkans, where Greece and Bulgaria, despite many similarities have 
developed highly antagonistic path-dependent policies of obstruction towards each 
other that remained remarkably persistent, regardless of changing external factors 
during most of the XX c. The main hypothesis is that such behaviour could be properly 
understood neither by leverage of Great Powers, nor by ancient hatreds, but by 
exploring the crucial role, played by path dependent institutionalized ideas 
(programmatic beliefs) in shaping policy outcomes. Only when ideas change- policy 
change does happen. The main task of this research is to outline historical ideational 
impediments to Balkan regional cooperation and explore if regional cooperation is 
attainable. The second hypothesis argues that  after the 1990s EU was such a powerful 
idea, that for the first time since the Independence revolutions, started to successfully 
challenge old institutional settings in the region, that have persisted for decades, even 
centuries. Political elites in the region encountered a new complicated situation, having 
to balance between the traditional nationalist ideational contexts and the `integration 
and cooperation´ ideational impetus, coming from outside. The implications of this 
tension between continuity and change are explored in the case studies on cooperation 
over common infrastructure projects between Bulgaria and Greece in the period 1990-
2010. So, we are considering the long-term historical force of path dependence and the 
possibility it can be rooted out, or at least significantly modified. The research is not 
only an endeavour to study the EU´s role in the Balkans, but to contribute to the 
growing debate in the field about the role of ideas in political life and to use such 
theoretical discussions, and the comparative method, to enhance our understanding of 
the evolution of modern EU states. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Nothing is simple in the Balkans 
-Lord David Owen 
 
The UK‘s existence is at risk due to danger of ‗Balkanization of Britain‘, Gordon 
Brown stated in January 2007, regarding a rise in support for Scottish independence.
1 
How did the Balkan region generate such a powerful metaphor that ‗travelled‘ with ease 
across time, space and disciplines? What happened that it was applied to Britain, where 
civic rights, equality, liberty, rather than ethnicity are the fundamentals of nationhood? 
Goldsworthy writes that ‗one Internet search engine offered nearly eight thousand 
results [...] of the term's usage: from the Balkanization of the world wide web, to the 
Chinese legal system, the territories of Nigeria and Columbia, to the U.S. electricity 
grid, the transit system in San Francisco, and, particularly in the eyes of right-wing 
politicians, even the United States itself (Pat Buchanan blames heavy immigration for 
the Balkanization of America, and a book about "an America without Americans" by 
Brent A. Nelson is titled, threateningly, America Balkanized).‘2 Everything and 
everywhere seems to be in danger of becoming ‚Balkanized‘, with only a tiny 
proportion of these cases taking place in the Balkans themselves.
3
 Indeed the Balkans 
are not particularly associated with the idea of regional cooperation. Just the opposite, 
‗the mountainous peninsula has always been an epitome of fragmentation, division, and 
confrontation; singled out as Europe‘s powder keg…A nightmarish series of wars, 
clashes, displacements of population (voluntary and forcible), petty rivalries and strong 
hostilities have characterized the two-century history of the modern Balkans.‘4 Such 
prejudice was reconfirmed during the 1990s when the region was the terrain of the 
devastating Yugoslav wars with consequences not only for its direct participants but 
also their neighbours. 
 
This study was inspired by a simple question, born of observation by a person, raised on 
the Balkans, trying to find out what makes this region so distinct in European 
cooperation context. Namely, why are the Balkans so persistent in their irrationality 
vis-à-vis Europe and why are they so irrationally persistent? ‗Irrational‘, meaning here, 
that as though states, governments, parties from the region followed their own algorithm 
of history and logic, not much bothered by the ‗rational‘ standards for political 
behaviour and cooperation, expected by their West European neighbours, while 
persistence refers to a remarkable path dependence of such policies, ideas, practices, 
regardless of changing external environments.
5
 
 
                                                 
1 Balkanization is a geopolitical term originally used to describe the process of fragmentation or division of a region or 
state into smaller regions or states that are often hostile or non-cooperative with each other. 
Source: ‗UK‘s Existence is at Risk‘-Brown-BBC News, Politics, 13 January 2007,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6258089.stm, accessed October 2008. 
2 Brent A. Nelson, An America without Americans, (American Immigration Control Foundation: Monterey, Va., 1994). 
3 Vesna Goldsworthy, ‗Invention and in(ter)vention: The rhetoric of Balkanization‘, Belgrade Circle Journal,  1-4, 
2006,p. 1. 
4 Ekaterina Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting, Roads Dividing: on Infrastructure in South East Europe‘, Institute of Balkan 
Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Etudes Balkanique, 2007, N1, p. 5. 
5 The terms rational/irrational used here and throughout the research  to describe Balkan political behaviour are not 
concerned with rational choice explanations and instrumental rationality, but rather to denote the inexplicability of the 
persistent lack of cooperation in the Balkans and the difficulty to predict political behaviour in the region. 
 2 
Such questions arose from very concrete examples of irrational (according to western 
perception) political behaviour in the Balkans. For instance, no one in the West believed 
that two NATO members could ever go to war. However, it happened in the Balkans. 
NATO was taken aback when, alleged ideological allies, Greece and Turkey went to 
war in the Cyprus conflict of 1974. 
 
Second example of such irrational political behaviour was when Greece,  proudly 
naming herself -‗the cradle of western civilization‘, broke ranks with its Western allies 
by refusing to support any NATO military operations against the Serbs during the 
Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s,  and was the only EU and NATO-member state, that 
supported Milosevic‘s Serbia. Greece also refused to condemn Serb atrocities in the 
Yugoslav Wars and frustrated the efforts of her partners to impose sanctions against 
Serbia. Even more surprising was that such support was very vocal and supported by 
Greek politicians from all parties, as well as the Greek Orthodox Church, the Greek 
media, and ultimately the Greek people themselves. One explanation for such Greek 
‗irrationality‘ might originate in a religious identification with their ‗Orthodox brother 
Serbs‘ but this generates striking new ‗irrationalities‘. The Greeks never harboured 
similar warm feelings for their other Orthodox brethren in Macedonia, or in Bulgaria. 
Western partners could not comprehend such Greek position and why the Greek state 
was supportive of Milosevic authoritarian regime, rather than its NATO and EU allies. 
 
A third example of irrational behaviour (especially from the point of view of proponents 
of the rational choice paradigm or liberal thinkers) refers to the large energy, transport 
and communication infrastructure projects, devised by the EU to facilitate regional 
cooperation after the end of the Cold War. In spite of firmly secured EU funding, 
proven economic benefits, (if completed) and clear technical specifications, the projects 
were in a state of impasse for a decade, and the EU could neither facilitate the 
commissioning of any of those projects, nor could it instill a culture of cooperation in 
the region during the 1990s. 
 
The lack of cooperation in the Balkans, despite external cooperation impetus similar to 
the examples above is relatively well documented. What is much less known to outside 
observers is that the region was also characterized by persistent patterns of irrational 
cooperation.
6
 Irrational in this context again implies to remarkable persistence, 
regardless of so many changing external factors. For example, Serbia and Greece have 
persistently cooperated through the whole span of their modern history. They have sided 
in the two Balkan Wars, the two World Wars and kept very warm relations even during 
the Cold War, despite belonging to different ideological camps. Furthermore, Greece in 
opposition to its Euro-Atlantic allies was the only member state to openly support 
Serbia in her ethnic cleansing campaign during the Yugoslav Wars and hundreds of 
thousands of people were shouting pro-Serbian and Anti-American slogans in the streets 
of Athens. One more time, outside logic was not applicable to the Balkans. It seemed 
the Balkans had their own algorithm of history, outside of time and space. How do 
different approaches explain such irrational political behaviour on the Balkans and its 
incredible persistence, regardless of changing external factors? 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 See 5. 
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Literature review 
 
One popular, but less than astute school of thought tries to explain Balkan behaviour via 
genetic predispositions, ancient hatreds, eternal bloodshed and perpetual war. Edith 
Durham wrote back in 1905, ‗because of their ancient hatreds, the Balkan peoples, 
irreconcilably divided by different religious and cultural affiliations, are forever fated to 
be at each other‘s throats like cats and dogs.‘7 Writing about fault lines and ancient 
hatreds, the British journalist Simon Winchester asks: 
 
But once again there arose the question that seemed so eternally asked and so perpetually 
appropriate here. Just why? Just why is there this dire inevitability about the Balkans 
being so fractious and unsettled a corner of the world, an inevitability that always seemed 
to exist? Just what was it that had marked out this particular peninsula, this particular gyre 
of mountains and plains, caves and streams, and made it a byword, quite literally, for 
hostility and hate? 
8
 
 
What forces were really at work here? I didn't mean by that the obvious ones [...]. I meant 
- or thought I meant - what basal forces, what innate characteristics, what elements of 
competing Balkan histories and cultures and ethnicities could ever have led to such a 
situation as this? For there was nothing new here [...]. What was actually happening here 
at Blace's swampcamp, and all the tales we were hearing from the refugees of what had 
been happening up in Kosovo, was merely as if the word merely could really be used in so 
awful a context - a manifestation of what had been going on in the Balkans for a thousand 
years or more. 
9
 
 
Winchester goes as far as resorting to ‗geological parallels between the land and the 
people who inhabit it: "The two chains [i.e., the Balkan Mountains and the Dinaric 
Alps] smashed into one another to create a geological fracture zone that became a 
template for the fractured behaviour of those who would later live upon it." Just as the 
peninsula "these strange and feral Balkans"- is outlandish and unlike the rest of Europe, 
its inhabitants, "the wild and refractory peoples of the Balkans," are seen almost as a 
different species: "One might say that anyone who inhabited such a place for a long 
period would probably evolve into something that varied substantially, for good or for 
ill, from whatever is the human norm."‘10  
 
Such argumentation bordering on racial arguments is largely discredited in academic 
discourse. Most notorious of all proponents of the ancient hatreds theory, Robert 
Kaplan, for example argued in his best-selling book, Balkan Ghosts ‗the nations of 
South-eastern Europe have always engaged in fratricidal, tribalistic wars, and no matter 
what the presumably enlightened West tries to do to stop bloodshed in the Balkans, the 
risk for new waves of angry battles and appalling massacres will always be very high.‘11 
Initially images such as fault lines, ancient hatreds, and powder kegs offered the 
advantage of beguiling simplicity to those confronted with Balkan history, which is, as 
Richard Holbrooke pointed out, ‗too complicated (or trivial) for outsiders to master.‘12 
In other words such terms were shorthand for ‗those commentators who were unsure 
                                                 
7 Edith Durham, The burden of the Balkans,  (London: Thomas Nelson, 1905), p. 20. 
8 Simon Winchester, The Fracture Zone: A Return to the Balkans, (London: Viking, 1999), p. 26. 
9 Winchester, The Fracture Zone, p. 29. 
10 Winchester, The Fracture Zone, pp. 3, 21-31, 60-61, quoted in Vesna Goldsworthy, ‗Invention and in(ter)vention: 
The rhetoric of Balkanization‘,  http://www.eurozine.com/article/2003-05-08-goldsworthy-en.html; accessed May, 2008. 
11 Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through  History, (New York: St Martin‘s Press, 1993). 
12 Richard Holbrooke, ‗To End a War‘ (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 22 quoted in Vesna Goldsworthy, 
‗Invention and in(ter)vention: The rhetoric of Balkanization‘, p. 1.  
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who exactly hates whom [therefore they] could always improvise‘. Stereotypes not only 
simplified reality, but have led to a situation in which ‗many of the outsiders dealing 
with the region have… shown an unwillingness to think beyond a symbolic, formulaic 
representation, to the point where … the Balkans have become nothing but a metaphor 
for conflict, incivility, and violence.
13
   
 
This research was inspired by the need to counter frame such constant negative 
‗imagining‘ of the Balkans and the idea that scholars should be debunking myths, rather 
than replicating them.   Negative metaphors not only reconfirm the prejudices both in 
Balkan and outside actors, but also have real policy implications as where ‗first-term 
President Clinton's initial espousal of Kaplan's theses [justified] non-intervention in 
Bosnia, which might have stopped the murderous actions of Serbian military and 
paramilitary forces.‘14 They also influenced the rhetoric of British Prime Minister John 
Major and EU mediator David Lord Owen, and many ‗ordinary citizens who read the 
book and concluded from it that, for reasons not made clear, Kaplan considered the 
peoples of the Balkans unusually wild and predisposed to violence.‘15 Reflecting on the 
Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, Kaplan states that the Cold War temporarily suppressed 
but failed to resolve ancient ethnic and other conflicts and that there was little hope that 
the ‗powder keg‘ of Europe would be able to escape the legacy of its bloody history 
after the end of communism. However, such theses were refuted by reality. Historically, 
‗instability and violence in one country almost always spread across much of the 
peninsula. Despite the numerous security, social, economic and other difficulties it 
caused in neighbouring countries, the recent and ongoing crisis in Yugoslavia was 
largely contained within its own borders.‘16  
 
Kaplan is right that communist rule and Cold War divisions froze but did not solve the 
age-old nationality problem in the peninsula. The entire Balkan peninsula could easily 
have fallen prey to the same destructive forces. For example, using as a pretext the 
sizable Greek minority in southern Albania or northern Epirus - a piece of territory with 
historic ties to Greece – Athens could have seized the moment to settle old scores, but 
did not. Similar temptations could have enticed Bulgaria to annex the fledgling FYROM 
state, or Romania-Moldova. But they did not. Despite the ‗untold destruction of 
property and human misery the Yugoslav crisis, and the numerous and severe economic, 
ethnic, social and other problems ravaging the area in the last decade, the apocalypse 
Kaplan and many other analysts predicted did not materialize.‘17 In the nineties, the 
Balkan countries were gradually embedded in a network of organizations and initiatives, 
promoting multilateral cooperation and translating Euro-Atlantic normative agenda to 
the area. This coupled with economic weakness and evidence of the devastating effects 
of the Yugoslav Wars played a restraining role. Even though the many multilateral 
cooperation measures are badly funded, lack in depth, and have yet to address core 
problems, they represent a significant step forward and the new cooperation idea 
constitutes an important break with past behaviour. Even if we assume the thesis of 
                                                 
13 Goldsworthy, ‗Invention and in(ter)vention: The rhetoric of Balkanization‘, p. 1. 
14 Vladimir Tismaneanu, ‗Understanding the Balkans‘, book review of  Misha Gleny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, 
and the Great Powers, 1804-1999, (Viking, 2000.),  
http://www.tikkun.org/magazine/index.cfm/action/tikkun/issue/tik0103/article/010351.html; accessed May, 2010, p. 1. 
15 Sabrina Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia, Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
16 Constantine Danopoulos, Toward Cooperation in Post-Cold Southeastern Europe ,  
http://www.uottawa.ca/associations/balkanpeace/texts/danopoulos-cooperation.pdf, accessed October 2009. 
17 Danopoulos, Toward Cooperation, pp. 5-8. 
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ancient hatreds could explain the persistent patterns of obstruction in the Balkans they 
fail to explain persistent patterns of cooperation, regardless of external change, like the 
Greek-Serbian cooperation during nineteen and early twenty century. 
In reaction to hatreds-stereotyping, the works of scholars like Todorova, Glenny and 
Goldsworthy have sought a more nuanced approach to the Balkans. Glenny ‗wants to 
make Balkan history accessible to rational people‘ looking for alternative explanations 
to Balkan political and historical reality rather than ‗genetic luggage‘ and ‗blood 
feuds‘.18 Glenny believes that ‗most of the ethnic and political conflict in the Balkans  
has its roots not in atavistic instincts and tribal sentiments of intolerance for otherness, 
but rather in games played by cynical great powers.‘19 While he believes that national 
sentiments and ideologies in the region developed endogenously, ‗the application and 
exacerbation of these local passions lay with foreign interests and agendas.‘ 20 Neal 
Ascherson writes that: 
Small Balkan nations were used as the proxies of bigger nations and then abandoned to 
the consequences. Serbia was egged on to attack Bulgaria in 1885 and then left to dangle 
in the wind. Romania was inveigled into the First World War by the Entente, and then 
betrayed. Greece…was lured into its crazy invasion of Turkey by Lloyd George, only to 
be defeated and face the first act of full-scale ethnic cleansing to defile the twentieth 
century.
21
  
Glenny goes even further stating that ‗ancient hatreds‘ is mostly nonsense. ‗Orthodox 
Serbs here went to battle in company with Turkish landlords. They did it again in 1878, 
during the Hadji Lojo insurrection in Bosnia, when Serbs and Muslims together fought 
the Austrian armies. In June 1913, during the Second Balkan War, Greek and Serbian 
troops were helped by Muslim villagers as they massacred helpless Bulgarian families 
in Macedonia. As Glenny puts it: ‗Nationalist violence knows no eternal enemy. The 
current enemy is always eternal.‘22 Relating to the Balkans, Greece has always sided 
with Orthodox Serbia, but never harboured similar feelings to Orthodox Macedonia or 
Bulgaria. Glenny‘s point is simple. ‗For 120 years, the Great Powers have shown the 
Balkans only miscalculation and indifference. Huge, destructive interventions by those 
powers created the Balkans of our nightmares, seen as culprits for their own 
misfortunes.‘23 
Glenny dismisses the concept of the Balkans ‗as a region of lunatic, bloody feuds, 
murders, and even genocide; he rejects the vision of an isolated and immutable Balkan 
politics…[instead] he proposes a comprehensively dynamic perspective that connects 
the region to European history. After all Balkan reality might prove not so distinct, not 
so specific and definitely not as gloomy as often portrayed.
24
 Such theses definitely 
merit attention and explain part of the puzzle, since Great Power‘s interference in the 
region was one of the key factors for the regional discord in the past. However, the 
World War II effectively ended the age-old rivalry among Europe's great powers, and 
eventually gave rise to the idea of the European Union (EU). In integrated and 
economically prosperous West, none of the former ‗Great Powers‘ had apparent reason 
                                                 
18 Tismaneanu, ‗Understanding the Balkans‘, p. 2. 
19 Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (Penguin Books, 1999), p. 15. 
20 Tismaneanu, ‗Understanding the Balkans‘, p. 3. 
21 Neal Ascherson, ‗On Inside the Balkan nightmare‘, The Observer, 21 November 1999, p. 15. 
22 Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999, p. 17. 
23 Ascherson, ‗On Inside‘, p. 15. 
24 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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to unilaterally engage in some kind of egoistic leverage in the Balkans. Therefore, the 
Great Powers leverage could be an useful tool for understanding past policies, but could 
not explain current policies of impasse on pan-European transport and energy projects 
in the Balkans, in spite of Western leverage and pressure for their completion. We need 
a more holistic approach to understanding Balkan political behaviour. 
 
While Glenny et al‘s analysis provides new approach, refuting old deterministic theories 
that blamed all regional misfortunes to local genetic, racial, cultural specifics, his 
analysis tends to somehow let domestic elites free of responsibility by linking all 
regional conflicts to outside interference. While it is true that external leverage has been 
overlooked in the research on Balkan conflicts while it has definitely shaped the 
region‘s history, the role of local elites in mobilising nationalist/ethnic sentiment should 
not be underestimated. 
Authors like Hagan, point directly at the role of populist national elites in the post-
Ottoman Balkans, abusing their status of power by playing the nationalist card for self 
legitimation purposes or control of power. According to such school of thought, local 
elites took advantage of the fact, that the Ottoman rule had stripped local states of their 
medieval dynasties and nobilities and the Ottoman collapse brought down those few 
groups that had prospered through collaboration with the Turks. Kagan further argues 
‗the newly liberated Balkan lands were peasant societies with only very modest 
commercial and manufacturing elites and nationalist intelligentsias. The intellectuals 
devoted themselves to state- building, advancing themselves as best they could within 
what might, with apologies to Marx, be called the nationalist mode of production -- that 
is, getting richer and accumulating status by serving the burgeoning national state. 
Capitalist individualism possessed little prestige or legitimacy; state-building in order to 
field armies capable of wresting away the unredeemed lands of the nation from their 
enemy possessors was the highest public value.‘25 However such school of thought fails 
short of explaining when it come to why exactly specific neighbours are framed as 
‗enemies‘ and others like ‗friends‘, nor it explains how other societies stripped of their 
intelligentsia like the Slovaks, or the Baltic states could build national states without 
falling prey to elite-instigated nationalist campaigns or serious conflicts with 
neighbours. 
 
Authors like Todorova, Goldsworthy and Bakic-Hayden, argue the negative image of 
the Balkans is Western scholarly construction, created at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and which was endlessly replicated. This tradition, ‗largely enforced by 
academics, stigmatizing the Balkans‘ had the unfortunate result that ‗the region has 
suffered from the neglect, abuse, and scant regard of both Western Europe and the 
world.‘ Moreover, ‗by being geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally 
constructed as ‗the other‘, the Balkan has served as a repository of negative 
characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the ‗European‘ 
has been constructed.‘ 26  Todorova argues this is not a ‗case of racial or religious 
prejudice‘, because ‗unlike those differences which follow usually racial or religious 
lines - you think of the Moslem as a threat from without; you think of the Jew as a threat 
to Christianity or the Blacks as a racial threat - here you don‘t have these lines: the 
Balkans are "white;" they are part of Europe; they are mostly Christian‘.  
                                                 
25 William Kagan, ‗The Balkans‘ Lethal Nationalism‘, Foreign Affairs, July 1999, vol. 78, n. 4. 
26 Review on Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),  
http://www.oup.com/ca/isbn/0-19-508750-X, accessed March, 2008.  
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Such ‗externalisation from within‘, positions firmly the Balkans as part both of the 
European and Western worlds ‗but somehow […] considered to be the "bad" side of 
oneself‘.27 Goldsworthy writes that such negative Western imaging has contributed to 
the internalization of western prejudices by Balkan peoples themselves as being some 
kind of anti-Europe, that is always not yet European or that which Europe has been long 
ago.
28
 This is also supported by the works of Alexander Kiossev and Milica Bakic-
Hayden.
29
 Goldsworthy observed that ‗with a new generation of Western historians […] 
and Balkan scholars pulling the rug from beneath some complacent Western certainties 
about the Balkans, there is now, for the first time since the Second World War, an 
ongoing dialogue and an unprecedented exchange of ideas.‘30 Negative imaging of the 
Balkans has been subdued with the advancing of the region towards full Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Another school of thought claims that the lack of cooperation and lunatic 
behaviour in the Balkans could be explained by the region‘s late modernisation.  
O‘Leary writes that nationalism came to the Balkans not because of industrialization but 
under conditions of underdevelopment or uneven modernization.
31
 Kokosolakis even 
connects late industrialization to Orthodox religion, trying to explain Balkan discord, 
claiming that Industrialization also, to the extent that it did, came to Orthodox countries 
(Russia, Georgia, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece) rather late in the 19th century and 
capitalism as a dominant economic force never developed in these countries in the way 
it did in the West. Moreover, ‗for all these and other historical reasons Orthodoxy was 
and remains culturally and theologically different from both Roman Catholicism and 
Protestantism. For the same reasons the relationship of Orthodoxy to modernity and to 
secularization is specific and ambivalent. Orthodoxy is premodern not only in a 
historical sense but also in the sense that it transcends Western rationalism and 
rationalization‘.32 
 
Introducing the research. Alternative approach 
 
The main task of this research is to outline the historical impediments to Balkan 
regional cooperation, explain why it has persisted so far and explore if cooperation 
might be attainable by providing a new approach for understanding Balkan policies of 
obstruction. As explored large body of literature is devoted to demystifying the Balkan 
political ‗irrationality‘ puzzle and the persistence of such irrationality. Some authors 
tend to explain the failure to cooperate through genetic predispositions, ancient hatreds, 
eternal bloodshed and propensity for perpetual war. Others largely blame the region‘s 
                                                 
27 ‗How Balkans Got Their Reputation‘, Interview with Maria Todorova,  
http://clasnews.clas.ufl.edu/news/clasnotes/9610/Todorova.html, accessed March, 2008. 
28 Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination (Yale University Press, 1998), pp 202-210. 
29 Alexander Kiossev and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Nationalism and the Imagination, (Seagull, 2008) and Milica 
Bakic-Hayden, ‗Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia‘, Slavic Review, 54.4 (Winter, 1995), pp. 917-
931. 
30 Goldsworthy, ‗Invention and in(ter)vention: The rhetoric of Balkanization‘, Belgrade Circle Journal,  1-4, 2006,p. 1. 
31 Brendan 0‘ Leary ‗A Critical Overview‘ in John A. Hall ed., The State of the Nation (Ernest 
Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 73. 
32 Nikos Kokosolakis, ‗The Historical Continuity and Cultural Specificity of Eastern Orthodox Christianity‘ in Cipriani, 
Roberto (ed.) Religions Sans Frontières? Present and Future Trends of Migration, Culture and Communication. (Roma: 
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 1994), p. 127. 
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problems to the direct and hidden leverage of the Great Powers. Third camp attributes 
the regional constant discord to a lack of royal dynasties and peasant national elites, 
exploiting the nationalist mode of production and accumulating status by serving the 
burgeoning national state for their own legitimacy. Another school of thought points at 
the West negative stereotypes internalized by local people, while fifth approach blames 
the unattainable, late and uneven modernization of the Balkans. Most of the above 
perspectives taken on their own facilitate greatly our understanding of the Balkans, but 
many questions still remain unanswered and the region still remains as unpredictable 
and as lunatic as before we approached it. 
 
To answer such question, we need more than ancient hatreds, Great power meddling in 
regional affairs, peasant elites, internalised stereotypes and late modernisation 
explanations. Although most of them offer good explanations, a more holistic approach 
is needed. We need a tool through which we can decipher the Balkan political 
algorithm, open the ‗black box‘ of political decision making in the region and make 
what seems as irrational policies -comprehensible. If we find such a tool, we would be 
able to answer why in the region nationalist attitudes proved stronger than other 
political ideologies, why certain countries in the region have persistently cooperated 
with one another, regardless of the various changes in external conditions (even when 
belonging to opposite ideological camps) and vice versa, other countries in the region 
could not establish fruitful cooperation among themselves, regardless of the fact they 
belonged to the same ideology and the outside pressure for cooperation. Last we would 
be able to see what motivates such selectivity and if regional cooperation could take 
place after all and how. 
 
This research explores one possible holistic approach for reading Balkan path dependent 
political decision making that could explain persistent lack of cooperation towards the 
neighbour and provide an answer to all of the above mentioned questions. To create 
such approach we need to address problems of ontology. The leverage of Great Powers, 
ancient hatreds and unattained modernization approaches all pointed at structural or 
agency-related impediments to regional cooperation. We need to adapt an ontological 
assumption positioning ideas and culture as factors in their own right alongside structure 
and agency.  
 
The research explores the role played by ideas as a method for understanding political 
behaviour. Ideas could provide the answer as to why, despite changing political regimes 
and actors, shifting ideologies, variety of alliances that states in the region have joined 
throughout history –plans, federations, leagues, pacts, in spite of external political 
pressure and good intentions, – all attempts of regional cooperation between certain 
states during the last two centuries failed (like Greece and Bulgaria, for example). 
Others have persistently cooperated through the whole span of their modern history 
(Greece and Serbia). Based on such assumptions we could form the hypothesis that 
Balkan policies of constant obstruction, regardless of changing external factors, could 
be properly understood by exploring the crucial role, played by path dependent 
institutionalized ideas in shaping policy outcomes. Only when ideas change-does policy 
change happen. 
The study employs two specific approaches: historical institutionalism and ideational 
theory. The use of combined perspectives provides a theoretically innovative approach 
to the study of both lack-of-cooperation and Europeanization processes. The study is 
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largely inspired by the ideational theoretical approach of Blyth, Archer and Berman.
33
 A 
combination of new institutionalism and ideational theory creates a coherent 
framework. A historical institutionalist framework, amplified by ideas as independent 
variable accounting for change, overcomes the change-explanatory limitations of 
historical institutionalist framework per se. Complementing historical institutionalism 
with ideas moves the latter approach further. Positioning ideas and culture as major 
explanatory factors alongside structure and agency ‗cuts against the grain of most 
current theorizing [of structure/agency debate] in political science by explicitly 
discussing when and how ideas influence political behaviour.‘34  Furthermore such a 
combination of theories undermines ‗the eternal genetic doom‘ of some Balkan 
theorists. When powerful ideas change and become institutionalized, then policies can 
also change. To employ a coherent theoretical framework, using ideas as an independent 
variable, we need a proper definition of terms, what we refer to when talking about 
ideas. The study employs Berman‘s concept of ideas ‗lying between [the too broad to be 
useful] ideologies and [the too narrow to be interesting] policy positions -the middle 
range of ideas‘ she calls ‗programmatic beliefs‘.35 They supply ‗the ideational 
framework within which programs of action are formulated. When political actors seek 
to formulate responses to particular challenges, it is, therefore, to their programmatic 
beliefs that they should look. The defining feature of programmatic beliefs is that they 
provide a relatively clear and distinctive connection between theory and praxis.‘36 
 
As Berman noted ‗once we have accepted that ideas can matter, we are still left with the 
task of explaining how and why they matter and showing that they did, in fact matter.‘ 
This requires setting out a theory about the connection between ideas and political 
behaviour and testing hypotheses derived from it.
37
 
Theoretical approach 
 
Berman‘s ideational theory is concerned with two things: ‗showing that particular idea 
can be considered independent variable, and, second, describing the mechanisms 
through which it influences the dependent variable‘.38 Therefore, first we need to 
examine how certain ideas are able to become and remain a powerful force in politics 
by looking at how different condition enable certain ideas to attain political salience and 
start to influence political behaviour over an extended period. Berman states that two 
factors in particular stand out: carriers and institutionalization. Ideas ‗achieve political 
salience through carriers…persons or groups that are able to make others listen or 
render them receptive‘ and carriers ‗act as intellectual entrepreneurs, bringing different 
ideas into the political system.‘ Prominent carriers ‗are better positioned to ensure that 
their ideas remain a force in politics even after they have left the scene.‘  
 
                                                 
33 Sheri Berman, The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University press, 1998), Mark Blyth, ‗Institutions and Ideas‘ in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker(2nd edition) , 
Theory and Methods in Political Science (eds), (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), Margaret Archer, Realistic 
Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach, (Cambridge university press, 1995), McAnulla, Stuart,  'Structure and 
Agency Theory and Methods' in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker(2nd edition), Theory and Methods in Political Science 
(eds), (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
34 Blyth, ‗Institutions and Ideas‘, p. 20. 
35 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 21. 
36 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 21. 
37 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 22. 
38 Berman, The Social Democratic,  p. 24. 
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However recognizing the power of agency in originating a certain idea, should be 
regarded in the broad context that ‗while carriers can play a key role in inserting ideas 
into political debate and helping them gain salience, the most important factor 
determining whether ideas are able to influence politics over the long term is 
‗institutionalisation‘, or ‗whether or not an idea becomes embedded in an institution or 
organization.‘ When ideas are institutionalised they ‗take a life of their own, changing 
the motivation and perception of political actors, affecting their decision making over 
the long term‘, often regardless of changing external factors. These ideas influence 
those operating within such institutions and the individuals‘ preferences correspond to 
the crystallized ideas in these institutions.  
 
If investigating what factors enable certain ideas to become and remain a powerful force 
is one part of the study of the connection between ideas and politics, ‗another is 
examining how ideas exert an independent influence over political behaviour‘, or in 
other words: What are the mechanisms by which ideas shape the choices of political 
actors?
39What do actors want: Ideational theory argues that ‗preferences are 
endogenous: political actors strive to ensure that their behaviour coincides to as great a 
degree as possible with their own particular ideas about the way the world works… 
[and] action is often based more on identifying the normatively appropriate behaviour 
than on calculating the return expected from alternative choices… [Also the behaviour 
of political actors] will often be motivated by an attempt to achieve the particular ends 
posited as paramount by ideas they hold: the policy preferences of political actors will, 
in other words, be shaped primarily by the normative guidelines and criteria provided by 
their ideas.‘40 Why do actors want that: Ideational theory argues ‗ideas play a crucial 
role in shaping how political actors perceive the world around them‘ and ‗ideas play a 
crucial role in structuring actors‘ views of the world by providing a filter or channel 
through which information about the external environment must pass‘, therefore 
political behaviour will often be based by distorted or incomplete information flows.
41
 
Therefore, based on Berman‘s ideational theory we derive certain hypotheses and test 
them through the case studies. 
Hypotheses 
 
Ideational explanations predict political actors will evaluate their options based on their 
expected ‗psychological comfort‘ returns-on the extent they fit in with the actor‘s ideas, 
rather than what is most likely to provide the greatest reward (given a particular 
economic situation, for example, as political economy explanations would predict).
42
 
Therefore, appropriateness would then be the most important factor, contributing to the 
choice of policy alternatives and since ‗definition of what is appropriate will remain 
reasonably constant within a given set of ideas, ideational explanations predict that a 
particular actor will make similar choices over time, even as the environment 
changes.‘43  At the same time since ‗decision making should often be influenced by 
incomplete or distorted information flows, [actors] with different ideas should 
                                                 
39 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 29. 
40 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 29. 
41 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 30 
42 Peter Hall, ‗Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain‘, 
Comparative Politics, 25, April 1993; ‗The Movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis and 
British Economic Policy in the 1970s‘ in K.Thelen and S. Steinmo, et al., Eds., Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
43 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 32. (emphasis in the original) 
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consequently evaluate similar situations in different ways and judge the value of 
different alternative courses of action accordingly. Ideational explanations predict, 
therefore, that actors with different ideas will make different decisions, even when 
placed in similar environments.‘44 Also change is possible, when new ideas are 
powerful enough to challenge or supplant political elites‘ own particular ideas about 
the way the world works. If ideational theory is correct, political actors will be much 
less sensitive to changes in the external environment and less concerned with strategic 
calculation, rather with logic of appropriateness. Indeed ‗if an ideational explanation is 
correct, we should find that decision making is a path-dependent rather than an 
efficiency driven process, in which previous decisions and cognitive criteria constrain 
and facilitate the evolution of political choice.‘45 
 
These predictions are borne out by the investigation of the Greek and Bulgarian failure 
to achieve cooperation over extended period of time, regardless of changing external 
contexts. This case will be used to test ideational theory and its predictions. Since path 
dependency means that history matters, as Douglass North has noted, ‗we cannot 
understand today‘s choices…without tracing their evolution through time‘ and ‗in order 
to uncover (if and) how ideas shape political outcomes, the analyst of ideas will… have 
to investigate decision making over an extended period‘46. Therefore, the case study 
explores decision-making in Greece and Bulgaria, related to policies of obstruction to 
each other in key periods from their modern nation state formation to present time. 
47
 
The rationale behind such a choice is that since the research explores long-held ideas 
and political decision making over extended periods of time, we would need actors that 
have been on the political stage of Europe for quite some time. In addition those two 
countries could be geographically regarded as ‗pure‘ Balkan countries. They share 
similar population, territory and historical development. Finally, for centuries they were 
all part of the Ottoman Empire and have experienced their independence revolutions at 
nearly the same time, the middle of the XIX century. Based on Berman‘s ideational 
theory, explained above, and operationalized with respect to that case, the study looks at 
two major research questions and advances two hypotheses, namely: 
 
 Research question 1: Why and how nineteenth century emerging modern 
Bulgarian and Greek states, in spite of being relatively similar in size and 
population, sharing the same religion, revolutionary ideas, and historical 
development, having similar political and social conditions, have developed 
highly antagonistic path-dependent policies of obstruction towards each other, 
that remained remarkably persistent, regardless of changing external factors 
during the early XX c., the two Balkan Wars, two World Wars, the Cold War and 
the 1990s? 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Bulgarian and Greek modern state‘ mutual obstruction, 
regardless of changing external factors and outside pressure could be properly 
understood by exploring the crucial role, played by path dependent 
institutionalized ideas (programmatic beliefs) in shaping policy outcomes. From 
the very formation of their modern states, Bulgaria and Greece had clashing 
                                                 
44 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 33. (emphasis in the original) 
45 John Cambell, ‗Recent Trends in Institutional Analysis: Bringing Culture Back into Political Economy‘ paper 
presented to the Seminar on the State and Capitalism since 1800, Harvard University, 1995, p. 1. 
46 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p. 100. 
47 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 34. 
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ideas for development of their states and such institutionalized ideas later 
informed political elites that cooperation with the other was highly 
inappropriate. 
 
 And also: Specific nationalist attitudes of Bulgarian and Greek political elites 
would most likely be path-dependent regardless of the different changes of 
external environments, if such changes do not produce an idea powerful enough 
to supplant old ideas and beliefs of what is deemed appropriate. 
 
Greek programmatic beliefs, powered by the Megale Idea envisioned the dream of 
restoring the territories of Byzantium as a modern Greek state, relying on the arguments 
of historical geography, while Bulgarian programmatic beliefs, powered by the San 
Stefano Idea, envisioned incorporating all Bulgarian-populated lands into one modern 
state and thus relying on human geography to back ideology.
48
 Therefore from the very 
formation, Greek and Bulgarian modern states were founded with two mutually 
incompatible programmatic beliefs, embedded in their institutions. The achievement of 
one‘s idea for state development would inevitably at odds with the idea of the other and 
vice versa, since they were both claiming same territories with different arguments. 
 
Greek Megale Idea, however, disregarded the demographical and cultural realities of the 
region because the territories of the former Byzantine Empire were now populated by 
Slavic, Albanian, Turkish, Vlach populations after hundreds of years of Ottoman rule. 
In early years of Greek Independence, elites looking through contemporary institutional 
and ideational contexts applied the geography of classical Greece to modern times. The 
problem was that ancient history clashed with human and political geography and 
presaged major conflicts with Albanians over Epirus, with Bulgarians over Macedonia 
and with Ottomans over Istanbul (Constantinople), the western coast of Anatolia, and 
islands from the Aegean to Cyprus. The particular historical and ideational context, in 
which Megale Idea crystallized, clashed with the crystallizing national programmes of 
Bulgarians and Albanians as well with the Ottomans trying to hold the Empire together. 
The period of national liberation revolutions in the Balkans (1830-1878) is the precise 
historical moment, when Bulgarians, Albanians and the Ottomans started to be regarded 
as ‗ideationally deprived‘ by Greek political elites and society at large, since their 
national programmes and territorial aspirations clashed with the Megale Idea. As the 
Serbian national programme Nachertanie (Strategy) stood opposed to Bulgarian and 
Albanian national ideas and because of the Serbian animosity to Turkey, it is no surprise 
Serbia was perceived as the closest natural ally of Greece. In addition, Nachertanie and 
Megale complement each other territorially and programmatically as both Greece and 
Serbia were seeking expansion in Albanian and Bulgarian-populated territories and both 
shared interest in demolishing the Ottoman Empire.  
 
This is how the idea of ‗Serbia is the most trustworthy Greek ally‘ was born. Serbia was 
perceived as ideationally enlightened agent, since it could facilitate the Greeks by 
helping Greece in its territorial quest against Bulgarians, Albanians and Ottomans. The 
period when Megale Idea (1830-1832) and Nachertanie (1843) crystallized is the critical 
juncture when the idea of Greek-Serbian ‗eternal‘ alliance emerged as a result of 
overlapping interests.  The idea that Bulgarians, Albanians and Turks have 
contradictory interests to the Greeks and are ‗the enemy‘ was institutionalized as well. 
Since 1830-1843 these ideas became institutionalized and ideationally informed elite 
                                                 
48 Megale Idea and San Stefano Ideas will be discussed in the Greek and Bulgarian Ideational Mapping Chapter, 
respectively. 
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attitudes and behaviour. Such an ideational configuration contributes to explaining 
subsequent events in Greek historical and political life. Greece and Bulgaria kept very 
antagonistic position towards each other with remarkable persistence, regardless of 
changing external factors and were always on opposite sides during the early XX c., the 
two Balkan Wars, two World Wars, the Cold War and the 1990s. On the other side-
Greece and Serbia (later Yugoslavia) sided not only in both Balkan Wars 1912-1913, 
but also in the two World Wars and maintained warm relations, in spite of the 
ideological differences during the Cold War. In the 1990s, Greece supported the 
Milosevic regime, being the only EU nation to back the Serbian position that Serbian 
forces had entered Bosnian territory in response to Bosnian provocations. Greece was 
also the only NATO member voting against NATO air strikes on Serbian positions, 
which seemed completely irrational to its allies. However, according to Greece‘s 
ideational context this was a completely ‗rational‘ policy.49 
 
Viewed from such theoretical perspective influential ideas about neighbours became 
institutionalized in Balkan polities during the time of their modern state formation, and 
later taking a life on their own, started to influence subsequent policies towards that 
neighbour, often regardless of changing external environments. In this sense, the above-
explained Balkan ‗irrationalities‘ of cooperation/obstruction to certain neighbours are in 
fact very ‗rational‘ according to the long-held ideas dominating society and political 
elites about that neighbour. In order to comprehend how dominant ideas exert their 
influence over time, we must open the ‗black box‘ of the decision-making process, 
examining in particular the role played by each country‘s institutionalized ideas for the 
neighbour in shaping its policy choices to that neighbour. Identifying path-dependent 
institutionalised ideas (programmatic beliefs) debunks the myth of Balkan 
irrationalities, as political elites act very ‗rational‘ according to their own institutional 
and ideational logic of appropriateness. 
 
                                                 
49 Similarly the current debate with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia seems incomprehensible to outside 
observers. However, through ideational map reading the issue becomes much clearer. As a socialist republic within 
Yugoslavia (1944-1991), Macedonia was perceived by Greeks as a friend, since it closely followed the policies of 
Belgrade and for both nations (Greeks, Serbians): Bulgarians, Turks and Albanians were the common enemies. 
However, after their independence Macedonians appropriated heroes and events from both ancient Greek and 
Medieval Bulgarian history to create historical linearity and justify their distinct existence. Since that moment Macedonia 
was perceived by Greeks -as an enemy 'appropriating Greek history' and that idea was quickly institutionalised and 
displaced previous perceptions of Macedonia as a friend within Yugoslavia.  
 
Bulgaria was the first country in the world to recognise the Macedonian independence under its constitutional name in 
1991, but did not recognise a separate Macedonian people and language existed before 1944.  Until that time the term 
'Macedonian' was not used as anything other, than a geographic definition. In the 'interwar period however, the term 
began to be put to use for the first time as an ethnic description serving as a fabrication to promote [Yugoslavia's] 
aspirations to increased regional influence. The crucial step was taken in 1944 by the Yugoslav leader Tito, when he 
implemented the decision to create a new federal state consisting of six republics. He gave to the southernmost 
province, previously known as Vardarska Banovina (i.e. District of [the river] Vardar), the new name of People's 
Republic of Macedonia.  
 
This republic was made a constitutive of federal Yugoslavia and its Slavic inhabitants, known until then as ethnic 
Bulgarians ..., were recognized as its ‗titular nation‘ under the name Makedontsi (Macedonians). Their language, which 
was until then held to be a western Bulgarian dialect, was christened "Macedonian" and became one of Yugoslavia's 
official languages'. Demetrius Andreas Floudas, 'FYROM's Dispute with Greece Revisited' in: Kourvetaris et al (eds.), 
The New Balkans, East European Monographs, (Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 85. 
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 Research question 2: The other related issue looks if nationalist attitudes and 
decades-long path dependent mutual obstruction between Bulgaria and Greece 
could be successfully challenged by new EU agenda and the idea of European 
integration? 
 
 Hypothesis 2: 
 
Only when ideas change-does policy changes happen. EU with its conditionality 
policies, normative agenda in addition to the processes of marketization and 
liberal democracy could be such a powerful idea- to effectively challenge, for 
the first time, traditional national-interest mentalities in Bulgaria and Greece 
and lead to change in policies and make cooperation possible. 
 
The argument goes that Greece and Bulgaria have formulated persistent policies of 
obstruction during most of the XX c. due to institutionalized ideas of the other as an 
enemy and normative prescriptions that prevented cooperation. Ideational mapping 
chapters on both countries explain how and why this happened. After the 1990s, they 
were forced to ―cooperate‖ within the EU normative framework. To what extent, if any, 
are ideational frameworks altered by new ideational constructs and cooperating within a 
supra-national framework. This is the purpose of the empirical case studies chapters on 
transport to explore the dynamic of these contradictory pressures. Therefore, we are 
considering the long-term historical force of path dependence and whether it can be 
changed. The core of the analysis of Greece and Bulgaria is that at successive historical 
junctures, the dominant ideational framework has been challenged, but it is only with 
the process of marketisation and liberal democracy that these national-interest 
mentalities were effectively challenged by the EU. The EU represents the creation of a 
new ideational framework of transformative normative power. External bodies, notably 
the EU, are pursuing policies of conditionality that are designed to create a particular 
form of state-the market liberal democracy-that is capable of taking the burdens of EU 
membership. There is a distinction between path dependence   and the possibility that 
this path dependence can be rooted out, or at least significantly modified. This is the 
crucial role of the EU and that is why we need to explore the implications of this tension 
between continuity and change using the case studies on large infrastructure projects in 
the period 1990-2010. 
Methodology 
 
From methodological point of view the project is a qualitative research, and a 
comparative case study. It explores how despite many similarities, Greece and Bulgaria, 
during the XX c., have developed policies of remarkably persistent obstruction towards 
each other, regardless of constantly changing external factors. It also explores if after 
1990, we could observe policy change.
 50
 
 
The main hypothesis to be tested is that institutionalized ideas largely account for such 
choice of policies (obstruction until 1990s, and emerging cooperation after 1990s). Thus 
the independent variable in our case is the set of ideas (programmatic beliefs), 
institutionalized in Greek and Bulgarian government institutions about the neighbour, 
which largely determine if cooperation with the neighbour is normatively appropriate 
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(possible). The dependent variable is the choice of policy towards that neighbour in key 
historical periods during the XXc. investigated in this study (see Fig. 1). 
 
programmatic beliefs        
 
normative guidelines        
 
choice of policies 
 
 
Fig. 1 Causual relationship between independent, intervening and dependent variables 
 
The thesis argues that modern Bulgarian and Greek state were constituted with very 
different mutually –incompatible ideas about their states‘ further development.  
Ideational theory states that policy preferences of political actors will be shaped 
primarily by the normative guidelines and criteria provided by their ideas. Thus, 
operationalized with our case, Greek and Bulgarian political elites, coming to 
government institutions were influenced by the institutionalized programmatic beliefs 
that the other was an enemy and that shaped normative guidelines that cooperation with 
the other was highly inappropriate, which in turn led to policies of obstruction, 
regardless of external change. 
 
For Greek context, we have to explore how the idea Bulgaria and Bulgarians are an 
enemy influenced a normative guideline that cooperation with them is not appropriate 
(possible), that in turn influenced the obstruction policy decisions taken in Greece vis-à-
vis Bulgaria during most of the XX c. For Bulgaria, we have to explore how the idea 
Greece and Greeks are an enemy shaped normative criteria that cooperation with them 
is not appropriate (possible), that in turn influenced the obstruction policy decisions 
taken in Bulgaria vis-à-vis Greece during most of the XX c. 
 
To further precise the analysis we would operationalize obstruction policies with more 
concrete policies of denationalization of the minority of the other and negative 
propaganda campaign in the domestic policies (existing/non existing)  and policy of 
political, social and economic obstruction (existing/non existing) in the foreign policy 
during the different periods explored. The justifications is that if certain neighbour is 
considered an enemy and normative guidelines dictate that cooperation with him is not 
appropriate, the above policies of assimilation, negative imaging, propaganda, choosing 
different war sides, lack of territorial cooperation and lack of social and cultural 
contacts would be some of the most logical manifestations of the general obstruction 
attitude. 
 
To acquire data about the programmatic beliefs about the neighbour in Greece and 
Bulgaria, the study relies on documentary research, using published and unpublished 
government publications, laws, published national doctrines, strategies and 
programmes, historical documents, letters, reports, newspaper articles, memoirs, 
biographies, etc. The data is analyzed through the method of ideational mapping. This, 
in other words, means identifying what the programmatic beliefs about the neighbour 
are, how such ideas crystallized, who were the carriers of such ideas and how they 
became institutionalized. (see Fig. 2). 
 
To collect data about the normative guidelines and policies towards the neighbour 
during the XX c., the complete spectrum of the case-study‘s typical data-collection 
techniques will be employed - both primary (participant observation, elite interviews) 
and secondary (documentary research). The data is analysed through process tracing 
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and focus on decision-making-during-crisis methods (see Fig. 2).
 51
   In process tracing, 
the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other 
sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in 
fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.
52
 In 
other words, the aim of process tracing is to uncover the causal mechanisms that link 
independent and dependent variables to one another in a particular context. In more 
detail, process tracing is looking at how particular programmatic beliefs shaped the 
perception of the normative guidelines and criteria   that in turn, shaped policy 
preferences of political actors. In our context process tracing helps us uncover how the 
programmatic beliefs that Bulgarian/Greeks are enemies (independent variable), 
influence normative contexts cooperation with Bulgarians/Greeks is not appropriate 
(intervening variable) that contributed to the policies of obstruction between Greece and 
Bulgaria during most of the XX c (dependent variable), regardless of changing external 
contexts. 
 
 Independent variable 
(programmatic beliefs) 
Intervening variable 
(normative guidelines) 
Dependent variable 
(choice of policies) 
Data 
collection 
technique 
documentary documentary, elite 
interviews, 
observation 
documentary, elite 
interviews, 
observation 
Method of 
analysis of 
the data 
ideational mapping process tracing, 
decision making 
during crisis 
process tracing, 
decision making 
during crisis 
 
Fig. 2 Data collection techniques and methods for analyzing the data 
 
 
Ideational explanations predict that within a given set of ideas a particular actor will 
make similar choices over time, even as the environment changes. Thus the aim of 
                                                 
51 Process Tracing: The general method of process tracing is to generate and analyze data on the causal 
mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link putative causes to 
observed effects. In other words, of the two kinds of evidence on the theoretical causal notions of causal effect and 
causal mechanisms, tests of covariation attempt to address the former, and process tracing assesses the latter. 
Source: Andrew Bennett, Alexander George, Process Tracing in Case Study Research, McArthur Foundation on Case 
Study Methods, 17-19 October, 1997. 
 
Crisis Decision Making: Historical new institutionalism is advanced as the theoretical framework of the research. A key 
concept is path dependency: The historical track of a given institution or polity will result in almost inevitable 
occurrences. In some institutions, this may be a self-perpetuating cycle: actions of one type beget further actions of this 
type. This theory does not hold that instituitional paths will forever be inevitable. Critical junctures may allow rapid 
change at a time of great crisis. The theory advances that change of institutionalized ideas in critical junctures (or times 
of crisis) lead to change in policy. Therefore, decision making in times of crisis and ideas available in times of crisis are the 
centre of primary interest here. See more:  Taylor C. Boas, ‗Conceptualizing Continuity and Change: The Composite-
Standard Model of Path Dependence‘, Journal of Theoretical Politics 19 (1), pp. 33-54.  and Ruth Berins Collier and 
David Collier. (1991), Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in 
Latin America. Princeton, Princeton University Press, chapter 1. 
52 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (MIT 
Press, 2005), p.6. 
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decision-making-during-crisis method is to explore if in critical periods, like the two 
Balkan Wars, two World Wars, the Cold War, the Fall of Communism, etc. (when ideas 
are most likely to change), we observe a significant change of the given set of ideas in 
Bulgaria and Greece about the other. Then we correlate it with the policies between 
Greece and Bulgaria in that historical moment. In general, if the given set of ideas did 
not largely change, we could expect no significant change in the existing policies of 
obstruction (denationalization of the minority of the other, negative propaganda and 
lack of political, social and economic cooperation). However, if we find policy change 
(no denationalization, negative propaganda and existing political, social and economic 
cooperation) that would most likely mean that there is change in the given set of ideas. 
 
This first hypothesis that, in Greece and Bulgaria, path-dependent programmatic beliefs 
influence policy preferences towards the other will be tested in the ideational mapping 
chapters of Greece and Bulgaria. Each of the two chapters will start with a discussion 
how the idea for the other as an enemy emerged, who was the intellectual carrier of such 
idea and how it became institutionalized in the institutional set-up of the modern Greek 
and Bulgarian state respectively. Then each chapter will explore how such 
programmatic beliefs played a crucial role in structuring actors‘ views that cooperation 
with the neighbour is not appropriate and will reconstruct the process through which the 
Greek and Bulgarian political elites decided on the policies of obstruction towards the 
other, exploring the filter or channel (provided by the normative guidelines and criteria) 
through which information about the external environment passed. This, in conjunction 
with a comparative study of the distinctive historical and structural contexts of Greece 
and Bulgaria should help uncover the most important factors influencing the 
development and decision making of respective political elites during these years. 
 
Finally, the two chapters will explore if in key historical periods during the XX c. 
(Balkan Wars, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, etc.), the programmatic beliefs that the 
other is an ‗enemy‘ and the normative guidelines that ‗cooperation with him is not 
appropriate‘, were challenged by new ideas. The research explores if they were 
powerful enough to replace the established path dependent programmatic beliefs. This 
observation will be correlated with the observation if the path dependent policies of 
obstruction (denationalization of the minority of the other, negative propaganda and 
lack of political, social and economic cooperation) still occurred in that same historical 
period. 
 
The second hypothesis that the EU idea is the first idea, powerful enough, to 
successfully challenge obstruction ideas and lead to policy change is tried in the two 
empirical chapters on transport infrastructure in SEE in 1990-2000 and in 2000-2010, 
respectively. The justification for such selectivity is backed by the observation that a 
significant difference between the two periods in terms of political, social and economic 
cooperation between the two states could be observed. In that period, Bulgaria was 
aiming for EU/NATO membership and was subject to EU conditionality. Greek elites 
were not subjected to such direct conditionality, but they were indirectly taught to 
cooperate, since continued lack of cooperation in the new condition started to produce 
undesired results and was making traditional policies of discord ever more inadequate. 
 
The justification for choosing to explore large EU infrastructure projects to test if EU-
idea can lead to change of policies of obstruction in the Balkans is that this case presents 
us with a unique opportunity to test such hypothesis. First, such projects were devised 
as the most potent EU-policy tool towards the region, aiming to enforce good 
neighbourly relations and cooperation. The financing of the projects and their 
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commissioning depends on the national governments‘ fulfilment of a certain set of 
criteria. Therefore, in that period (1990s) the most powerful EU ideational challenge, 
confronting old programmatic beliefs  in the region through the EU conditionality, is 
represented by the policies to commission the large infrastructure  projects, such as 
Corridor IV, VIII, X, etc.  Second, the successful commissioning of such pan-European 
projects requires high level of political, social and economic cooperation among 
neighbours. They also could hardly materialize between states that enforce assimilation 
or negative imaging domestic policies. In that sense looking at large infrastructure 
projects between Bulgaria and Greece in 1990s-2010s is a logical continuation of the 
narrative of previous chapters looking at normative guidelines shaping policy 
preferences towards the neighbour. Therefore, the case allows us to explore not only the 
pressure of new EU ideas and ideational change, but to also explore policy change. 
This is a period of contradicting pressures between old programmatic beliefs and the 
pressure of new EU integration ideas. Local political elites were exposed to an 
enormous ideational pressure from the different levels at which they operate in. They 
had to reconcile between two powerful forces: the ideational contexts of the path-
dependant, nationalist, parochial, over-historic institutions back home and the EU 
normative framework, at the international level forcing cooperation. During the first 
period (1990-2000) political, social and economic cooperation between the two states 
was still rather wary and reluctant, as justified by the common EU large infrastructure 
projects that were in a state of impasse for a decade, in spite of firmly-secured EU 
funding, proven economic benefits and clear technical specifications. As hinted by the 
preliminary primary research, decision makers in Bulgaria and Greece still tended to 
identify and interpret the challenges they faced within the old normative guidelines and 
criteria and matched problems with solutions they had applied in the past, rather than 
searching for politically or economically ‗optimal‘ solutions.‘53 In other words during 
that first period traditional programmatic beliefs could not be displaced by EU-ideas, as 
happened many times before. 
However, during the second period (2000-2010), a historical breakthrough in 
obstruction policies occurred. Cooperation between Bulgaria and Greece started to 
emerge in the economic, political and social sphere and gradually increased with each 
year. That was also manifested by starting work on the long-delayed infrastructure 
projects and even commissioning some of them towards the end of the period. The task 
of that chapter is not only to explore if policy change occurred, but to link such historic 
policy change to ideational change and explore why precisely, this time, it happened. 
What made EU-idea so much more powerful than previous ‗weaker‘ ideas that were not 
able to significantly change nationalist programmatic beliefs? To achieve that, in the 
two empirical chapters on transport infrastructure, I complement the documentary 
research with primary research data of elite interviews and direct observation. Elite 
interviewing was undertaken after careful non-probability purposive and chain referral 
sampling of relevant top-policy makers in Bulgaria and Greece, operating on regional, 
national and European level. 25 Bulgarian and 25 Greek Members of European 
Parliament, ministers, local mayors from different political parties, NGO activists 
involved in Bulgaria-Greece Cross-border cooperation, academics, etc., were 
interviewed through semi-structured open-ended interviews mostly during 2006-2009. 
They were asked question, exploring their ideas, opinions/values, feeling, knowledge, 
sensory and background to the past and present attitudes towards the neighbor, did such 
attitudes influence policies, how do they evaluate the lack and existence of political, 
                                                 
53 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 33. 
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social and economic cooperation with that neighbour in the past and in the present and 
what are their predictions for the future;  
 
Process tracing requires the collection of data concerning key political decision-making 
and activity, often at the highest political level, and elite interviews will frequently be a 
critical strategy for obtaining this required information. In our case the elite interview 
subjects were selected using a combination of reputational and positional criteria– that 
is, interview respondents were chosen not just by virtue of their political positions and 
their known involvement in the process of interest, but also by virtue of their reputation 
among their peers. The goal of collecting data from elite interviewing was to confirm 
information collected from documentary sources.  Documents, memoirs and other 
secondary sources provide an initial overview of the events or issues under examination, 
interviews with key players were used to corroborate the early findings. In this way, 
interviews contributed towards the research goal of triangulation, where collected data 
is cross-checked through multiple sources to increase the robustness of the findings.
54
 
 
Elite interviewing was undertaken after careful non-probability purposive sampling of 
relevant top-policy makers in Bulgaria and Greece, operating on regional, national and 
European level. Why non-probability sampling was selected? When the goal of a study 
is ‗to generalise from a sample to the wider group the sample is drawn from, then some 
form of probability sampling is essential for the robustness of such generalisations. 
Without the randomness that probability sampling entails, it would be impossible to be 
certain that the sample was not selected in a biased manner, and that the selection rule is 
not in some way related to the variables being used in the study.‘55 However, when such 
interviews are employed not to make generalisations about the characteristics, beliefs or 
actions of the full population of relevant actors, but rather to use the testimony of those 
who were most closely involved to construct a theoretically-informed narrative of the 
process of interest then the subjective judgements in the selection of the sample is a 
plus. While the sample should be representative of the wider population to the extent 
that it does not systematically exclude a set of actors who played an important role, it 
does not need to be drawn from the population through random selection as the purpose 
is not to generalise findings from the sample to the population. When ‗using process 
tracing, the most important issues to consider when drawing the sample are that the 
most important and influential actors are included in the sample, and that testimony 
concerning the key process is collected from the central players involved. In such 
circumstances, random sampling will be a hindrance rather than a help, as the most 
important actors of interest may be excluded by chance. Instead, the goal with process 
tracing is to reduce randomness as much as possible, and work to ensure that the 
identities of the most important actors are established, and that they are approached 
directly for interview.‘56 In our case, probability sampling enables us to interview key 
actors in Bulgaria and Greece that shaped decision making vis-à-vis the other in regards 
to political, social and economic cooperation in the period 1990-2010. Through elite 
interviews based on non-probability sampling, policy change could be linked to possible 
change of ideas of actors directly, involved in the decision-making of the explored 
                                                 
54 Philip H. J. Davies, ‗Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of 
the Intelligence and Security Services‘ in Politics, Vol.21, No.1, 2001 in Oisín Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite 
Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. 
55 Oisín Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling, Nuffield College, 
University of Oxford. P. 10. 
56 Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing, p. 11. 
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process. This is used to corroborate the documentary findings. Among the types of non-
probability sampling, each has varying rules for selecting the final sample. 
 
How actors were selected in the sample? 
 
25 Bulgarian and 25 Greek Members of European Parliament, ministers, local mayors 
from different political parties, NGO activists involved in Bulgaria-Greece Cross-border 
cooperation, academics, etc., were interviewed through semi-structured open-ended 
interviews mostly during 2006-2009. They were selected through purposive and chain-
referral sampling. Purposive sampling is a selection method where the purpose of the 
study and the researcher‘s knowledge of the population guide the process. As Kidder et 
al suggest, the basic assumption of purposive sampling is that with good judgement and 
an appropriate strategy, researchers can select the cases to be included and thus develop 
samples that suit the needs of the study.
57
  
 
The chain-referral, sampling method ‗involves identifying an initial set of relevant 
respondents, and then requesting that they suggest other potential subjects who share 
similar characteristics or who have relevance in some way to the object of study. This 
second set of subjects is then interviewed, and also requested to supply names of other 
potential interview subjects. The process continues until the researcher feels the sample 
is large enough for the purposes of the study, or until respondents begin repeat names to 
the extent that further rounds of nominations are unlikely to yield significant new 
information.‘58 One of the ‗dangers with snowball sampling is that respondents often 
suggest others who share similar characteristics, or the same outlook, and it is thus also 
incumbent on the researcher to ensure that the initial set of respondents is sufficiently 
diverse so that the sample is not skewed excessively in any one particular direction.‘59 
In our case 10 Bulgarian and 10 Greek key policy makers were selected through 
purposive sampling based on their position and the other 15 in each case respectively 
were recommended through chain-referral sampling of their peers, based on their 
relevance for the case explored.  
 
As Tansey said ‗initiating a chain referral sample with known participants can 
…identify not only the occupants of key positions that have been identified in advance, 
but can also shine light on the role of important actors who may have played a role from 
an unlikely or unpredictable position. The sampling method can thus contribute to the 
process tracing method, as information is collected from a complete set of relevant 
players, and no significant actors are omitted from the study as a result of the selection 
rules.‘60  
 
The 50 Bulgarian and Greek key decision makers were asked probing, theoretically-
driven questions, exploring their ideas, opinions/values, feeling, knowledge, sensory 
and background to the past and present attitudes towards the neighbor, appropriateness 
of cooperation with that neighbour, how they felt about the infrastructure projects (our 
three sub-cases) between the two countries, if the EU had to do with the change of 
perception towards the neighbour (if there was such) and why it was able to do that. 
After the data was processed and analyzed, it confirmed the findings based on primary 
                                                 
57 Louise H. Kidder,  Charles Judd and Eliot Smith, Research Methods in Social Relations, 6th ed., (Fort Worth, TX: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1991). 
58 Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing, p. 12 
59 Anthony Seldon and Joanna Pappworth, By Word of Mouth: Elite Oral History (Methuen, 1983).  
in Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing, p. 12 
60 Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing, p. 13. 
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and secondary documentation analysis and proved the link between ideational change 
and policy change. 
Structure of thesis and conclusions 
 
The research‘s originality lies in exploration of how some ideas can become and remain 
a powerful political force, and about the mechanisms through which they can influence 
political behaviour. It contributes to the growing debate of the role of ideas in political 
life and political decision making by comparative research on two European countries to 
enhance our understanding of political development and evolution of European modern 
states. Balkan phenomena of path dependent persistent mutual obstruction between 
certain states, regardless of changing external factors is explained through the power of 
institutionalized ideas, influencing policy outcomes, while previous explanations 
pointed at ancient hatreds, late industrialization, or external power leverage factors. We 
are also exploring the critical role of the EU and the implications of this tension 
between continuity and change in the case studies. So, we are considering the long-term 
historical force of path dependence and the possibility that this path dependence can be 
rooted out, or at least significantly modified. The research is not only an endeavour to 
study the EU´s role in the Balkans, but to contribute to the understanding of evolution 
of modern EU states. 
The outline of the rest of the study is as follows: Chapter 2 examines the connection 
between institutions, ideas and political behaviour. First, I discuss the problem inherent 
in previous analyses of ideas and institutions with a special focus on new 
institutionalism and ideas. Then I discuss Berman‘s ideational theoretical framework as 
the most appropriate theory that helps us analyze the impact of ideas on political 
behaviour. Finally, I sketch out how this theory could be applied to the cases of Greek 
and Bulgarian obstruction policies of the XX century. 
Chapter 3 deals with the ideational mapping of Greece and starts with a discussion how 
the idea ‗Bulgarians are an enemy‘ emerged, who was the intellectual carrier of such 
idea and how it became institutionalized in the institutional set-up of the modern Greek 
state in the late XIX c. Then the chapter explores how such programmatic beliefs 
influenced actors, coming in different periods to those institutions, to form the same 
normative guidelines that cooperation with Bulgarians is not appropriate. Then I will 
reconstruct how such normative guidelines shaped the process through which Greek 
political elites decided on policies of obstruction towards Bulgarians with remarkable 
persistence during most of the XX c.(Balkan Wars, WWI, WWII, the Cold War), 
regardless of changing external factors. 
 
Chapter 4 repeats this procedure for Bulgaria and the idea –‗Greeks are an enemy‘, 
shaping Bulgarian obstruction policy vis-à-vis Greece during the same period. 
 
Chapter 5 describes political, economic and social cooperation between Bulgaria and 
Greece, in the period 1990-2000, operationalized with the case of the large regional 
infrastructure projects enforced by the EU, as the main policy tool towards the region. 
Bulgarian and Greek political elites were pressured between traditional programmatic 
beliefs that prevented cooperation with the other and the new EU‘s normative agenda 
that strictly prescribed cooperation between them. The period is characterized by the 
typical policies of obstruction, despite the clear benefits of cooperation, implying that in 
this period traditional programmatic beliefs still took precedence over new EU-ideas. 
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Chapter 6 looks at the historic breakthrough in the obstruction policies between 
Bulgaria and Greece, in the period 2000-2010, manifested by the started work on the 
long-delayed infrastructure projects and even commissioning some of them towards the 
end of the period. Such policy change is linked to the ideational change as a result of 
EU‘s leverage. 
Chapter 7, the conclusions, elaborates this study‘s findings about the connection 
between ideas and politics, while showing (in the light of previous discussions why the 
standard non-ideational explanations in the existing literature cannot adequately account 
for explaining Bulgarian and Greek policies of obstruction during most of the XX c., 
regardless of changing external contexts. 
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Chapter 2. New Institutionalism and Ideas 
 
…it is a paradox that scholars, whose entire existence is centred on the production and 
understanding of ideas,…grant ideas so little significance for explaining political life1 
 
Introduction 
 
The research employs historical institutionalism, amplified by ideas to explain path 
dependent political behaviour.
2
 The theoretical framework is applied to explain political 
behaviour in the Balkans, where Greece and Bulgaria, despite many similarities have 
developed highly antagonistic path-dependent policies of obstruction towards each other 
that remained remarkably persistent, regardless of changing external factors during most 
of the XX c. The main hypothesis is that such behaviour could be properly understood 
neither by leverage of Great Powers, nor by ancient hatreds or late modernization, but 
by exploring the crucial role, played by path dependent institutionalized ideas 
(programmatic beliefs) in shaping policy outcomes. Only when ideas change- policy 
change does happen. The purpose of this chapter is to justify why new institutionalism, 
amplified by ideas  is selected as a best fit to the case study, present the theory selected 
and its application to that case. 
 
The chapter first explores the rise of new institutionalist paradigm in current political 
science as a reaction to the inherent problem rational choice and state theorists‘ analysis 
encountered when they had to account for persistence and change respectively. The 
different strains of new institutionalism, and namely- historical, rational and 
sociological are explored. Similar to earlier turn to institutions, more recently ideas were 
introduced as a ‗fix‘ by normative and rationalist institutionalist frameworks to better 
explain why institutions changed or persisted, respectively. This thesis is essentially 
concerned with historical institutionalism, since it is identified as an approach that 
incorporates ideas more successfully within its paradigm, without violating its 
ontological or epistemological basis. 
 
Then the chapter looks at the ideational turn in political science to give more detail on 
the debate of ideas, presenting how ideational, material and constructivist approaches 
incorporated ideas in their analysis.  By elaborating on similarities and differences, 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach historical institutionalism plus ideas is 
identified as the best fit for the case studies. 
 
Third, the chapter explores Berman‘s ideational theory. This theory is selected as it is 
one of the exemplary ‗new institutionalism plus ideas‘ studies, creating a convincing 
model of change within historical institutionalist framework, without making the theory 
incoherent. End of the chapter elaborates on applying Berman‘s ideational theory to the 
selected case of path-dependent Balkan political behaviour and the methods to do that. 
                                                 
1 Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Argentina and Brazil (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
1991), p. 3. 
2 The research could also be framed under the very recently-emerging ‗ideational/constructivist institutionalism‘, which 
is still a paradigm in the making, largely influenced by Colin Hay, ‗Constructivist institutionalism‘ in R.A.W. Rhodes, 
Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press., 2006), pp. 56–74 and Vivien A. Schmidt,‗Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of discourse‘, 
Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 2008.  
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The Rise of Institutionalism 
 
New institutionalism has recently become one of the most influential paradigms in 
political science. Aspinwall and Schneider contend that the work of March and Olsen 
‗heralding the institutionalist turn in political science‘, led academic discourse on 
regional collaboration to a situation where ‗almost any Europeanist with a minimal level 
of self-respect flags herself as an "institutionalist" at the moment.‘3 New 
institutionalism‘s appeal lies in ‗the special significance…to defuse the unconstructive 
stand-off between structuralists and behaviouralists that has bedevilled political 
science.‘4 Furthermore the emergence of new institutionalism is considered ‗the single 
most significant contribution‘ to ‗the period of rapprochement‘ which characterises 
political science at the present time.
5
 
 
After the initial demise of behaviouralism and ‗bringing back the state‘, proponents of 
the contending approaches within new institutionalism discovered that there was, more 
or less, only one non-contestable premise common to all strains of institutionalism: 
institutions are instrumental to understanding political life. While both normativists and 
rationalists agree that institutions affect the political strategies adopted by individuals, 
groups and governments, so affecting outcomes and behaviour, they disagree on the 
mechanism how institutions actually affect behaviour. In Hall and Taylor‘s terms, 
historical institutionalists tend to give two different answers to this question, grouping 
either around the ‗calculus‘ or the ‗cultural‘ approach. Each provides different answers 
to questions such as ‗how do actors behave, what do institutions do, and why do 
institutions persist over time?‘6  
 
Hay and Wincott notice that such divide within the historical institutionalist canon 
actually coincides with the divide between the rational and the normative versions of 
institutionalism.
7
 Following the rational-normative divide within new institutionalism, 
theorists such as Shepsle, Bulmer, Norgaard, Thelen and Steinmo distinguish between 
rational and historical institutionalism.
 8
 Others go as far as to distinguish seven strains 
                                                 
3 Mark Aspinwall and Gerald Schneider, ‗Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science 
and the Study of European Integration‘, European Journal of Political Research, 38, 2000, p. 2 and James G. March 
and Johan P. Olsen, ‗The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life‘, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 734-749. 
4 Robert E. Goodin, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), ‗Ch.1.Political Science: The Discipline‘ in A New Handbook of 
Political Science, , (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), pp.10-11. 
5 Goodin and Klingemann, A New Handbook quoted in Vivian Lowndes, ‗Institutionalism‘, p. 107. 
6 Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, ‗Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms‘, Political Studies, 44, 4, 939 
(1996). 
7 Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, ‗Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism‘, Political Studies, XLVI, 951-
957(1998). 
8 Kenneth  Shepsle, ‗Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach‘, Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, 1, 1989, pp. 131-147, Simon Bulmer, ‗The new governance of the European Union: A new institutionalist 
approach‘, Journal of Public Policy 13, 1994, pp. 351–380, A. Norgaard, ‗Rediscovering reasonable rationality in 
institutional analysis‘, European Journal of political research, 29, 1996, pp. 31–57, K. Thelen and S. Steinmo, ‗Historical 
institutionalism in comparative politics‘ in S.Steinmo, K. Thelen & F. Longstreth (eds.), Structuring politics. Historical 
institutionalism in comparative analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.  
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within the neo-institutionalist paradigm.
9
 Most recently, Hay argued that ‗none of these 
authors made any reference to constructivism, far less to a distinctive constructivist 
variant of institutionalism in its own right. Indeed, until recently, there has been little if 
any reference to what is now variously described as an ideational, discursive or, as here, 
constructivist institutionalism. This is for three good reasons – constructivist 
institutionalism is by far the most recent addition to the family of institutionalisms, it 
arises out of an engagement with the limitations of the others, and, as a consequence 
and in contrast the others, it is still very much in its inception. It is, nonetheless already 
highly distinctive (ontologically, analytically and methodologically), and it poses a 
series of challenges to extant institutionalisms.‘10 The newest ‗new institutionalism‘, 
‗lends insight into the role of ideas and discourse in politics while providing a more 
dynamic approach to institutional change than the older three new institutionalisms.‘11 
The research reflects on the Hall and Taylor‘s distinction, who emphasise three 
institutionalisms- rational, historical, sociological, while appreciating Hay and 
Schmidt‘s observation that ideas should be given due weight in institutional analysis.12 
Rational institutionalism 
 
In rational choice theories humans are regarded as utility-maximizers ‗who are able to 
rank their priorities in accordance with fixed, exogenous preference scales‘.13 Their 
behaviour is strategic, instrumental, seeking maximum gain through selection of the 
most ‗rational‘ strategy. (i.e. the strategy that brings the most gains for the fewest 
resources expended). Politics is a series of collective action dilemmas, where 
individuals ‗acting to maximize the attainment of their own preferences are likely to 
produce an outcome that is collectively suboptimal‘ and the ‗absence of institutional 
arrangements that would guarantee complementary behaviour by others‘ is seen as the 
major obstacle to reaching a ‗collectively-superior‘ outcome.14 However, classical 
rational choice theory unfortunately to its theorists, painted a picture of a ‗world…, all 
in all, a little too dynamic. By predicting ‗a world, populated by self-interested agents 
who have no loyalties, suffer no informational or ideological illusions and are generally 
unable to make binding agreements with each other‘ rational choice theories largely 
failed to explore how the world ‗holds together‘.15 Indeed the world ‗was a little [in fact 
much] more orderly than their theories would predict.‘16 As Blyth notes, this is the 
moment when institutions were evoked by rational choice theorists to answer the 
troubling question how was such order possible. While still positioning human action as 
the central element in social scientific explanation, institutions were ‗brought in‘ by 
rational choice theorists to help explain stability better because the world ‗in flux, 
                                                 
9 Guy Peters, Institutional theory in political science, quoted inLowndes, ‗Institutionalism‘, p. 96. 
10 Colin Hay,  ‗Constructivist Institutionalism: Or, Why Interests into Ideas Don't Go‘, Paper presented at the Annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention 
Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2010-06-15 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p152815_index.html and Andreas Gofas and Colin Hay (eds.), The Role of Ideas in 
Political Analysis: A Portrait of Contemporary Debates, (Taylor&Francis, 2009) 
11 Vivien A. Schmidt,‗Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of discourse‘, Annual Review of Political 
Science, 11, 2008, pp. 303–326. 
12 Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, pp. 936-957. 
13Aspinwall and Schneider, ‗Same Menu, Separate Tables‘, p. 10. 
14 Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, p. 945.                                                                                                                
15 Blyth, ‗Institutions and Ideas‘, p. 299. 
16 O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, (New York: The 
Free Press, 1985) and D.C. North , Structure and Change in Economic History, (New York: Norton, 1981). 
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replete with cycling, multiple equilibria and the like, where institutions are both formed 
and changed according to rapidly shifting contract curves and cost-benefit trade-offs‘ 
predicted by them poorly represented reality. Rationalists adopted institutions which are 
‗consciously designed structures chosen by individuals to produce stability‘ to improve 
some theoretical limitations.
17
 Blyth believes that placing institutions within rationalist 
analysis created even ‗further theoretical anomalies rather than solving current 
ones…[Also] according to rationalists, institutions are ‗intentional products that are 
designed to help individuals maximise their utilities‘ and they also persist as long as the 
cost of their existence is smaller than the benefits they yield. 
18
 However, ‗societies are 
replete with institutions that continue after their ostensible purpose has ended‘ which 
inevitably poses a quite disturbing question for rational theorists: ‗if institutions are 
merely instrumental products, how can they go about broadening their own agendas?‘19 
Positioning the individual as the ultimate ‗sovereign‘ of analysis, and later invoking 
institutions to overcome theory limitations, undermined the ontology of rationalist 
paradigm, when institutions acted as agents on their own still ‗existing‘ after they have 
achieved their purpose, ‗broadening their agendas‘ and surprisingly to rationalists 
yielding ‗irrational cooperation‘.20 
 
For Blyth rational institutionalists regard institutions as consciously designed structures 
chosen by individuals to produce stability and they are also purposeful human 
constructions designed to solve collective action problems and institutions originate 
through voluntary agreement by the relevant actors: and if the institution is a subject to 
a process of competitive selection, it survives primarily because it provides more 
benefits to the relevant actors than alternate institutional forms. Rational institutionalists 
disagree that remote historical trajectories determine the actor‘s behaviour.  It is 
strategic calculation which drives actors and their calculation will be deeply affected by 
the actor‘s expectations about how others are likely to behave as well and through 
increasing information, flows and transparency over what all agents are doing the 
designed institutions cause all agents to adhere to the dictates of the institution and over 
time this adherence becomes the norm that is obeyed almost automatically. By reducing 
uncertainty in other‘s behaviour, institutions tend to facilitate cooperation through 
allowing ‗gains from exchange‘ therefore institutions resolve the ‗common-pool 
resource‘ problem (CPR).21  This framework is challenged by this research, which 
focuses on a situation where agents, participating in the construction of an institution 
making the behaviour of other actors completely transparent and predictable, which 
provided ‗collectively-superior‘ outcomes from cooperation, cannot  cooperate.   
 
Despite the fact that most of the region‘s countries are already deeply involved into the 
EU integration process and widely proclaiming strict adherence to the principles of the 
consciously designed institutions supposed to produce stability (TINA Initiative and 
SPSEE within EU), Balkan political elites fail to cooperate on the implementation of 
large pan-European transport and energy corridors, thus disregarding the ‗collectively-
                                                 
17 Hugh Ward, ‗Rational Choice‘ in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (2nd edition) , Theory and Methods in Political 
Science (eds), (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp.65-89. 
18 Blyth, ‗Institutions and Ideas‘, p. 302. 
19 Mark Blyth, ‗Any More Bright Ideas? The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy‘, Comparative Politics 
Vol. 29 (1) January 1997 and Mark Blyth, ‗Institutions and Ideas‘. 
20 Geoffery Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, ‗Ideas, Interests And Institutions: Constructing The European Communities 
Internal Market‘, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political 
Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)  
21 See Blyth,  ‗Any More Bright Ideas?‘ and Blyth, ‗Institutions and Ideas‘. 
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superior‘ benefits of cooperation.22 At the same time they are actively embedded in 
these organizations and agree that EU is the best institutional design providing most 
benefits for agents. For rationalist might be difficult to answer such dilemma-why some 
actors are ‗rational‘ within CPR-problem-solving organization and some are  ‗irrational‘ 
despite the common organizational context providing ‗information, relevant to the 
behaviour of others, enforcement mechanisms for agreements, penalties for defection‘ 
and ‗collectively-superior‘ outcomes from cooperation for all agents, involved in this 
institutional context.
23
 Rational institutionalists argue that ‗institutions persist, because 
they embody something like a Nash equilibrium‘ and ‗individuals adhere to these 
patterns of behaviour because a deviation will make the individual worse off than will 
adherence.‘24 
 
Sociological, and especially historical institutionalism, is better prepared to face such a 
dilemma than rational institutionalism. Introducing history, path dependency, ideas, 
culture and context in the analysis, rather than relying on interest and calculation is a 
major advance analytically. To understand political phenomena, timing and sequence 
matter more than relying on certain a-historical equilibra, offering predictability across 
time. The empirical part of this research explores the paradox (perceived so by 
rationalists), where Balkan elites fail to cooperate on the commissioning of the pan-
European transport and energy corridors where the superior economic benefits from the 
latter are clear and also institutionalized through the EU and its TINA initiative, 
explored in the following chapters. Empirical observation supports the ideational 
theorists approach that the ‗policy preferences of political actors are shaped primarily by 
the normative guidelines and criteria provided by their ideas. Ideational theorists argue 
that interests are neither given, nor can they be inferred from the environment; instead, 
they evolve from ideas and beliefs held by actors themselves. Such approach helps 
explain why Balkan elites perceive some agents as ‗more special‘ than others. They 
might cooperate with the one agent out of material gains calculations, but this should be 
in compliance with the ‗appropriateness‘ and ‗psychic returns‘ of such action, or the 
extent they fit with the actors‘ ideas of such action.25 Through the moral and cognitive 
templates, arising from institutionalized ideas, political elites interpret and respond to a 
situation. In the case studies through such templates, some neighbouring countries were 
considered ideationally-enlightened, while others ideationally-deprived. This meaning 
that according to institutionalised ideas and the logic of appropriateness (rather than 
strategic calculation), political elites could cooperate with an ideationally enlightened 
agent, regardless of the fact that cooperation with the ideationally deprived agent might 
have been more economically justified, simply because that is what ideas tell them to 
and because such action is deemed right‘. In this respect, the research supports 
ideational theorists‘ findings that the rationalist approach misses a part of the political 
phenomena, by relying on fixed or given interest, strategic calculation and logic of 
increasing returns. 
                                                 
22 SPSEE (Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe) is explored in detail in the EU Involvement Chapter. TINA 
(Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment) Initiative is explored in the EU Involvement Chapter and the Transport 
Infrastructure Chapter. 
23 Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, p. 939.                                                                                                                                          
24 Randall Calvert, ‗The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions‘ in Jeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek (eds), 
Modern Political Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) in  Aspinwall and Schneider, ‗Same Menu, 
Separate Tables‘, p. 4 and Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, p. 940.                                                                                                                                          
25 Peter Hall, ‗Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic policymaking in Britain‘, 
Comparative Politics, 25 (3), 1993, pp. 275-296. 
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Sociological Institutionalism 
 
If the last three decades in social sciences might be termed the ‗age of institutionalism‘ 
the most recent tendencies within that age might be framed as the ‗cultural‘ or 
‗cognitive‘ revolutional turn.26 Hall and Taylor argue that for sociological 
institutionalists there is a ‗highly interactive and mutually-constitutive‘ relationship 
between institutions and agency.
27
 Sociological theorists argue that ‗institutions do not 
only constrain and/or enable specific choices to actors but they also shape their choices 
and their relative preferences‘, thus rejecting the rationalist idea of exogenous, timeless, 
strategically fixed preferences. Institutions shape not only the actor‘s behaviour but 
‗what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context.‘28 This is extremely important 
as it determines what actors actually regard as politically feasible. Preference formation 
is a dynamic process in which institutions and contexts have a pronounced shaping 
power. Furthermore ‗procedures, rules, norms, and belief systems that are embodied in 
institutions do not only reflect the initial preferences of their founding actors  [but] also 
reflect cultural features akin to the myths and ceremonies prevailing in certain 
societies.‘29 As Hall and Taylor observed, by doing so, sociological institutionalists 
conflate institutions and culture, ‗breaking the conceptual divide between them.‘30 This 
is the first major endeavour in social sciences to institutionalize culture, 
reconceptualizing it as ‗network of routines, symbols or scripts providing templates for 
behaviour.‘31 
 
 Contrary to the rationalists‘ perception of institutional existence justified by better 
serving the ‗material ends of those who accept it‘, sociological institutionalists argue 
that institutional redesign aims to enhance the ‗social legitimacy of the organization or 
its participants‘ and such redesign takes place ‗because the latter [is] widely valued 
within a broader cultural environment‘.32 This provides an answer to why organizations 
often adopt practices which might be considered ‗dysfunctional with regard to achieving 
the organization‘s formal goals […] [Also] common institutional practices are said to 
emerge from a more interactive process of discussion among the actors in a given 
network-about shared problems, how to interpret them, and how to solve them […] 
[Through such negotiated interaction actors] develop shared cognitive maps […] 
embodying a sense of appropriate institutional practices, which are then widely 
employed.‘33 For social institutionalists institutional change is ‗seen as a process of 
isomorphism or diffusion through mechanisms such as pressures to appear legitimate 
and normative schemes embedded in training and practice.‘34 
                                                 
26 Paul Di Maggio, ‗Culture and Cognition‘, American Review of Sociology, 23, 263-287 in  Klaus Nielsen, ‗Review of 
Institutionalists Approaches in the Social Sciences: Typology, Dialogue and Future Prospect‘s , Research Paper no. 
7/01, Research papers Network Institutional Theory, Roskilde University,  
www.ssc.ruc.dk/institutional/Research_Paper_7-01.pdf; accessed May, 2007. 
27 Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, p. 948.                                                                                                                             
28 Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, p. 948. 
29 Neo-institutionalism and the study of the domestic impact of EU policies,  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~koutalac/Neo-
institutionalism.doc; last accessed May, 2006.  
30 Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, p. 947.                                                                                                                                         
31 Ann Swidler, ‗Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, American Sociological Review, 51(1986), 273-286.                                                                                                                                       
32 Cf. Campbell, ‗Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political economy‘; March and Olsen, Rediscovering 
Institutions, ch. 2. quoted in Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms‘, p. 949.                                                                     
33 Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, pp. 949-950.                                                                                                                                         
34 Klaus Nielsen, ‗Institutionalist approaches in the social sciences: Typology, dialogue; and future challenges‘, Journal 
of Economic Issues,  Jun 2001, pp. 1-2. 
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Historical Institutionalism 
 
Historical institutionalism evolved from state theory when the latter was struggling to 
provide explanations for less macro-level phenomena, when the demand for a lower 
level of abstraction revived institutions and state theorists became historical 
institutionalists.
35
 Hall and Taylor identify two strains within the historical 
institutionalism: normative and rational. Despite the divergent strains, proponents of 
this paradigm widely accept that ‗time and history matter and shape policy outcomes in 
ways that do not fall in simple cause-effect rational choice theories of action [...] [They 
also emphasize that actors are embedded in a] ‗world of institutions, composed of 
symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation…out of which 
a course of action is constructed.‘36 The disagreement is on the degree of 
embeddedness. Rationalists insist on autonomy on the part of agency, while more 
sociologically biased theorists emphasize a greater degree of embeddedness and co-
determination of structure and agency. Such embeddedness is defined by the ‗extent to 
which institutional effects are ‗internalized‘ by agents‘; [according to] rational choice 
perspective, institutions are most often external to the agent -- including voting 
procedures and conflict resolution mechanisms …from the sociological perspective 
institutions are internalized -- including identitive institutions such as nationality or 
religion.
37
 
 
Historical institutionalists argue that ‗behaviour is not fully strategic, but bounded by 
individual‘s worldview‘ and ‗the choice of a course of action depends on the 
interpretation of a situation rather than on purely instrumental calculation.‘38  Historical 
institutionalists do not necessarily disagree that actors could act rationally to maximise 
their gain, but that ‗the formation of their preferences and the ways they pursue them are 
contingent upon historical developments that define the range of strategic choices 
available to them.‘39 HI is often considered as a ‗meso-level approach‘ between 
individualism and social constructivism, using both rational and social institutionalists‘ 
premises.
40
 Historical institutionalism defines institutions as ‗the formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions, embedded in the organizational structure 
of the polity or political economy‘ it also ‗associates institutions with organizations and 
the rules or conventions, promulgated by formal organizations‘, or simply-formal and 
informal rules and
 institutions provide ‗moral and cognitive templates for interpretation 
and action‘.41 Moreover institutional arrangements not only provide a context for action, 
as in the rationalist institutionalist perspective, but they affect the identities, self-images 
and preferences of the actors.
42
 Thelen and Steinmo implied that not just the strategies 
but also the goals actors pursue are shaped by the institutional context.
43
 Summarizing 
                                                 
35 See: S.Steinmo, K. Thelen & F. Longstreth (eds.), Structuring politics, Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The 
Policy of State Intervention in Britain and France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
36 Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, p. 939. See also: James March and Johan P. 
Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: the Organizational Basis of Politics (New York NY, Free, 1989)  
37 Aspinwall and Schneider, ‗Same Menu, Separate Tables‘, p. 6. 
38 Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, p. 939. 
39 See Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, ‗Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics‘, in Sven Steinmo, 
Kathleen  Thelen, Frank Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
40 Steimo, Thelen, Longstreth, ‗Structuring politics‘, p. 2. 
41 Hall and Taylor, ‗Political Science‘, p. 938. 
42 See March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions.  
43 Steimo, Thelen, Longstreth, ‗Structuring politics‘, pp. 2-5. 
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the agenda of historical institutionalistst would note that they are generally interested in 
how institutions structure choices. 
 
The notion of path dependence 
 
The most basic concept which historical institutionalists work with is the notion of path 
dependence. In general, the term explains how the set of decisions one faces for any 
given circumstance is limited by the decisions one has made in the past, even though 
past circumstances may no longer be relevant. Path-dependence generally was 
developed in economics to explain certain theoretical inconsistencies of neo classical 
economics, applied to reality. The concept of path dependence helped them explain why 
a standard, which is first-to-market, can become entrenched, in spite of its suboptimal 
economic benefits. The most famous example is the QWERTY layout in typewriters 
still used in computer keyboards, despite the proven better efficiency of the alternative 
DSK standard.
 44
 Economists explained that inferior standards could persist simply 
because of the legacy they have built up. Through a ‗lock in‘ in particular time, an 
inferior technology could be adopted and followed if the costs for introducing the better 
standard outweigh the benefits of its adoption.  
 
The concept of path dependence was quickly applied in political science and sociology 
to help theorists face the basic challenge of accounting for both continuity and change 
over time. The common presumption was that institutions shape ‗the order in which 
things happen [and] affects the way how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a 
certain point itself constrains the trajectory after that point; and the strategic choices 
made at a particular moment eliminate whole ranges of possibilities from later choices 
while serving as the very condition of existence of others.‘45  However a difference 
should be noted between the notion of path dependence adopted by the rational and the 
normative strain within new institutionalism.  Historical rational institutionalists rely on 
the transaction-costs theory to explain institutional persistence. The latter is based on 
the ‗fundamental assumption that any given institutional matrix determines its own 
transaction costs, in the sense of measuring and enforcing costs‘ and ‗established 
courses of action provide increasing returns to the relevant actors, which make them 
difficult or virtually impossible to reverse even if they prove to be inefficient. 
Rationalist historical institutionalists introduce the notion of increasing returns, which 
are the source of path dependence. They believe that: 
 
Any given institutional matrix determines its own transaction costs, in the sense of 
measuring and enforcing costs. Established courses of action provide increasing returns to 
the relevant actors, which make them difficult or virtually impossible to reverse even if 
they prove to be inefficient. (…)Political institutions succeed over others and dominate in 
certain markets even in cases that alternative ones have been proved as more efficient 
(path inefficiency) in the same way that certain technologies do in markets. Once a certain 
type of technology gains an initial advantage over others, due to even minor or accidental 
events, positive feedback effects may lock-in the preferences of the relevant actors 
making them inflexible over the adoption of alternative technologies. This is because 
increasing returns create strong incentives to actors to continue developing within the 
initial path.
46
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Such a notion of path dependence is applicable mainly to technologies, markets, 
economies. However proponents of the rational strain within historical institutionalism 
fail to account for path dependence caused by cultural and historical factors. Such a 
theory focusing on increasing returns, creating strong incentives to actors to continue 
developing within the initial path, fails to explain why certain polices are followed if 
they do not yield increasing returns, and even why they are followed when they 
generate increasing losses. 
 
For historical and sociological institutionalists path dependence has been used primarily 
in comparative politics and sociology to analyze the development and persistence of 
institutions. Primarily used in comparative historical analyses normative institutionalists 
distinguish mainly two types of path-dependent processes-the ‗critical juncture‘ and the 
‗reactive sequences‘. In the critical juncture framework, ‗antecedent conditions define 
and delimit agency during a critical juncture in which actors make contingent choices 
that set a specific trajectory of institutional development and consolidation that is 
difficult to reverse. This is akin to the concepts of vendor lock-in or positive feedback 
derived from path dependence in economics. The other path-dependent process deals 
with "reactive sequences" where a primary event sets off a temporally-linked and 
causally-tight chain of events that is nearly uninterruptible.‘47 
 
In other words for historical institutionalists, path dependence can express the idea that 
‗outcomes at a ‗critical juncture‘ trigger feedback mechanisms [negative or positive] 
that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future‘. Pierson and Skocpol 
argue ‗once actors have ventured far down a particular path, they are likely to find it 
very difficult to reverse course…The ―path not taken‖ or the political alternatives that 
were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost. ―Path dependence analysis‖ 
highlights the role of what Arthur Stinchcombe has termed ―historical causation‖ in 
which dynamics triggered by an event or process at one point in time reproduce 
themselves, even in the absence of the recurrence of the original event or process.‘48 As 
Pierson stated in general terms, path dependence came to mean simply ‗history matters‘ 
in a broad concept and that institutions are self reinforcing in a narrow concept.
49
  
 
How this worked however was a matter of content with some scholars emphasizing 
lock-in and increasing returns, self-reinforcing sequences and the ‗mechanisms of 
reproduction‘ of particular historical legacies respectively.50 Boas implied such works 
played an ‗important role of systematizing arguments about historical causation and 
moving the discussion of institutional stability beyond the arguably unassailable notion 
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that ―history matters.‖‘51 More recently, neo-institutionalists and especially the 
historical strain have attempted to move away from the notion of path dependence, 
focusing on how institutions change, rather than being stable over time. Many authors 
argued that ‗prevailing models of path dependence overstate the degree of stability in 
political institutions… [and] have distanced themselves from the notions of increasing 
returns, lock-in, and switching costs that were central to the economics literature on 
path dependence.‘52 Rather they have focused on other mechanisms of institutional 
change such as layering and conversion.
53
 
 
Bringing institutions back in did not help rationalists overcome their internal theoretical 
limits. Such inconsistency provoked theorists to look for alternative explanations and 
that is when they turned to ideas. However, the ‗rationalist adoption of ideas runs in the 
same problems as its adoption of institutions‘, as ideas could not also give satisfactory 
explanation to the problem with stability these theorists faced.
54
 Rationalists believe 
cooperation in situations of uncertainty occurs when a new institution is designed, after 
an idea ‗becomes a focal point‘ and stabilizes the situation. Garrett and Weingast 
explained how the agreement for EC single market   was reached in 1992.
55
 They argue 
that a ‗focal point‘ is chosen as it ‗promote[s] stability where self-interest alone would 
not suffice.‘ However, rationalist theory poorly conceptualizes how exactly agents and 
ideas ‗meet‘, how certain ideas become focal points over which agents agree, and why, 
after choosing a certain focal point, one can still observe a lack of cooperation. Blyth 
argues ‗ideas are not just ―out there‖ things which agents use to coordinate their actions 
by randomly stumbling into them.‘ They are not a pick-and-mix tool to satisfy the 
interest of agents. Ideas need to be developed, deployed, repeated, proselytised, spread, 
disseminated. As much as supplying institutions is a collective action problem, so is the 
dissemination of ideas, therefore neither institutions, nor ideas could resolve the 
rationalist dilemma with stability in a world of self interested egoists.  
 
 Blyth continues on a more general level rational choice theory is constricted by its own 
ontological assumptions. In a theory where agency is the ‗theoretical primitive‘, ideas 
and institutions can only be regarded as tools, which agents instrumentally use to satisfy 
their ‗means-end‘ logic. Anything extra-individual such as ideas and institutions could 
not fundamentally alter what in fact agents want as this would position the former as 
theoretical primitives prior to agents, thus violating the very core of rationalist 
ontology.
56
 Hay and Gofas also acknowledge that ‗ideational factors are not easily 
incorporated within the parsimonious theoretical core of rational choice. Indeed, the 
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recognition of the potential significance of ideas may serve in itself to undermine the 
very elegance and analytical simplicity that has long constituted rational choice‘s 
principal appeal.‘57 
 
Blyth further argues unlike rationalist institutionalists‘ failure in explaining stability, 
historical institutionalists‘ theories have been very successful in producing satisfactory 
and convincing research explaining stability. As discussed above for normative 
institutionalists, institutions are formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions, embedded in the organizational structure of the polity that constrain, rather 
than facilitate political action. Therefore historical institutionalism predicted ‗a world of 
stability, path-dependence and persistence.‘ As known in such a world change was 
somehow hard to explain. Furthermore, if institutional contexts actively shaped 
individual behaviour how could one account for why agents ever got the desire to do 
something different in situation where starkly different behaviour emerges within one 
and the same long established institutions. Blyth gives an example from the Thatcher 
period in relation to the British economy, where ‗change is difficult to explain because, 
if all parties in power do not behave the same way (as the Thatcher period clearly 
demonstrated), then one must wonder about where such agents ever got the desire to do 
anything different from their forebears‘ and ‗if their choices were dictated by the 
institutional context, then how would agents within such institutions ever get the desire 
to do something different?‘58 
 
Within such path dependent institutions and their contingent historical trajectories, 
change was seen as occurring only due to large-scale external events such as wars or 
depressions or more generally due to ad-hoc exogenous punctuations.
59
 Life often 
contradicted theory. Institutions appeared to change much more often than historical 
institutionalist‘s ‗world of persistence‘ predicted.  Blyth states that this is when 
historical institutionalists turned to ideas to explain change. Therefore, while rationalists 
turned to ideas to justify stability, historical institutionalists used ideas to explain 
change. Unlike rationalist paradigm, incorporating ideas in historical institutionalist 
analysis did not make their theory incoherent, nor violated their ontology. On the 
contrary, introducing ideas greatly enriched our understanding of politics by forcing all 
political scientists to question the notion of agents having fixed or ‗given‘ interests.60  
 
We have explored the general framework of   how historical institutionalists were more 
successful than rational institutionalists in appropriating ideas in their theoretical 
paradigm. However, we need to explore the ideational turn, in more detail, focusing on 
the role accorded to ideas in   political analysis and the relationship between material 
and ideational factors. 
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The Ideational Turn  
 
The ideational turn has appeared in political studies since the late 1980s and has 
generated a profound implication for contemporary social policy research.
61
 ‗Ideational 
turn‘ refers to an upturn of interest in the idea in social studies, ‗Ideational turn‘, the 
reflection of the role of idea on politics and policies, not surprisingly, leads to a 
fundamental and ontological question about the relationship between agency (or idea) 
and context.
62
 Depending on the assumption on the relationship, as Hay argues, 
perspectives in social science could be divided into two categories: those who believe 
ideas should be accorded a casual role independent of material actors and those who do 
not. He also states that ‗rather like the issue of structure and agency …, positions on the 
relationship between the ideational and the material can be differentiated into those who 
privilege either moment in the process of social and political causation and those which 
explore the interaction between the two. Thus, in the same way that we can distinguish 
between simple and dialectical accounts of the relationship between structure and 
agency so we might differentiate between simple and dialectical accounts of the 
material-ideational relationship.‘63 
 
The materialist position claims that ideas are epiphenomenal-or in other words, they are 
simply the consequence of other factors and are therefore not worth studying in their 
own right.
64
 One of the first proponents of this view were Marxists. Marx argued ‗The 
phantoms formed in the human brain are […] necessarily, sublimates of their material 
life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, 
religion, metaphysics, […] have no history, no development; but men, developing their 
material intercourse, alter, along with this, their real existence, their thinking and the 
products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness 
by life.‘65For Marx and historical materialists, ideas were best viewed, as the result of 
material factors, having little or no independent value or impact. Many contemporary 
scholars, predominantly rational choice theorists, realists and neo-realists have followed 
in Marx‘s footsteps viewing ideas of individuals and groups as primarily shaped by 
material circumstances and economic interests. Therefore, they also presume ideas 
could not have casual role and cannot account as independent variables of analysis. For 
E.H. Carr, the ideational is ‗product of circumstances and interests and weapons framed 
for the furtherance of others.‘66 
 
As Hay noted idealist position (represented by postmodernists, interpretivists, 
deconstructivists, discourse analysis) is materialism‘s polar opposite and in general, 
idealists claim that there is no relationship between the material and the realm of 
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language, text, discourse, ideational. They also reject casual relationship between the 
two; rather they try to ‗establish the (discursive) conditions of existence of specific 
social and political practices.‘67 
 
The third position is that of constructivists, normative institutionalists, critical realists 
and namely, that privilege neither ideational, nor material, but rather adopt a more 
dialectical stance that both matter. Constructivists argue that ‗we cannot hope to 
understand political behaviour without understanding the ideas actors hold about the 
environment in which they find themselves‘ and most importantly they accord ideas an 
independent casual role in political explanation.
68
  Hay claims that ‗the development of 
the system depends not merely on the context, the condition of the system itself and the 
preferences and/or rationality of the actors within it, but on the understandings of those 
actors. Such ideational variables may be difficult to gauge, but there are excellent 
reasons for thinking both that they exist and that they should be accorded a far more 
central role in contemporary political analysis.‘69 
 
A prominent critical realist, Margaret Archer, develops her morphogenetic approach, 
applying it to the problem of structure and agency. Since structure and agency constitute 
different levels of stratified social reality, each possesses distinctive emergent properties 
which are real and causally efficacious but irreducible to one another. The problem, 
therefore, is shown to be how to link the two rather than conflate them, as has been 
common theoretical practice. Archer not only rejects methodological individualism and 
holism, but argues that the debate between them has been replaced by a new one, 
between elisionary theorising and emergentist theories based on realist ontology of the 
social world. The morphogenetic approach is the sociological complement of 
transcendental realism, and together they provide a basis for non-conflationary 
theorizing which is also of direct utility to the practising social analyst. Archer further 
argues that the relationship between culture and agency is analytically similar to that 
between structure and agency. She, like Blyth is dissatisfied because existing theories 
tend to conflate culture and agency in manners similar to the way in which the 
structuralist and intentionalist reductively conflates structure and agency. Therefore 
culture and structure should be conceived of as relatively autonomous. Ideas ‗should be 
accorded a crucial role in political explanations, since actors behave the way they do 
because they hold certain views about the social and political environment they inhabit. 
Moreover, those ideas cannot simply be derived from the context itself.‘70Positioning of 
ideas and culture as major explanatory factors alongside structure and agency ‗cuts 
against the grain of most current theorizing in political science by explicitly discussing 
when and how ideas influence political behaviour.‘71 Culture should be regarded as 
having a ‗defined role‘ alongside structure and agency. Moreover ‗the distinction 
between the realm of ideas (the ideational) and the material should not be seen as that 
between the realm of the superficial or non-real (the ideational) and that of the real (the 
material). Ideas and beliefs are both real and have real effects.‘72 McAnulla reflecting 
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on Archer‘s morphogenetic approach argues that the main aim of drawing a distinction 
between structure and culture is to avoid conflating the material and the ideational.
73
 
 
The materialist failure to ‗take ideas seriously‘ and the self-conceited assumptions of 
ideationalists are both unconstructive to move beyond the current vogue for 
epistemological polemic ‘, as most recent theorizing on the structure-agency debate 
advises ‗.74 Gofas and Colin argue that the ‗incommensurability thesis between causal 
and constitutive logics is only credible in the context of a narrow, Humean, conception 
of causation. If we reject this in favour of a more inclusive (and ontologically realist) 
understanding then it is perfectly possible to chart the causal significance of constitutive 
processes and reconstrue the explanatory role of ideas as causally constitutive.
 75
 
 
Lowndes claims current theorizing in the discipline adopts a stance that ‗political 
scientists [should] no longer think in the either/or terms of agency or structure, interests 
or institutions as the driving forces [and that] virtually all serious students of the 
discipline would say [good research] is a matter of a judicious blend of both‘.76This is 
certainly true for the material-normative debate as well. To overcome such dualisms we 
have to acknowledge the distinct role of culture and ideas as a ‗key meta-theoretical 
concept.‘77 
 
Therefore, ideational theory within the constructivist/normative institutionalist position 
offers a good way forward towards a dualistic approach of material and ideational 
factors without violating its ontological and epistemological premises and this study is 
positioned within this paradigm. Justification for such choice is first, the 
epistemological and ontological inconsistency rationalists encountered when 
appropriating ideas into their analysis, second, the belief that dualistic approach 
attributing casual role of normative factors is more inclusive and ontologically realist 
and third, the Balkan case of path dependent patterns of ‗irrational‘ obstruction and 
‗irrational‘ cooperation, regardless of changing external factors  could not be explained 
by materialist, or purely ideational explanations. After we have positioned this study in 
constructivist/normative institutionalist realm let us look in more detail, the main 
arguments of ideational theorists, working in that paradigm. 
 
Ideas and beliefs are both real and have real effects. They ‗should be accorded a crucial 
role in political explanations, since actors behave the way they do because they hold 
certain views about the social and political environment they inhibit.
78
  Moreover, those 
ideas cannot simply be derived from the context itself‘ and we can hardly assume that 
‗political actors are blessed with perfect information of their context. They have to make 
assumptions about their environment and about the future consequences of their actions 
and those of others if they are to act strategically.‘79 Therefore ideational theorists in 
constructivist/normative institutionalist paradigm clearly distinguish between, as Jervis 
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put it, ‗the operational milieu‘ (the world in which a decision is carried out) and the 
‗psychological milieu‘ (the world as the actor sees it).80 
 
Hay implies actors rely upon cognitive short-cuts in the form of more or less 
conventional mappings of the terrain in which they find themselves…This suggests a 
very significant role for ideational factors in political analysis‘ and ‗the ideas political 
actors hold about the environment are, then, crucial to the way they act and hence to 
political outcomes.‘81 Pierson also states that political actors should rely on a ‗wide 
range of cognitive shortcuts in order to make sense of the social world.‘82 
 
Actors appropriate a world which is always already structured, yet they are confined to 
do so through lens of understanding and, inevitably, misunderstanding. The agent‘s 
point of access is then, irreducibly ideational [positioning] ideas at centre stage in 
political analysis for all but the most structuralist of positions.
83
  Also the ‗elementary 
screening devices used by individuals in looking at the world tend to obscure those 
elements of reality that are not consonant with prior attitudes. As far as possible, 
individuals see what they want to see.‘84 
 
Hay makes a significant contribution to the material-ideational dialectic. ‗For particular 
ideas, narratives and paradigms to continue to provide cognitive templates through 
which actors interpret the world, they must retain a certain resonance with those actors‘ 
direct and mediated experiences.‘  In this way, the context comes to exert a discursive 
selectivity upon the understandings actors hold about it…However accurate and 
inaccurate, such understandings inform strategy and that strategy in turn yields both 
intended and unintended consequences. Unintended consequences, in particular, provide 
an opportunity for strategic learning, offering a clue to the inadequacies of existing 
understandings of the context and inviting revisions…In this way ideas about the 
context and the strategies they inform [might] evolve over time. Whether this results in 
a process of cumulative learning, as might be reflected, say, in more effective policy-
making…can be answered only on case-by-case basis.‘85 
 
Not only the context influences ideas, but vice-versa such ‗ideas, however, misinformed 
they may prove to have been, exert their own effect upon the development of the 
context over time through strategic action they inform.‘86 This in short represents the 
dialectical relationship between the ideational and the material in 
constructivist/normative institutionalist framework. 
 
Ideational theorists within the constructivist/normative institutionalist paradigm argue 
that adoption of certain idea is directly linked to two important factors- ‗carriers‘ and 
‗institutionalisation‘. Bernstein argues that the adoption of such ideas will depend 
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‗largely on the perceived legitimacy of the source of new ideas by relevant actors.‘87 
Sikkink maintains that ‗ideas held by powerful individuals are the key to understanding 
the adoption of policies.‘88 The chief mechanism for this is the ability of a carrier to 
build a consensus around an idea, getting it accepted as the most suitable means of 
understanding and reacting to vents in a particular sphere.‘89 
 
Regarding instituionalisation, ‗most ideas have some power of their own … but the 
social power of any set of ideas is magnified when those ideas are taken up by a 
powerful political organization, integrated with other ideological appeals, and widely 
disseminated.‘90 Indeed, one of the main arguments of ideational theorists is ‗that ideas 
acquire force when they find organizational means of expression.‘91 When ideas are 
institutionalised they ‗take a life of their own, changing the motivation and perception 
of political actors, affecting their decision making over the long term‘, often regardless 
of changing external factors.
92
 This is so because well-developed ideas ‗generally resist 
change and can even persist in the face of disconfirming evidence (belief 
perseverance)‘. 93 Haas implied ‗faced with a new situation, we identify and interpret 
problems within existing frameworks and according to past protocols and then try to 
manage the problems according to operating procedures that we have applied in 
analogous cases. Aspects of a situation that cannot be dealt with in established ways are 
only incompletely perceived and processed, with the result that the salient dimensions 
of a problem or issue at hand are often ignored.‘94 
 
Normative ideational theorists claim that when new ideas and paradigms change old 
institutionalised ideas, policy change might occur. They also claim that in times of crisis 
and uncertainty it is more likely for new ideas to challenge old ideas.
95
 For example, 
Berman says that ‗ideas play a greater role where situational stimuli are weakest or most 
confused. Also ‗political behaviour is a function of both the environmental situations in 
which actors find themselves and the ideas they use to interpret and respond to those 
situations, the less clear or direct pressures the environment provides, the more leeway 
actors will have to follow the dictates of their own beliefs.‘96 Similarly, Haas says ‗that 
ideas matter most during periods of great uncertainty: when political actors find both 
                                                 
87 Steven Bernstein, ‗Ideas, Social Structure, and the Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism‘, European Journal of 
International Relations,  (6) 4, 2000, p. 465. 
88 Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), pp. 26, 48. 
89 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ‗Socialization and Hegemonic Power‘, International Organization, 44, 
Summer 1990, p. 289 and  
90 Hall in Martin Marcussen, The Social Construction, p. 20. 
91 Peter Hall in Albert S. Yee, ‗The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies‘, International Organization , 50, 1, 1996, p. 92 
in Claudia Fabbri, An Analytical Framework for Understanding Processes of Regional Integration: The Role of Ideas 
and Institutions, p. 10. See: Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions, pp. 23-27, 248-250. 
92 Peter Hall, ‗Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain‘, 
Comparative Politics, 25, April 1993. 
93 Marcussen, The Social Construction, p. 17. 
94 Peter M. Haas, ‗Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination‘, International 
Organization, 46, 1, winter 1992, p. 28. 
95 Clifford Geertz, ‗Ideology as a Cultural System‘,  in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, (New York: Free 
Press, 1964),  pp. 60-65,  Ann Swidler, ‗Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies‘, American Sociological Review, 51, 
April 1986, p. 273, Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises 
(Ithaca: N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 9-33. 
96 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 35. 
 39 
their most general cultural orientations and their most down-to-earth rules of thumb 
inadequate.‘97 Therefore, studying crises proves to be very rewarding for students of 
ideas.  During such times, ‗the historical legacies and structural factors that may 
normally influence political behaviour recede in importance. Crises are also times, 
however, when a shift in historical trajectories is possible because it is during such 
periods that traditional patterns of political, economic, and social life are questioned, 
providing political actors with unique opportunities to reshape dramatically the contexts 
within which they operate.‘98 
 
Hay makes important modification to this, stating that no matter how ‗tempting though 
it may seem to see ideas as somehow more significant-as ―mattering more‖ in the 
uncertainty and confusion of the moment of crisis, this is a temptation we should resist. 
For it implies an ontological inconsistency-a variable relationship between the 
ideational and the material over time. Arguably more convincing, and certainly more 
consistent, is the view that the ideational and the material are always intimately 
connected but that the significance of that dialectical relationship is rather more obvious 
and immediate in a context in which one set of perceptions and cognitions is replaced 
by another. It is not that ideas matter more in times of crisis, then, so much that new 
ideas do. Once the crisis is resolved and a new paradigm installed, the ideas we hold 
may become internalized and unquestioned once again, but it does not mean that they 
cease to affect our behaviour.‘99 
 
Once we have selected the broad church of that position, historical institutionalism, 
amplified by ideas is advanced as best fit to the case study of path-dependent political 
behaviour on the Balkans. This study will employ the theoretical framework of Sheri 
Berman‘s, The Social Democratic Moment to explore path-dependent political 
behaviour in the Balkans, as it represents an exemplary research which acknowledges 
the transformative power of ideas within historical institutionalist framework. However, 
Berman‘s theory is amplified by Hay‘s observation that ‗it is not that ideas matter more 
in times of crisis, then, so much that new ideas do‘, which makes the dialectical 
relationship even more obvious and convincing.
100
 I present Berman‘s theory and Hay‘s 
modification in the next section. 
 
Berman‟s Ideational Theory 
 
Berman explores why the German and Swedish Social Democratic parties acted so 
differently in the pre-war and post-WWII-period, regardless of the fact that ‗they 
belonged to the same transnational political movement and faced similar political and 
social conditions‘ which has had ‗crucial consequences for the fates of their countries 
and the world at large.‘101 Berman was puzzled by the fact that the interwar German 
Social Democratic Party (SPD), being the largest and  most powerful social democratic 
party in the world at the time after taking the power in the interwar period ‗did not even 
attempt to fight the economic crisis which created political vacuum and facilitated 
Hitler‘s ascent to power. In contrast Swedish Social Democrats (SAP) resisted the 
fascist threat and subsequently laid the foundations for the world‘s most successful 
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experiment in social democracy. Berman argues each party had very different ideas 
about politics and economics; what she calls their ‗programmatic beliefs.‘  Such 
opposing notions of socialism accounted for the different paths taken.  
 
The German Social Democrats ideologically burdened by Marx‘s intellectual legacy, 
which placed SPD as the leading actor of the revolution which was supposed to ‗come 
first in Germany‘, could not later adequately face the economic crisis and implement 
any policies from the ‗anarchic capitalist system.‘ While the SPD became ‗a kind of 
defender of the faith‘, Swedish Social Democrats did not bear such ideological and 
expectational burden and were ‗free to interpret Marxism as a statement of goals, rather 
than of means.‘102 Therefore the SAP was much more ready to face the challenges of the 
economic depression flexibly, adopting new ideas about the economy and its 
performance, unlike their German counterparts who slavishly adhered to their 
programmatic beliefs ‗suspicious of reform, reluctant to embrace Keynesian solutions 
during the Depression, and inflexibly Marxist‘ even at the height of the economic 
depression. It is ‗through such ideational inflexibility, Hitler came to power.‘103 Blyth 
contends that Berman‘s study is so valuable because it introduces   ideas so creating a 
convincing model of change within historical institutionalist framework without making 
the theory incoherent.  In such a theory ideas have major explanatory power unlike in 
rationalist theory, where they are at best a sticking plaster for their existing theories.
104
  
 
To continue the metaphor in such world ‗institutions are ‗crystallized ideas‘ about how 
to organize things‘, while ‗agents have ideas about what institutions to construct to 
produce a desired end… [Once established], ‗such institutions embody and give 
continuing content to agent‘s wants…[Institutional change in such world] becomes the 
question of challenging the ideas such institutions rest upon.‘105 Ideas are neither 
reducible to individual preferences, nor to a mere structure (which Archer warns would 
be conflation of material and ideational). Ideas are distinct, powerful concepts which 
allow us to comprehend how structure and agency relate to one another over time. 
 
Acknowledging more the role of ideas in contemporary politics, normative reservations 
have most recently been replaced by methodological concerns, most notably that ‗ideas 
are epiphenomenal-that is, they are simply the consequence of other factors and are 
therefore not worth studying in their own right‘ and that they are vague, amorphous and 
‗have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification‘.106 According to 
Berman to overcome the first reservation, for an ideational theorist most important is to 
show that ideas can be considered independent variables, it should be demonstrated that 
they cannot be reduced to some other (structural) factor in the contemporary system; 
Thus careful attention should be paid to the evolution and acceptance of an idea in order 
to be able to show that it indeed can be considered independent variable, which would 
require examining how different conditions enable certain ideas to take on a life of their 
own, influencing political behaviour over an extended period of time. Therefore, most 
important if this can be done is to show that over time an idea takes on a life of its own, 
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separate from the context within which it arose-then the fact that its development was 
influenced by other factors is an analytically distinct subject that is only related to the 
ultimate outcomes being explained. 
 
Berman also states to determine causality, then, requires two things: first, establishing a 
connection between the proposed independent and dependent variables, and, second, 
explaining why this connection exists-showing precisely how the independent variable 
influences the dependent one which translated to the study of ideas means we must not 
only show that ideas are correlated with political behaviour but also be able to explain 
how ideas actually influenced behaviour. Then the criteria for suggesting causality 
would seem to be met ‗if it can be shown that a specific idea held at time T cannot be 
reduced to any other variable…and had an effect at time T+1.‘107 
 
To address the second reservation that ideas are too vague to study would require proper 
definition of terms, as a part of developing of a ‗rigorous theoretical framework for the 
analysis of ideas [...] [Also] in order to be useful independent variables, ideas must be 
able to be clearly identified and associated with specific political actors.‘108 Berman 
operationalizes ‗programmatic beliefs‘ which are positioned in between ideology, too 
broad to have explanatory power and policy positions, too narrow to be interesting. This 
research adopts that defining ideas in such middle range between ideologies and policies 
is in a good position to explain how political actors interpret such ideas and how such 
interpretation affects policy outcomes. 
 
In short, Berman‘s ideational theory is concerned with two things: ‗showing that 
particular idea can be considered independent variable, and, second, describing the 
mechanisms through which it influences the dependent variable‘.109 Therefore, first we 
need to examine how certain ideas are able to become and remain a powerful force in 
politics by looking at how different condition enable certain ideas to attain political 
salience and start to influence political behaviour over an extended period. Berman 
states that two factors in particular stand out: carriers and institutionalization. 
 
Ideas ‗achieve political salience through carriers. In order ‗to be heard in a world where 
different ideas are calling out for attention, an idea must be adopted by a person or 
group that is able to make others listen or render them receptive. Carriers act as 
intellectual entrepreneurs, bringing different ideas into the political system‘ and the 
position of such carriers in the system ‗will affect the likelihood of an idea‘s gaining 
political salience: the greater the influence of the carrier, the greater the chance that the 
idea carried will attain political importance.‘110  Berman argues the lengthier and more 
successful the carrier‘s career, the more likely it is that his or her ideas ideas will gain 
acceptance. The longer a carrier has to mobilize support and provides incentives and 
disincentives for cooperation, the greater will be the chance that others will come to 
accept the idea. Prominent carriers, moreover, ‗will be better positioned to ensure that 
their ideas remain a force in politics even after they have left the scene.‘ Here is a 
situation where leadership ‗can play a crucial role in shaping history: by inserting new 
ideas into the political arena and working to ensure their acceptance by others, 
individuals can critically influence the evolution of politics.
111
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However recognizing the power of agency in originating a certain idea, should be 
regarded in the broad context that ‗while carriers can play a key role in inserting ideas 
into political debate and helping them gain salience, the most important factor 
determining whether ideas are able to influence politics over the long term is 
‗institutionalisation‘, or ‗whether or not an idea becomes embedded in an institution or 
organization.‘ When ideas are institutionalised they ‗take a life of their own, changing 
the motivation and perception of political actors, affecting their decision making over 
the long term‘, often regardless of changing external factors.112 If investigating what 
factors enable certain ideas to become and remain a powerful force is one part of the 
study of the connection between ideas and politics, ‗another is examining how ideas 
exert an independent influence over political behaviour‘, or in other words: What are the 
mechanisms by which ideas shape the choices of political actors?
113
What do actors 
want: Ideational theory argues that ‗preferences are endogenous: political actors strive 
to ensure that their behaviour coincides to as great a degree as possible with their own 
particular ideas about the way the world works… [and] action is often based more on 
identifying the normatively appropriate behaviour than on calculating the return 
expected from alternative choices [Also the behaviour of political actors] will often be 
motivated by an attempt to achieve the particular ends posited as paramount by ideas 
they hold: the policy preferences of political actors will, in other words, be shaped 
primarily by the normative guidelines and criteria provided by their ideas.‘114 Why do 
actors want that: Ideational theory argues ‗ideas play a crucial role in shaping how 
political actors perceive the world around them‘ and ‗ideas play a crucial role in 
structuring actors‘ views of the world by providing a filter or channel through which 
information about the external environment must pass‘, therefore political behaviour 
will often be based by distorted or incomplete information flows.
115
 
 
Therefore, based on Berman‘s ideational theory we could derive certain hypotheses and 
later test them through the case studies. Ideational explanations predict political actors 
will evaluate their options based on their expected psychic returns-on the extent they fit 
in with the actor‘s ideas, rather than what is most likely to provide the greatest reward 
(given a particular economic situation, for example, as political economy explanations 
would predict).
116
 Therefore, appropriateness would then be the most important factor, 
contributing to the choice of policy alternatives and since ‗definition of what is 
appropriate will remain reasonably constant within a given set of ideas, ideational 
explanations predict that a particular actor will make similar choices over time, even as 
the environment changes.‘117  At the same time since ‗decision making should often be 
influenced by incomplete or distorted information flows, [actors] with different ideas 
should consequently evaluate similar situations in different ways and judge the value of 
different alternative courses of action accordingly. Ideational explanations predict, 
therefore, that actors with different ideas will make different decisions, even when 
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placed in similar environments.‘118 Also change is possible, when new ideas are 
powerful enough to challenge or supplant political elites‘ own particular ideas about 
the way the world works. If ideational theory is correct, political actors will be much 
less sensitive to changes in the external environment and less concerned with strategic 
calculation, rather with logic of appropriateness. Indeed ‗if an ideational explanation is 
correct, we should find that decision making is a path-dependent rather than an 
efficiency driven process, in which previous decisions and cognitive criteria constrain 
and facilitate the evolution of political choice.‘119 An action, fundamentally different 
than that dictated by institutional contexts, would not only clash with political elites‘ 
own perception of what is right but also be regarded by the public as a loss of integrity, 
national treason and lack of credibility. Potential courses of friendly or cooperative 
action ‗that differed from previous behaviour [of hostility] were rejected simply because 
they represented a break with the past, while other initiatives were legitimized when 
practical or intellectual precedents for them could be found.‘120 
 
Applying Berman‟s ideational theory to the case 
 
Berman claims that in ideational theory, the case selection ‗in an ideal scenario,…would 
have to use cases where the outcomes to be explained vary and and the relevant political 
actors are matched in everything except the ideas they hold. In such a situation 
everything would be held constant except the proposed independent variable (ideas), 
thereby ensuring that an analysis could provide us with unequivocal evidence of 
causality. In the real world, however, it is virtually impossible to find such situations.  
 
Consequently, the best the political scientist can attempt is to construct good 
comparisons and to be explicit about their drawbacks, as well as alternative 
explanations. As Marc Bloch, one of the great comparativists, once noted, a good 
comparison involves choosing ‗from one or several situations, two or more phenomena 
which appear at first sight to offer certain analogies between them; then to trace their 
line of evolution, to note the likenesses and differences, and as far as possible explain 
them.‘ Bulgarian and Greek case treated here seem to fit these criteria well. 
 
For centuries they were all part of the Ottoman Empire and have experienced their 
independence revolutions at nearly the same time at the middle of the XIX century, they 
had similar political, social and economic conditions and were nearly equal in 
population and size.  
 
In Berman‘s theory appropriateness is the most important factor, contributing to the 
choice of policy alternatives and since definition of what is appropriate would remain 
reasonably constant within a given set of ideas, a particular actor will make similar 
choices over time, even as the environment changes. 
 
Viewed from such theoretical perspective influential ideas about neighbours became 
institutionalized in Balkan polities during the time of their modern state formation, and 
later taking a life on their own, started to influence subsequent policies towards that 
neighbour, often regardless of changing external environments. This theory fits the case 
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well and allows for formulation of the hypothesis that Greece and Bulgaria have 
formulated persistent policies of obstruction during most of the XX c. due to 
institutionalized ideas of the other as an enemy and normative prescriptions that 
prevented cooperation. Moreover, Greece and Bulgaria kept very antagonistic position 
towards each other with remarkable persistence, regardless of changing external factors 
and were always on opposite sides during the early XX c., the two Balkan Wars, two 
World Wars, the Cold War and the 1990s. Vice versa, the Serbian national programme 
stood opposed to Bulgarian and Albanian national ideas and because of the Serbian 
animosity to Turkey, it is no surprise Serbia was perceived as the closest natural ally of 
Greece. Therefore, Greece and Serbia (later Yugoslavia) sided not only in both Balkan 
Wars 1912-1913, but also in the two World Wars and maintained warm relations, in spite 
of the ideological differences during the Cold War and regardless of very different 
external environments. 
 
Furthermore, Berman predicts that actors with different ideas will make different 
decisions, even when placed in similar environments. Also change is possible, when 
new ideas are powerful enough to challenge or supplant political elites‘ own particular 
ideas about the way the world works. In Berman‘s case where the German and Swedish 
Social Democratic parties had very different ideas about politics and economics and 
such opposing notions of socialism accounted for the different paths taken. Acting on 
their different programmatic beliefs, responded so differently in the pre-war and post-
WWII-period, regardless of the fact that ‗they belonged to the same transnational 
political movement and faced similar political and social conditions. Similarly, Greek 
and Bulgarian political elites could only start cooperating, only after an idea powerful 
enough (EU-idea) was able to challenge old programmatic beliefs of friends and 
enemies and old normative criteria if cooperation was possible, in spite of the fact that 
impetus for cooperation and possible benefits from such cooperation were often an 
available option long before the 1990s. However, that was very hard to materialize in 
the old ideational set-up. 
 
The thesis tests Berman‘s theory by not only exploring persistence, regardless of 
changing environments (first research question and hypothesis), but also exploring 
change, attributed to powerful new ideas, challenging old path-dependent ideas (second 
research question and hypothesis). 
 
This first hypothesis that, in Greece and Bulgaria, path-dependent programmatic beliefs 
influence policy preferences towards the other will be tested in the ideational mapping 
chapters of Greece and Bulgaria. 
 
The second hypothesis that the EU idea is the first idea, powerful enough, to successfully 
challenge obstruction ideas and lead to policy change is tried in the two empirical 
chapters on transport infrastructure in SEE in 1990-2000 and in 2000-2010, respectively. 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to justify why new institutionalism, amplified by ideas  
was selected as a best fit to the case study, to present the theory selected and how its is 
applied to the Greek-Bulgarian case study. The chapter first explored the rise of new 
institutionalist paradigm in current political science as a reaction to the inherent problem 
rational choice and state theorists‘ analysis encountered when they had to account for 
persistence and change respectively. The different strains of new institutionalism, and 
namely- historical, rational and sociological were explored as well. Similar to earlier 
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turn to institutions, more recently ideas were introduced as a ‗fix‘ by normative and 
rational institutionalist framework to better explain why institutions changed or 
persisted, respectively. Historical institutionalism was identified as a paradigm that 
incorporates ideas more successfully within its paradigm, without violating its 
ontological or epistemological basis. 
 
Then the chapter looked at the ideational turn in political science to give more detail on 
the debate of ideas, presenting how ideational, material and constructivist approaches 
incorporated ideas in their analysis.  By elaborating on similarities and differences, 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach historical institutionalism plus ideas is 
identified as the best fit for the case studies. 
 
Third, the chapter explored Berman‘s ideational theory. This theory was selected as it is 
one of the exemplary ‗new institutionalism plus ideas‘ studies, creating a convincing 
model of change within historical institutionalist framework, without making the theory 
incoherent. End of the chapter elaborates on applying Berman‘s ideational theory to the 
selected case of path-dependent Balkan political behaviour and the methods to do that. 
 
After we have derived two hypotheses from Berman‘s ideational theory, we will test 
them in the next four chapters that present our Greek-Bulgarian empirical case. The 
Greek and Bulgarian ideas and behaviour chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), reflect on 
the first research question to test the hypothesis that Bulgarian and Greek modern states‘ 
remarkably persistent mutual obstruction during most of the XX c., regardless of 
changing external factors and outside pressure could be properly understood by 
exploring the crucial role, played by path dependent institutionalized ideas 
(programmatic beliefs) in shaping policy outcomes. The second question and hypothesis 
if EU idea could lead to ideational and policy change will be tested in the two empirical 
chapters (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) on transport infrastructure during the 1990s and 
2000s. 
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Chapter 3.  Ideational Mapping and Elite Behaviour: The Case 
of Greece 
 
A man encounters an unfriendly group of warriors in the jungle. 
‗Are you with us or with the others?‘ the warriors ask. 
‗With you‘ is the man‘s immediate answer. 
‗Sorry‘, the warriors‘ retort, ‗we are the others.‘1 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the two key research questions of this study is why and how nineteenth century 
emerging modern Bulgarian and Greek states, despite so many similarities, have 
developed highly antagonistic path-dependent policies of obstruction towards each 
other, that remained remarkably persistent, regardless of changing external factors 
during most of the twentieth century.: the two Balkan Wars, two World Wars, the Cold 
War and the 1990s. The second explores if after 1990, we could observe policy change. 
 
The Greek and Bulgarian ideas and behaviour chapters, reflect on the first research 
question to test the hypothesis that Bulgarian and Greek modern states‘ remarkably 
persistent mutual obstruction during most of the twentieth century, regardless of 
changing external factors and outside pressure could be properly understood by 
exploring the crucial role, played by path dependent institutionalized ideas 
(programmatic beliefs) in shaping policy outcomes. From the very formation of their 
modern states, Bulgaria and Greece had clashing ideas for development of their states 
and such institutionalized ideas later informed political elites that cooperation with the 
other was highly inappropriate, which led to the choice of obstruction policies towards 
the other in the explored period. The second question and hypothesis if EU idea could 
lead to ideational and policy change will be tested in the two empirical chapters on 
transport infrastructure. 
 
Thus the independent variable in our case is the set of ideas (programmatic beliefs), 
institutionalized in Greek and Bulgarian government institutions about the neighbour, 
which largely determine if cooperation with the neighbour is normatively appropriate 
(possible). The dependent variable is the choice of policy towards that neighbour in key 
historical periods during the XXc. investigated in this study. 
 
The chapter describes Greek political and cultural development in the early nineteenth 
century, focusing on the period after the modern Greek state formation and the 
development of the Greek programmatic beliefs towards Bulgaria. This, in other words, 
means identifying the ideational map how in Greece, or in other words how the idea 
‗Bulgarians are an enemy‘ crystallized, why exactly that idea for the neighbour was 
adopted, who were the carriers of such idea and how it became institutionalized in the 
institutional set-up and identity of the modern Greek state in the late XIX c. Then the 
chapter explores how later acting under the influence of such programmatic beliefs, 
Greek political elites decided on policies of obstruction towards Bulgarians with 
remarkable persistence during most of the XX c.(Balkan Wars, WWI, WWII, the Cold 
War), regardless of changing external factors. 
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The Megale Idea: Carriers and Institutionalisation 
Constantinople, not Istanbul… 
 
The Modern Greek Enlightenment (Diafotismos/Διαθωηιζμός) of the eighteenth century 
was given impetus by the Greek predominance in trade and education, in the Ottoman 
Empire. Greek merchants financed a large number of young Greeks to study in 
universities in Italy and the German states. There they were introduced to the ideas of 
the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The Greek students also 
became aware of the admiration that their Western counterparts had for the culture and 
language of ancient Greece and Byzantium, this realization arousing a consciousness of 
their own past. Most notable among this first wave of intellectual entrepreneurs of 
Greek nationalism were Riggas Feraios and Adamantios Korais (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). 
In the half century, leading up to 1821 a veritable flood of books on ancient Greek, 
literature and history of the ancient Greek world was written and published for an eager 
Greek readership. Such scholarship influenced second wave of intellectual carriers, such 
as Spyridon Zampelios and Constantine Paparrigopoulos to come with the idea that 
finally tied modern Greece to its classical and medieval roots, a position which implied 
valid claims to all the lands of the Byzantine Empire, which in turn led to the 
crystallization of the Μεγάλη Ιδέα (Megale Idea), which is Greek for Great Idea. There 
could hardly be a better example of a powerful idea, brought in by prominent carriers 
that originated in a critical period of time, and which became institutionally embedded 
and took a life of its own.  
 
The Great Idea is the crystallized nationalist ideology which emerged as a result of the 
Modern Greek Enlightenment of the nineteenth century with the goal of uniting all 
former territories of the Medieval Byzantine Empire into a modern Greek state. This, 
however, disregarded the demographical and cultural realities of the region because the 
former Byzantine Empire‘s territories, were now populated by Slavic, Albanian, 
Turkish, Vlach populations after hundreds of years of Ottoman rule. However to the 
Greek Enlightenment leaders and their followers, such as Feraios, Korais, 
Paparrigopolous and Zampelios, ‗the Grand Idea echo[ed] in its ardour, ―an 
amalgamation of Greece‘s ancient glories and the grandeur of Byzantium.‖‘.2 Such 
leaders also dreamt of the recovery of Constantinople and the re-creation of Christian 
Byzantium with all the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, included in this 
Greek world. The Megale Idea was a project much larger than recapturing of territories, 
but ‗was [also] the aspiration for [total] Greek cultural and economic dominance [over 
the whole Orthodox population] within the Ottoman Empire‘.3 Influenced by the 
Megale Idea, Greek modern states‘s first leaders, such as Ioannis Kolettis, believed 
there were two great centres of Hellenism: Athens and Constantinople. Athens was just 
the capital of the Greek kingdom, but Constantinople was the coveted capital city of the 
projected big state.
4 
 
After we have identified what the main Greek nationalist idea is, we need to identify 
who were the carriers of this idea, why precisely that idea gained salience and how it 
became institutionalized. After nearly 400 years of Ottoman domination, at the end of 
the eighteenth century, numerous Western educated Greek émigrés and others began 
questioning the political and economic status quo of current Greek political, economic 
and social life. Such critical period of challenging the old ideas of Greek people‘s 
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existence as Ottoman subjects was reached because by the end of 18th century the 
Greek population has gained momentum to stimulate mass support for action, due to its 
growing comparatively prosperous class of merchants, sailors, tax-farmers, many of 
which were increasingly dissatisfied with the political, economic and social status quo.
5
  
There was even bigger support for change among people who did not share the power 
and prosperity of collaboration with the Ottomans. The growing material foundation for 
a critical change was coupled with the process of national awakening. Ideational 
revolutionary entrepreneurs were empowered by the newly accumulated economic 
wealth and influenced by the new ideas of the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution. The material and ideational foundations, discussed above signified that at 
the turn of the nineteenth century, Greek society was entering into a critical period of 
change. This created an ideational vacuum and opened the market for ideas. Ideational 
theory states that to be heard in a world where different ideas are calling out for 
attention, an idea must be adopted by a person or group that is able to make others listen 
or render them receptive. Carriers act as intellectual entrepreneurs, bringing different 
ideas into the political system. 
 
In the Greek case, influential ideational entrepreneurs soon appeared. Enlightenment 
leaders, such as Korais and Feraios, could appeal to both -merchants and peasants using 
their belief systems, united behind the idea of a Greece free from Ottoman rule. 
Merchants and entrepreneurs found the economic and political concepts of liberalism 
and the Enlightenment attractive and the Ottoman domination as hindering their 
economic interests.  Peasants under Ottoman rule, who were hardly influenced by 
Enlightenment ideas, but rather by Greek Orthodox Christianity found the idea of 
independence as a chance to change their deprived economic and political status quo. 
 
The carriers who crystallized the language and ideas for revolutionary struggle came 
from the rich and prominent eighteenth century Greek diaspora in places like Paris, 
Vienna, Livorno, Calabria, Bari, Alexandria, Liverpool and London. They were 
intellectual entrepreneurs whose ideas were widely acknowledged by both prosperous 
class and peasants and later institutionalized. Most influential were Adamantios Korais 
and Rigas Velestinlis-Feraios.
6
 Korais ideational input was mostly cultural, while 
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Ottoman court, supplying food and other services or as contractors for tax-farmers (men who bid to collect a district's 
taxes, and took their profits from excess revenues squeezed out of the peasants). Greeks outside of the administration 
often acted as commercial agents, ship owners and captains.  
 
6 Adamantios Korais (1748-1833) was born in Smyrna. He was a humanist scholar credited with laying the foundations 
of Modern Greek literature and a major figure in the Greek Enlightenment. His activities paved the way for the Greek 
War of Independence and emergence of a purified form of the Greek language. The Britannica asserts that 'his 
influence on the modern Greek language and culture has been compared to that of Dante on Italian and Martin Luther 
on German.' Korais graduated from the school of medicine of the University of Montpellier in 1788 and was to spend 
most of his life as an expatriate in Paris, pursuing literary career. Source: Adamántios Koraïs. (2008) in Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,  Encyclopædia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/322120/Adamantios-Korais, 
assessed July 2008. 
 
Rigas Feraios (1757-1798) was born in Velestino, Thessaly. He received his education at the Ampelakion School. He 
later went to the monastic community of Mount Athos, and later became a clerk for the Wallachian Prince Nicholas 
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Velestenlis‘ was largely political. Most of Korais' works were published with the help 
of merchants from Chios. He identified language with nationality which challenged the 
centuries old idea of identification solely on the basis of religion, regardless of national, 
ethnic or cultural differences. This idea, influenced by the Enlightenment was easily 
accepted by intellectuals as by the time it was brought in all the necessary preconditions 
(such as growing material wealth, increased national awareness, western revolutionary 
ideas) for an ideational change were present. Korais redefined the Greek language and 
promoted a purified form known as Katharevousa. He also propagated the secular 
cultural national awareness and he tried to revive past Greek glories, writing modern 
versions of tales from Greek antiquity, translated parts of Herodotus and Homer, and 
composed a Greek language dictionary. Korais also believed that mass education was 
the pre-requisite for Greek national awakening, self-identification and liberation. This 
would seem to require a modern state to raise taxes, make policy and get children to 
school. Korais played an important part in the shaping of a new consciousness among 
the intelligentsia, which later facilitated the creation of a new national movement.  
 
Rigas Velestinlis-Fereos, known as Rigas Feraios was the other prominent ideational 
entrepreneur in the Megale formation. In 1797, Velestinlis published The Revolutionary 
Manifesto that ‗envisaged a large country occupying both the Balkans and Anatolia, 
sheltering all the ethnic groups found there but ruled according to Greek ideas.‘7 His 
manifesto was the first blueprint for a new Greek state that would rise from the ashes of 
revolution against the Ottoman Empire.  Since its inception the Greek national idea was 
a project not only for liberating all Greeks, but restoring as many of the former 
territories of the Byzantium Empire, united in some kind of form of modern Greek state, 
with the capital at Constantinople.
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Mavrogenes. Feraios was developing support for an uprising against the Ottomans by meeting with Greek bishops and 
guerrilla leaders. Later he moved to Bucharest to serve for some time as dragoman at the French consulate. He moved 
to Vienna around 1793, where he was asking for support for a Greek uprising from Napoleon Bonaparte. He printed 
pamphlets, translated into Greek foreign classics, edited newspapers, created and published a proposed political map 
of Great Greece which included Constantinople. Source: E. M. Edmonds, Rhigas Pheraios (London, 1890). 
7 Rigas Velenstinlis (Feraios) (1797), The Revolutionary Manifesto, in Vranousis L. (1958), Rigas, Basic Library, 
Athens. 
8 The economic and religious advances which Ottomans allowed to the Greeks helped to keep alive visions of a 
revived state among the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover they created the pre-conditions for Greek‘ feeling of 
superiority above the other Christian subjects of the Empire, which was later crystallized in the Greek Megale.  
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Fig. 3 Adamantios Korais (1748-1833)            Fig. 4 Rigas Velestinlis Feraios (1757-
1798) (Αδαμάνηιος Κοραής)                               (Ρήγας Βελεζηινλής- Φεραίος) 
 
Fig.  5  Constantine Paparrigopoulos (1815-1891)                                                       
(Κωνζηανηίνος Παπαρρηγόποσλος) 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Source: Greek War of Independence, Britannica,  http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/244575/War-of-Greek-
Independence#tab=active~checked%2Citems~checked&title=War%20of%20Greek%20Independence%20--
%20Britannica%20Online%20Encyclopedia, accessed October, 2008. 
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Spyridon Zampelios and Constantine Paparrigopoulos (1815-1891) can be regarded as 
the second wave of modern Greek intellectual entrepreneurs after Korais and Feraios, 
who set the basis for the formation of national identity in modern Greek society (Fig. 5).   
Zampelios and Paparrigopoulos had introduced influential ideas into the Greek political 
and cultural context that were institutionalized, complementing the ideas of Korais and 
Feraios. Zampelios introduced a tripartite examination of Greek history, ancient 
Hellenism, medieval Hellenism and modern Hellenism, directly appropriating the 
Ancient Greek and Byzantine heritage.
10
 Byzantium‘s Greek portrayal in the work of 
Zampelios supported the idea that the ‗ancient Greek civilization had not faded away, 
but had been creatively reshaped as it met Christianity, which took place during the 
Byzantine Empire.‘ Another of his influential ideas was the term Greek-Christian, by 
which he introduced the union of Hellenism and Christianity. According to Zampelios, 
the merging of these two different traditions (ancient Greek civilisation, Christianity) 
occurred inside the Byzantine Empire, and it gradually penetrated and marked it. 
Zampelios‘ purpose was  a total national history to be written for the past, the 
continuous course of the Greek nation from antiquity till the 19th century, to be 
narrated.‘11 Only by such continuity the theories of Fallmerayer, who supported that the 
Greek nation had disappeared because of the descent of Slavs and Albanians to Greek 
territory during the 6th-10th century could be refuted.
12
 
 
That monumental task was undertaken by Paparregopoulus.
 13
  His work shows how 
ideas underlay politics. Paparregopoulus is deemed ‗the greatest historian of modern 
                                                 
10 Spyridon Zampelios (1815-1881) was born in Lefkada, having studied in Corfu (Ionian Academy) and Pisa, Italy, he 
had been familiarised with Western European intellectual and ideological tendencies, mainly the one of Romanticism, in 
the framework of which the embellishment of notions on the Middle Ages was attempted. Sp. Zampelios, who shaped 
his ideology and intellect in this climate, became interested in the Byzantium and attempted to prove that it was Greek. 
By the work of Sp. Zampelios and mostly the Folklore Songs of Greece, published after a historical study on Medieval 
Hellenism (1852) and the Byzantine Studies. On sources of the New Greek Nationality from 800 to 1000 A.D. (1857) 
the Byzantium was organically placed in a new perspective as regarded the course of the Greek nation and the 
unbroken continuation of its civilisation from Antiquity till the 19th century. Within this perspective, the Byzantium was 
seen as a cradle of shaping the special character of the modern (Greek-Christian) civilisation.  
Source: K Paparrigopolous and the History of the Greek Nation,  
http://www2.fhw.gr/chronos/12/en/1833_1897/society/+sfgRmluamFuX1R5cGU9amF2YSZGaW5qYW5fRW50cnlQb2lu
dD1tZW51My5jbGFzcw==+/people/02.html, accessed July 2008. 
11 Pavlos Karolidis, ‗Biography of Constantine Paparregopoulus‘ in History of the Hellenic Nation, Volume I, Editions: 
Eleftheroudakis, 1925, p. 5. 
12 Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer (1790 –1861) Tyrolean traveller, journalist, politician and historian, who is well known for 
his theories concerning the racial origins of the Greeks, where he claims that 'The race of the Hellenes has been wiped 
out in Europe. Physical beauty, intellectual brilliance, innate harmony and simplicity, art, competition, city, village, the 
splendour of column and temple — indeed, even the name has disappeared from the surface of the Greek continent.... 
Not the slightest drop of undiluted Hellenic blood flows in the veins of the Christian population of present-day Greece 
Source: T. Leeb, Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer, Publizist und Politiker zwischen Revolution und Reaktion (Munich, 1996), 
p. 5.      
13 Constantine Paparrigopoulos (1815-1891) was born in Constantinople, studied in France and Germany and was 
permanently installed in Greece in 1834. At first he worked as an employee at the Ministry of Justice, then taught in the 
secondary education sector, and in 1851 he was elected professor of history at the University. His first piece of writing 
was the study On the settlement of some Slavic nations in the Peloponnese in 1843. The goal to which he was devoted 
was the refutation of the theories of the German historian Fallmerayer. In his famous work History of the Greek Nation, 
From Antiquity till Modern Times which was published in five volumes from 1860 to 1874 he conceived and wrote the 
entire national history. In this work he adopted the tripartite examination of periods already introduced by Sp. Zampelios 
(ancient Hellenism, medieval Hellenism, modern Hellenism) and used it as a tool for the narration of the course of the 
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Greece, because he was the first who, in his six-volume History of the Hellenic Nation, 
regarded the history of Greece from the ancient years onwards as a unity, insisting on 
the continuity of the Greek nation. At the same time he promoted the importance of the 
Byzantine Empire and of the Byzantine history in general.‘14 Paparregopoulus utilizing 
the ideas of Zampelios introduced the powerful idea that Modern Greeks were direct 
descendants of ancient Greeks and the Byzantium Empire. 
 
According to ideational theories, the carrier‘s status within the system will affect the 
likelihood of an idea‘s gaining political salience: the greater the influence of the carrier, 
the greater the chance that the idea carried will attain political importance. Also the 
lengthier and more successful the carrier‘s career, the more likely it is that his or her 
ideas ideas will gain acceptance. The longer a carrier has to mobilize support and 
provides incentives and disincentives for cooperation, the greater will be the chance that 
others will come to accept the idea. The ideas of Korais, Feraios, Zampelios and 
Paparrigopolous achieved political salience among so many competing ideas through 
their prominent status in Greek society. They were able to make others ‗listen‘ through 
their position as government officials, university professors and intellectuals and 
prolific writers. Moreover, they were very persistent during their long careers in 
articulating their beliefs and manoeuvring the forming intellectual elite of the young 
Greek state toward the adoption of particular nationalist stances. 
 
Korais and Velestinlis‘s had an instrumental role in the shaping of a new consciousness 
among the intelligentsia, which later facilitated the creation of a new national 
movement. Korais could do that through his position as university lecturer in Paris and 
through his numerous literary contributions, sponsored by the Chios merchants. 
Velestinlis‘ role could make others listen to his ideas through the Greek-language 
newspaper, Ephemeris, published in Vienna (where he created and published a proposed 
political map of Great Greece which included Constantinople), through his 
Revolutionary Maniphesto and published poems and books about Greek history that 
became widely popular. He was aware that his ideas will attain political importance, 
justified by his words ‗I have sown a rich seed; the hour is coming when my country 
will reap its glorious fruits‘.15 
 
Paparrigopolous could maintain the importance of his ideas through his unique position 
as the greatest historian of modern Greece, his longevity as ideational carrier through 
his books, magazines, university lectures, government appointments, combined with his 
uncommon talent of writing style. By virtue of such particular talents and long tenure as 
a public figure, he could exert unparalleled influence over the development of the 
national narrative of the forming modern Greek state. Because of his profound surveys, 
the disdain towards the Byzantine history was limited. In 1843, while working in the 
Ministry of Justice, Paparrigopoulos published his first survey, About the emigration of 
Slav tribes in Peloponnese, contradicting Fallmerayer's opinion that modern Greeks are 
of Slav descent, having no racial relation with the ancient Greeks. In 1844, he published 
his second survey, The last year of the Greek independence, describing the fall of 
Corinth.
16
 In 1855, he gave important lecture as professor of the university, 
                                                                                                                                               
Greek nation throughout the centuries.  Source: K Paparrigopolous and the History of the Greek Nation,  
http://www2.fhw.gr/chronos/12/en/1833_1897/society/people/03.html, accessed July 2008. 
14 Karolidis, ‗Biography of Constantine Paparregopoulus‘, p. 5. 
15 Peter Mackridge, ‗Aspects of language and identity in the Greek peninsula since the eighteenth century‘, The 
Newsletter of the Society Farsarotul, Volume XXI & XXII, Issues 1 & 2. 
16 Karolidis, ‗Biography of Constantine Paparregopoulus‘, p. 6. 
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contradicting a theory that did not recognise the importance of the Dorian influence on 
the civilization of ancient Greece. In 1851 Paparrigopolous became a professor of 
history of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. His classes at the 
University, ‗which constituted the raw material for the writing of his memorable 
History, were frequently published in Pandora magazine, of which he was the co-
publisher, as well as in the Athenian Press. ‗17Their work did not relate to only a closed 
and restricted circle of specialists and academics. It was directed at the society of their 
times, in order to strengthen their national self-knowledge.  
 
His ideas remained a force in politics long after he has left the scene became embedded 
in the institutions of the liberated Greek state, and most notably through school 
textbooks in the educational system and through public discourse in government 
institutions. He could make others listen through his position as most respected Greek 
historian, his position in the Ministry of Justice, his longevity as university professor 
and public figure and his prolific publications in the press. As an example the idea for 
historical continuity from the antiquity to 19th century and that modern Greeks are 
direct descendents of Ancient Greece and Byzantium penetrated most state institutions. 
The other idea Greek-Christian which was devised also did not remain just a simple 
instrument of analysis in the hands of specialists. Both ideas became a canvass on which 
the ideology of the Greek state was developed and shaped, becoming part of the self-
understanding and identity of Greeks. The content of education, the orientation of 
historical studies and the study of tradition (folklore) were organised on this basis.‘18 As 
a result of those ideas the Byzantine Empire, which had now been acclaimed a cultural 
mould of the Greek state which was still small, became the model for its territorial 
expansion. The Megale, which was nebulous until that time, acquired flesh and bones. If 
the works of Korais and Feraios laid the broad foundations of the Megale Idea in 
unstructured and idealistic way, the second wave of ideational entrepreneurs, such as 
Zampelios and Paparrigopolous crystallized ‗what, why and how‘ had to be achieved. 
 
Prominent carriers, moreover, will be better positioned to ensure that their ideas remain 
a force in politics even after they have left the scene. The chief mechanism for this is the 
ability of a carrier to build a consensus around an idea, getting it accepted as the most 
suitable means of understanding and reacting to vents in a particular sphere.‘19 Here is a 
situation where leadership ‗can play a crucial role in shaping history: by inserting new 
ideas into the political arena and working to ensure their acceptance by others, 
individuals can critically influence the evolution of politics. This explains why precisely 
Megale Idea was adopted and not some other idea. Korais, Feraios, Paparrigopolous and 
Zampelios were successful through their professional positions and literary scholarship 
to build a consensus that the most suitable (only appropriate) development course of the 
modern Greek state is in line with the Megale Idea. We have already identified the 
Megale idea and who were its carriers. In theory, 
 
while carriers can play a key role in inserting ideas into political debate and helping them 
gain salience, the most important factor determining whether ideas are able to influence 
politics over the long term is ‗institutionalisation‘, or in other words ‗whether or not an 
idea becomes embedded in an institution or organization.‘ When ideas are 
                                                 
17 Karolidis, ‗Biography of Constantine Paparregopoulus‘, p. 8. 
18 Karolidis, ‗Biography of Constantine Paparregopoulus‘, p. 20. 
19 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ‗Socialization and Hegemonic Power‘, International Organization, 44, 
Summer 1990, p. 289 and  
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institutionalised they ‗take a life of their own, changing the motivation and perception of 
political actors, affecting their decision making over the long term.
20
 
 
 
1830-1832 is the critical juncture, when most of the institutions of the new Greek state 
were founded and the ideational legacy of Feraios, Korais and others that largely shaped 
the Megale Idea, was instituionalised mostly through the educational system and history 
textbooks. Several scholars on the topic of schooling end education contend that 
‗history textbooks have traditionally served as a tool to transmit historical information 
that forms in an individual‘s conscious and collective memory a basic concept of a 
national identity-especially when some form of overarching national history is explicitly 
introduced.‘21 
 
Education in Greece after the Greek Revolution was the main driving force in shaping 
and inculcating a Greek national identity through a connection to the ancient Greek 
past.
22
 The Megale legacy was further enhanced by Paparrigopolous and Zampleios‘ 
ideas. For example, in 1853 Paparigopoulos published a history school textbook, which 
was widely used in the Greek schools for years to come.
23
  Once the Greek state 
incorporated the ideas for restoring the territories of the former Byzantium Empire and 
the struggle for incorporating most Christian subjects in a modern Greek state, those 
ideas ‗took a life of their own‘ and started to influence all those later operating within 
such institutions.  For example, 
 
Greek political elites were educated not only by the 
schooling system, dominated by Paparrigopolous, Zampelios and others, but they were 
also influenced by the public discourse outside education that such intellectual carriers 
had managed to dominate for many years through their positions of prestige and power, 
explored above. 
 
How Bulgarians were viewed through the prism of the Megale Idea 
 
After we have identified the Megale Idea, its carriers and institutionalization, we have to 
explore how Bulgarians were viewed as enemies through the prism of the Megale Idea 
and how such ideas shaped the normative prescriptions that cooperation with Bulgarians 
was not appropriate, which in turn shaped policies of obstruction, explored later in the 
chapter. 
 
After dominant ideas are institutionalised they provide the ideational context for action 
in future policy formation and implementation.  This is the case with Megale, where the 
machinery of the state began consistently promoting, educating and pursuing the idea as 
the core of the state building process. In early years of Greek Independence, elites 
looking through contemporary institutional and ideational contexts applied the 
geography of classical Greece and especially Byzantium to modern geo-politics. The 
                                                 
20 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 26. 
21 CharleTaylor,  Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity,  (Harvard University Press, 1989) quoted in  
Theodoros Zervas, ‗Resurrecting the past, constructing the future: A historical investigation on the formation of a Greek 
national identity in schools, 1830-1922‘,  Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the 53rd Annual Conference of the 
Comparative and International Education Society, Francis Marion Hotel, Charleston, South Carolina, Mar 22, 2009, p. 
18 
22 Frederic Miller, Agnes Vandome and John McBrewster,  Diafotismos: Age of Enlightenment, Ottoman Empire, 
Adamantios Korais, Rigas Feraios, Filiki Eteria, Theophilos Kairis, Eugenios Voulgaris, (VDM Publishing House, 2009), 
pp. 15-30. 
23 Miller, Vandome and McBrewster, Diafotismos, p. 35. 
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problem was that history clashed with human and political geography and presaged 
major conflicts with Albanians over Epirus, with Bulgarians over Macedonia and with 
Ottomans over Istanbul (Constantinople), the western coast of Anatolia, and islands 
from the Aegean to Cyprus. The particular historical and ideational context, in which 
Megale Idea crystallized, clashed with the crystallizing national programmes of 
Bulgarians and Albanians as well with the Ottomans trying to hold the Empire together.  
 
The period of national liberation revolutions in the Balkans (1830-1878) is the precise 
historical moment, when Bulgarians, Albanians and the Ottomans started to be regarded 
as ‗ideationally deprived‘, since their national programmes and territorial aspirations 
clashed with the Megale Idea and vice versa. As the Serbian national programme 
Nachertanie (Strategy) stood opposed to Bulgarian programme San-Stefano and 
Albanian national ideas and because of the Serbian animosity to Turkey, it is no surprise 
Serbia was perceived as the closest natural ally of Greece. In addition, Nachertanie and 
Megale complement each other territorially and programmatically as both Greece and 
Serbia were seeking expansion in Albanian and Bulgarian-populated territories and both 
shared interest in demolishing the Ottoman Empire. This is how the idea of Serbia as the 
most trustworthy Greek ally was born. Serbia was perceived as ideationally enlightened 
agent in terms of cooperation, since it could facilitate the Greeks by helping Greece in 
its territorial quest against Bulgarians, Albanians and Ottomans. The period when 
Megale Idea (1830-1832) and Nachertanie (1843) crystallized is the critical juncture 
when the idea of Greek-Serbian ‗eternal‘ alliance emerged as a result of overlapping 
interests.  The idea that Bulgarians, Albanians and Turks have contradictory interests to 
the Greeks and are ‗the enemy‘ was institutionalized as well. 
 
Since 1830-1843 these ideas became institutionalized mostly through the schooling 
system, or in other words becoming programmatic beliefs, shaping the normative 
guidelines of Greek political actors that cooperation with Bulgarians, Albanians and 
Turks is not appropriate and that cooperation with Serbia is highly desired and 
normatively acceptable. Such an ideational configuration contributes to explaining 
subsequent Greek policy choices of persistent cooperation/obstruction towards certain 
neighbours during most of the XX c. Greece and Serbia (later Yugoslavia) sided not 
only in both Balkan Wars 1912-1913, but also in the two World Wars and maintained 
warm relations, in spite of the ideological differences during the Cold War.  On the 
contrary Greece and Bulgaria have developed highly antagonistic path-dependent 
policies of obstruction towards each other that remained remarkably persistent, 
regardless of changing external factors during the early XX c., the two Balkan Wars, 
two World Wars, the Cold War and the 1990s. 
 
 
How programmatic beliefs „Bulgarians are enemies‟ shaped policies of 
obstruction towards Bulgaria 
 
After we have identified how programmatic beliefs towards Bulgarians crystallized, in 
this section we explore if in critical periods, like the two Balkan Wars, two World Wars, 
the Cold War, the Fall of Communism, etc. (when ideas are most likely to change), we 
observe a significant change of the given set of ideas in Greece about Bulgaria. Then we 
correlate it with the policies between Greece and Bulgaria in that historical moment. In 
general, if the given set of ideas did not largely change, we could expect no significant 
change in the existing policies of obstruction (denationalization of the minority of the 
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other, negative propaganda and lack of political, social and economic cooperation). 
However, if we find policy change (no denationalization, negative propaganda and 
existing political, social and economic cooperation) that would most likely mean that 
there is change in the given set of ideas. This is done through the methods of process 
tracing and decision-making during crises analysis.  In addition the study of the 
distinctive historical and structural contexts of Greece and Bulgaria during the different 
periods should help uncover the most important factors influencing the development 
and decision making of respective political elites. 
Late XIX c.-Early XX c. 
 
First step towards the fulfilment of the Megale Idea was achieved in 1864, when Britain 
ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece as a reward for adopting a pro-British King George I 
(1864–1913). (Fig.1) A second step was fulfilled when, taking advantage of the Russo-
Turkish War (1877-78), Greeks received Thessaly and parts of Epirus in1881 (see Fig.6 
and Fig. 10A). 
 
Fig. 6 The Evolution of the Greek State: 1832-1947. 24 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Map Greece expansion 1832-1947-fr.svg (adaptation of Image: Population exchange 1923.gif, GFDL). Image 
renamed from Image: L'expansion territoriale de la Grèce 1832-1947.svg, Historicair, translator Rursus 
 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third phase of the achievement of the Megale would not go as smoothly. Thessaly 
and the Ionian Islands were predominantly Greek, so unification proceeded with few 
obstacles. However, Macedonia and Epirus had predominantly Bulgarian-Slav and 
Albanian population respectively and very few Greeks.
25
 Serbia also aspired to the 
northern parts of Macedonia, despite the fact that she did not have any substantial 
population on that territory. The ardour with which Greece aspired to the region of 
Macedonia and Epirus were direct result of the nineteenth century‘s Megale and modern 
Greek nationalists who took as a territorial basis for a reconstituted Greece the 
Byzantium Empire at its fullest extent. The territories belonging to the former Byzantine 
Empire were for centuries populated by Slavic, Albanian, Turkish, Vlach populations, 
since it was a universal Christian Empire, populated by many nationalities. In areas, 
such as Northern Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace and Anatolia, Greeks lived mostly in the 
peripheries.
26
 
 
Guided by the  prescriptions of the already-forming Great Idea in the the nineteenth 
century, the Greek Patriarchate started to work effectively to Hellenize the Slav 
population in Macedonia and Albanian in Epirus by establishing various religious 
educational institutions and setting up Greek schools in the non-Greek territories. They 
received further support through the institutions of the liberated Greek state (1830). If 
such polices were somehow not that explicit, the first very clear clash between 
Bulgarian and Greeks occurred after 1870, when the Bulgarian Exarchate declared 
autonomy from the Constantinople Greek Patriarchate, after decades of church struggle. 
Majority of the Slav population in Macedonia declared allegiance to the Bulgarian 
Exarchate in plebiscites (1871-1873).  The Treaty of Berlin (1878), creating an 
independent Bulgarian state left large masses of Bulgarian population in Macedonia and 
Thrace under Turkish rule. They were deprived of political independence, but had their 
religious autonomy under the Exarchate.  
 
The Ilinden (St Elijah‘s Day) Uprising (1903) aimed at national independence of the 
Slav population in Macedonia with a final result incorporation in Bulgaria, or creation 
                                                 
25 Ethnographie Des Vilayets D'Adrianople, De Monastir et De Salonique Courrier D Orient, (Ethnography of the 
Adrianople, Monastir and Thessaloniki regions), (Constantinople, 1878) and Ireneusz Slupkov, The Communist Party of 
Greece and the Macedonian National Problem 1918-1940, (Szczecin, 2006), p. 110.  
26 Slupkov, The Communist, p.11. 
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of an independent Macedonian state, if the Great Powers do not agree to the former. The 
uprising was brutally suppressed by Ottomans after three months of struggle. The 
Bulgarian Exarchate‘s growing influence in Macedonia and the Ilinden Uprising 
signalled to Greeks that they were gradually loosing these regions to the Bulgarian Idea. 
Guided by the programmatic beliefs that Bulgarians are the ultimate rivals for the spoils 
of the falling Ottoman Empire, after 1903 Greece intensified its obstruction policies 
towards Bulgaria and namely initiated campaign to Hellenize the Slav population in 
Macedonia. The Greek state organised military units of Greek andarts, Greek state-
sponosred military officers who were sent to Macedonia in order to thwart Bulgarian 
efforts to bring all of the Slavic speaking majority population of Macedonia on their 
side by prevent the population from switching allegiance from the Patriarchate to the 
Exarchate. The most famous was Pavlos Melas, who after his death, soon after he 
entered Macedonia was considered to be the symbol of the Greek cause in Macedonia. 
 
The andarts abused their status and started terrorising and killing the innocent civilian 
population.
27
 This led to bloody conflicts between local Bulgarian chetas (bands), many 
of which formed during the Ilinden Uprising and Greek andarts between 1904 and 1908. 
These events later became known in Greek historiography as the Greek Struggle for 
Macedonia (Μακεδονικός Ἀγών). In other words the Greek Struggle for Macedonia had 
an aim to defend the Greek and Greek Orthodox clerical interests against the Bulgarians 
in then Ottoman Turkish-ruled Macedonia. The struggle was officially put to an end by 
the Young Turks‘ revolution in 1908, but tension continued until the Balkan Wars 
(1912-1913). The Greek state, through its Consulate in Thessaloniki became the centre 
of the struggle, coordinating the guerrilla troops, distributing of military material and 
nursing wounded. Fierce conflicts between the Greeks and Bulgarians started in the area 
of Kostur (Kastoria), in the Giannitsa (Pazar) and elsewhere; both parties committed 
cruel crimes at points.
28
 
 
The andarts also closely collaborated with the Greek Church and the Greek government. 
Brailsford writes in his personal account: ‗The leaders of the Greek Orthodox Church 
were the most crazed supporters of the Greek state‘s plan to eliminate the Bulgarian 
element from Macedonia. This allegiance is typified by the actions of the Metropolitan 
Bishop Germanos Karavangelis‘, nicknamed the Devil‘s Disciple for his actions.29 
Karavangelis was sent to Macedonia by the ambassador of Greece Nikolaos 
Mavrokordatos and the consul of Greece in Monastiri, Ion Dragoumis, realising that it 
was time to act in a more efficient way and started organising Greek opposition. 
Information on Karavangelis‘s psychotic behaviour is available directly from his 
autobiography, published in 1959 by the Salonica Institute for Studies. In that work we 
note admissions and comments by Karavangelis.
30
 He was the first and most fervent 
champion of the emergence of the Andarts movement in Macedonia.  For seven years 
(1900-1907), as Metropolitan Bishop of Kostur/Kastoria (Slavic/Greek), he maintained 
the slogan ‗let no single Bulgarian remain alive‘, not only followed in practice, but 
printed in books, on post cards, etc. as a manifestation of the state sponsored campaign 
                                                 
27 Lithoksoou, Dimitrios, The Greek Anti-Macedonian Struggle: From Ilinden to Zagorichani (1903-1905) [Ellinikos 
Antimakedonikhos Aghonas: Apo to Illinten sti Zagkoritsani (1903-1905)], (Athens: Ekdoseis Megali Poreia, 1998). 
28 Ioannis Koliopoulos, History of Greece from 1800, Nation, State and Society, (Thessaloniki, 2000). 
29 Dr HN Brailsford, Personal Account- Macedonia: Its Races and their Future 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1906),  pp. 193-194. 
30 Germanos Karavangelis  ‗The Macedonian struggle‘, Archives of the Macedonian struggle of Penelope Delta, 
(Thessaloniki, 1959), Γερμανού Καραβαγγέλη. "Ο Μακεδονικός Αγών (Απομνημονεύμαηα), Εηαιρία Μακεδονικών 
Σποσδών, Ίδρσμα Μελεηών Χερζονήζοσ ηοσ Αίμοσ", 1959  
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against Bulgaria by the Greek government both in Greece and in the region of 
Macedonia (see Fig .7) Similar state-sponsored campaign against Greece was initiated 
by the Bulgarian state (explored in the next chapter) that culminated in the Anti-Greek 
riots in Bulgaria in  1906.
31
 
 
Fig. 7 Greek Propaganda Post Card from the Macedonian Struggle with Pavlos Melas 
and the slogan -Voulgaros Na Mi Meini (Let no single Bulgarian remain alive), the 
Motto of Greek Andarts
32
 
 
In his memoirs, Karavangelis admits that together with Vardas, a Greek army officer, he 
inspired and helped organise the massacres against the Slav villages of Zeleniche 
(Lerin) and Zagorichane (Kostur).
33
 Massacres which shocked the international 
                                                 
31 Kostadin Kostadinov, The Anti-Greek Movement in Varna , (Fondacia VMRO: Varna, 2009) 
32 Source: Petar Dobrev, ‗Review of Anastasia Karakasidou‘, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood,  
http://images.google.bg/imgres?imgurl=http://e-
vestnik.bg/imgs/bulgaria/Bulgarin%2520da%2520ne%2520ostane_976.jpg&imgrefurl=http://e-
vestnik.bg/3743&h=553&w=850&sz=129&hl=bg&start=11&um=1&usg=___yfqXLQtqwfzuWh7G90uwfBDljI=&tbnid=9oP
1JmnbRW4uEM:&tbnh=94&tbnw=145&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dpavlos%2Bmelas%26ndsp%3D20%26um%3D1%26hl
%3Dbg%26sa%3DN, accessed October 2008. 
33 The burning of the village of Zagorichane (Kostur district) and the massacre of its inhabitants was done by 7 Greek 
andart bands (lead by the so-called ‗kapetans‘ Vardas [Lt Georgios Tsontos from Crete as chief commander], Kaudis, 
Karavitis, Makris, Kukulakis, Pulanas, and Melios) on 25th of March 1905. It is also important to state that at the time of 
the Greek attack on Zagorichane, there were no Bulgarian revolutionaries in the village. Also, just a few days before the 
attack, the Turkish asker (commander) came to the village to search for arms. Before he entered, the asker had his 
troops blow military horns, an act which frightened the village population.  
 
However, the Turkish officer explained to the peasants, that this sounding of horns was simply a military protocol, and 
whenever they heard it they should remain calm and realise it meant no danger. Not uncoincidently the Greek attack on 
Zagorichane began with the same blowing of military horns as used by the Turks. Stamatis Raptis provides the andarts‘ 
quote that ‗When Bulgarians hear the horn, they will think, that it is a  Turkish asker, and will hurry to hide their 
weapons, where they can. So that we shall have time.‘ The massacre at Zagorichane was documented afterwards by 
the Italian gendarme officers Manera, Gastoldi and Albera, Russian consul Kol, Austro-Hungarian consul Prohaska, 
and many others. In his report the Bulgarian diplomat A. Toshev wrote ‗They - Russian and Austrian consuls, and 
Italian officers Albera, Gastoldi and Manera - were horrified at all that they saw and found.  
 
The streets, and around the church, was strewn with corpses, many of which had been sadistically mutilated. There 
were 5-year-old children with their stomachs cut-open and their intestines ripped out; murdered women with their arms 
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community by the level of depravity and sadism which occurred. Karavangelis writes 
that he regularly used assassins to eliminate people he had pre-selected. These killers 
were paid 5 pounds by Karavangelis, on delivery of the person's severed head. He 
admitted being proud of his actions, that he had one of these ‗trophies‘ photographed 
and displayed in his office in his bishoprics (see Fig. 8 and 9).
34
 This was the head of a 
Bulgarian cheta leader Lazar Poptraykov. This is also witnessed by Brailsford, who 
writes, 
 
But there, above my head, on the wall, in a conspicuous place hung the photograph of a 
ghastly head, severed at the neck, with a bullet through the jaw, dripping blood. And then 
I remember the tale. That head belonged to a Bulgarian chief. A band of bravoes in the 
Archbishop's pay had murdered him as he lay wounded in hiding. And the tale went on to 
tell how the murderers carried the bleeding trophy to the Palace and how the Archbishop 
had had it photographed and paid its price of fifty pieces of gold. And there, over my 
head, hung the photograph. Somehow, we stopped talking moral philosophy.
35
 
 
As the level of Andart activity increased, he writes in his autobiography  
‘I kept regular contact with them [andarts] through the consulate in Bitola and the 
Metropolitan bishops. I personally met them and instructed them to kill all priests and 
Bulgarian teachers.‘36 Karavangelis succeeded to enstrenghten the Greek positions in 
Macedonia and thus according to the Greek historians helped the later incorporation of a 
part of Macedonia by Greece in the Balkan Wars, for which Greece officially praises 
him as a national hero of the Greek Struggle for Macedonia. He is referred to as one of 
the so-called Macedonian fighters (Makedonomachos). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
hacked off. Some of the dead had their skulls smashed and their brains removed, others had eyes gouged out, many 
had severed limbs. The body of the 60 year old priest was covered with wounds. An entire family had been killed by 
bombs thrown through the chimney, and from two holes in the roof. The bodies of the father, mother, and two children 
were appalling disfigured by the bombs. The youngest child, a 5 year old girl, had tried to escape through the door, but 
was killed by Greek bayonets. Russian consul Mr Kol was weeping. Austrian consul Mr Prohaska also had tears in his 
eyes. They both claimed that they had not witnessed such horrors and barbarities even in the time of the rebellion 
(1903).‘ 
Source: Stamatis Raptis, O kapetan Poulakas - Captain Pulakas. All Macedonian Struggle. Heroic Battles. Avengers 
Bulgarian-Killers. Most Patriotical Reading. With the True Images of the Heroes, (Athens, 1910), p. 990  and A.Toshev 
Report (No. 447, from 30th of March, 1905). 
34 Karavangelis  ‗The Macedonian struggle‘. 
35 Dr HN Brailsford, Personal Account, pp. 193-194. 
36 Karavangelis  ‗The Macedonian struggle‘. 
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Fig. 8 Lazar Poptraykov 1878-1905 
 
 
Fig. 9   Photograph of the severed head of the Bulgarian cheta leader and poet, Lazar Pop 
Traykov, killed by andarts in October 1905 at the instigation of the Greek Archbishop 
Karavangelis. 
37
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Source: Macedonian Scientific Institute, Illustartion Ilinden (Илюстрация Илинден) Magazine, Vol. 6 (1), 1929, p. 6. 
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The success of Greek efforts in Macedonia during the so-called Struggle for Macedonia 
(1903-1908) was an experience that gave confidence to the Greek state. It caused large 
masses of the Slav population in Macedonia to stay under the Greek Patriarchate, rather 
than the Bulgarian Exarchate. The Slav population that stayed under the Patriarchate 
was called Graecoman [Greek leaning] by Bulgarians and Slav-speaking Hellenes by 
Greece. The presence of such Slav population, leaning towards Greece gave grounds for 
the latter to seek expansion into most of Macedonia, referring to the Graecomans as 
Slav-speaking Greeks. After the Balkan Wars the part of Macedonia ceded to Greece 
included most of the areas that they controlled during the conflicts with the Bulgarians 
from 1903 to 1908. Megale Idea was put to practice and since Bulgarians and Albanians 
were perceived as enemies over the future spoils of the Ottoman Empire, cooperation 
with them was not appropriate and this was the period when in Greece the first policies 
of obstruction towards Bulgaria were officially adopted as a result of such ideas. The 
polices included the Hellenization of the Slavs in Macedonia, the negative propaganda 
against Bulgarians in Greece and among the population of Macedonia and the total lack 
of political, economic and social cooperation between the two states. 
 
Balkan Wars and WWI 
 
We explored that Greek obstruction polices towards Bulgaria in the period 1904-1908 
could largely be explained by the programmatic beliefs –Bulgarians are enemies and the 
main contenders over the spoils of the Ottoman Empire. Let us explore if there is 
significant change to such programmatic beliefs and the policies of obstruction during 
the following period of the Balkan Wars. Exploiting the growing instability of the 
Ottoman Empire flowing from the Young Turks‘ Revolution (1908-1909) and the Italo-
Turkish War (1911-1912), Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia formed a secret 
alliance and simultaneously declared war on the Ottomans in October 1912. What made 
such an uneasy alliance possible was the fact that no single country could defeat the 
Ottomans.  
 
The main aim of the war was to liberate all remaining Christian subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire, since all four countries still had significant populations under Ottoman power. 
After the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 Serbia had more than doubled its territory by 
acquiring significant territories to the East on the boundary with Bulgaria, Greece 
expanded into Thessaly and newly liberated Bulgaria (1878) was enlarged by the bald 
unification of the two Bulgarian states (1885), artificially separated by the Great Powers 
with the Treaty of Berlin (1878) to prevent from creating a strong Slavic state near the 
Straits. Therefore, with a new acquired confidence these young Balkan states declared 
war on Turkey, after the latter rejected their ultimatum for administrative reform and 
autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace. The four countries (The Balkan League) entered 
the war with their own national agendas. Bulgaria was aiming at Macedonia and 
Western Thrace and an outlet to the Aegean, Serbia looked for expansion into Vardar 
Macedonia, parts of Albania and outlet to the Adriatic Sea, Greece wanted Macedonia, 
Epirus and numerous Aegean islands. Montenegro was looking for territorial expansion 
into North Albania, the Shkodra region. 
 
On May 30, 1913, Turkey signed the Treaty of London, conceding all its European 
territories beyond the Midia-Enos line to the allies, except for a strip of land, around the 
Straits. Serbia and Greece refused to withdraw from any territory in Macedonia and 
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Thrace in spite of the pre-war arrangements with Bulgaria and the fact that both 
countries had agreed that those territories should go to Bulgaria if the League was 
victorious. Two days after the signing of the London Peace Treaty, Greece and Serbia 
concluded a secret pact with a military protocol against Bulgaria. Greece was acting 
according to its programmatic beliefs that Bulgarians are enemies and Serbians are 
friends, regardless of the pre-war arrangements and the normative prescriptions to 
cooperate with Serbia against Bulgaria to achieve the Megale. It dictated that 
Macedonia and Thrace are the next step towards the ‗Return to Constantinople‘. Serbia 
was acting in compliance with its secret programme of 1843 Nachertanie that dictated 
that Serbia should control Vardar Macedonia and acquire a common border with Greece 
at any price. Bulgaria was trying to incorporate all territories which had in 1870 joined 
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church Exarchate, which if accomplished would re-enact the 
short-lived San Stefano Treaty (1878), that created a large Bulgarian state. Serbia and 
Greece acting on their institutional and ideational logic expected that, if victorious, they 
would come into conflict with Bulgaria. It seems that the Bulgarian governments 
underestimated the special ties that had developed between Greece and Serbia in the 
previous eighty years from Greek Liberation to the Balkan Wars (1832-1912). Serbia 
signed a secret alliance against the Turks with Bulgaria on 13 March 1912 and Greco-
Bulgarian alliance followed on 29 May 1912. At the same time Greece and Serbia had 
signed a secret agreement in 1867 agreeing to partition Macedonian territories at 
Bulgarian expense. The document stated that the two countries should cooperate with 
all means possible to have a common frontier. 
 
By knowing the programmatic beliefs of Greece one can understand that having to 
choose to respect either the secret pact signed with Serbia against Bulgaria or the one 
concluded with Bulgaria against Turkey, the Greeks would follow the former as Serbia 
was perceived as closest partner. Bulgaria was perceived as an enemy, as evidenced by 
the centuries‘ long church and educational struggle and the Struggle over Macedonia 
(1904-1908). The second pact and military protocol against Bulgaria, concluded on 1 
June 1913, by former allies Greece and Serbia, comes as no surprise, but as a 
completely appropriate policy dictated by the ideational institutional contexts of the 
latter countries. 
 
By the terms of the treaty of alliance the two states agreed upon a mutual guarantee of 
territory, promised not to come to any separate understanding with Bulgaria in regard to 
the division of the former Turkish territory in Europe, drew a common boundary line for 
the two states, defined a Serbo-Bulgarian boundary line which was to be claimed, and 
bound themselves ‗to afford assistance with all their armed forces,‘ if Bulgaria ‗should 
attempt to impose her claims by force.‘ The alliance was to last for at least ten years. The 
treaty included a stipulation that it ‘be kept strictly secret’. By this treaty Serbia secured, 
as she hoped, the possession of Monastir and the surrounding districts, and Greece 
secured Saloniki and Kavalla. The treaty was, of course, one of reciprocal obligation. If 
Bulgaria threatened Greece, Greece was entitled to call upon Serbia for aid. Should Serbia 
be attacked by Bulgaria, Greece was bound to go to the aid of Serbia.
 38
 
 
By referring to the programmatic beliefs, we could easily outline what the actual 
priorities for the Greek foreign policy in the period 1830-1920 were. The Balkan 
League Pact was doomed at the time of its signing. As a result of the two Balkan Wars, 
                                                 
38 Frank Maloy Anderson and Amos Shartle Hershey, ‗The Greco-Serbian Alliance, 1913‘ in  Handbook for the 
Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa 1870-1914, Prepared for the National Board for Historical Service, 
Government Printing Office: Washington, 1918,  excerpt   http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos150.htm, p. 
1, (emphasis added) 
 64 
Greece gained southern Epirus, coastal Macedonia, Crete, and the Aegean islands 
except the Dodecanese, which had been acquired by Italy. These gains nearly doubled 
Greece‘s area and population and Megale seemed within reach (Fig. 5). Such favourable 
outcome for Greece would hardly be possible without the guidance of Eleftherios 
Venizelos (1864-1936), statesman, Prime Minister and ardent supporter of the Megale. 
During the WWI, both the Triple Entente and the Central Powers, tried to form alliances 
in the Balkans. Both alliances promised privileges to any country that took their side. 
Eventually, Serbia allied with the Triple Entente while Bulgaria and Turkey preferred 
the Central Powers. Prime Minsiter Venizelos shaped through the traditional Greek 
programmatic beliefs also argued that Greece should enter the war on the side of Serbia, 
against Bulgaria. He was also urged by the defense treaty of 1913, according to which 
Greece was obliged to come to Serbia‘s aid if attacked from the Kingdom of Bulgaria. 39  
As in the Balkan Wars, Greek political leaders chose to side with Serbia against 
Bulgaria, following their logic of appropriateness that precluded any form of political, 
economic and social cooperation with the latter.  
 
Siding with the victorious powers in World War I, according to the Treaty of Sevres 
(August 1920) Greece was awarded all of Thrace and a large area of western Anatolia in 
Asia Minor around Smyrna. The future of Constantinople was left to be determined. 
The treaty was never ratified. A new Turkish nationalist movement, lead by Mustapha 
Kemal (later Kemal Ataturk), led a successful war of resistance. The Greeks were 
routed and Smyrna fell to the Turks in August 1922. The Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 
1923) fixed the boundaries between Greece and Turkey and imposed exchange of 
populations. More than a million Greeks had to be resettled from Turkish territory to 
Greece and 500,000 Turks and a large number of Albanians and Bulgarians were 
expelled from Greece. Those refugees would later come to play a significant part in 
Greek politics, and especially those settled among indigenous Slav population near 
Thessaloniki and the Greek northern border, causing unrest in Slav villages and taking 
part in the Civil War (1946-1949). Greece was also forced to yield eastern Thrace, 
Imbros and Tenedos to Turkey.‘40 This was referred as to the Smyrna Catastrophe in 
Greek historiography. 
                                                 
39 John Keegan, The First World War, (Knopf, 1999),  pp. 5-40. 
40 ‗Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne‘, July 24, 1923 in The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. II, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1924. 
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Fig. 10 A. The territorial accretion of Greece, 1830–1947 
B. The partition of Macedonia 
C. Slav ethnic traces in Greek Macedonia and Albania
41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Source: John Agnew, No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p. 407. 
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Since Greece no longer dreamed of expansion, it turned to policies of state 
consolidation. 
Interwar Period (1923-1936) 
 
The Smyrna catastrophe marked the end of Megale in its classical form, but it did not 
alter the already institutionalized beliefs of Bulgarians as an enemy, neither had it 
changed the normative criteria that cooperation with them is not appropriate, regardless 
of the very changed external context. The interwar period marked a shift in the Greek 
foreign policy. If the dominant idea of the previous period 1830-1922 was ‗looking 
outside‘ at territorial expansion in line with Megale Idea, the period 1923-1946 was a 
period of almost constant crisis marked by ‗looking inside‘ with the idea of preserving 
the status-quo and the integrity of the country. In spite of the population exchanges 
with, Bulgaria, Albania and Turkey, the Greek state still had significant Slav, Albanians 
and Turk populations in the newly acquired territories to the North (see Fig. 10 C).
 42
  
 
The Ideational shift was, then, towards consolidating the Greek element in the newly 
acquired lands, in other words assertion of national identity.  The large Bulgarian 
minority that found itself in Greece after WWI was perceived as the ‗the enemy within‘, 
while Bulgaria was viewed as the ‗enemy from the North‘ in line with traditional Greek 
programmatic beliefs (see Fig. 10 C).  Therefore, the new situation and changed 
environment, neither significantly challenged the old perceptions of enemies and 
friends, nor had real policy implications. In other words, Megale was muted in its 
classical form, but its legacy was felt in the new idea of ‗the enemy within‘, namely the 
foreign populations in the new territories should become Greek, or would pose a threat 
to national integrity. This was evidenced by the statement of educational minister 
Papandreou: 
 
The Great Idea remains immortal. It simply changed its content. Instead of the increase of 
territory, it aims at the increase and elevation of civilization… The nation united strives 
for its economic, intellectual, and moral development.
 43
 
 
                                                 
42 The research will refer to the Slavic population, remaining in Greece after the Balkan Wars as Slav, rather than 
Bulgarian or Macedonian. Linguists before  the war  tended  to consider Slavonic-oriented idioms  in Greek Macedonia 
and southern Yugoslavia--now  the Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of Macedonia  (FYROM)--as  western Bulgarian 
dialects. The large part of the population in the region, split between Yugoslavia (40%), Greece (52%) and Bulgaria 
(8%) in 1913, on numerous occasions had manifested its Bulgarian allegiance, evidenced by Ottoman archives, 
Patriarchate and Exarchate church archives, birth certificates, war actions, etc.    
 
Since 1944, however, the idioms spoken in regions of FYROM were transformed, by government decree, into a  literary  
language  named  Makedonski.   Political considerations  in Yugoslavia at  the  time sought to weaken the ties with the 
Bulgarian language and instead to strengthen the linguistic  links  with  Serbo-Croatian  and  other  Slavonic languages. 
After that a separate Macedonian identity emerged in FYROM. In Greek Macedonia some of the Slavs continued to 
identify with Bulgaria, while others developed Macedonian national identity. Therefore, for practical reasons the 
research will refer to the minority in Northern Greece as Slavs or Slav Macedonians, without any political connotation, 
but to delimit it from Greek majority. 
 
Source: Human Rights Watch- Report ‗Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece‘, (Library of Congress 
Catalog Card Number: 94-75891, USA, 1994), p. 38. 
43 G. Papandreou, Politika Keimena, quoted in Mark Mazower, Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis, (Oxford, 
1991), p. 34. 
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If ‗improvement was the national ideal, national unity was the necessary prerequisite to 
attain that ideal, and social stability was the primary element needed to attain that unity. 
That is why the interwar period is characterized by brutal polices of Hellenization.‘44 
That was a policy of securitization of minorities plus national integration defined by 
reference to 'the other'. Attitudes towards neighbours did not dramatically change after 
the Smyrna crisis; for Greeks, Serbians were the allies, and Bulgarians, Albanians and 
Turks were still regarded as ‗the enemy‘. 45 Difference is that if before 1923 the conflict 
was localized at the contact zones of those ethnic groups, while after 1923 the conflict 
was within the territory of the expanded Greek state with a large number of non-Greek 
populations. Koliopoulos and Veremis write that ‗with the acquisition of Epirus and 
Macedonia in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 the frontier was pushed so far to the north 
and northwest that the Greeks met and faced‘ new realities deep into Bulgarian and 
Albanian populations.
46
 Also, ‗the frontier was no longer a gate leading to the promised 
land or a world…that exercised irresistible attraction and fascination‘ of unredeemed 
Greek lands. Rather ‗the long and vulnerable new frontier was an outpost of Hellenism 
facing the Barbarians and keeping at bay enemies who coveted the Hellenic state.‘47The 
land beyond was no longer inviting;  This perception was reinforced ‗after the 1940-1 
Axis invasion from the north and the 1946-9 Civil War, in which the country‘s 
Communists received political and military support from that quarter, the northern 
frontier and the north itself came to be associated with insecurity and war.‘48 The ideas 
that came to dominate the Greek political and institutional context after 1923 could be 
summarized as defence from the 'danger from the north' outside the country and active 
process of Hellenization towards the ‗enemy within‘ (Slav, Albanian, Turk  minorities) 
inside the country. 
 
In line with the idea that ‗everyone who lives in Greece should be Greek‘, Greek elites 
devised elaborate policies to accomplish that aim. By the Treaty of Lausanne in July 
1923, the Greco-Turkish war came to an end. Greece and Turkey signed a population 
exchange agreement using 'religion as the basic criterion for nationality'.
49
 The total 
population in Greece rose between 1907 and 1928 from 2,600,000 to 6,200,000.
50
 Many 
of those came from Asia Minor following the Smyrna crisis. Not surprisingly ‗searching 
for locations in which to settle this mass of humanity, the Greek government looked 
north to the newly incorporated land in Macedonia‘ and ‗by 1930, 90 percent of the 
578,844 refugees settled in rural Greece were concentrated in the regions of Macedonia 
and western Thrace. Thus Macedonia, Greece‘s newly acquired second "breadbasket" 
(after Thessaly), became the depository for East Thracian, Pontic, and Asia Minor 
refugees.‘51 The new arrivals were quite heterogeneous and ‗the hundreds of different 
communities had very little in common save their Christian religion and a weak 
                                                 
44 Gerasimos Augustinos, Hellenism and the Modern Greeks in Peter Sugar, Eastern European Nationalism in the 
Twentieth Century, (Washington D.C.: American University Press, 1995), p. 181. 
45 The constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1.12. 1918, and later Yugoslavia did not affect 
much Greek political perception, since the country dominated by Belgrade, and policies devised closely following 
Serbian national aspirations  Misha Glenny,  Balkans: 1804-1999 Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, p. 366. 
46 John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, Greece-The Modern Sequel: From 1821 to the Present, (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2002), p.331. 
47 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece, p. 331. 
48 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece, p. 332. 
49 Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 120. 
50 Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, p. 121. 
51 Anastasia Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 145. 
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penetration of Megale‘52 Furthermore, newcomers were settled among Slavic, Albanian 
(Aegean Macedonia) and Turkish (remaining pockets in Western Thrace) population 
and local Greek population, creating further social problems, where coexistence was 
already uneasy. The conflicts between the local population and the refugees from Asia 
Minor were quite pronounced. During my visit to numerous villages in the region of 
Lerin (Florina), Kostur (Kastoria) and Voden (Edhessa) in Aegean Macedonia, people 
still referred to categories such as endopii (locals) and madzhiri (refugees).
53
 
54
Eighty 
years after the influx of refugees local villagers were explaining how many houses 
belong to the endopi and how many to the madzhiri. Nearly, a century later the two 
communities did not marry between themselves and kept memories of the conflicts over 
land, houses, etc when after the war Greece was bankrupt. The severe economic 
difficulties that interwar Greece faced were invariably blamed on minorities and 
partially on refugees. 
 
The Smyrna catastrophe marked the end of the state building era and signified the 
beginning of an era of overcoming economic and political crisis and state consolidation. 
In other words, that meant that after the Bulgarian-Greek (1919) and the Turkish-Greek 
(1923) population exchange, the minority issue was considered close and that everyone 
who stayed in Greece in the newly-acquired lands to the north should be Greek.
55
 If 
Greece ‗exists today as a homogeneous ethnos, she owes this to [the Asia Minor 
Catastrophe]. If the hundreds of thousands of refugees had not come to Greece, Greek 
Macedonia would not exist today. The refugees created the national homogeneity of our 
country.‘56 Speaking numbers 'after the Greek advances of 1912, for instance, the Greek 
elements in Greek Macedonia had constituted 43 percent of the population. By 1926, 
with the resettlement of the refugees, the Greek element has risen to 89 percent.'
57
 The 
Hellenization idea has penetrated all state institutions and media of the time. Anything 
foreign is presented as Barbarian. This is evidenced by a publication in Vradini 
Newspaper, typical of the time: 
 
Our Macedonian question is neither a question of the population‘s language, nor of the 
Bulgarian Macedonian Committee…nor of our military weakness in Macedonia. It is a 
question of adapting the local population to the Greek organism- a question of its official 
assimilation. To be able to win over the Bulgarian symbols in Macedonia, we would need 
to create from the inside, from local population other symbols, which would be superior 
or at least equal to the Bulgarian ones. Does anyone know of another means, to 
permanently bring peace to the region and forever secure Macedonia from Greek point of 
                                                 
52 Misha Glenny,  Balkans: 1804-1999 Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (London: Granta Books, 1999), p. 394 
53 Interview with A.B.,B.C., D.D dwellers of  Embore (Emborio) village, Kaylari region, 20.10.2009, field notes [in 
Bulgarian]. 
54 Interview with T.T., S.S., A. K- dwellers of Vrbeni (Ekshi su) and Voshtarani (Meliti) in the Lerin (Florina) , 21.10.2009, 
field notes [in Bulgarian]. 
55 The Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine was signed on November 27, 1919. It was dealing with Bulgaria for its role as one of 
the Central Powers in World War I. The treaty established borders over contested territory between Bulgaria, Turkey, 
Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. As a Central Powers belligerent, Bulgaria had  to cede 
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and was required to reduce its army to 20,000 men, pay reparations exceeding $400 million. As a consequence of the 
Treaty of Neuilly some 50-70 000 Slav-speakers moved to Bulgaria and 25 000 moved to Greece 
56 Antonios Kandiotis, Metrpolite of Florina in  Anastasia Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood, (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 141. 
57 Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, p. 121. 
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view. At least we do not see other means, but clearing up the mess by force by expelling 
the unfortunate foreign tongue population from their villages.
58
 
 
By law promulgated on November 21, 1926 in Government Gazette #331 all names of 
cities, villages, mountains and rivers in Macedonia and Thrace were changed from Slav, 
Albanian and Turkish to Greek and new names published in the government daily 
Efimeris tis Kiverniseos no. 322 and 324 of November 21 and 23, 1926. Thus Kostur 
became Kastoria, Lerin-Florina, Voden-Edhessa, Kukush-Kilkis, Ber-Veria, Greben-
Grevena, Subotsko-Aridhea, etc. Slavic inscriptions and evidence of Slavic language 
were removed from churches, icons, monuments, archaeological sites and cemeteries in 
Macedonia; Slavonic church or secular literature was seized and burned. Church 
services at the local language are outlawed. The use of the Slavic language was strictly 
forbidden also in personal communication between parents and children, among 
villagers, at weddings and work parties, and in burial rituals.
59
 During 1927, the Slav 
people are ordered to abandon their personal names and under duress adopt Greek 
names assigned to them by the Greek state. 
60
 This involved complete change of their 
first names and adopt surnames ending in ‗os‘, ‗is‘, or ‗poulos‘, according to the Greek 
system.
61
  
 
By 1928 1,497 Macedonian place-names in Aegean Macedonia were Hellenized. 
English journalist V. Hild revealed ‗the Greeks do not only persecute living Slavs…, 
but they even persecute dead ones. They do not leave them in peace even in the graves. 
They erase the Slavonic inscriptions on the headstones, remove the bones and burn 
them.‘62 Even nowadays in all areas North of Thessaloniki, there are no graves of 
people buried before 1940s, as though people never lived there before. This is to erase 
the memory that prior to 1912 there was no significant Greek presence in Aegean 
Macedonia north of Thessaloniki, but the region was mostly populated by Turks, 
Bulgarians and Vlachs. 
 
In 1929, under Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, a legal Act was issued and 
enforced On the Protection of Public Order, was promulgated whereby demands for 
nationality rights were defined as high treason. This law is still valid.
63
 Law 4096 
further encourages the Hellenization of places names. The newspapers, schools and 
public places were decorated with posters Voulgarofagos (Bulgar-eater), presenting a 
Greek soldier, drinking the blood of a Bulgarian one (see Fig. 11). Such posters were 
put in many schools in the interwar Greece period. This was an example that the 
negative propaganda towards Bulgarians did not change much and we could observe it 
during the Macedonian struggle, the Balkan Wars, The WWI and in the interwar period. 
The propaganda and Hellenization policies and the complete lack of social, political and 
economic cooperation between Bulgaria and Greece, regardless of external change 
could be explained by the stability of the programmatic beliefs and normative criteria of 
political elites. 
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Fig. 11  Greek Propaganda: The Bulgar-Eater Poster
64
 
 
Metaxas Dictatorship (1936-1941) 
 
The culmination of such policies was reached during the Metaxas dictatorship.
65
 Ioannis 
Metaxas is among the most prominent royalist politicians during the Republic of 1924-
35. After restoration of the monarchy and with the support of King George II, Metaxas 
dissolved parliament on August 4th, 1936 and established a National Socialist regime. 
Within six years, Metaxas ‗implemented dozens of social, industrial and economic 
reforms while stabilizing the tumultuous political situation of those years.‘ He also 
achieved macroeconomic stability. His ‗grandiose vision was to create a Third Greek 
Civilization based on its glorious Ancient and Byzantine past, but what he actually 
created was more a Greek version of the Third Reich.‘ 66 The legacy of Megale was 
present in and influenced both his ideas and the nature of the regime. He continued the 
policies of Hellenization and national consolidation with even more enthusiasm than his 
predecessors did. 
 
On December 18, 1936, Metaxas‘ government issued On the Activity Against State 
Security, on the strength of which thousands of Slavs, Albanians and Muslims were 
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arrested, imprisoned, expelled or exiled to arid, inhospitable Greek islands, where many 
perished. Law 6429 reinforced Law 4096 on Hellenization of toponyms. Decree 87 was 
published to accelerate the denationalisation of the Slav and Albanian Helsinki 
minority. In 1936, the Greek Ministry of Education sends ‗specially trained‘ instructors 
to accelerate conversion to the Greek language.
67
 On September 7, 1938 Act No. 2366 
was issued banning the use of the Slavic local languages. Macedonia was flooded with 
posters: ‗Speak Greek‘ and evening schools were opened in which adults were taught 
Greek.
68
 People were being publicly humiliated by having their tongues pierced by 
needles and having to drink castor oil for being caught speaking the Slav language.
69
 
Metaxas died in 1941, which was the end of his regime, followed by a fascist puppet 
government placed into power through a large-scale German invasion of Greece. 
 
Civil War 1946-1949  
 
The period after the Lausanne Treaty (1923-1946) marked the ideational shift from 
‗outward expansion‘ to ‗inward consolidation‘ from Megale to Hellenization. After 
1944-46, In addition to the already strong identification of ‗others‘ in national terms, it 
introduced the idea of ‗others‘ in terms of ideology, notably Communism. In the power 
vacuum after the German occupation, The Communist Party of Greece (Kommunistikon 
Komma Ellados or KKE) which bore the mark of Moscow controlled Comintern rose in 
prominence. It opposed Hellenization and nationalism, partly because it was drawing its 
largest support from the new territories to the north (Macedonia and Thrace) with their 
significant minority populations. This automatically ‗placed the party on a collision 
course, not only with the ruling parties of the time but with the entire state system.
70
 
KKE and the Comintern brought in the Greek polity new influential ideas that were very 
radical to the whole political establishment. The KKE was immediately presented by its 
opponents both from the internationally recognized Greek government and opposition 
forces ‗as an agent of external subversion-which in sense it was and continued to be for 
most of its life.‘71 The KKE promoted the idea that ‗nation‘s interests lie not with the 
triumph of national aspirations…but in the defeat and humbling of those who pursued 
these aspirations by means of war.‘72 The KKE found popular support in the north 
regions of Greece. ‗Almost two-thirds of the destitute refugees were settled in the part 
of Macedonia which had been won by the Greek army in the Balkan Wars. They were 
settled next to a multilingual population, of which as many as 250,000 were of Slav 
origin before the wars. They and the Vlachs, as well as the Albanians and the Greeks, 
both indigenous and refugees, became a fertile ground for Communist propaganda. 
Furthermore, in 1924 the KKE acting on Comintern instructions introduced the idea to 
create a sizeable Macedonian state using territories from Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia 
and Albania forming a Balkan Soviet republic. The KKE condemned the Greek state's 
efforts to Hellenise parts of Macedonia and Thrace and supported the right of 
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‗Macedonian people‘ and ‗Thracian people‘ to unite their dismembered lands into 
‗independent‘ Communist states. This would have a ‗destabilising effect on the 
―bourgeois‖ governments of the existing nation-states in the region.‘73 The Greek state 
and political elites presented KKE and its supporters as treasonous by advocating for the 
cession of national territory. During Metaxas KKE leaders were imprisoned and 
deported under Law 4229 (1929) passed to combat the spread of ideas seeking to 
overthrow the existing regime. Under the Metaxas dictatorship was when such policies 
were transformed into a crusade against Communism, when the entire leadership and 
almost all middle ranking cadres, numbering 2000 were imprisoned or internally exiled 
on inhospitable Greek islands.
74
 During the Nazi occupation KKE witnessed impressive 
growth of its appeal and supporters. 
 
After the liberation in 1944 the biggest Anti-Nazi resistance organization, the Greek 
People's Liberation Army (Ελληνικός Λαϊκός Απελεσθερωηικός Σηραηός, ELAS), the 
leadership of which was controlled by the KKE, clashed with the British sponsored 
Royalist regime for control of the state. This lead to the brutal Civil War of 1946-9. 
Since most of the KKE‘s popular, support was coming from Macedonia and Thrace, the 
interwar idea of the cultural ‗enemy within‘ was now coupled with the ideological 
‗enemy within.‘ The ELAS and KKE‘s supporters were now portrayed not only Vlach, 
Albanians or Bulgarian/Macedonian ‗others‘, but also Communist Vlach, Albanian or 
Bulgarian/Macedonian ‗others‘. The fatal blow to the KKE was political rather than 
military. When Tito‘s Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Union and its satellites in June 
1949, communist insurgents in Greece lost their closest supporter and subsequently lost 
the war. This was viewed in the west as victory in the Cold War against the Soviet 
Union. However the revolutionary ideas of KKE remained influential in Greek polity 
and KKE's is still a factor in modern Greece. In other words the ideas that KKE 
crystallized did strongly challenge traditional Greek programmatic notions of friends 
and enemies. Furthermore, they challenged the whole existence of Greek polity. 
However, they were not able to displace traditional programmatic beliefs due to the 
short period, intellectual carriers had to propagate their ideas and to the lack of  
institutionalization in the Greek organizational set-up. 
 
Therefore the perception of enemies and friends did not largely change.
75
 For Greece 
the interwar idea of a ‗danger from the north‘ was joined by the ‗ideological enemy 
from the north‘, as communist regimes were established in neighbouring Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia that supported Communist insurgents in Greece.
76
 The civil 
war and its end facilitated Greece's alliance with the United States and joining NATO, 
and further shaped the enemy-perception of Communist northern neighbours. The 
policies of Hellenization through exchange of populations and repressive actions trough 
the machinery of the state have largely been successful. The Greek elements (declaring 
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as Greek) in Greek Macedonia had gone from 43 percent in 1912 to 89 percent in 
1926.
77
 This was further strengthened by the large number of KKE supporters from the 
north regions (many of whom of Slavic origin) emigrating to Albania, Bulgaria or 
Yugoslavia during and after the end of the Civil War. Slavs and Albanians were now 
regarded with suspect not only because of their ethnicity, but in addition because of 
their possible infiltration from the Communist north. 
The Cold War Period (1949-1974) 
 
After completing the task of national consolidation it was a time of economic 
reconstruction and strengthening the ideological division lines along the Cold War 
status-quo.
78
 US influence on Greek policy making increased dramatically due to factors 
as ‗strategic concern over a Soviet or a Balkan threat; the solely needed economic aid to 
finance reconstruction; and the political weight that the stamp of US endorsement 
carried in the 1950s.‘79 Greece joined NATO in 1952. Conservatives and liberals agreed 
that ‗Greece‘s main security was in the northern borders, that Communism threatened 
common cherished values, that NATO was indispensable for the defence of the country, 
and that  America was Greece‘s natural ally and guarantor‘ for the next three decades.80 
 
Regarding the minority policies, in 1947 those who had fought against the government 
in the civil war and fled Greece were deprived of their citizenship   and their property 
confiscated by the state.
81
 Due to the fact that the Slav and Albanian minority joined the 
forces of KKE, after the war the Hellenization policies of 1923-1949 were significantly 
intensified. This is evidenced by a publication in Macedonia newspaper: 
 
We believe that the people responsible should more seriously start changing the names of 
many lakes, rivers, mountains, towns, villages, etc. In Old Greece, even in Peloponnesus , 
let us not be ashamed there are Bulgarian and Turkish names, such as Turnovo, Zmokovo, 
Dobrena, Tzaritchena, Prostova, Varibombi, Demilri, etc.  After the liberation of Thrace 
and Macedonia from Turkish yoke there was a very serious campaign for rooting out 
foreign names. We need to start a new policy to liquidate once and for all the foreign 
Barbaric names.
82
 
 
In Greece the ideological fight with communism was used as a pretext for following 
persistent and structured obstruction policies in line with traditional nationalist 
ideology. With the pretext to protect Greece against communist influence, several laws 
were introduced that allowed further confiscation of property of those who left the 
country during the Civil War. During my visit to the regions of Lerin (Florina), Kostur 
(Kastoria) and Voden (Edhessa) in September 2008, nearly in all villages the 
grandfather generation spoke freely only the Slavic idiom, the middle generation spoke 
Greek and the Slavic idiom with more difficulty, while the younger generation mostly 
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knew Greek and English and could not communicate in the local language with their 
parents and grandparents. To my question how was it possible for parents not to 
transmit their mother tongue to kids, villagers explained that crèches and nursery 
schools were created in all the regions where the Slav and Albanian minority live after 
the Civil War to eradicate the local language from the youngest generation.
83
 People 
were living in situation of fear and they were eavesdropped while in their houses to hear 
if they spoke Greek or the local idiom at home. A very interesting story was told in the 
village Prekopana (Perikopi) in the Lerin (Florina) district by local villagers. After the 
end of the Civil War a fine of 8 drachmas was imposed for every Slavic word said at a 
public place. An old villager spoke on the occasion of his grandson‘s birthday in the 
presence of the local nomarch (mayor), who was writing down the number of words and 
after the villager finished paid the bill. Villagers in Atrapos (Krapeshina) confirmed 
Danforth‘s account that in 1959, several Macedonian villages introduced ‗―language 
oaths‖.  .  . administered  in  several  Macedonian  villages,  which  required  
Macedonians  to swear that they would renounce their ―Slavic dialect'‖ and from then 
on speak only Greek.‘84 The oath, published in Phoni tis Kastorias (4 Oct 1959) said: 
 
I do promise before God, the people, and the official state authorities, that from this day 
on I shall cease to speak the Slav dialect which gives ground for misunderstandings to the 
enemies of our country - the Bulgarians - and that I will speak always and everywhere the 
official language of our fatherland, the Greek language, in which the holy gospel is 
written.
85
 
 
Such  measures  led  to  many  emigrating  to  Australia  or  Canada.
86
 The Greek junta 
or ‗The Regime of the Colonels‘ started on 21 April 1967 with a coup d'état   and right-
wing military governments ruled Greece until 1974. The Colonels justified their action 
as an attempt to prevent George Papandreou‘s victory in the upcoming election and the 
Communist takeover that would, supposedly, follow it.
87
 
They claimed that ‗communist conspiracy‘ had infiltrated institutions-academia, the 
press, even the military. To protect the country from communist takeover a drastic 
action was needed. So the coup d'état was a ‗revolution to save the nation‘. The defining 
characteristics of the Junta were its staunch anti-Communist, pro-American, and 
Western stance. The regime was internally characterised by the absence of civil rights 
and an atmosphere of fear, persecution, torture and oppression, division and long lasting 
trauma. Externally, ‗the absence of human rights in a country belonging to the western 
block during the Cold War was a continuous source of embarrassment for the free world 
and this and other reasons made Greece an international pariah abroad and interrupted 
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her process of integration with the European Union with incalculable opportunity 
costs.‘88 Military Junta continued the policy of Hellenization and colonizing the 
confiscated lands in Aegean Macedonia and land was handled over to persons with a 
'proven patriotism' for Greece. 
The Cold War posed an ideational challenge to the Greek political elite. The coup 
provoked a systemic crisis. The traditional national ideational contexts were challenged 
by ideational input along ideological lines, i.e. communism-non-communism. Not 
surprisingly, the contradictions of Greek policy emerged. It was easy to denounce 
ideologically Bulgarians and Albanians with their Communist regimes as ‗enemies‘ as 
political ideology overlapped with traditional national ideology. Ideological difference 
with the communist Albania and Bulgaria reinforced the institutionalized idea of 
Bulgarians and Albanians as the traditional national enemies. However, Yugoslavia and 
Turkey posed a serious dilemma. Greek elites were trapped between their traditional 
emotional support for an idea of friendly Serbia (now communist) whilst being part of 
NATO and massively dependent on US and later EU aid. Turkey, also a member of 
NATO, was an ideological ‗friend‘, a notion that clashed with the idea of Turkey as the 
nation‘s greatest enemy. Did the new ideas challenge old nationalist ideas in the case 
with Yugoslavia and Turkey? The new ‗ideological difference‘ ideas, based on Cold 
War division were institutionalized in the Greek polity but they joined traditional 
national programmatic beliefs ideas, because the former were not strong enough to 
challenge and displace them. Political elites selected ideas for political purposes, 
securing their own position, and pushing the country towards the United States and 
NATO security umbrella and generous aid. During periods of crisis elites resorted to the 
long institutionalized old nationalist ideas, rather than the new ‗imposed‘ and ‗somehow 
partially-institutionalized' for domestic political reasons and gaining legitimacy. 
National ideational contexts proved much stronger than political ideology in the case of 
Turkey and Yugoslavia. No matter that both countries belonged to the same ideological 
camp, Greece could not perceive Turkey as a true friend. Nor it could vision socialist 
Yugoslavia as an inevitable enemy (with a short exception during the Civil War 1946-
49). This is evidenced by the Greek-Turkish crisis over Cyprus during and after the 
1874 invasion which proved that old ideational contexts were still very influential. 
 
Democratization and Europeanization  
 
This section explores the moment when previously uncontested path dependent 
nationalist ideas met with new democratization ideas that emerged after 1974 and 
started to challenge traditional doctrines by pressure from outside actors. The restoration 
of democracy in Greece after the Military Junta (1967-1974), came about largely 
through a dramatic external event, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (23 July 1974), which 
triggered the disintegration of the military regime.‘ As a consequence ‗a broad  
consensus was thus formed among Greeks of all political tendencies that the immediate 
threat to their national security no longer emanated from Greece‘s communist 
neighbours but from Turkey.‘89 The conflict over Cyprus and the feeling of insecurity 
that prevailed brought up the need for further strengthening ties with the EU, decreasing 
the dependence on the US and developing the economy, in other words the need for 
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democratization as a response to the systemic crisis was the ideational force behind 
internal and foreign policies of the time. 
 
Turkish aggression on the side of the Turks challenged for the first time traditional ideas 
of Albanians and Bulgarians as historical and ideological enemies. This was possible 
because the policies of Hellenization (1923-1974) proved successful and the Slavic and 
Albanian minorities in Northern Greece had shrunk to lesser numbers through 
assimilation and expulsion and the country was largely homogenised. In addition by 
1970s, neither Albania, nor Bulgaria had any territorial or population claims towards 
Greece. Also both people could be possible allies against the Turks. Michaletos claims, 
 
that the best side effect, the silver lining as it were of the Cyprus catastrophe, was that 
Greek-Bulgarian relations became more normalized over the next 15 years than they had 
been at any time since the 7
th
 century. In developing its relations with Bulgaria, Greece 
had been in a way prepared by the events of 1974 for those of 1989. The former had been, 
as it were, a trial run, meaning that when the final collapse of the Soviet bloc came, 
Greece was in a favourable and prepared position to welcome its old rival to the world of 
the free market. Tens of thousands of Bulgarians were also eager to taste the fruits of 
capitalism, many illegally, by working in Greece.
90
 
 
This is not to say that the policies of oppression towards the Slav and Albanian minority 
were discontinued and the dominant ideology was still in place. A nationalist ideology, 
incorporated in institutions is strongly path-dependent. The argument here is that after 
1974 other ideas that opposed the traditional nationalist ones started for the first time to 
propose a powerful alternative agenda, based on cooperation and reach institutions. 
However traditional programmatic beliefs that Bulgarians, Turk and Albanians were 
‗enemies‘ was still the dominant ideology. As evidence of that in 1974 the Greek state 
created a special institution, called Ministry of Northern Greece, dealing with the 
problematic regions of the country, where despite the successful Hellenization, Slav, 
Albanian and Turkish minorities still lived. According to a Secret Report of the Greek 
Security Service, drafted on 16 February 1982 there was a need of a new institution to 
facilitate the assimilation of the Slav minority in Northern Greece; Such new institution 
‗will depend from the Prefectures of the regions near the borders, lined with the suitable 
and specially trained to the "Plot against Macedonia" subject, personnel. This institution 
will engage itself only with this subject, with the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and will collaborate closely, but in secret, with the Security Authorities and all 
the public services (Tax office, Schools, Army, Church, etc.).‘91 It also instructs that in 
the public services and especially in the educational institutions the employees who will 
be in service have to be ignorant of the local idiom (Slav language), insertion of various 
obstacles (non-recognition of diplomas, postponement of military service, etc.) for the 
Greek students who wish to study in Skopje, encouragement, by the leadership of the 
Army, of meetings and marriages of Army officers, who are on duty there and have 
origins abroad, with women that speak the idiom (See Appendix 1 for the whole 
report).
92
  As a result the Ministry of Northern Greece was renamed to Ministry of 
Macedonia and Thrace in 1985 and it started to coordinate the policies, outlined in the 
report. In 1982, a ‗Greek ministerial Decree 106841 of 29 December 1982 provided that 
"all Greeks by genus [i.e. of Greek origin] who during the Civil War of 1946-1949 and 
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because of it have fled abroad as political refugees may  return  to Greece,  in spite  [of  
the  fact]  that Greek citizenship has been taken away from them.‘93  In 1985, a law was 
enacted that  permitted  political  refugees  who  were  ‗Greek  by  origin‘  to  reclaim  
their property, thus excluding Macedonians from doing so.
94
 A high  school  teacher  
currently  teaching  in  northern  Greece,  told  the Helsinki Watch Fact Finding Mission 
in 1994 that, 
 
During breaks  in high school, kids speak Macedonian  to each  other.  They speak 
Macedonian with me, too, because they know I'm  Macedonian.   Whether  a  kid  gets  in  
trouble  for  speaking  Macedonian depends on  the  teacher--if  the  teacher decides to  
report it, the kid's parents may be called in.  Other teachers are open-minded,  and  don't  
report  such  things.    In  the  old  days,  when I was a child (I'm thirty-eight now), 
teachers would hit kids  with sticks if they spoke Macedonian, and would say things like, 
‗You dirty Bulgarians, you'll never learn Greek.‘95 
 
The Balkan Wars of the 1990s 
 
Having explored the development of traditional contexts, we would focus on the new 
democratization ideas that started to challenge old nationalist ideas. The EU ideational 
push for democratization and the proliferation of regional cooperation organizations in 
the post-communist years initiated the formation of a new international cooperation and 
integration normative agenda that started to pressure Greek polity and clash with 
traditional nationalist ideas. Greece officially applied for membership in the EC shortly 
after restoration of democracy in 1975. The transformative power of this idea was noted 
by the Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis, who in May 1973, referred to a 
European orientation as being Greece‘s new 'Great Idea.'96 Greece signed the accession 
treaty with the EC in May 1979 and officially joined the EU in 1981.  The reasons for 
which Greece chose full accession to the Community can be summed up as follows 
from the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
97
 
 Greece considered the Community to be the institutional framework within which 
stability could be brought into its democratic political system and institutions. 
 Greece sought to enforce its independence and position within the regional and 
international system as well as its ‗power to negotiate‘, particularly in relation to Turkey, 
which, after the invasion and occupation of Cyprus (July 1974), appeared as a major 
threat to Greece.  Within this context, Greece also sought to loosen its strong post-war 
dependence upon the US. 
 Accession into the Community was regarded by Greece as a powerful factor that would 
contribute to the development and modernization of the Greek economy and Greek 
society. 
 Greece wanted, as a European country, to have "presence" in, and an impact on, the 
process towards European integration and the European model. 
 The Commission (…) proposed the institutionalization of a pre-accession transition 
period before full institutional integration, in order for the necessary economic reforms to 
take place. 
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According to the Greek Foreign Ministry, Greece's participation in the European 
Community / Union could be divided into three periods: the first, 1981 to 1985, the 
second, 1986 to 1995, and the third, 1996 to date. After 1974 and especially after 1981 
Greece has been ‗under constant pressure to import and internalize a set of policies and 
practices that appear in conflict with traditional domestic policies and politics.‘ At the 
time of its accession Greece embodied the archetype of a centralized state with a long 
history of entrenched resistance to decentralization.‘98 European Commission 
considered decentralization and economic stabilisation as instrumental to Greece‘s 
modernization. Logically, the first period was ‗characterized by strong doubts 
concerning certain serious aspects of European integration‘. However, gradual 
decentralization and economic benefits as a result of the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes contributed to allowing Europeanization ideas into national polity during 
the second and especially third period after 1996.
99
 
 
In 1982 Greece the anti European PASOK government submitted a Memorandum 
requesting permanent derogations from the acquis communautaire and for increased EU 
funding.
100
 In response, the European Commission devised the Integrated 
Mediterranean Programs (IMPs), approved in 1985. Through the IMP, the EU managed 
to play a crucial role during the establishment of the regional level of government that 
followed in 1985-1986.
101
 Taking advantage of ‗PASOK‘s revisionist policy, the 
Commission managed to establish a novel policy model that would have profound 
consequences for the conduct of structural policies.‘102 The regulation for the IMPs 
stipulated that the EU would contribute ECUs 2 bln for Greece for the period 1985-
1992. The general economic effects of the IMPs, decentralization and increased funding 
were quickly felt and the second period was characterized by gradual adoption of 
stronger pro-integration positions. Greece‘s net receipts from the Community budget 
grew from ECU 170 m in 1981 to ECU 1020 m in 1985.
103
 In 1997, a major reform of 
local government authorities was carried out, leading to ‗drastic reduction of the number 
of municipalities and to the transfer of certain government responsibilities to the local 
level.‘104 
 
Greece ‗began to support the "federal" integration model as well as the development of 
joint policy in new departments (education, health, and environment)‘, but discord was 
felt in ‗the sector of economy, with the country diverging from the average 
"community" development level, and the political sector. The first Community Support 
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Framework (CSF) 1989-1993, adopted in 1990. The first CSP is considered the largest 
developmental plan in Greek history. The financial weight of the EU co-financed 
programmes reached unprecedented levels of ECU 16.86 billion.
 
The second CSP for 
Greece was approved in 1994. EU financial support for Greece for the period 1994-
1999 was double that of period 1989-1993, amounting to ECU 29.7 bln.
 
Together with 
the other Community Initiatives, the Cohesion Funds and the loans of the EIB the 
amount rose to ECU 37.1 billion for a period of only five years.
 105
 Between the second 
and the third planning period, negotiations between the EU and the Greek government, 
the Commissioned pushed for creation of structures as independent as possible from the 
mainstream public administration, or at least structures with transparent procedures and 
high quality of human capital. Despite ‗considerable resistance from certain ministers, 
civil servants and implementation agencies‘ new institutions such as Management 
Organisation Unit, Joint Steering Committee for Public Works, Expert Agent for 
Quality Control of Infrastructure, etc were formed. Moreover a ‗number of semi-
independent companies were set up to manage big infrastructure projects, according to 
the Public Private Partnership model (PPP).
106
 An example of such a company that 
proved instrumental for the breakthrough in transport infrastructure impasse was 
Egnatia Odos, explored in the empirical chapter. 
 
The third period started in 1996 and has been characterized by even further support for 
the idea and process of European integration and intensifying integration in every 
department, in line with the federal model.  It is also characterized by an effort towards 
greater economic and social convergence with the fulfilment of the ‗convergence 
criteria‘ set by the Maastricht Treaty and Greece's participation as a full member in the 
single currency (Euro) and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since January 1, 
2002.
107
 During the negotiations for the third CSF for the period 2000-2006, Greek 
authorities were negotiated into carrying further reforms, which ‗further reinforced the 
logic behind the institutional innovations that took place in the mid 1990s and namely 
provisions for creation of managing and paying authorities, reinforcement of 
monitoring, evaluation and control for tighter co-financing requirements gave an extra 
impetus to the ―de-politization‖, …favoured by the European Commission.‘108 The 
Regional Development Plan that Greece submitted to the Commssion in 1999 was by 
far the best of all Plans Greece ever produced in terms of planning procedures, strategic 
thinking and consistency, abiding by all EU standards. In 2000 Greece passed the 
legislation that established the current institutional framework in accordance with the 
last CSF Programme.
109
 Cohesion Policy has been of utmost importance to Greece‘s 
Europeanization. The outcome of each previous CSP negotiations framed the rules of 
the next game. In this context, ‗actors are constrained by decisions taken previously at a 
higher level, but have plenty of room to pursue their own negotiating strategies. In the 
light of this argument, the implementation of cohesion policy in Greece has not been 
simply a response to ‗European‘ prescriptions, but the outcome of continuous 
interaction between a great number of actors, be it supranational, national and sub-
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national institutions or domestic interest groups.‘110 The 1999 reforms and the stricter 
criteria, imposed on Greece during the negotiations of the third CSF programme could 
be regarded within the framework of EU conditionality imposed on CEECs introduced 
in 1997-1999. This overlapped with the end of the Yugoslav Wars and the election of 
truly democratic governments in Bulgaria and Romania. Therefore, as a result of these 
three developments Europeanization ideas significantly penetrated Balkan policies and 
structures. This was manifested by change in policies, explored in the infrastructure 
chapter. 
 
Having explored the Europeanization pressure from outside on Greek polity during the 
1990s, we would now explore how were the competing traditional nationalist 
mentalities evolving during the same period. The demise of the communist system 
created a vast ideational vacuum in many countries of Eastern and South-eastern 
Europe. The change was so sudden and abrupt that it caught policy makers in the East 
and the West unprepared. Huliaras and Tasardanidis argue three ideas, or ‗geopolitical 
codes‘, about the Balkans dominate Greek politics and institutions in the post-
communist era. These are the 'Muslim Arc' (in the beginning of the 1990s), 'the natural 
hinterland' (the middle of the 1990s) and the Europeanization (from late 1990s on). All 
three were introduced by the Greek political elite and decisively influenced public 
attitudes and foreign policy making in Greece for about half a decade each. 
111
 
 
With the ‗collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern and Central Europe, Greece‘s 
usefulness as an eastern bulwark of NATO had disappeared.‘112  The same however did 
not apply to Turkey, who was still perceived as a key ally due to its strategic proximity 
to Central Asia and the Middle East. The 1991 Gulf War was perceived in Greece as 
substantially increasing the strategic value of Turkey, which added to Greek feelings of 
insecurity and the feeling that the West (especially the US) was abandoning them. This 
encouraged a 'siege mentality' in Greek foreign policy circles.
113
 The collapse of 
Yugoslavia was so dramatic that it caught Greek policy makers unprepared and as in the 
past, perception of insecurity reinforced the idea of the danger from the North. It was 
neither nations, minorities, nor ideology that underpinned this, but religion. The idea of 
the Muslim Arc became increasingly influential. In other words ‗Muslim populations of 
the Balkans formed an axis, an ‗arc‘ from Turkey to Albania that transgressed Bulgaria, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo and Bosnia‘, which  
‗threatened the stability of the whole region and posed a significant threat to Greek 
national security.‘ 114 The Muslim Arc idea was a continuation of the longstanding idea 
of ‗danger from the North‘ and the ‗enemy within‘, and it developed in the post-Cold 
war vacuum, Greeks resorted to the traditional national contexts, because of 
disappearance of the idea of external ideological threats, and the yet not firmly 
institutionalized EU idea. The proponents of the Muslim Arc idea, such as foreign 
minister Antonis Samaras argued Greece should develop a ‗counter strategy aiming at 
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[encouraging] ―Orthodox Arc‖.‘115  In practice however, an Orthodox Arc was rather 
difficult to create as Greece had entered into a bitter conflict with (Orthodox) FYROM 
over the republic‘s name while in Orthodox Bulgaria Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms  (DPS, Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi -Движение за права и свободи) 
representing the Muslim minority, became part of the governing coalition. Thus, the 
―Orthodox‖ arc was [one more time] limited in Greek discourse to the Greek-Serbian 
friendship.‘116 Again Greece's opponents were Albania, Bulgaria (its Muslim minority) 
and Turkey and the ally was Serbia. The Cyprus Crisis and the Yugoslav Wars showed 
that in spite of the started process of democratization and Europeanization old ideational 
contexts were still very much in place in 1995. 
 
Greece was the only NATO and European Union member to support Slobodan 
Milosevic‘s regime. Greece broke ranks with its Western allies, weakening their efforts 
to impose sanctions against Serbia. Takis Michas stresses that ‗what seemed 
incomprehensible during the Bosnia and Kosovo wars was not so much that Greece 
sided with Serbia, but that it sided with Serbia‘s darkest side‘117 Michas quotes Serb 
intellectual Zoran Mutic: 
 
When I hear so many Greeks -journalists, academics, politicians, intellectuals- expressing 
their admiration for Karadzic, what can I say? How can they consider as a hero a criminal, 
somebody who bombed hospitals, who placed snipers to kill kids on the streets?‘ 
Karadzic was honoured in an open-air mass meeting in Piraeus, in the summer of 1993, 
attended or supported by all political parties, trade unions, media and the Orthodox 
Church: the handful of demonstrators who opposed the meeting were even arrested.
 118
 
 
Michas recalls also ‗the refusal in Greece to condemn Serb atrocities in all recent wars 
and to accept that rapes were used as an ethnic cleansing weapon by Serbs; as well as 
the eagerness to refute any such allegations. The government of Andreas Papandreou 
even challenged the credibility of the Hague Tribunal or other international expert 
commissions and the Greek Central Bank refused to cooperate with the Chief 
Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in The Hague, Carla Del Ponte.
119
 Greek banking 
authorities had repeatedly denied foreign press reports concerning the existence of 
Milosevic's secret funds in Greece.
120
 Furthermore, ‗many business activities 
involve[ed] Greeks [...] to break the embargo against Serbia, acquire companies in 
Kosovo, launder Milosevic money, all that with full state support‘, as evidenced in the 
Dutch report on Srebrenica and especially in the volume by Cees Wiebes Intelligence en 
de oorlog in Bosnie, later published in a book.
121
 The volume deals with ‗the 
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involvement of foreign secret agencies and foreign powers in the war in Bosnia.‘ 
Wiebes ‗has had for five years unrestricted access to the Netherlands intelligence 
community and to various foreign archives and the archives of the United Nations. 
Moreover, more than 90 foreign intelligence officials were interviewed for the 
project. It found that Bosnian Serb army was supported by the Greek secret services 
which provided them with arms and ammunition.
122
 Moreover this is even more 
credible, when taken into account that NATO military secrets leaked out to the Bosnian 
Serb side. Michas claims that ‗NATO military secrets on the August 1995 air strikes 
were passed on to Mladic on direct orders of then socialist Prime Minister Andreas 
Papandreou.
123
 The author‘s source is ‗none other than Papandreou‘s personal 
intermediary with Karadzic and Milosevic, Aris Mousionis, the then and now-President 
of Greek-Serbian Friendship Association, who was carrying out the mission.‘124 NATO 
simply stopped sharing intelligence with the Greeks.
125
 According to the Dutch report, 
the ‗Greek paramilitaries took part in the Srebrenica massacre and the Greek flag was 
hoisted in the city after it had fallen to the Serbs. The report bases its findings on 
telephone intercepts of the Bosnian Serb Army provided by Bosnian intelligence.‘126 
 
Michas points that culmination of such ‗irrationality‘ came at the time of the Kosovo 
bombings, and the ‗near unanimity of Greeks opposed them; almost all Greek media 
reported events along the official Serb government line; and anti-Americanism reached 
a new high during the same year‘s US President Bill Clinton‘s state visit.‘127 According 
to opinion polls published during the period of the Kosovo War, '96-98 percent of the 
Greek public opposed the NATO air campaign.'
128
Michas concludes, 
 
Surely Milosevic feels sorry that he did not pursue this matter further. Had his plan for a 
Greek-Serb federation materialized, he might well have won the 2000 election. The 
majority of Greeks would have voted for him at any rate…How can one contest it, when 
his popularity rating in Greece, to the very end of his rule, was many times higher than 
that of all Western leaders and even than his popularity among Serbs? Or when a few 
hours after his extradition to the Hague, in June 2001, 79 of the some 100 Greek deputies 
present in Athens signed a petition opposing it and all other extraditions of Serbs to the 
Hague Tribunal?
 129
 
 
This 'irrational pro-Serbian stance' shocked many who assumed that all members of 
NATO would follow the lead of the United States and the United Nations. Instead, 
Greece supported Serbia‘130  Edgar Morin, who was visiting Athens during Clinton‘s 
visit, characterized what was going on as ‗fundamental irrationalism.‘131 The ideational 
mapping of Greece, explored in this chapter makes it possible to comprehend such 
‗irrationality‘. The idea of Serbia as the ultimate eternal partner has been 
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institutionalised in Greek political context since 1830-1832. Initial ideas such as the 
Megale were challenged and transformed and coupled with other ideas, but attitudes 
towards neighbours (Serbia-friend/Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey-enemies) largely remained 
in line with traditional ideational contexts till down to the late 1990s. This is evidenced 
by the public speeches, delivered by political and spiritual leaders of the time. 
 
Former Republic of Srpska President Radovan Karadzic said ‗The Serbs have only two 
friends, God and the Greeks‘; on the twentieth anniversary of the Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus, Bishop Nicolas of Sarajevo stated, ‗We, the Serbs, are blessed to have God in 
heaven and Hellenes on earth. You the Hellenes have us Serbs as your friends. We will 
continue the struggle you undertook in 1974 against the Muslims until Constantinople 
becomes a centre for Orthodoxy‘ on the 20th anniversary of the Turkish invasion. May 
the traditional Greek – Serbian friendship flourish! [...]; ‗The Greeks have always been 
friends of our people‘, Serbian Patriarch Pavle stated. Former Serbian President and 
PM, Vojislav Kostunica announced that ‗Greek and Serb peoples will remain united 
until Doomsday‘ [during his visit to Greece in 2000]. HRH Crown Princess Catherine 
of Serbia (living in exile) stated on 18 Dec 2004 ‗we have more in common than 
differences. The Greek people stood by our side more than any other nation. Up there 
we do not say the Greeks, we say our brothers. Whatever happens here – let's hope the 
time will never come – they will be by your side in no time. They are yours. You have 
won their brotherhood.‘ This relationship is mutual. Former Prime Minister 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis is known to have said on numerous occasions ‗The Serbs are 
our true friends [...]‘; Andreas Papandreou went further stating ‗As a Greek I swear 
eternal friendship with the Serb people‘ [during his visit to Belgrade in 2003]. Secretary 
General for European Affairs Dimitrios K. Katsoudas pronounced in 2007 ‗Greece and 
Serbia are two countries linked by ancient and inextricable bonds. Our relationship is 
lost in the depths of time. Serbian culture and religion were greatly influenced by our 
common roots in the great civilisation of Byzantium.‘132 Even in mid 1990s, the 
dominant idea that Serbia is the Idee Fixe, eternal partner for Greece has not been 
significantly challenged since 1830-1832. 
 
However the EU-ization and Europeanization ideas and the respective normative 
agenda, started to shift the decades-long held ideas of ‗enemies‘ and ‗friends‘ and ideas 
of ‗threats outside and within‘. This is not to say that new ideas have displaced the old 
ideational contexts, but for the first time there is an ideational framework, powerful 
enough that could challenge the ideational status-quo and change the normative base of 
politics in SEE. An example of such tendency is an article by Greek intellectuals in the 
daily Elefterotipiya, 
 
The Government, political parties, prominent journalists, high-ranking officers and the 
Church are giving signals for immediate danger. Greece is presented as continuously 
surrounded and aimed for suffocating by its enemies [...] We wish to live in peace with all 
nations in the Balkans [...] There is nothing abnormal in the existence of one harmonious 
society, which is built by different cultures and ethnoses. On the contrary - the reverse is 
admired. It is a real disgrace to suppress and eliminate minorities in the name of national 
unity. Let's respect these minorities, as we respect each citizen of Greece. We do not need 
neither to eliminate them, nor to assimilate them. On the contrary, we insist they have the 
same rights and opportunities as each one of us and support their specific rights as 
language, religion and politics, emerging from their ethnic base. Finally, isn't it this that 
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the Greek Government requests constantly from other nations, where Greek minorities 
live?
133
 
 
Greece: A Regional Superpower? 
 
The deepening of EU-involvement and the state of Balkan post-communist economies 
lead to the abandoning of the Muslim Arc idea to give way to the ‗regional superpower‘ 
or ‗Balkans as a Greek Hinterland‘ idea.134  Greek political elites ‗saw their country as 
the most powerful state in the region, the ―natural‖ leader of the Balkans. This idea is a 
turning point as for the first time since the Greek Independence (1830-1832), the 
Balkans and the North were not perceived as a threat  on ‗national‘, ‗ideological‘, 
‗religious‘, etc. terms, but rather as an opportunity, as an ‗El Dorado, full of economic 
opportunities, cheap workforces and untapped markets.‘135 This period could largely be 
characterized as ‗westernisation‘ or ‗modernisation‘ of Greek foreign policy, which 
engaged in developing relations with Balkan countries ‗not only at the bilateral but also 
at the multilateral level… to promote regional cooperation schemes… [and] building a 
new climate of trust.‘136 
 
On Greece‘s initiative, a summit of all Balkan leaders took place in Crete in November 
1997. The ‗regional superpower‘ idea soon took over Greek political elites and the 
media. I Kathimerini, the leading conservative centre-right newspaper wrote ‗the idea of 
a Balkan hinterland has been one of the foundations upon which the Greek development 
vision was built.‘137In Greek context ‗all businesses with headquarters in Greece were 
considered as ―agents‖ of Greek national interest, business people were compared to 
diplomats, investments were thought of as Greek foreign policy instruments.‘ However, 
it gradually became clear that Greece ‗had major economic interests in the Balkans and 
a new political approach to reflect them had become necessary. Therefore, Greek 
foreign policy priorities and the interests of the Greek business have begun to converge 
as never before.‘ The Greek Deputy Minister of National Economy stated ‗Each one of 
the Greek companies developing its activities abroad constitutes a bridge of cooperation 
and contributes to the further development of the relations of friendship and cooperation 
with the neighbouring countries. We need the relevant support of the companies to 
accomplish this goal.‘138 As a sign of the changing attitudes is the changing of names of 
some streets. In Greece nearly every town or village has a central street, called 
Boulgaroktonos, literally meaning the Bulgar-killer (see Fig. 12). Only in Athens there 
are eleven streets with that name, one of them being a central boulevard. This is to 
honour Byzantium Emperor Basil II, who in 1014 won a battle against Bulgaria and 
captured 15,000 prisoners and blinded 99 of every 100 men, leaving 150 one-eyed men 
to lead them back to their ruler Samuel of Bulgaria, who fainted at the sight and died 
two days later suffering a stroke.
139
 This gave Basil his nickname Boulgaroktonos, ‗the 
Bulgar-killer‘ in all Arab, Byzantium, Armenian, etc. medieval chronicles. 
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Fig. 12 Odos Boulgaroktonos ( Bulgar-Killer Street), present in most Greek towns and 
villages
140
 
 
In 2006, just before Bulgaria‘s accession representatives of the Bulgarian and Greek 
government renamed the Vasil II Boulgaroktonos Street in Thessaloniki to Basil II. This 
also happened in Serres and Athens. While most of the hundreds of Bulgar-killer street 
still remain as a road map of the past, the trend is quite indicative. A Street that ran in 
one direction for a thousand years had finally changed course. 
 
The immense significance of EU-ization normative agenda (that will be explored in 
detail in the EU Chapter), has been powerful enough to displace the old ideational 
contexts, rather than uneasily coexisting with old ideas as in previous critical junctures. 
However, it is only by the end of 1990‘s, and especially after the Kosovo war when the 
idea of Europeanization became dominant in Greek foreign policy making and it started 
to penetrate Greek institutions, political elites‘ ideas and media discourse. This was 
possible due to the idea and realization that Greece‘s role in the EU could be a major 
resource in its dealings with SEE. The Thessaloniki Summit 2003 held under the Greek 
presidency was a major and significant opportunity to delineate the outlines of Greek 
policy and its new dominant ideology/ideational approach. The integration of the 
Balkans into the EU was now considered by Athens to be a number one priority, a 
factor capable of contributing decisively to the consolidation of stability, democracy and 
market economy in the region.‘ Also, ‗only the EU framework could provide the means 
for cementing peaceful relations in the region, mainly through an integration process 
that could bring about the same reconciliation as in the case of relations between France 
and Germany. For Greece, the option of leaving even part of the Balkans permanently 
outside the European institutional structures was considered destabilizing, and could 
                                                                                                                                               
army in the Battle of Kleidion, with Samuil separated from his force. Having crushed the Bulgarians, Basil was said to 
have captured 15,000 prisoners and blinded 99 of every 100 men, leaving 150 one-eyed men to lead them back to their 
ruler, who fainted at the sight and died two days later suffering a stroke. Although this may be an exaggeration, this 
gave Basil his nickname Boulgaroktonos, ‗the Bulgar-killer/slayer‘ in later tradition. Four years later Bulgaria fell to the 
Byzantines (1018). 
140 Source: Author.  
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lead to a new round of violent conflict. Greece‘s national interests in the Balkans were 
seen as better served via multilateral efforts in the EU framework, rather than via 
unilateral and bilateral one. Not only was the nationalistic and opportunistic policy of 
the early 1990s abandoned, but… ―multilateral‖ came almost exclusively to mean 
‗integration into the European Union‘. 141 
 
In Greece  the era of state building (1830-1922) was entirely shaped by the Megale Idea, 
or the recovery of Constantinople and the re-creation of Christian Byzantium with all 
the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire in a Greek –controlled modern national 
state.  After independence, guided by the institutionalized ideas of Korais, Feraios, 
Zampelios and Paparrigopolous the machinery of the state began consistently 
promoting, educating and pursuing the idea. As a result of such policies and successful 
wars, by 1922, Greece doubled its territory and population and Megale seemed within 
reach. The Smyrna catastrophe marked the end of Megale in the classical form. The 
subsequent interwar period marked a shift in Greek foreign policy. 
 
If the dominant idea of the previous period 1830-1922 was ‗looking outside‘ at 
territorial expansion in line with the Megale Idea, the period 1923-1946 was a period of 
economic problems marked by ‗looking inside‘ with the idea of preserving the status-
quo and the integrity of the country, in other words, characterized by policies of state 
consolidation and Hellenization. Megale was muted in its classical form, but its legacy 
was felt in the new idea that: everyone who lives in Greece should be Greek. The 
objective was directed at the large Slav, Albanian and Turkish minorities in the newly 
acquired lands to the North. The ideas that came to dominate the Greek political and 
institutional context after 1923 could be summarized as foreign policies of defense from 
the danger from the north (Bulgaria, Albania, Turkey) and the brutal policies of 
Hellenization of the enemy within (Slav, Albanian, Turk  minorities) at home. The 
Metaxas regime (1936-1941) was marked by the grandiose vision was to create a Third 
Greek Civilization based on its glorious Ancient and Byzantine past, but what he 
actually created was more a Greek version of the Third Reich'
 142
 In such respect the 
legacy of the Megale was present and influenced his ideas and the nature of the regime. 
He continued the policies of Hellenization and national consolidation with even bigger 
strife than his predecessors. 
 
The World War II (1941-1945) and the Civil War (1946-1949) period in addition to the 
already strong identification of ‗others‘ in national terms, introduced the idea of ‗others‘ 
in terms of ideology, notably Communism. During the Cold War period, (1949-1974) 
Greece was a bulwark against Communist expansion and its administrative, military, 
economic and political institutions were shaped to serve that purpose. Thus the interwar 
ideas of national ‗enemy within‘ and national ‗danger from the north‘ on ethnic terms 
was now coupled with a political ideological dimension. The perception of a threat now 
came from the ideological enemy within (minorities) that were now portrayed not just as 
Albanian or Bulgarian/Macedonian ‗others‘, but as Communist Albanian or 
Bulgarian/Macedonian ‗others‘.  Also the interwar idea of national danger from the 
north was joined by the ideological enemy from the north, as communist regimes were 
established in neighbouring Albania and Bulgaria. The policies of Hellenization through 
exchange of populations and repressive actions trough the machinery of the state have 
largely been successful. 
                                                 
141 Tsardanidis, ‗(Mis)understanding the Balkans‘, p. 13. 
142 Andreas Markessinis, Who was Metaxas?,  http://www.metaxas-project.com/who-was-metaxas/, accessed July, 
2008, (emphasis added) 
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The Greek elements (declaring as Greek) in Greek Macedonia had gone from 43 percent 
in 1912 to 89 percent in 1926.
143
 In spite of the overall success of Hellenization they 
were not discontinued. The Greek Junta (1967-1974) described their coup d'état as a 
revolution to save the nation from a communist conspiracy. The defining characteristic 
of the Junta was its staunch anti-Communism and pro-American and Western stance, 
terror, oppression and lack of civil rights. 
 
As a result of the Cyprus conflict of 1974 the regime of the colonels fell and a broad 
consensus was thus formed that the immediate threat to their national security no 
longer emanated from Greece‘s communist neighbours but from Turkey. The feeling of 
insecurity brought up the need for further strengthening ties with the EC, decreasing the 
post-war dependence on the US and developing the economy, in other words the need 
for democratization which was the ideational forces behind internal and foreign policies 
of the time, which led to the country‘s full membership in the EC in the 1981. Turkish 
aggression on the side of the Turks, started to challenge for the first time traditional 
ideas of Albanians and Bulgarians as eternal historical and later ideological enemies. 
This was possible since the policies of Hellenization (1923-1974) have largely proved 
successful and the country had more or less been homogenised. In general the whole 
post-1974 and especially the post 1989 development is marked by the uneasy 
coexistence of traditional nationalist ideas with the cooperation international agenda. 
This explains the contradictions of Greek policy (e.g., emotional support for an idea of 
Serbia whilst being part of NATO and massively dependent on EU, and now EU aid). 
Such pressure on local elites was especially visible during the mid 1990s, when demise 
of the communist system created a vast ideational vacuum in many countries of Eastern 
and South-eastern Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s, as in previous critical 
junctures plethora of ideas was calling for attention in Greek society.  Most notable 
among them were the idea of the Muslim arc surrounding the country and the need for 
Orthodox solidarity (early 90s), also the Balkans-as-a-Greek-economic hinterland idea 
(mid 90s) and finally Europeanization and EU-ization ideas (late 90s) started to 
penetrate deeper in Greek institutions and challenge old assumptions of enemies and 
friends. 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter started with a discussion how the idea ‗Bulgarians are an enemy‘ emerged, 
who was the intellectual carrier of such idea and how it became institutionalized in the 
institutional set-up of the modern Greek state in the late XIX c. Then the chapter 
explored how such programmatic beliefs influenced actors, coming in different periods 
to those institutions, to form the same normative guidelines that cooperation with 
Bulgarians is not appropriate. The chapter reconstructed how such normative guidelines 
shaped the process through which Greek political elites decided on policies of 
obstruction towards Bulgarians with remarkable persistence during most of the XX c., 
regardless of changing external factors. One of the most critical turning point during 
that period, the Smyrna catastrophe, marked the end of the Megale in its classical form 
and the expansionist policies were discontinued. Post-Smyrna Greek politics turned to 
policies of state consolidation In other words, that meant that after the Bulgarian-Greek 
(1919) and the Turkish-Greek (1923) population exchange, the minority issue was 
considered closed and everyone who stayed in Greece in the newly-acquired lands to 
the north should be Greek and was subjected to policies of Hellenisation. No matter the 
                                                 
143 Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, p. 121. 
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Megale was muted in its classical form, in post-Smyrna Greece, perception of 
Bulgarians as historical external enemies was joined to the idea of the enemy within the 
state (the Slav national minority) that was dangerous and needed to be made Greek. 
Communist regime further added the anti-communist negative image to the historical 
animosity towards the Slav minority in Greece and Bulgaria in general. Therefore, in 
spite of Smyrna change, Greek programmatic beliefs towards Bulgarians and normative 
criteria that cooperation was unthinkable were not changed (they were even re-
inforced).  
 
To summarize at successive historical junctures the dominant ideational framework has 
been challenged, but traditional programmatic beliefs of mistrust towards each other 
have remained unchanged. The national ideology has included more than one discourse 
and has displayed remarkable adaptability to different ideologies and regimes for 
legitimizing purposes, but perception of the other as an enemy and the inappropriateness 
of cooperation from the early XX c. to the 1990s did not change. As a result policies of 
obstruction during that period did not change as well. It is only with the EU 
involvement in SEE, the significant power of the EU-normative agenda and Bulgaria‘s 
membership perspective that traditional persistent nationalist ideas started to be 
gradually challenged by new ideas. 
 
The first hypothesis that Bulgarian and Greek modern state‘ mutual obstruction, 
regardless of changing external factors and outside pressure could be properly 
understood by exploring the crucial role, played by path dependent institutionalized 
ideas (programmatic beliefs) in shaping policy outcomes has been confirmed in the 
Greek case. That specific nationalist attitudes of Bulgarian and Greek political elites 
would most likely be path-dependent regardless of the different changes of external 
environments, if such changes do not produce an idea powerful enough to supplant old 
ideas and beliefs of what is deemed appropriate was confirmed as well has also been 
confirmed. Chapter 4 will repeat this procedure for Bulgaria and the idea –‗Greeks are 
an enemy‘, shaping Bulgarian obstruction policy vis-à-vis Greece during the same 
period to determine if the hypothesis will be confirmed by the Bulgarian case as well.
Chapter 4. The Case of Bulgaria 
Moesia, Thrace, Macedonia
1
 
 
Introduction 
 
The chapter describes Bulgarian political and cultural development in the early 
nineteenth century, focusing on the period after the modern Bulgarian state formation 
and the development of the Bulgarian programmatic beliefs towards Greece. This, in 
other words, means identifying the ideational map how in Bulgaria, the idea ‗Greeks are 
an enemy‘ crystallized, why exactly that idea for the neighbour was adopted, who were 
the carriers of such idea and how it became institutionalized in the institutional set-up 
and identity of the modern Bulgarian state in the late XIX c. Then the chapter explores 
how later acting under the influence of such programmatic beliefs, Bulgarian political 
elites decided on policies of obstruction towards Greeks with remarkable persistence 
during most of the XX c., regardless of changing external factors. 
 
Maria Todorova claims that ‗Bulgarian nationalism throughout the past century 
demonstrates a remarkable continuum of ideas and feelings with some…differences 
between the separate sub-periods.‘2 The initial cornerstone idea of Bulgarian national 
ideology, San Stefano, could be traced through all phases till the 1990s and it is only in 
the post-communist environment that it was successfully challenged by the EU 
normative agenda. Indeed, San Stefano merits a special attention, since without it we 
cannot talk about Bulgarian nationalism and the modern Bulgarian state. 
 
San Stefano Idea: Carriers and Institutionalisation 
 
‗San Stefano‘ (Сан Стефано) is the Bulgarian equivalent of the Greek Megale. 
Bulgaria‘s national idea, adopted in 1878 was the restoration of the borders according to 
the Treaty of San Stefano, (3 March 1878) or in other words the very powerful idea of 
restoring the ideal ethnic territory of the nation envisioned by the short-lived San 
Stefano Treaty, then dismembered by the Berlin Congress (June 13 - July 13, 1878) (see 
Fig. 13). In this view, the Bulgarian state would only be complete by encompassing the 
three historic provinces of Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia, as was according to the San 
Stefano Treaty, since those were the ethnic territories of the Bulgarian nation, justified 
by two criteria: Bulgarian language and adherence to the Bulgarian Exarchate. The 
latter became ‗the sui generis metahistorical event in the development of Bulgarian 
nationalism, a dream almost come true, and an idée fixe for decades to come.‘3 After the 
country‘s liberation from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, Bulgarian political elites had 
involved the country in five wars to accomplish this. How the idea crystallized, who 
were its carriers and how it became institutionalized in the following sections. 
 
                                                 
1 The Bulgarian national idea could be simplified to the unification of the three historic provinces of the antiquity into a 
modern Bulgarian state, since it was believed they were the demographical limits of the Bulgarian people at the time. 
2 Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 100. 
3 Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 77. 
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Fig. 13 Establishment of the Bulgarian State. Treaty of San Stefano (1878) and 
Congress of Berlin (1878)
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Source: Todor Bozhinov, 2008. 
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The Second Bulgarian Empire fell to the Ottomans in 1396 and Bulgarians had to wait 
for their National Revival for more than four centuries. The Ottoman Empire organized 
the Christian millet (Greek and Slav) under the Greek Orthodox patriarch (Patriarchate 
of Constantinople), who assumed thus the jurisdictional responsibility for the rights of 
all Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire.
5
 The Constantinople patriarch was 
delegated the right to administer, to tax, and to exercise justice over all the Orthodox 
Christians of the Empire thus providing Greeks with substantial religious, educational, 
administrative and legal power in the Ottoman Balkans. The Greek language ‗prevailed 
everywhere in schools and churches, and the remains of ancient Bulgarian literature 
were destroyed to a large extent by the Greeks. Thus Bulgarians were subjected to 
double oppression, political by the Ottomans and cultural by the Constantinople 
Patriarchate. On the demand of the Greek higher clergy the centuries old Serbian Pec 
Patriarchate and Bulgarian Ohrid Archbishopric saw the last remnants of their 
autonomy abolished in 1766 and 1767, respectively. ‗With the rise of Greek nationalism 
in the second half of the 18th century, the cultural oppression turned into an open 
assimilatory policy which was aimed at imposing the Greek language and a Greek 
consciousness on the emerging Bulgarian bourgeoisie and which used as its basic tool 
the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The opening of a number of schools with all-round 
Greek language curriculum and the virtual banning of the Bulgarian liturgy at the end of 
the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century threatened the very survival of the 
Bulgarians as a separate nation with its own, distinct national culture.‘6 
 
After we have identified what the main Bulgarian nationalist idea is, we need to identify 
who were the carriers of this idea, why precisely that idea gained salience and how it 
became institutionalized. As a reaction to the policies of the Greek clergy, Paisius of 
Hilendar (1722-1773), a monk from the south-western Bulgarian town of Bansko, wrote 
a short historical pamphlet in 1762, called Istorija Slavjanobulgarskaja (A History of 
Slav-Bulgarians), which later became the ‗bible of Bulgarian nationalism‘.7  
 
This was the first work written in the Bulgarian vernacular and was the first call for a 
national awakening. Father Paisius revived ancient glories and urged his compatriots to 
speak their native language and ‗not be ashamed to call themselves Bulgarians‘, since 
‗of all Slav people, Bulgarians had had the mightiest medieval kingdoms, were 
Christened first [885 AD], created the alphabet to the benefit of all Slavs, had the most 
glorious Tzars and the longest written history [since 681 AD]‘.  
 
He urged his compatriots to fight against the cultural subjugation to the Greek language 
and Church and the political subjugation to the Ottomans. If Rigas Feraios was the first 
intellectual entrepreneur of the Megale, Paisius of Hilendar was his Bulgarian 
counterpart. The modern Bulgarian nation was constructed around the idea of the 
‗majestic medieval continuity‘ and ‗the old grandeur‘, 
But there are those who do not like to know about their Bulgarian kin and turn to foreign 
culture and to foreign tongue and do not care for their Bulgarian tongue but learn how to 
read and speak Greek and feel ashamed to call themselves Bulgarians. O, you misshapen 
                                                 
5 In the Ottoman Empire ‗[P]opulation was administered within four administrative units, the millets, which were 
organized on the basis of religion and not ethnicity nor territory. These were the Umma, regulating the Muslims‘ affairs 
and the Christian, Jewish and Armenian millets. The Ottoman state treated them as corporate bodies, dealing with their 
leaders and not with their individual members. 
6 Pedro Ramet and Sabrina P. Ramet, Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, (Duke University 
Press, 1989), pp.20-21.  
7 Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 74. 
 92 
creature, bereft of reason! Why are you ashamed to call yourself Bulgarian and do not 
read and speak your own language? As though the Bulgarians have not had a kingdom 
and a state? For so many years they reigned and reaped glory and were famous all over 
the world and many a time they exacted tributes from powerful Romans and from wise 
Greeks. And emperors and kings gave them their royal daughters for wives in order to 
live in peace and love with the Bulgarian tsars. The Bulgarians were the most famous of 
all Slav peoples, they were the first to call themselves tsars, they were the first to have a 
patriarch, they were the first to become converted into the Christian faith and it was they 
who conquered the largest territory. Just as powerful and respected by all the Slav peoples 
were also those first Slav saints who came to shine in radiance descending from the 
Bulgarian people and speaking the Bulgarian language, as I have written all about it in 
this history. For this too the Bulgarians have testimony from many histories because 
everything about the Bulgarians is true, as I have said.
8
 
In this text there is ‗an intensive defensiveness, a feeling of humiliation, and a struggle 
against an inferiority complex. At the same time, there is also an acute counter 
offensiveness, based on intensive pride in the glories of the past.‘ The defensiveness 
stems out of the fact that ‗Bulgarians were defining themselves in opposition against the 
earlier nationalisms and previously articulated irredentist programs of [their] 
neighbours.‘9 Paisius‘ pamphlet is a reaction to the Greek economic, cultural and 
political influence through church and schools over the Bulgarians in the Ottoman 
Empire. He was even more critical to the Greek-leaning Bulgarians from the more 
affluent circles, such as merchants. Paisius crystallized the idea that Greek educational 
and ecclesiastical influence was detrimental to Bulgarian people and they needed to 
overthrow it. He justified that with the glories of the Medieval Past, when Bulgarian 
people had their own Empire and did fight with the Greeks to preserve it. 
 
Paisius was followed by a number of others and most notably by Sophronius of Vratsa 
(Sofroni Vrachanski) (1739-1813).  Paisius‘ History and its distribution by Sophronius 
and other disciples gave birth to a mass national political, religious, educational and 
cultural struggle for independence.
10
 The influential ideas he introduced quickly spread 
over the population and instigated a process, known as Bulgarian Enlightenment (1762-
1878), which was a time of national awakening and dominated by three main ideas: 
independent educational system, independent ecclesiastical organization as 
prerequisites for political independence for all Bulgarian populated lands of the 
Ottoman Empire. These ideas were triggered by Paisius‘ History that had a clearly 
pronounced anti-Greek sentiment and later became the bible of Bulgarian nationalism. 
Therefore, the whole Bulgarian nationalism was born with the idea of Greeks as 
‗enemies‘. 
 
                                                 
8 Paisius of Hilendar, Istorija Slavjanobulgarskaja ( History of Slav-Bulgarians), original manuscript kept in the Zograph 
Monastery  on Athos, 1762. Bulgarian text  http://scriptorium.hit.bg/istoria.pdf and partial English translation by 
P.Miltenov  http://members.tripod.com/~zlatnite/Paisiy.htm, accessed October 2007. 
9 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, pp. 74-75. 
10 Saint Sophronius of Vratsa (or Sofroniy Vrachanski; Bulgarian: Софроний Врачански) (1739–1813) was born in 
Kotel, Central Bulgaria. He was a Bulgarian cleric and a prominent figure in the National revival, publishing Nedelnik 
(„Неделник―)—a collection of precepts and sermons for every holiday of the year based on Greek and Slavic sources. 
The collection had historical importance in initiating book printing in modern Bulgarian and establishing the Bulgarian 
vernacular as the language of literature. He also wrote another collection, Sunday Evangelic Interpretation in 1805, as 
well as a very popular autobiography, Life and Sufferings of Sinful Sophronius („Житие и страдания грешнаго 
Софрония―, Zhitie i Stradaniya Greshnago Sofroniya) 
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Due to the Greek domination over the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, for 
Bulgarians religious divider was not as important as linguistic in the national ideology 
crystallization. Sharing same religion, Bulgarians had to first emancipate through 
language and education, then through religion to finally strive for political 
independence. That explains the fierce struggle for independence of the educational 
system. By 1820s, ‗there had developed a distinct impulse to establish Bulgarian secular 
schools instead of the existing Helleno-Bulgarian schools, which offered a bilingual 
Greek and Bulgarian education and which dated from the beginning of the century.‘11 
Through the support of the growing class of Bulgarian merchants, who facilitated the 
creation of a dense network of secular schools in the Bulgarian lands, the struggle for 
educational emancipation had achieved its goals by the time of the Crimean War (1854-
56). 
 
The ideas of Paisius of Hilendar influenced the second wave of ideational entrepreneurs 
such as Neofit Bozveli and Ilarion Makariopolski (1812–1875). They followed Paisius‘ 
ideas and started to propagate the need for Bulgarian ecclesiastical organization 
independent of the Greek Patriarchate. Such ideas gained large support and provoked 
unrest against the Greek clergy that intensified dramatically during the 1860s turning 
into a mass movement for an independent Bulgarian church.  Neofit Bozveli became the 
leader of the movement, initiating large scale propaganda campaign against the 
Patriarchate withinh the Empire, supported from Bulgarians of the Diaspora in Southern 
Russia, Moldova, Wallachia and Austria.                                                                        .  
 
Bozveli realized that the first clashes with Greek clergy demand the creation of 
management center to coordinate and direct the struggle of the Bulgarians. He choose the 
imperial capital as the seat of the movement due to its closeness to the Patriarchate and 
the Turkish government, the presence of foreign diplomatic missions and especially the 
existence substantial wealthy and influential Bulgarian community in the city.  
 
The leaders of the movement prepare a memorandum to the Patriarchate with demands to 
appoint Bulgarian bishops in the Bulgarian lands, instead of Greeks, to allow the 
publishing of Bulgarian newspapers and books, to demand Bulgarian secular schools free 
from Greek influence, to have own spiritual representatives in Istanbul to express their 
national interests before the Turkish government, etc.
12
 
 
As a result the Greek clerics were ousted from most Bulgarian bishoprics by the end of 
the decade.
13
 On 3 April 1860, during the so-called Easter Action or Bulgarian Easter, 
Makariopolski intentionally did not mention the name of the Patriarch of 
Constantinople, but mentioned the Sultan instead, which, according to the canon law, is 
an act of throwing off the Patriarchate authority, while respecting the authority of the 
Ottoman state. Infuriated by such action, the Patriarchate sent Makariopolski into exile 
                                                 
11 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 73. 
12 Selected primary sources from the Bulgarian Enlightenment, Vol. 3, (Sofia: Tangra TanNakRa, 2008) 
13 Ilarion Makariopolski (Bulgarian: Иларион Макариополски), (1812–1875) Born in Elena, Central Bulgaria. He was 
one of the most prominent figures during the 19th-century Bulgarian church struggle against the Constantinople 
Patriarchate. He was a raised in a prominent Bulgarian family and received his education in his native town and later at 
Arbanasi Greek School.  He became a monk in the Hilandar Monastery on Mount Athos in 1832 and was later 
educated on the island of Andros, and famous high school in Athens. He chose to guide the Bulgarian church struggle 
from Constantinople together with Neofit Bozveli, and as a result was exiled to Mount Athos between 1845 and 1850 
and later between 1861-1864. After the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 he was Metropolitan of Tarnovo, 
and died in Constantinople in 1875. He was buried in the yard of the Bulgarian St Stephen Church in the city, where the 
Sultan‘s firman was first read. 
 94 
to Mount Athos (1861-1864). However, the news of such act spread over through all 
Bulgarian eparchies and further intensified the church struggle. Acknowledging the 
mass unrest Sultan Abdülaziz established the Bulgarian Exarchate, an independent 
Bulgarian ecclesiastical organization by firman of 28 February 1870. The Greek 
Patriarchate declared the Bulgarian Exarchate schismatic and its adherents heretics.  The 
crucial idea of what constituted Bulgarian territories was outlined in article 10 of the 
firman. This identified the dioceses of the Bulgarian Exarchate, covering Moesia and 
parts of Thrace and Macedonia, for which there was no doubt of their belonging to the 
Bulgarian nation.
14
 For those eparchies in Thrace and Macedonia with mixed population 
and claimed by the Greek Patriarchate the firman provided for holding a plebiscite. The 
firman of 1870 was the first time a Sultan‘s decree allowed a free referendum. 
 
If all, or at least two thirds of the Orthodox Christian population [...] are willing to accept 
the supremacy of the Bulgarian Exarchate in religious matters and if this is duly proved, 
they will be allowed to do so, but this shall happen only by the will and with agreement of 
all or, at least two thirds of the population. Those, who try by these means to create 
trouble and disturbances among the population, will be persecuted and punished 
according to the law.
 15
 
 
The population voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining the Exarchate (Skopje by 
91%, Ohrid by 97%). The establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian Church had 
enormous significance far more than a simple administrative act within the Empire, as it 
signified to Bulgarians ‗the legalization of a new nation on the Balkans‘.16 The 
significance of this firman for Bulgarian nationalism is that it recognized the existence 
and the first official delimitation of the boundaries of the Bulgarian nation.
17
 From this 
moment there was no question as to what was meant by Bulgarian nation. It was ‗the 
official recognition of separate Bulgarian millet, under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian 
exarchate in 1870 that specified the extent of the Bulgarian nation and which became a 
significant step toward further political independence.‘18 
Similar to the Greek case, the ideas of Paisius, Sofronius, Bozveli and Makariopolski 
achieved political importance among so many competing ideas through the latter‘s 
prominent position in society. They were able to render others receptive to their ideas 
through their position as ecclesiastical officials, intellectuals and prolific writers. 
Moreover, they were very persistent during their long careers in articulating their beliefs 
and manoeuvring the forming Bulgarian intellectual elite‘s views toward the adoption of 
particular nationalist stances. 
 
Paisius and Sofronius‘ had a crucial role in the shaping of a new consciousness among 
the intelligentsia, to emancipate and overthrow the Greek spiritual oppression, which 
later facilitated the creation of a new national movement. Their prolific literary 
contributions were supported by Bulgarian merchants from within the Empire and 
wealthy immigrants in Austria, Wallachia and Southern Russia. Sofronius could make 
                                                 
14 Emil Kazakov, ‗Geopoliticheskite Modeli v Bulgarskata Vunshna Politika: Sanstefanizmut‘ (The Geopolitical Models 
in the Bulgarian Foreign Policy: The Syndrom of San Stefano) in Geopolitika i geostrategia, 2-2004. pp. 40-43.          
15 Some Authentic Turkish Documents About Macedonia. ‗Sultan‘s Ferman for the establishment of a Bulgarian 
Exarchate.‘,  http://www.macedoniainfo.com/books/dg2en/sultans_ferman.htm, accessed August 2008. 
16 Joelle Dalegre, La Trace grecque. Population et territoire, ‘Harmattan‘, P., 1997, p. 268. 
17 Grigor Velev, Bulgaria prez XXI vek. Bulgarskata Nacionalna Doktrina (I chast), [(Bulgaria in XXI Century. The 
Bulgarian National Doctrine (Part I)], (Sofia: Znanie, 1997), p. 128. 
18 Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 81. 
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others listen to his ideas through his position as the most influential Bulgarian writer 
from the beginning of the XIX c. and through his books, most notably Kiriakodromon 
sirech Nedelnik (Sofronie), where he urged Bulgarians to emancipate from Greeks, 
published in 1806 in 1000 copies, which was an impressive number for those times.
19
 
Bozveli and Makariopolski could make others accept their ideas through their role as 
leaders of the national movement for church independence. The latter also had 
substantial influence through his position as representative of the Bulgarian church in 
Istanbul and through the first Bulgarian newspaper, published in Istanbul Tsarigradski 
vestnik (Tsarigrad‘s newspaper). Makariopolski influential ideas were maintained 
through the newspapers Dunavski lebed (Danube Swan), Budushtnost (Future), Branitel 
(Defender), Bulgarska starina (Bulgarian heritage), published in Novi Sad, Belgrade 
and Odessa between 1855 and 1865.
20
 
 
Paisius and Sofronius were the carriers that crystallized the idea Bulgarians should 
emancipate from Greeks and should overthrow their influence. Their ideas were 
developed by Bozveli and Makariopolski who directed the struggle for independent 
Bulgarian church and education. Therefore, if in the Greek case, Megale ideology 
prescribed to be Greek meant to be Orthodox Christian, in the Bulgarian case, to be 
Bulgarian meant to speak the language and to belong to the Bulgarian Exarchate. Thus, 
Greek ideology sought for the modern Greek state to incorporate all Orthodox 
Christians within the Ottoman Empire. The Bulgarian ideology seeked to unite all lands, 
populated by Bulgarian speakers, adhering to the Exarchate. Such criteria encompassed 
the population living in the three historic provinces of Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia, 
or in other words the territories incorporated later by San Stefano. Both ideas of 
language and independent church as markers of Bulgarianness, became a canvass on 
which the ideology of the future Bulgarian state was developed and shaped, becoming 
part of the self-understanding and identity of Bulgarians. If the works of Paisius and 
Sofronius laid the broad foundations of the Bulgarian national idea in unstructured and 
idealistic way, the second wave of ideational entrepreneurs, such as Bozveli and 
Makariopolski crystallized ‗what, why and how‘ had to be achieved. As a result of those 
ideas the territories, envisioned by the Sultan‘s firman from 1870 for the creation of the 
Bulgarian Exarchate, became the model for the territorial expansion of the future state. 
 
Similar to the Greek case, Sofronius, Paisius, Bozveli and Makariopolski were better 
positioned to ensure that their ideas remain a force in politics even after they have left 
the scene. The chief mechanism for this was their ability to build a consensus around an 
idea, getting it accepted as the most suitable means of understanding and reacting to 
events in a particular sphere. They successful through their professional positions and 
literary scholarship to build a consensus that the most suitable (only appropriate) 
development course of the modern Bulgarian state is in line with the educational and 
ecclesiastical emancipation from Greeks and adherence to the Bulgarian Exarchate. 
 
The second step towards the formation of the modern national ideology is the Tzarigrad 
Conference (1876-1877) and its blueprint for autonomous Bulgaria.
21
 The Russian 
                                                 
19  Sofronii Vrachanski. Sbornik Izsledvania (Sofronius of  Vratsa. Collection), (Sofia: Marin Drinov Academic 
Publishing House, 2004),  Sofronii Vrachanski, Suchinenia  v dva toma, (Sofronius of Vratsa-Primary sources in two 
volumes), (Sofia: Marin Drinov Academic Publishing House, 1989-1992). 
20 Ivan Shishmanov, Ot Paisii do Rakovski (From Paisius to Rakovski), (Sofia: Zahari Stoyanov, 2009). 
21The conference was held in Istanbul (Tsarigrad in Bulgarian , meaning 'City of the Tzars') Reluctant to let Russia 
take the role of the sole protector of the Balkan Christians, and under pressure from public opinion, the governments of 
the European countries decided to intervene on the issue. This led to the convocation of an international conference in 
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Ambassador countered the British plan to split the Bulgarian national territory into one 
east and one west provinces, but it had to accept the Austro-Hungarian plan to divide it 
into north and south.  Both plans were motivated by the unwillingness of the Great 
Powers to prevent the creation of a very powerful pro-Russian state in the Balkans in 
very close proximity to the Straits. The Ottomans introduced a new constitution that 
attempted to address all issues with the Christian subjects that were to be dealt at the 
conference.
22
 Despite the plans for dividing Bulgarian territories into two different 
states, the Tzarigrad Conference was considered by Bulgarians and by the outside world 
as the first internationally acknowledged recognition of the nation defined by the 
boundaries of the eparchies of the Bulgarian Exarchate.
23
 The boundaries of Bulgaria in 
the Sultan‘s firman of 1870 were according to the firmly declared affiliation of the 
population with the Bulgarian Exarchate, following a plebiscite in 1871-1873. The 
plebiscite profoundly influenced the decisions of the Tzarigrad Conference of 1877 and 
the national Bulgarian boundaries that were discussed were identical with the 
boundaries, outlined by the Sultan‘s firman and by the plebiscites 1873-4.   
 
The third and most decisive event contributing to the crystallization of the modern 
national ideology and territory of the Bulgarian nation is the The Russo-Turkish War 
(1877-8) that ended with the Treaty of San Stefano between Russian and the Ottoman 
Empire, signed on 3 March 1878. It established a great autonomous principality of 
Bulgaria reborn after 500 years Ottoman domination. It extended from the Black Sea to 
Lake Ohrid and from the Danube to the Aegean. San Stefano‘s Bulgarian borders were 
drawn following ‗the dioceses of the Bulgarian exarchate [28 February 1870] and 
[were] considered, therefore, to conform most closely to the natural ethnic (e.g. 
linguistic and religious) boundaries of the Bulgarian nation.‘24 Such boundaries were 
already recognized as Bulgarian-populated by the Ottoman Empire with the firman of 
Sultan Abdülaziz and according to the borders recognized by the Tzarigrad 
Conference.
25
 Bulgarian territory embraced the three historical provinces with 
predominantly Bulgarian population; Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia. With a total area 
of 172 000 square kilometres, the new kingdom became by far the largest Balkan state 
in terms of both territory and population, twice as large as Greece and Serbia taken 
together. Great Britain and Ausria-Hungary feared that such a large pro-Russian state, 
close to the Straits, would dramatically increase Russian power in the region and so 
initiated the Congress of Berlin between June 13 and July 13 1878 to revise the Treaty 
of San Stefano. Under Russian pressure Serbia, Montenegro and Romania were 
recognized as independent principalities, but full independence of Bulgaria was denied. 
The territory identified by San Stefano was split into three. Thrace was separated as an 
autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire with artificial name ‗Eastern 
Rumelia‘, Macedonia was returned to Ottoman rule, and only the remaining strip of 
land ‗squeezed between the Danube and the Balkan range‘, Moesia, was proclaimed as 
                                                                                                                                               
the Turkish capital with the task of devising a strategy of reforms in the Ottoman Empire. The forum was held at the 
level of ambassadors of the Great Powers. The conference opened on 23 December 1876 with the participation of the 
ambassadors of Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Russia and Turkey. 
22 Emil Kazakov, ‗Geopoliticheskite Modeli‘, p. 41. 
23 Grigor Velev, Bulgaria prez XXI vek, p. 70. 
24 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 76. 
25Reluctant to let Russia take the role of the sole protector of the Balkan Christians, and under pressure from public 
opinion, the governments of the European countries decided to intervene on the issue. This led to the convocation of an 
international conference in the Turkish capital with the task of devising a strategy of reforms in the Ottoman Empire. 
The forum was held at the level of ambassadors of the Great Powers. The conference opened on 23 December 1876 
with the participation of the ambassadors of Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Russia and Turkey. 
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the Principality of Bulgaria.
26
 Another two parts of the Bulgarian Exarchate were given 
to Serbia and Romania (the Nish province and the Northern Dobrudzha) as a sign of 
their contribution to the war outcome. (Fig. 3) 
 
1870-1878 is the critical juncture, when most of the institutions of the new Bulgarian 
state were founded and the ideational legacy of carriers that largely shaped the San 
Stefano idea, was institutionalised. The intellectual entrepreneurs, Paisius of Hilendar 
and Sophronius of Vratsa influenced profoundly not only the pre-independence network 
of schools, but their ideational legacy was institutionalised through the schooling 
system of the young Bulgarian Kingdom. Similarly, the powerful ideas of Neofit 
Bozveli and Ilarion Makariopolski  were institutionalised through the first Bulgarian 
independent institution, namely the Bulgarian Exarchate and later passed in the 
ecclesiastical organization of the modern state. 
 
Their intellectual legacy was transmitted through their prominent position as prolific 
writers, leaders of the independent church and school movement, public figures and 
state officials and the events of, the immensely powerful San Stefano Idea became 
institutionalized and unquestionably shaped the Bulgarian politics from 1878 to 1944 
and as in the Greek case, can be felt even today. However, all pre-1878 revolutionary 
propaganda, which had as its ideal the educational, and political independence of the 
Bulgarians, was based almost exclusively on demographic, not on historical rights as in 
the case of Greece, who tried to justify their claims over foreign populations through 
history. Bulgaria had the argument of human geography to back its ideology.
27
 
Therefore, the predominant feeling of elite and population was that they were fighting 
for a just cause-national unity. Regardless of the nature of the political regime in Sofia, 
the fulfilment of the idea remained the basis of every government and became the 
fundamental and most stable marker of modern Bulgarian national identity. 
 
It is quite common for a liberated state not to encompass all its ethnic territories. The 
intriguing fact is that before the Principality of Bulgaria was established as a result of 
the compromise of conflicting interests of the Great Powers, another large or Great 
Bulgaria, coinciding with the perceptions of the territorial limits of the nation, was 
outlined. By the Treaty of San Stefano the ‗Bulgarian nationalism obtain[ed] a 
brilliantly simple blueprint, and namely to correct the injustice of Berlin, by restoring 
the Bulgaria of San Stefano.‘28 San Stefano‘s ideational power originates in the 
discrepancy between the Bulgarian ethnic populated territories (170 000-200 000 sq 
km) and the tiny polity of some 63 000 sq km. Both the Bulgarian political elites and 
the population felt this was a grave injustice and humiliation. The broader context of 
San Stefano was so powerful and all encompassing that it permeated all state 
institutions and was elevated to a sacred objective, and some kind of a moral duty with 
near religious power and influence. This is evidenced by all media and political 
speeches of the time, for example, 
 
For us, the Bulgarians San Stefano is not only a historic and all encompassing name: it 
rather is an ideational flag, a mesmerizing programme. […] And we hope that Bulgaria 
will never forget that program. And the Bulgarian people will never extinguish their belief 
                                                 
26 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 77. 
 
27 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 81. 
28 Emil Kazakov, ‗Geopoliticheskite Modeli‘, p. 43. 
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in a better future. They will repeat as one the prayer: ‗I believe in a unified Saint Stefano 
eternal and long lived Bulgaria‘.29 
 
Bulgarian political elites were educated not only by the schooling system, dominated by 
Sofronius, Paisisus and others, but they were also influenced by the public discourse 
outside education that such intellectual carriers had managed to dominate for many 
years through their positions of prestige and power, explored above. 
 
Once the ideas for restoring the territories of the short-lived San Stefano, become 
embedded in the educational and ecclesiastical institutions of the Bulgarian state, they 
took on a life of their own and were therefore difficult to change. This was due not 
merely to the attachment of certain important individuals to these ideas, but more 
importantly, to a widespread fear that abandoning these ideas would decrease the 
political elites‘ appeal, coherence and political power. Consequently, although the 
political, social and economic environment, confronting Bulgarian governments 
changed radically during the XX c., it proved extremely difficult to shift their policy 
responses accordingly. Indeed, as we will see later in the chapter, even when new 
policies appeared to hold out the promise of greater political success, it proved 
extremely difficult, if not impossible to get them accepted if they conflicted with the 
Bulgarian governments‘ long-held principles of San Stefano. 
 
How Greeks were viewed through the prism of the San Stefano Idea 
 
After we have identified the San Stefano Idea, why that idea was adopted, who were its 
carriers and how it became institutionalized, we have to explore how Greeks were 
viewed through the prism of the San Stefano Idea and how such institutionalized ideas 
(programmatic beliefs) shaped the normative prescriptions that cooperation with Greeks 
was not appropriate, which in turn shaped policies of obstruction, explored later in the 
chapter. 
 
The Third Bulgarian state started its political life with unresolved national question. The 
initial Bulgarian geopolitical vision stated that the ideal Bulgarian national territory was 
delimited by the boundaries of the Bulgarian language speakers and the borders of the 
Bulgarian Exarchate. The series of political events in the period 1870-1878, creation of 
the Bulgarian exarchate (1870), the Tzarigrad Conference (1877), the Treaty of San 
Stefano (1878) and the Treaty of Berlin (1878), further facilitated the consolidation of a 
modern Bulgarian national identity, evolving from the vague idea of some kind of 
unification of Moesia, Trace, Macedonia into a geographically relatively precise idea.
30
   
By dismembering Bulgaria, the Congress of Berlin added the final touch in the 
codification of the Bulgarian national idea. Bulgarian nationalism ‗actually began in 
1878, the year of its greatest triumph and its greatest defeat.‘31 This is the critical 
juncture in Bulgarian history when imperative geopolitical aim for restoration of the San 
Stefano Bulgaria and reunification of all Bulgarians developed. The latter became the 
sui generis metahistorical event of Bulgarian nationalism, a dream almost fulfilled, and 
an idée fixe for decades to come.  
 
                                                 
29 Stefan Bobchev, ‗The Bulgarian Prayer‘ in Slavyanski Glas (Slavic voice), 1927-1, pp. 3-6. 
30 Emil Kazakov, ‗Geopoliticheskite Modeli‘, p. 39. 
31 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 76. 
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After dominant ideas are institutionalised they provide the ideational context for action 
in future policy formation and implementation. The very first Bulgarian institution, the 
Exarchate crystallized as a result of the direct struggle against the Greek clergy. Nearly 
the entire Bulgarian Enlightenment (1732-1878) was marked by the movement to 
overthrow Greek influence in church and school. Not surprisingly, such ideas passed in 
the modern Bulgarian state, through carriers and institutionalization, as explored above. 
Bulgarian political elites perceived the modern Greek state and the Greek 
Constantinople Patriarchate as the fiercest threat to the fulfilment of San Stefano (the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire was only a matter of time). Such perceptions were 
further exacerbated by the fact that the two states and their ideologies clashed directly 
over the territories of Macedonia that were still part of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The period 1878-1913 was a fierce rivalry between the Greece and Bulgaria and 
precisely between the Greek Patriarchate and Bulgarian Exarchate to win the loyalty of 
Macedonian population through education, propaganda, terror, bribes, etc. The struggle 
over Macedonia reconfirmed the already institutionalized perception of Greeks as 
enemies and the Greek state as ultimate threat to the Bulgarian cause of San Stefano. 
Since 1878-1913 these ideas became institutionalized mostly through the schooling and 
ecclesiastical system, or in other words becoming programmatic beliefs, shaping the 
normative guidelines of Bulgarian political actors that cooperation with Greeks is not 
appropriate or normatively acceptable. Such an ideational configuration contributes to 
explaining subsequent Bulgarian policy choices of obstruction towards Greece that 
remained remarkably persistent, regardless of changing external factors during the early 
XX c., the two Balkan Wars, two World Wars, the Cold War and the 1990s. 
 
 
How programmatic beliefs „Greeks are enemies‟ shaped policies of 
obstruction towards Greece 
 
The programmatic beliefs ‗Greeks are enemies‘ played a crucial role in structuring 
Bulgarian actors‘ views that cooperation with Greeks was not appropriate. This section 
reconstructs the process through which the Bulgarian political elites decided on the 
policies of obstruction towards Greeks, exploring the filter or channel (provided by the 
normative guidelines and criteria) through which information about the external 
environment passed during different key periods of the XXc. In more detail, it explores 
if in key historical periods during the XX c., the programmatic beliefs that the other is 
an ‗enemy‘ and the normative guidelines that ‗cooperation with him is not appropriate‘, 
were challenged by new ideas that were powerful enough to replace the established path 
dependent programmatic beliefs. This observation is correlated with the observation if 
the path dependent policies of obstruction (denationalization of the minority of the 
other, negative propaganda and lack of political, social and economic cooperation) still 
occurred in that same historical period. 
Late XIX c.-Early XX c. 
 
The ‗separation of southern Bulgaria into a separate artificially created state was a 
guarantee against the fears expressed by Austria-Hungary and Great Britain that 
Bulgaria would gain access to the Aegean Sea, which logically meant that Russia was 
getting closer to the Mediterranean. […] The third large portion of San Stefano Bulgaria 
 100 
— Macedonia — did not get even this slight taste of liberty, as it remained in the 
Ottoman borders like it had been before the war‘ (see Fig. 14). 32  
 
In these conditions, it was natural that Bulgarians in Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia and 
Macedonia strove for unity. By mid-1885 most of the active unionists in the Principality 
of Bulgaria and in Eastern Rumelia shared the vision that the preparation of a revolution 
in Macedonia should be postponed and all efforts should be concentrated first on the 
unification of Bulgaria and Rumelia. On 6 September 1885, armed unionist groups and 
Rumelian militia entered the capital Plovdiv and took over the Governor‘s residence. 
The Governor was Gavrail Krastevich, a Bulgarian patriot who, naturally, did not resist 
the unionists.
33
 Knyaz Alexander I accepted the Unification on 8 September and entered 
Plovdiv a day later against the will of the Great Powers and all neighbours. Defying 
most expectations Russia did not support the unification and ordered all its officers to 
leave Bulgaria. Britain initially assumed that powerful support by St. Petersburg stood 
behind the bold Bulgarian act. However, they soon realized the reality of the situation, 
and after the Russian official position was announced, Great Britain gave its support for 
the Bulgarian cause.  
 
The strongest reaction came from Greece and Serbia who threatened Bulgaria with war. 
Greece mobilized its army, but since then it still did not have a common border with 
Bulgaria, it only concentrated its army at the Ottoman border. Serbia declared war on 
Bulgaria on 14 November 1885. Since the Bulgarian government had expected an attack 
from Turkey, the main forces of the Bulgarian Army were situated along the 
southeastern border. In the conditions of 1885 Bulgaria, their redeployment across the 
country would normally take at least 5-6 days, but the morale of the army and 
population was very strong, as well as the feeling among the men that they were 
fighting for a just cause, that it took the armies 48 hours to reach the battlefield. Despite 
their military advantage and surprise attack, the Serbs suffered a humiliating defeat.  
 
As a result of the war, the Great Powers and the neighbours accepted the unification and 
Bulgaria with a territory of 96 345 sq km became the largest Balkan country at the time. 
The unification of the Bulgarian principality with Eastern Rumelia in 1885 and the 
subsequent Serbo-Bulgarian war are the first decisive moment in the evolution of the 
Bulgarian nationalism after 1878.
34
 The Serbian attack of 1885 surprised Bulgarian 
government and population. However, the support Greece gave to Serbia was not very 
surprising. This is evidenced by the publications, pamphlets of the time and most 
notably by the Bulgarian King Alexander I‘s War Manifesto, stating, 
 
The government of our neighbourly Serbian people, motivated by personal egoistic 
purposes and aiming at preventing the sacred unification of the Bulgarian people into one 
unity, today, without any lawful or justified reason, has declared war on our country and 
has ordered its armies to enter into our lands. With a big regret we heard this piece of 
news, since we never believed, that our  brothers in blood and in religion will start such a 
fratricidal war in those complicated times…and to act so inhuman and senseless towards 
their neighbours, who without causing anyone harm, have worked and have fought for a 
noble and just cause. Leaving the whole responsibility for such fratricidal war between 
two brotherly people and for the grave consequences for both countries, we announce to 
our beloved people, that we have accepted the war with Serbia and have ordered our brave 
                                                 
32 Jono Mitev, Suedinenieto 1885 (Unification 1885), (Sofia: Hristo G. Danov, 1985), p. 22. 
33 Jono Mitev, Suedinenieto 1885, p. 22. 
34 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 77. 
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armies to involve in  the military action against the Serbs and defend the land, honour and 
freedom of the Bulgarian people.
 35
 
 
The young Bulgarian state failed to understand Serbian ideational context that 
crystallized in the independent Serbian Kingdom from the autonomy to the Serb-
Bulgarian War (1830-1885). This is because the Serbian national programme 
Nachertanie, devised in 1844 by Iliya Garashanin was kept secret until 1906, when it 
was officially published.
36
 In its decision to attack Bulgaria, Serbian King Milan I was 
acting on the tenets of Nachertanie. According to the latter, the new independent and 
unified Bulgarian Kingdom was perceived as a grave threat to the Serbian aspirations 
towards Macedonia and the idea of Great Serbia. Therefore, Milan I wanted to seize the 
opportunity of the young and dislocated Bulgarian army and quickly capture Vidin and 
the capital Sofia, only 55 km away from the border. His vision was then to dictate the 
peace conditions from there: All territories from the Serbian border to the river Iskur, 
including the capital annexed by Serbia, the remaining territory occupied by Serbia, 
relocation of the Bulgarian capital further east to Turnovo, military parade of the 
Serbian army in the Bulgarian capital and a huge financial compensation.
37
 The Serbian 
attack marked the painful realization in Bulgaria that Serbians were siding with Greeks 
to compete with Bulgaria, especially over Macedonia. 
 
First step towards the fulfilment of the San Stefano Idea was achieved in 1885 with the 
unification of North and South Bulgaria (see Fig. 14).   The second phase of the 
achievement of the San Stefano, incorporating Macedonia would not go as smoothly, 
because of the Greek pronounced interest in the region. Bulgarian school and church 
institutions presented  Macedonia as a sacral land, the birthplace and cradle of the 
Bulgarian medieval culture and civilization, the land where Cyrillic alphabet was 
created, the most Bulgarian land, a land of brave voevodi (freedom fighters) and 
dignity, the Bulgarian land with the best dances and songs, the Bulgarian land that 
                                                 
35 Manifest for the Promulgation of Serbia-Bulgarian War. Plovdiv, 2.11.1885 by Alexander Joseph of Battenberg I 
Prince of Bulgaria, Bulgarian States Archives Agency,  
http://www.archives.government.bg/index.php?lang=en&page=33, accessed August 2008,  (Emphasis added) 
36 Independent Serbian Kingdom appeared in 1830. Iliya Garashanin is a Serbian statesman and the intellectual 
enterpreneur, who in 1844 creates the national programme Nachertanie, that similar to Greek Megale, will become 
institutionalised and will profoundly influence Serbian policy-making for about a century. Nachertanie‘s legacy is felt 
even in The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. Garashanin introduces the idea, that since Serbia is the first Slav country, 
liberated from the Turks it should unite all South Slavs in one country under Serbian domination. Garashanin justifies 
this with the short-lived Medieval Serbian state of Stefan Dushan (1331-1355).  
 
Garashanin writes that the Slav population in the Ottoman Empire should be subjected to an active Serbian 
propaganda through books, sending priests, agitators. Serbia should acquire the foreign Slav territories (Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Bulgaria) ‗stone by stone‘. Serbian prince Mihailo Obrenovic III (1860-1868) appoints the 
creator of the Serbian national doctrine Garashanin as his prime minister. The Nachertanie evolves from the idea of 
Serbian dominated Slav state, to a Yugoslav state, still dominated by Serbia. After the San Stefano Treaty (1878) 
Serbia is given its first Bulgarian populated lands in the Nis and Leskovac region. Some months later, according to the 
Berlin Treaty it is awarded additional Bulgarian territories in the Vranya and Pirot region.  Serbia is acting on the 
Nachertanie annexing ‗stone by stone‘ from the Bulgarian lands.  
37 E. Lavele, Balkan Peninsula ( Balkanskii Poluostrov, Балканский полуостров),  (Moscow, 1889), p. 181, 191, 199 
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suffered most of all.
38
 The idea of Macedonia in Bulgarian national psyche is closely 
corresponding to the very powerful ‗lost territory‘ myth of Serbs and Kosovo. 
However, this clashed with the Greek ideas for incorporating the territory of Macedonia 
within the Greek state. As a reaction to the perception of Greece as the main enemy to 
the Bulgarian cause in Macedonia, the Bulgarian state devised policies to counterweight 
the attempts of the Greek Patriarchate to prevent the population from switching 
allegiance from the Patriarchate to the Exarchate. The Exarchate and the Bulgarian state 
started intensive campaign to build schools and churches in Macedonia in the period 
1878-1913. As a result only in Macedonia and in the Andrianople Region alone the 
Bulgarian Exarchate disposed of over seven dioceses with prelates and eight more with 
acting chairmen in charge, with 38 vicariates, 1 218 parishes and 1 212 parish priest, 64 
monasteries and 202 chapels, as well as 1 373 schools with 2 266 teachers and 78 854 
pupils.
39
 The most notable among those schools was the Sts. Cyril and Methodius 
Bulgarian Men's High School of Thessaloniki (Solunska balgarska mazhka gimnazia 
„Sv. sv. Kiril i Metodii―), in operation between 1880 and 1913. It turned into one of the 
most influential Bulgarian educational centres in Macedonia and Southern Thrace.  
The Bulgarian Exarchate‘s growing influence in Macedonia and the Ilinden Uprising of 
1903 signalled to Greeks that they were gradually loosing these regions to the Bulgarian 
Idea. As a result after 1903 initiated campaign to Hellenize the Slav population in 
Macedonia. The Greek state organised military units of Greek andarts, Greek officers 
who were sent to Macedonia in order to thwart Bulgarian efforts to bring all of the 
Slavic speaking majority population of Macedonia on their side. Andarts abused their 
status and started terrorising and killing the innocent civilian population.
40
 Bulgaria 
supported the creation of local chetas (bands) that entered into bloody conflicts with the 
Greek andarts between 1904 and 1908. The Greek armed efforts to Hellenize Bulgarian 
Slavs in Macedonia provoked fierce anti-Greek campaign in Bulgaria that escalated 
during 1905-6. Many newspapers published Anti-Greek articles. For example, Svoboden 
glas (Free voice) urges the Greek minority of Bulgaria to be expelled and propagated 
the need for total defeat of Hellenism in Bulgaria.
41
 There is an organsed campaign not 
to buy merchandise from the shops belonging to the Greek minority.
42
 The unrest 
escalates and leads to armed clashes between Bulgarians and representatives of the 
60, 000 strong Greek minority in Bulgaria. Churches, schools and other public 
buildings, belonging to the Greek minority are appropriated by Bulgarians. Such 
policies culminated in the Asenovgrad, Plovdiv, Burgas riots in 1906, when within a 
year more than 10 000 Greeks were forced to leave Bulgaria.
43
 
                                                 
38 Naum Kaichev, Makedonijo vuzzhelana-Armiata, uchilisteto i gradezhut na naciata v Serbia I Bulgaria 1878-1912 
(Macedonia, beloved-Army, school and nation-building in Serbia and Bulgaria 1878-1912), (Sofia: Paradigma, 2003), 
pp. 117-123. 
39 Voin Bozhinov, Bulgarskoto obrazovanie v Makedonia i Odrinska Trakia 1878-1913 (Bulgarian education in 
Macedonia and the Adrianople region of Thrace -1878-1913) , (Sofia: Publishing house of the Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences, 1982, p. 356. 
40 Lithoksoou, Dimitrios, The Greek Anti-Macedonian Struggle: From Ilinden to Zagorichani  (1903-1905), (Athens: 
Ekdoseis Megali Poreia, 1998), Dimitrios Lithoxoou, Ellinikos Antimakedonikhos Aghonas: Apo to Illinten sti 
Zagkoritsani (1903-1905).  
41 Svoboden glas, (Free Voice), N23, 24.06.1906. 
42 Svoboden glas, (Free Voice), N28, 29.07.1906 
43 Kostadin Kostadinov, The Anti-Greek Movement in Varna , (Fondacia VMRO: Varna, 2009), p.36 and p. 50. 
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Therefore, in the period 1878-1913, as a result of the normative criteria of Greeks as 
enemies, the Bulgarian state formulated obstruction policies towards the Greek 
Patriarchate by creating a dense network of schools and churches in Macedonia and by 
supporting the cheta (bands) in their armed struggle against the Greek andarts. In 
addition, the state organized negative campaign against Greece in Bulgarian press and 
supported campaign against the Greek minority in Bulgaria-Greeks were forced to leave 
the country and their economic activities were suppressed by the campaign not to buy 
Greek merchandise. 
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Fig. 14 Unified Bulgaria — a lithography by N. Pavlovich (1835-1894), showing the 
Unified Bulgarian Principality and Eastern Rumelia, represented by two women. 
Macedonia is represented by a third woman in black in the background, symbolizing its 
still not liberated status.
44
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Source: National Museum of History Sofia-Permanent Exhibition. 
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The Balkan Wars and WWI 
 
The Bulgarian government engaged in the First Balkan war (1912-1913) entirely guided 
by the San Stefano ideational impetus. Prime Minister Ivan Geshov said in his memoirs: 
‗We had a program. […] Could the aim of the war be any other than to fulfil our dream 
of San Stefano Bulgaria, which […] [the Great Powers] forbade us even dream of?‘45 
Geshov also expressed the belief of most Bulgarians at the time that all the misfortunes 
of liberated Bulgaria dated from the despised Berlin Congress that partitioned the 
Bulgarian ethnic territory into three and cancelled out the ‗noble and just virtue of San 
Stefano.‘46 The exclusivity of the idea in the Bulgarian institutional setting was so 
unquestionable, that there was no other perceived political discourse. 
 
In the Second Balkan War, Greece and Serbia refused to evacuate any conquered land 
(mainly in Macedonia) despite the Bulgarian pre-war arrangements with Bulgaria and 
the ethnic character of the population in favour of Bulgaria. As said earlier, even when 
new policies appeared to hold out the promise of greater political success, it proved 
extremely difficult, if not impossible to get them accepted if they conflicted with the 
actor‘s long-held principles. Bulgaria decided to attack Greece and Serbia over the 
spoils in Macedonia, when it was clear that negotiations with other neighbours Turkey 
and Romania were needed to secure the flanks. Russian Empire also warned Danev that 
Romania could also attack Bulgaria and in such case Russians would not respect the 
Russian-Bulgarian military convention of 1902 to help Bulgaria.
47
 Also due to the pre-
war agreements the Russian Emperor had to act as an arbiter in case of conflicts 
between the Balkan states.
48
 Securing the flanks and negotiations appeared to hold the 
promise of greater political success. However, the Bulgarian government of  Stoyan  
Danev and King Ferdinand could not wait for such negotiations, acting on their beliefs 
and urged by public opinion they decided immediately declare war on Greece and 
Serbia. Danev justified the Bulgarian attack on Greece and Serbia with ‗Bulgarian 
rights‘ over those lands justified by the ethnic argument in the firman and San Stefano.49 
 
Ideational theory argues ‗ideas play a crucial role in shaping how political actors 
perceive the world around them‘ and ‗ideas play a crucial role in structuring actors‘ 
views of the world by providing a filter or channel through which information about the 
external environment must pass‘, therefore political behaviour will often be based by 
distorted or incomplete information flows. Such distorted information flows and the 
normative filter through outside information passed could explain the decision of 
Bulgarian King Ferdinand and Danev to engage in the Second Balkan War, instead of 
waiting for the arbitrage of the Great Powers was framed by the Bulgarian 
historiography as the ‗Criminal Insanity‘.50 Adhering to their beliefs, Danev and 
Ferdinand engaged Bulgaria in a fight against all its neighbours at the same time 
(Greece, Serbia, Turkey and Romania).  Bulgaria suffered a heavy defeat and lost nearly 
all territorial gains from the First Balkan War with the Treaty of Bucharest (1913). 
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After the defeat Danev was replaced by Vassil Radoslavov of the Liberal Party (LP), a 
party of officers and politicians who were the most radical proponents of the national 
idea. He stated ‗Bulgaria would make no compromise with the San Stefano or the 
Bulgarian-Serbian contract of 1912 regarding Macedonia. Those will be the fundaments 
of the foreign policy of the government‘ and also ‗San Stefano Bulgaria was buried for 
the second time-first time in 1878 and now in 1913 in Bucharest. The Bucharest Peace 
is the second partition of the Bulgarian people.‘51 The tragic aftermath of the Second 
Balkan War is known as the First National Catastrophe in Bulgarian history. After 1913 
the idea that the country is surrounded only by enemies takes shape. Unlike the Greek 
case, where Serbians were perceived as the ally, and Bulgaria, Albania and Turkey as 
the threat, in Bulgarian ideational context all neighbouring countries conspire against 
Bulgaria to preserve the status-quo and also Bulgaria borders on itself in all four 
directions. However, Greeks (together with Serbians) are considered the biggest 
enemies of the nation and the San Stefano due to the events from the Balkan War II. 
 
It comes as no surprise that the Radoslavov‘s Government and the population enters 
into First World War with eagerness, since ‗Bulgarians remained undeniably faithful to 
their ideal-the unification and could not wait for the moment of its attainment.‘52 The 
Triple Entente and the Central Powers, tried to form alliances in the Balkans. Both 
fractions promised to Bulgaria to more or less restore the boundaries of the Treaty of 
San Stefano. As in the Balkan Wars, Bulgarian political leaders chose to side with the 
factor that was against Serbia and Greece, and namely –the Triple Entente, following 
their logic of appropriateness that precluded any form of political, economic and social 
cooperation with the latter. 
 
During the war, Bulgaria occupied most of these lands, but was forced to once again 
evacuate them after the war. Between 1878-1918, there were no political factors, which 
deviated from the national programme for reunification, as defined by San Stefano with 
the exception of some worker‘s and agricultural parties which were so weak they did 
not exercise any influence over Bulgarian politics.
53
 This program, ‗whether it was used 
as a blueprint for practical political action or merely as an unattainable, but justified 
ideal, continued to be the main inspiration of Bulgarian nationalism throughout the next 
period, until World War II.‘54 
Interwar Period (1919-1944) 
 
Following defeat World War I, the Treaty of Neuilly (1919) forced Bulgaria to cede its 
last part of Aegean coastline in its possession to Greece (Western Thrace), recognize the 
existence and cede nearly all of its Macedonian territory to Yugoslavia, and transfer 
Southern Dobrudzha to Romania. The country was forced to reduce its army to less than 
20,000 men, and pay reparations exceeding $400 million. The results of the treaty are 
popularly known as the Second National Catastrophe. The two national catastrophes 
that followed within a short span of five years (in 1913 and 1918): the second Balkan 
war and World War I ‗produced a profound public frustration which has been handed 
down from generation to generation and the effects of which can be felt even today.‘ 
The large influx of refugees from the lost territories intensified to an unprecedented 
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degree the tensions in Bulgaria proper. This, ‗coupled with a severe economic crisis and 
raging social problems could not but make the Neuilly Treaty of 1919 into the 
counterpart of Versailles for Germany. The response was an outcry of bitter and 
humiliated nationalism.‘ 55 
 
The disruption and trauma in Bulgaria after Neuilly was so enormous that it marked a 
new era in the strategy of how to achieve the national goals. After four wars and two 
national catastrophes in the course of only 33 years in pursuit of the national idea 
reunification and the restoration of San Stefano Bulgaria, Bulgarian political elites opted 
for peaceful revision. Bulgaria seemingly conforms to the new European order, without 
giving up on its national idea. In other words the San Stefano idea stays the same after 
1918, however the means are changed by the doctrine of peaceful revision. This was 
largely followed by the new Bulgarian King Boris III (1918-1943). The San Stefano 
achieved by war ‗had lost its mass appeal, surviving ‗in numerically small pockets, such 
as the officers‘ corps, segments of the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie and, of course, 
the refugees‘ organizations.‘56 Clearly ‗the fiasco of the national unification program 
produced a social and political climate that led to the type of introspective mood that 
infected the intelligentsia en masse.‘57 This did not lead to ‗denunciation of the national 
idea; on the contrary, there is no question that the national idea is justified and worth 
fighting for. What is attacked are the ways and manner of achieving the national idea: 
‗we imagined that we can achieve the reunification of the Bulgarian people at once, 
instead of at separate stages.‘58 This is undoubtedly ‗a discourse that lies within the 
framework of the national idea, but which has realism and wisdom borne of defeat and 
which has a sobriety of manner quite distinct from the elevated prose of the previous 
period.‘59 Therefore, the programmatic beliefs for Greeks as enemies did not change, 
but the approach towards them was modified, namely peaceful revision of the 
boundaries. A parallel could be made between post-Smyrna Greek politics and post-
Neuilly Bulgaria, when in spite of major societal change, and major recast of the 
national idea-pursuits, traditional negative programmatic beliefs about the neighbour did 
not change and normative criteria that cooperation was not appropriate remained 
constant. 
 
In 1934 the Balkan Entente, an alliance formed by all neighbours- Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Greece, and Turkey was created to safeguard their territorial integrity against 
neighbours‘ revisionism. This entente fuelled the Bulgarian ideational belief that Greece 
(and Serbia) were the arch enemies, since they were the most ardent supporters of the 
Balkan Entente. Bulgaria did not sign the pact, mainly because of Greece (and Serbia) 
among the signatories and any cooperation with them was deemed inappropriate.  
 
During the WWII, the Axis Powers and the Allies Both promised to Bulgaria territories 
in Vardar Macedonia and outlet to the Aegean. As in the Balkan Wars and WWI, 
Bulgarian political leaders chose to side with the factor that was against Serbia and 
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Greece, and the Axis Powers, following their logic of appropriateness that precluded 
any form of political, economic and social cooperation with the latter. On 1
 
March 1941, 
Prime Minister Bogdan Filov signed the Tripartite Pact and Bulgaria officially joined 
the Axis bloc. As a result the country briefly fulfilled San Stefano gaining control of 
Macedonia, Western Thrace and the Western Outlands between 1941 and 1947, but it 
had to cede again those territories to its neighbours. In August 1944, Bulgaria 
unilaterally announced its withdrawal from the war and asked the German troops to 
leave, declaring war on Germany, in order to prevent Soviet troops from occupying the 
country. This did not prevent the Soviet Union to declare war on Bulgaria on 8 
September and occupy the country a week later.  At the same time the country was still 
at war with the allied powers, so for a brief period Bulgaria was at war with, the UK, the 
US, the allied powers, Germany, the Soviet Union and most of the neighbouring 
countries. As recognition of the military inclusion on the side of the Allied Powers 
towards the end of the war, the Paris Peace Conference (1947) restored the country to its 
pre-war boundaries. Bulgarian foreign policy towards fulfilment of the San Stefano 
remains largely unchanged in the period 1878-1944, despite the two different 
approaches- ‗all means possible‘ and ‗peaceful revisionism‘ after 1918. This is also 
evidenced by the words of Genchev, 
 
After the Berlin Treaty of 1878 there is one, fundamental, ever standing national task of 
the Bulgarian foreign policy. This is the idea of completion of the national revolution, for 
reunification of the lands inhabited […] by people, speaking the Bulgarian language. […] 
In the policy of all Bulgarian governments from 1879 to 1939 this idea and aim were the 
primary objective.
60
 
 
Despite changing contexts the institutionalized programmatic beliefs of Greeks as 
enemies did not change and the inappropriateness of cooperation with Greeks 
materialized in the Bulgarian governments‘ persistent choice of obstruction policies 
towards Greece, regardless of changing environment. 
The Cold War Period (1944-1989) 
 
World War II was a watershed in the development of the Bulgarian national idea. If the 
nationalism of the pre-war period can be generally defined as irredentist…the 
nationalism of the post-war period is unambiguously status quo nationalism.‘61 The 
building of ‗real socialism‘ or communism ‗included the appropriation of some 
elements of the Marxist doctrine [...] primarily its modernizing potential, especially in 
the drive for industrialization.‘62 From the very beginning ‗the variety of communism 
practiced in and exported from Russia, especially after World War II, was, among other 
things, an ideology of modernization, an attempt to produce a unique way to meet the 
challenge of a hegemonic West. Both nationalism and state communism responded to 
the same challenge, becoming tools of modernization.‘63 
 
In attempt to displace old nationalist ideas after 1944, the communist regime in Bulgaria 
initiated the formation of an ideology, based on socialism, ‗bright future‘, ‗heavy 
industrialization‘ and ‗international solidarity‘. The national heroes were now seen 
through the socialist lenses and the state became the sole producer of history. The 
                                                 
60 Nikolay Genchev, Vunshnata politika na Bulgarija 1938-1941 (The Foreign Policy of Bulgaria 1938-1941), (Sofia: 
Vector, 1941), pp. 173-174. 
61 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, p. 92. 
62 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, pp. 88-89. 
63 Maria Todorova, ‗The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism‘, pp. 88-89.  
 109 
Bulgarian new ‗others‘ were the capitalist world and the pre-war fascist Bulgarian 
regimes. National heroes were regarded according to their appropriateness for the 
socialist ideology until the late 1950‘s. The decade of ‗non-national Communist 
experiment‘ (1944-1956) was characterized by supranational considerations and 
‗primacy of class struggle over national issues, subordination to national interests to the 
cause of the global proletarian revolution, adherence to the proletarian international 
discipline‘.64  The ‗ongoing [ideational] conflict between the two [mutually exclusive] 
discourses‘ of communist internationalism and traditional nationalism reflected the 
power struggle within the intellectual elite. Marxism ‗failed to develop an adequate 
theory [idea] of nationalism‘ because of the nature of Marxist ideology itself: ‗the 
incompatibility between a cosmopolitan, universalist ideology and a particularist 
romantic creed precluded their theoretical syncretism.‘65  
 
From the early 1960s, political elites understood that the international socialist agenda 
was not powerful enough to adequately displace the national idea ‗and the state began 
reviving some national heroes and stories suppressed for over a decade (such as the 
1903 Ilinden uprising revolutionaries and the whole myth of Macedonia as the lost land 
and most important part of Bulgarian culture and history). This is a direct result of the 
awareness of political elites that at the time ‗absolutely nobody …already believed in 
anything… referring to people‘s belief in the communist ideology, as defined by the 
ruling Communist Party, which was presumed to underlie individuals‘ public, if not 
necessarily their private, behaviour.‘66 Communist ideology failed to articulate a 
powerful enough idea to adequately challenge traditional institutionalized nationalist 
ideas. In the Greek case communist ideas could render other receptive, they had 
powerful carriers, but they did not gain salience in the Greek polity due to the lack of 
institutionalization of such ideas and due to the short period their carriers exerted 
influence before the communist fraction lost the Civil War. In the Bulgarian case, 
communist ideas were institutionalized in the totalitarian state, but they never had large 
popular support, they were imposed from outside, lacked popular carriers and could not 
render others receptive. 
 
Therefore, after the death of Stalin and the famous April Plenum of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party in 1956, in order to gain legitimacy political elites re-introduced old 
suppressed national ideas in the political context and a renewed interest in the inter-war 
heritage came out. ‗The ―genuine‖ Marxist discourse was very soon replaced by the 
imagery of nationalism, translated into an idiosyncratic Marxist slang‘67 Initially official 
view was that communist nationalism adopted national ideology in order to be 
overcome, but as a result ‗it was national ideology that adopted the language of 
Marxism in order to gain legitimacy.‘68  
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By early sixties ‗the so-called communist nationalism was nothing but a transvestite, 
ordinary nationalism.‘69 One example being ‗after the 1960s the anniversary of the San 
Stefano Treaty (3 March) was increasingly commemorated in public meetings, concerts 
and other ceremonies.‘70 This, however, came after careful ‗blending‘ the national 
discourse with socialist elements, since ‗in Bulgaria, where the official policy was […] 
one of complete consent with the centre (Moscow), the majority of the party leadership 
and the ruling elite shared the national ideology but articulated it in a more cautious 
way, using the hegemonic Marxist discourse clearly for purposes of gaining legitimacy 
[at home and abroad].‘71 The national idea was somehow muted abroad in the name of 
‗socialist solidarity‘ and ‗communist brotherhood‘, but it flourished on the internal 
scene in school textbooks, academic discussions, official celebration of certain historic 
events and numerous monuments, although heavily diluted with socialist ideology and 
symbols. Marxist discourse, blended with national ideology further reinforced 
traditional programmatic beliefs for Greeks as the enemy since now they were enemies 
not only according to the nationalist but according to the communist ideology as well. 
This cemented the normative guidelines and criteria that cooperation with them is 
inappropriate. Moreover, since Bulgaria was external border of the Communist bloc, the 
frontier with Greece was one of the most heavily guarded in Europe. Along the 500 km 
border there was only one border check point, but no one passed through it. There was 
no political, economical and social cooperation of any kind between the two states and 
the borders were effectively closed.
72
 
 
Political elites had to operate on two levels adhering to the principles of proletarian 
internationalism abroad and advocating high national self esteem at home to gain 
legitimacy. As said the Bulgarian ‗socialist patriotism‘ is the resulting compromise 
between these opposing discourses. Status quo nationalism or socialist patriotism 
stripped of the irredenta of the pre-war periods advocates not geopolitical cultural, 
linguistic and historical rights, but ‗high national esteem‘, ‗healthy respect for one‘s 
historical achievements, and the pride ‗of having been able to give something to the 
world.‘73 The educational system, media, books, political rhetoric, as another example 
of the obstruction policies, is in line with such more nuanced approach. Regarding anti-
Greek propaganda in that period, it unites traditional hostility and Cold War sentiments. 
Typical example of this new ideology is Bulgarian poet Dzhagarov‘s poem from the 
eighties dedicated to Bulgaria, where Greece is compared to ‗poison‘ through the 
historical image of Byzantium, 
 
A land just like a human palm… 
A bigger land I don‘t require. 
I‘m glad your mountains are flint-hard 
And that your blood has southern fire. 
 
A land just like a human palm… 
But tougher, able to withstand 
The poison of Byzantium, 
The bloody Turkish yatagan. 
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Traders in blood and in tobacco 
Who parcelled out your earth for sale 
Fell to the ground with broken backs 
For you, though small, were never fail. 
 
A land just like a human palm… 
To me you are the world entire. 
I measure you not by the yard 
But by the love that you inspire.
74
 
 
One of the biggest manifestations of such trend is ‗the lavishly and expensively 
prepared festivities commemorating the 1300
th
 anniversary of the Bulgarian state 
[created 681 AD], which was supposed to […] raise Bulgaria‘s self esteem and 
international reputation.‘75  The celebrations were directly linked to Lyudmila 
Zhivkova, the daughter of the Communist leader Todor Zhivkov.
76
 As a Minister of 
Culture (1975-1981) sshe started a massive campaign for promoting foreign art and 
culture in communist Bulgaria. Even more successful are her policies for popularizing 
Bulgarian culture and historical heritage abroad. Under her initiative the First 
International Children‘s Assembly and the World Children‘s Parliament, under the aegis 
of UNESCO are created and convened in Sofia in 1979, 1982, 1985 and 1988. She also 
initiated the building of the massive National Palace of Culture, the Gallery for Foreign 
Art in Sofia and facilitates the opening of literally tens of thousands cultural houses, 
libraries, museums and galleries throughout the country. Such initiatives, and especially 
the one year celebrations under the ‗13 centuries Bulgaria‘ programme were considered 
in the Soviet Union as a dangerous resurgence of nationalism in Bulgaria, endangering 
the proletarian socialist ideology.  
 
Zhivkova mysteriously died in the middle of the celebrations in 1981, at the age of 39, 
and the accident is directly linked to Moscow, according to popular belief. Zhivkova‘s 
ideational input had shifted the nationalist discourse to a more transcendent, esoteric 
narrative but generally follow the line of the socialist patriotism. After her death, the 
discourse returns to the nationalist mainstream and culminates in the middle of the 
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1980s with the ‗renaming‘ of the Bulgarian Turkish minority.77 This is a proof that 
despite blending with Marxist discourse, traditional nationalist programmatic beliefs 
had primacy over proletarian internationalism. For example, Bulgaria continued its 
isolationist policy of the pre-war times in communist times, according to its national 
ideology, and namely as one surrounded by hostile neighbours from everywhere, but the 
Black Sea. The ‗national enemies‘, Greece and Turkey now became ‗ideological 
enemies‘; the national enemy Serbia/Yugoslavia was a ‗socialist traitor‘. Romania, 
despite being in the same ideological camp, was never perceived as a true friend, since 
the memories of the country occupying Southern Dobrudzha, attacking Bulgaria in the 
Second Balkan War and participating in the Balkan Entente against Bulgaria (1934) 
were still alive. As a consequence commercial, cultural and economic ties were much 
more developed not with neighbouring communist Romania but with the USSR, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. In the period 1944-1989, similar to the 
Greek case communist ideology in Bulgaria reinforced traditional nationalist ideas of 
Greeks as enemies, materializing in the complete lack of political, economic or social 
cooperation between the two states and the negative campaign in media, educational 
system, political discourse, numerous publication, etc. 
Return to Europe 
 
Post-communist ideational discourse in Bulgaria is marked by two periods. The first 
(1989-1999) is characterized by clearing the nationalist discourse of communist clichés 
and reviving aspects and narratives forbidden under the regime. At the same time this 
period was a period of ideational vacuum, characterized by feeling of loss of identity 
and clear direction, economic difficulties, suspicion towards the West and feeling of 
being abandoned. The second (2000-2010) is dominated by the ‗Return to Europe‘ idea 
with its Europeanization and democratization normative agenda. During the first period 
in the post-communist ideational vacuum and lack of any clear EU/NATO engagement, 
the status quo nationalism of the previous era was the only safe and stable marker of 
national identity. Indeed after 1989 and the collapse of communism, Bulgarian ‗ 
―communist nationalism‖  as being ordinary transvestite nationalism…gloated in its 
newly acquired nudity-it no longer had to pay lip service to the formerly dominant 
jargon.‘78  As a sign that San Stefano ideas were not completely dead was the fact that 
Bulgaria in 1992 became the first country in the world to recognize the independent 
Macedonian state. However it failed to recognize the existence of a Macedonian 
language and nation, different from Bulgarian. Bulgaria restored 3 March 1878, the day 
of the signing of the San Stefano Treaty, as a present Bulgarian national holiday and 
reaffirmed the old national motto ‗In Unity is Power‘. However, from 1989 to 1997 ‗all 
signs indicate[d] that there [was] no reversal of the status quo nature of nationalism, no 
matter how and by whom it [was] articulated. The two potentially sensitive spots of 
Bulgarian nationalism [were] the Macedonian question and the Turkish [minority] 
problem [...] despite the creation of several Macedonian minority organizations, the 
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issue seems […] to be likely to remain within the confines of cultural nationalism-even 
in its most outspoken, and even shrill, articulations, the irredenta is absent.‘79 
 
The resentment and suspicion towards the West in that period was coming from the 
economic difficulties, loss of direction, but also from a humiliated feeling of pride of 
not being acknowledged of a perceived discrepancy between glorious past and mediocre 
present. One of the main reasons for such discourse was the lack of clear engagement on 
behalf of the EU and NATO to accept Bulgaria. In addition putting the country in the 
‗Black Schengen list‘  and the visa regime with the long queues in front of foreign 
embassies as well as the negative imaging of Bulgaria in foreign newspapers added to 
the idea of holding back to traditional nationalism and scepticism towards the EU and 
the West. Bulgarians searched for comfort in real or imaginary sources of national 
pride. Aspects of the national discourse forbidden under communism were revived. At 
the same time new national myths were created and disseminated by media. An example 
of real or imaginary sources of national pride in that period are: Bulgaria is one of the 
oldest European states, Bulgarians gave the Cyrillic alphabet to all Slavs, Bulgarians are 
second in IQ tests only after Israeli, Bulgarian Asen Yordanov constructed the first 
Boeing, John Attanasoff was the inventor of the first automatic electronic computer, 
Bulgarian aviators for the first time in history used airplane for a military action during 
the Odrin (Edirne) siege in the first Balkan War and many others. 
However from the mid 1990s the ideological vacuum was filled by a very powerful idea 
of Euro-Atlantic membership and integration and the respective EU normative agenda 
started to more and more challenge old nationalist ideas, making them look ever more 
inadequate in the new conditions. EU normative agenda had one goal: to bring the 
region to normalcy and extend over it the EU achievements in the political, economic 
and security spheres.  Therefore the objectives can be summarized as- building strong 
institutions, build mutual trust, generate a mutual awareness dialogue and share lesson 
learned by the region with the extra regional partners, create conditions for genuine 
private enterprise, encourage free trade and customs union, fight corruption and 
organized crime, create free media, respect human rights and minorities, link up the 
region- transport infrastructure, create a common European education area. 
The EU, on its part has always relied on conditionality in its policies towards Member 
states, applicant countries and third countries to impose its normative criteria.
80
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Shimmelfennig at al. have explored ‗democratic conditionality as the main mechanism through which international 
organizations such as the EU induce non-member states to comply with their fundamental rights.‘ Anastasakis and 
Bechev write that ‗Conditionality is the EU‘s most powerful instrument for dealing with the candidate and potential 
candidate countries in post-communist Europe. To summarize the ultimate goal of EU‘s conditionality policies in SEE is 
instalment of liberal democracies throughout the region. The latter goal is also manifested by the explicit requirement that 
only democracies and functioning market economies are eligible for membership in the union.  However, most interesting 
is how conditionality actually works and the degree of its effectiveness. Shimmelfenig et al. stress that ‗in the case of post-
communist applicants for EU membership conditionality works through reactive reinforcement- the international 
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However, the early 1990s witnessed the practice of setting out political and economic 
conditions.
81
 Thus Central and East European countries (CEECs) and later South East 
European countries (SEECs)  ‗became the first target of a very demanding political, 
social and economic conditionality, closely linked with the process of transition towards 
democracy and market economy.‘82 However, initially the ‗conditions were not backed 
up by the promise of membership, despite CEECs‘ demands.‘83  
The Copenhagen European Council in 1993 is the turning point for EU leverage and 
conditionality in SEE. It generated and conveyed to CEECs and SEECs two very 
powerful ideas. Firstly that CEECs and SEECs have the possibility to join the EU, and 
secondly what the criteria for starting of negotiation process are. Going back to the 
theoretical chapter and ideational theory ‗the most important factor determining whether 
ideas are able to influence politics over the long term is ‗whether or not an idea becomes 
embedded in an institution or organization.‘ The two Copenhagen Council fundamental 
ideas were institutionalized through the SAp/CARDS and the negotiation process and in 
a broader framework through DG Enlargement of the European Commission. The EU‘s 
conditionality requirements, as set out by the Copenhagen Council required that before 
a country could become a candidate for EU membership it has to achieve ‗stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.‘ In 
addition a state has to have the capacity ‗to take on the obligation of membership, 
including adherence to political, economic and monetary objectives.‘84  
                                                                                                                                               
organization reacts to the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of its conditions by granting or withholding rewards, but does not 
proactively punish or support non-compliant states‘ and also that effectiveness of reactive enforcement ‗depends on 
domestic conditions in the target countries at the level of governments and state elites.‘ 
 
Furthermore, as discussed in the theoretical chapter the research employs the social learning model of conditionality, and 
namely that ‗a state adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules.‘ Therefore according to the 
‗logic of appropriateness‘, ‗the actors involved are motivated by internalized identities, values, and norms. Among 
alternative courses of action they choose (the most) appropriate or legitimate one.‘ Furthermore the process of rule 
transfer and rule adoption is characterized by ‗arguing about the legitimacy of rules and the appropriateness of behaviour 
(rather than bargaining about conditions and rewards), persuasion (rather than coercion), and ‗complex‘ learning (rather 
than behavioural adaptation). Or as discussed above the normative programme promoted by EU and other regional 
institutions should be powerful and appropriate enough to challenge and displace the old nationalist institutional agendas. 
To comprehend the complexity behind the EU conditionality in SEE, the nature of EU-regional strategy should be explored 
in detail: 
 
The EU has always relied on conditionality in its policies towards Member states, applicant countries and third countries. 
However the early 1990s witnessed the practice of setting out political and economic conditions. Thus Central and East 
European countries (CEECs) and later South East European countries (SEECs)  ‗became the first target of a very 
demanding political, social and economic conditionality, closely linked with the process of transition towards democracy 
and market economy.‘80 However, initially the ‗conditions were not backed up by the promise of membership, despite 
CEECs‘ demands.‘  
81 Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev, ‗EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the 
Process‘, European Studies Centre, St Anthony‘s College, University of Oxford, April 2003, pp. 4-6. 
82 Anastasakis and Bechev, ‗EU Conditionality in South East Europe‘, p. 5. 
83 Anastasakis and Bechev, ‗EU Conditionality in South East Europe‘, p. 6.
 
84 European Council in Copenhagen: Conclusions of the Presidency, 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf 21-22 June 2003, accessed April 2007, p.13 
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The next major stage in the formation of EU conditionality strategy towards SEE came 
with the adoption of ‗Conclusions on the principles of conditionality governing the 
development of the European Union‘s relations with certain countries of south-east 
Europe‘ in April 1997.85 The introduction of the document stated that ‗in an effort to 
consolidate peace and stability in the region and to contribute to its economic renewal, 
the EU intends to develop bilateral relations with the countries of the region within a 
framework which promotes democracy, the rule of law, higher standards of human and 
minority rights, transformation towards market economies and greater cooperation 
between those countries. In this context, particular importance is attached to the 
principles of conditionality‘, and also that the EU has agreed to ‗establish, in the 
framework of the regional approach, political and economic conditions as the basis for a 
coherent and transparent policy towards the development of bilateral relations in the 
fields of trade, of financial assistance and economic cooperation as well as of 
contractual relations, allowing for the necessary degree of flexibility. The EU strategy 
should serve as an incentive, and not an obstacle, to the countries concerned to fulfil 
these conditions. 
In that sense Bulgaria (together with Romania) was the laggard in the accession process, 
but have just elected reform-minded government in 1997 and was among the first 
countries to be subjected to such structured and focused policy of EU conditionality. In 
other words the reward for compliance was twofold: the country was promised 
membership, but it was also granted access to funds released under the SAPARD 
(agricultural aid) and ISPA (regional aid) programmes, in addition to the PHARE 
programme. What was the impact of EU conditionality on Bulgaria through the pre-
accession funds? 
Phare impacted in three ways on the country‘s domestic policies and public 
administrations. First, there was the programme‘s express concern with building and 
strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, so that Bulgaria could 
implement the acquis and participate fully in EU policies upon accession. One of the 
key changes between the ‗old‘ and the ‗new‘ Phare was the increased funding targeted 
at institution building. After 2000 roughly 30% of Phare funding was allocated to 
institution building through transfer of know-how, and another 35% to physical 
investment in key regulatory institutions.
 86
  While working with pre-accession funding, 
Bulgarian authorities were also expected to design and implement national strategies for 
human resources development and adopt national laws guaranteeing civil service 
professionalization and neutrality, 
 
Many Phare projects had a wider effect on horizontal/non-acquis public administration 
reform (Commission, 2005: 138). Phare management required harmonisation of national 
legislation with Community acquis on public procurement, state aid and competition, 
environment and equal opportunities. In the area of budgetary management, legislation 
has to be passed to facilitate multi-annual commitment and reallocation of funds between 
and within programmes. National legislation on regional policy and statistics also needed 
to be brought in line with EU practices.
87
 
 
                                                 
85 ‗Conclusions on the principles of conditionality governing the development of the European Union‘s relations with 
certain countries of south-east Europe‘, 29 April 1997 in EU Bulletin 4 (1997) 
86 Pavlina Nikolova, ‗The Implementation of Phare, Ispa and Sapard in Bulgaria‘ , paper presented at Workshop- A 
Roadmap for the Western-Balkans: Using IPA and other EU Funds to Accelerate Convergence and Integration,  held in 
Brussels, 11 October 2007,  http://web.ceu.hu/cens/assets/files/conference/Nikolova_IPA, accessed October 2008, p.8
 
87 Nikolova, ‗The Implementation of Phare‘, p.8. 
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Transfer of expertise happened mainly through the so-called twinning. It is a threeparty 
instrument, involving member states, candidate administrations and the Commission as 
a co-ordinator. For example, in the period 1998-2000 Bulgaria was involved in 40 
twinning projects. It was successful in creating an ‗administrative market‘ where 
candidate states could ‗shop for‘ most appropriate administrative practices offered by 
incumbent EU member states.
88
 Second, the actual management of Phare funding by 
Bulgaria yielded significant institutional learning benefits. For aid to flow from the 
Commission, Phare administrative and budgetary structures had to be set up and 
integrated into the national administration. Last, but not least, Phare implementation 
provided for a redefinition of relations between the national and the regional and local 
administrations. Phare provided an impetus to candidate states to strengthen the 
competences of their sub-national levels (regions, municipalities) and streamline their 
territorial organisation. Crossborder projects expected local and regional authorities to 
provide for the programming, implementation and monitoring of activities. Similarly, 
beneficiaries of ESC projects were often regional or municipal administrations.
89
 In 
short, EU conditionality managed to impose its normative agenda on Balkan polities 
mainly through new institution building, learning of new practices within old 
institutions, coupled with facilitating the increase of regional governance capacity. This 
facilitated new Europeanization ideas to challenge decade old nationalist contexts, 
which led to change in policies, explored in the transport infrastructure chapter. The 
implementation and scope of action of Phare, Ispa and Sapard Programmes in Bulgaria 
and Romania went far beyond the simple transfer of funds, although money was by 
itself a powerful incentive for governance change at the national and the sub-national 
level. They provided institutional and legislative models for the state administration, as 
well as benchmarks, advice and training and new ideas to penetrate the Balkan states‘ 
polity. Out of all tools of the EU‘s conditionality vis-à-vis SEE, described above, the 
common infrastructural projects under the TINA initiative (together with the perspective 
of EU-membershp) had the most powerful ideational appeal. The following two 
chapters would explore the power of EU conditionality, represented by the TINA 
network vis-à-vis Bulgarian and Greek political elites and their traditional nationalist 
ideas for the neighbour and cooperation with that neighbour. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 tested the first hypothesis that, in Greece and Bulgaria, path-dependent 
programmatic beliefs shape the remarkably persistent obstruction policies towards each 
other during most of the XX c., regardless of constantly changing external factors. Each 
of the two chapters started with a discussion how the idea for the other as an enemy 
emerged, who were the intellectual carriers of such idea and how it became 
institutionalized in the institutional set-up of the modern Greek and Bulgarian state 
respectively. Then each chapter explored how such programmatic beliefs played a 
crucial role in structuring actors‘ views that cooperation with the neighbour is not 
appropriate and reconstructed the process through which the Greek and Bulgarian 
political actors, shaped by such normative guidelines and criteria decided on the policies 
of obstruction towards the other during key periods of the XX c., regardless of changing 
environment.. This, in conjunction with a comparative study of the distinctive historical 
                                                 
88 Papadimitriou, D. and D. Phinnemore (2004), ‗Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The 
Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania‘, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42, 
3, pp. 619-39 in Nikolova, ‗The Implementation of Phare‘, p. 8. 
89 Nikolova, ‗The Implementation of Phare‘, pp. 9-10.
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and structural contexts of Greece and Bulgaria uncovered the most important factors 
influencing the development and decision making of respective political elites during 
these years. 
 
To acquire data about the programmatic beliefs about the neighbour in Greece and 
Bulgaria, the two chapters relied on documentary research, using published and 
unpublished government publications, laws, published national doctrines, strategies and 
programmes, historical documents, letters, reports, newspaper articles, memoirs, 
biographies, etc. The data was analyzed through the method of ideational mapping. To 
collect data about the normative guidelines and policies towards the neighbour during 
the XX c., both primary (participant observation) and secondary (documentary research) 
were used. The data was analysed through process tracing and focus on decision-
making-during-crisis methods. We operationalized obstruction policies with more 
concrete policies of denationalization of the minority of the other and negative 
propaganda campaign in the domestic policies (existing/non existing)  and policy of 
political, social and economic obstruction (existing/non existing) in the foreign policy 
during the different periods explored. 
 
The chapters explored if in critical periods, like the two Balkan Wars, two World Wars, 
the Cold War, the Fall of Communism, etc. (when ideas are most likely to change), we 
observed a significant change of the given set of ideas in Bulgaria and Greece about the 
other. Then we correlated ideas with the policies between Greece and Bulgaria in that 
historical moment. In general, if the given set of ideas did not largely change, we could 
not have expected significant change in the existing policies of obstruction 
(denationalization of the minority of the other, negative propaganda and lack of 
political, social and economic cooperation). However, if we have found policy change 
(no denationalization, negative propaganda and existing political, social and economic 
cooperation) that most likely meant that there was change in the given set of ideas. 
 
In Greece the dominant idea was the Megale. It was a crystallized national ideology 
with a goal of uniting all former territories of the Medieval Byzantine Empire into a 
modern Greek state. Korais and Velstinlis revived the ancient glories and provoked the 
interest towards Greek history. Zampelios and  Paparregopoulus introduced a tripartite 
examination of Greek history, ancient Hellenism, medieval Hellenism and modern 
Hellenism, claiming that Modern Greeks were direct descendants of ancient Greeks and 
the Byzantium Empire. The ideas of Korais, Feraios, Zampelios and Paparrigopolous 
achieved political salience among so many competing ideas through their prominent 
status in Greek society. They were able to make others ‗listen‘ through their position as 
government officials, university professors and intellectuals and prolific writers. 
Moreover, they were very persistent during their long careers in articulating their beliefs 
and manoeuvring the forming intellectual elite of the young Greek state toward the 
adoption of particular nationalist stances. Korais could do that through his position as 
university lecturer in Paris and through his numerous literary contributions, sponsored 
by the Chios merchants. Feraios could make others listen to his ideas through the 
Greek-language newspaper, Ephemeris, published in Vienna through his Revolutionary 
Maniphesto and published poems and books about Greek history that became widely 
popular.  
 
Paparrigopolous could maintain the importance of his ideas through his unique position 
as the greatest historian of modern Greece, his longevity as ideational carrier through 
his books, school textbooks, published magazines, university lectures, government 
appointments, combined with his uncommon talent of writing style. By virtue of such 
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particular talents and long tenure as a public figure, he could exert unparalleled 
influence over the development of the national narrative of the forming modern Greek 
state. Megale Idea and not some other idea was adopted  since Korais, Feraios, 
Paparrigopolous and Zampelios were successful through their professional positions and 
literary scholarship to build a consensus that the most suitable (only appropriate) 
development course of the modern Greek state is in line with the Megale Idea.  
 
The particular historical and ideational context, in which Megale Idea crystallized, 
clashed with the crystallizing national programmes of Bulgarians-San Stefano, since 
both people were claiming the same lands, mostly in Macedonia. San Stefano and 
Megale were mutually incompatible. As a result Bulgarians were viewed as enemies 
through the prism of the Megale Idea and such idea were institutionalized in the modern 
Greek state and shaped the normative prescriptions that cooperation with Bulgarians 
was not appropriate, which in turn shaped policies of obstruction during most of the XX 
c. During the early XIX c. Megale Idea was put to practice and since Bulgarians were 
perceived as enemies over the future spoils of the Ottoman Empire, cooperation with 
them was not appropriate and this was the period when in Greece the first policies of 
obstruction towards Bulgaria were officially adopted as a result of such ideas. The 
polices included the Hellenization of the Slavs in Macedonia, the negative propaganda 
against Bulgarians in Greece and among the population of Macedonia and the total lack 
of political, economic and social cooperation between the two states.  
 
The Smyrna catastrophe marked the end of Megale in its classical form, but it did not 
alter the already institutionalized beliefs of Bulgarians as an enemy, neither had it 
changed the normative criteria that cooperation with them is not appropriate, regardless 
of the very changed external context. During the Balkan Wars, WW I and WW II, 
Greek political leaders chose to side against Bulgaria, following their logic of 
appropriateness that precluded any form of political, economic and social cooperation 
with the latter. The chapter confirmed that during those periods, policies of 
Hellenization and negative propaganda against Bulgaria intensified. During the Civil 
War, the ideas that KKE crystallized did strongly challenge traditional Greek 
programmatic notions of friends and enemies. Furthermore, they challenged the whole 
existence of Greek polity. However, they were not able to displace traditional 
programmatic beliefs due to the short period, intellectual carriers had to propagate their 
ideas and to the lack of institutionalization in the Greek organizational set-up. During 
the Cold War the perception of Bulgarians as enemies according to nationalist ideology 
was joined by the perception of Bulgarians as enemies according to communist 
ideology. The period is characterized by complete lack of communication, intense 
propaganda and continued assimilatory policies. 
In Bulgaria, San Stefano is the crystallized national ideology that the Bulgarian state 
would only be complete by encompassing the three historic provinces of Moesia, 
Thrace and Macedonia, since those were the ethnic territories of the Bulgarian nation, 
justified by two criteria: Bulgarian language and adherence to the Bulgarian Exarchate. 
This idea was reconfirmed through the short-lived San Stefano Treaty that created large 
state for couple of months, before it was dismembered by the Berlin Treaty. Paisius 
crystallized the idea that Greek educational and ecclesiastical influence was detrimental 
to Bulgarian people and they needed to overthrow it. He justified that with the glories of 
the Medieval Past, when Bulgarian people had their own Empire and did fight with the 
Greeks to preserve it. Paisius was followed by a number of others and most notably by 
Sophronius of Vratsa (Sofroni Vrachanski) (1739-1813).  Therefore, the whole 
Bulgarian nationalism was born with the idea of Greeks as ‗enemies‘  
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The ideas of Paisius of Hilendar influenced the second wave of ideational entrepreneurs 
such as Neofit Bozveli and Ilarion Makariopolski (1812–1875). They followed Paisius‘ 
ideas and started to propagate the need for Bulgarian ecclesiastical organization 
independent of the Greek Patriarchate. Similar to the Greek case, the ideas of Paisius, 
Sofronius, Bozveli and Makariopolski achieved political importance among so many 
competing ideas through the latter‘s prominent position in society. They were able to 
render others receptive to their ideas through their position as ecclesiastical officials, 
intellectuals and prolific writers. Moreover, they were very persistent during their long 
careers in articulating their beliefs and manoeuvring the forming Bulgarian intellectual 
elite‘s views toward the adoption of particular nationalist stances. Makariopolski 
influential ideas were maintained through the newspapers Dunavski lebed (Danube 
Swan), Budushtnost (Future), Branitel (Defender), Bulgarska starina (Bulgarian 
heritage), published in Novi Sad, Belgrade and Odessa between 1855 and 1865. Similar 
to the Greek case, Sofronius, Paisius, Bozveli and Makariopolski were better positioned 
to ensure that their ideas remain a force in politics even after they have left the scene 
because they were able to build a consensus that the most suitable (only appropriate) 
development course of the modern Bulgarian state is in line with the educational and 
ecclesiastical emancipation from Greeks and adherence to the Bulgarian Exarchate.  
1870-1878 is the critical juncture, when most of the institutions of the new Bulgarian 
state were founded and the ideational legacy of carriers that largely shaped the San 
Stefano idea was institutionalised. And namely, the intellectual entrepreneurs, Paisius of 
Hilendar and Sophronius of Vratsa influenced profoundly not only the pre-
independence network of schools, but their ideational legacy was institutionalised 
through the schooling system of the young Bulgarian Kingdom. Similarly, the powerful 
ideas of Neofit Bozveli and Ilarion Makariopolski  were institutionalised through the 
first Bulgarian independent institution, namely the Bulgarian Exarchate and later passed 
in the ecclesiastical organization of the modern state.  
Nearly the entire Bulgarian Enlightenment (1732-1878) was marked by the movement 
to overthrow Greek influence in church and school. Not surprisingly, such ideas passed 
in the modern Bulgarian state, through carriers and institutionalization, becoming 
programmatic beliefs, shaping the normative guidelines of Bulgarian political actors 
that cooperation with Greeks is not appropriate or normatively acceptable explaining 
obstruction policies during subsequent periods. In the period 1878-1913, as a result of 
the normative criteria of Greeks as enemies, the Bulgarian state formulated obstruction 
policies towards the Greek Patriarchate by creating a dense network of schools and 
churches in Macedonia and by supporting the cheta (bands) in their armed struggle 
against the Greek andarts. In addition, the state organized negative campaign against 
Greece in Bulgarian press and supported campaign against the Greek minority in 
Bulgaria-Greeks were forced to leave the country and their economic activities were 
suppressed by the campaign not to buy Greek merchandise. During the Balkan, WWI 
and WWII, Bulgarian political leaders persistently chose to side with the factor that was 
against Greece, following their logic of appropriateness that precluded any form of 
political, economic and social cooperation with the latter. The Communist period 
nationalism was blended with Marxist discourse, blended with national ideology further 
reinforced traditional programmatic beliefs for Greeks as the enemy since now they 
were enemies not only according to the nationalist but according to the communist 
ideology as well. This cemented the normative guidelines and criteria that cooperation 
with them is inappropriate. The lack of any contact and the anti-Greek propaganda in 
the educational system, media, books, political rhetoric, are typical examples of the 
obstruction policies of the time. 
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To summarize at successive historical junctures the dominant ideational framework has 
been challenged, but traditional programmatic beliefs of mistrust towards each other 
have remained unchanged. The national ideology has included more than one discourse 
and has displayed remarkable adaptability to different ideologies and regimes for 
legitimizing purposes, but perception of the other as an enemy and the inappropriateness 
of cooperation from the early XX c. to the 1990s did not change. As a result policies of 
obstruction during that period did not change as well. The first hypothesis that 
Bulgarian and Greek modern state‘ mutual obstruction, regardless of changing external 
factors and outside pressure could be properly understood by exploring the crucial role, 
played by path dependent institutionalized ideas (programmatic beliefs) in shaping 
policy outcomes has been confirmed. That specific nationalist attitudes of Bulgarian 
and Greek political elites would most likely be path-dependent regardless of the 
different changes of external environments, if such changes do not produce an idea 
powerful enough to supplant old ideas and beliefs of what is deemed appropriate was 
confirmed as well. 
 
After the 1990s, traditional obstructionist programmatic beliefs between Bulgaria and 
Greece were gradually challenged by the EU normative agenda. This is not to say that 
‗Europeanization‘ ideas have completely displaced old ideas, rather it is still a process 
in the making. This was possible due to the role of the EU as a powerful ideational 
carrier, longevity of such ideational pressure and the appeal of such EU idea making old 
beliefs increasingly inadequate and the fact that old ideas and policies started to yield 
more and more unintended consequences.  
 
During the 1990s, Greek and Bulgarian political elites had to engage in a multiple level 
game-Euro-Atlantic solidarity and conformity on the international arena and nationalist 
discourse, according to old ideas on the domestic. During the 1990s Bulgarian 
governments (mostly former Communist Party in power) informed by traditional 
nationalist ideas payed lip service to EU‘s demands for reforms and did not engage in 
completion of common infrastructure projects or any form of cooperation with the only 
EU-neighbour country, Greece. With the election of a truely democratic government in 
1997, the normative agenda of the EU and EU conditionality started to influence 
Bulgarian polity at regional, domestic and international level. This also challenged the 
programmatic beliefs of Greeks as enemies and the normative ideas cooperation with 
them is not appropriate due to the latter‘s membership in EU and NATO, so coveted by 
Bulgarian governments of that time. Similarly, in Greece it is not until the involvement 
of the EU in SEE in the 1990s and the Bulgarian perspective for EU-membership that 
there emerged a normative/ideational challenge with sufficient power to challenge the 
traditional attitudes displayed by the Greek elites towards Bulgaria. 
 
After a decade of ideational struggle between the discourses of nationalism and Euro-
Atlantic supranationalism, by late nineties political elites in the region started to 
increasingly translate and promote the Euro-Atlantic agenda into their domestic 
contexts. Institutions also started to feel the ideational challenge. This is evidenced by 
the fact that after 1999, all Bulgarian political forces reached an agreement on the Euro-
Atlantic‘s agenda centrality in the Bulgarian geopolitical aims and started EU accession 
negotiations.  Such developments correspond to the Greek case, discussed in the 
previous chapter, where by late nineties, there was an ideational turn towards perception 
of Bulgarians as possible allies within the EU and NATO and its normative framework 
started to significantly challenge old nationalist contexts and displace decades-old 
national ideas. Such change in perception, as evidenced by the documentary research 
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and elite interviews in the following chapters was to a large extent possible through the 
appeal of the EU membership idea and the imposing of the EU‘s normative agenda. 
 
Unlike in Bulgaria, Greek elites were not subjected to such direct conditionality, but 
they were indirectly taught to cooperate. Both Bulgarian and Greek elites were 
increasingly feeling the pressure of regional and supranational levels informing them 
that continued lack of cooperation in the new condition started to produce undesired 
results and was making traditional policies of discord ever more inadequate. For 
example, Bulgaria‘s EU entry was delayed for the failure to satisfy conditionality, while 
Greek governments were ever more being criticized both by supranational EU-level and 
domestic regional level for the lack of progress of infrastructural projects between 
Bulgaria and Greece, the delay of the opening of new border points and economic 
backwardness of the border regions. 
 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 reflect on such developments and through EU-imposed infrastructure 
cooperation (as one of the main instruments of EU conditionality in SEE during the 
1990s and 2000s) will test the second hypothesis if EU idea is linked to change of 
traditional perception of Bulgarians and Greeks as enemies and change of policies 
between the two states. This will be achieved through the elite interview method and 
documentary research. The empirical chapters on transport infrastructure reflects on the 
contradicting pressures on political elites, having to balance between nationalism at 
home and supra-nationalism outside, between traditional programmatic beliefs and 
‗modern‘ EU ideas.  The 1990-2000 period is characterized by dominance of the old 
beliefs and obstruction, while the 2000-2010 is marked by new ideas and cooperation.                                                               
.
Chapter 5. Transport infrastructure between Bulgaria and 
Greece.  First Phase 1990-2000: Traditional obstruction 
 
Via Vita Est 
-Roman saying 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The first hypothesis that, in Greece and Bulgaria, path-dependent programmatic beliefs 
influenced obstruction policies towards the other, regardless of changing contexts was 
tested in the ideational mapping chapters of Greece and Bulgaria. The second 
hypothesis is explored in the two following empirical chapters. Namely, that EU with its 
normative agenda and conditionality could be such a powerful idea effectively 
challenging for the first time, traditional national-interest mentalities in Bulgaria and 
Greece and lead to change in obstruction policies.  
 
The two chapters look at transport infrastructure between Bulgaria and Greece during 
1990-2000 and 2000-2010 periods, respectively. Such periodization is backed by the 
observation that a significant difference in terms of political, social and economic 
cooperation could be observed between the two periods as a result of the EU ideational 
impact. The justification for choosing to explore large EU infrastructure projects to test 
if EU-idea can lead to change of policies of obstruction in the Balkans is that this case 
presents us with a unique opportunity to test such hypothesis. First, such projects were 
devised to enforce good neighbourly relations and cooperation. The financing of the 
projects and their commissioning depended on the national governments‘ fulfilment of a 
certain criteria. Therefore, during that period (1990s) the most powerful EU ideational 
challenge, confronting old programmatic beliefs  in the region through the EU 
conditionality, was represented by the policies to commission the large infrastructure  
projects, such as Corridor IV, VIII and X.  Second, the successful commissioning of 
such pan-European projects required high level of political and economic cooperation 
among neighbours. They could also hardly materialize between states that enforce 
assimilation or engage in negative public campaigns towards the other. In that sense 
looking at large infrastructure projects between Bulgaria and Greece is a logical 
continuation of the narrative of previous chapters looking at normative guidelines 
shaping policy preferences towards the neighbour, operationalized through policies of 
obstruction (denationalization of the minority of the other, negative propaganda and 
political, social and economic cooperation-existent/non existent). Cooperation over the 
large infrastructure projects to take place under the EU framework, required political, 
social and economic cooperation at regional, national, supranational level, and 
precluded any assimilation or propaganda policies towards the other. 
The first period (1990-2000) is characterized by contradicting pressures between old 
programmatic beliefs and the pressure of new EU-integration ideas. Local political 
elites were exposed to an enormous ideational pressure from the different levels at 
which they operate in. They had to reconcile two powerful forces: the ideational 
contexts of the path-dependant, nationalist, parochial, over-historic institutions and the 
EU normative framework, at the international level. This is a period when political, 
social and economic cooperation between the two states was wary and reluctant, as 
justified by the common EU large infrastructure projects that were in a state of impasse 
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for a decade, in spite of firmly secured EU funding, proven economic benefits and clear 
technical specifications. As hinted by the preliminary primary research, decision makers 
in Bulgaria and Greece tended to identify and interpret the challenges they faced within 
the old normative guidelines and criteria and matched problems with solutions they had 
applied in the past, rather than searching for politically or economically ‗optimal‘ 
solutions.‘1 In other words during that first period traditional programmatic beliefs 
could not be displaced by EU-ideas, as happened many times before. 
However, during the second period (2000-2010), a historical breakthrough occurred. 
Cooperation between Bulgaria and Greece started to emerge in the economic, political 
and social sphere and gradually increased with each year. That was also manifested by 
starting work on the long-delayed infrastructure projects and even commissioning some 
of them towards the end of the period. The task of the two chapters is: First, to explore 
if change of obstruction policies between Bulgaria and Greece occurred between 1990s 
and 2000s. Second, to link such historic policy change to ideational change through the 
documentary sources and elite interviewing. Third, to explore why this time, it 
happened. What made EU-idea so much more powerful than previous ‗weaker‘ ideas 
that were not able to significantly change nationalist programmatic beliefs? 
 
The 1990-2000 chapter, first, explores traditional ideology in the Balkans regarding 
regional infrastructure. Second, the initiative for the Trans-European Transport 
Networks (TEN) and TINA Network as the main EU-policy tools towards SEE during 
the 1990s is introduced. Third, it discusses the three concrete sub-cases of EU-backed 
projects between Bulgaria and Greece. It is explored that during the 1990s those 
projects were in a situation of impasse, regardless of EU pressure, secured financing and 
obvious benefits if completed. This was a result of old programmatic beliefs that still 
shaped normative criteria during that period that cooperation was still not appropriate. 
This is supported by the documentary research on government publications, newspaper 
articles, international memorandums, etc. and corroborated by elite interviews of current 
Greek and Bulgarian policy makers and their views of that period. 
 
The 2000-2010 period demonstrates how after the 2000, cooperation suddenly emerged 
and very intensive work on the infrastructure projects was undertaken. To find policy 
change, the data will be collected through archival and documentary research on 
government publications, memorandums, agreements, transport strategies and 
programmes, reports, newspaper articles. As dicussed in detail in the methodology 
section of the introductory chapter, to link such historic policy change to ideational 
change, as a result of EU leverage, I complement the documentary research with 
primary research data of elite interviews. Elite interviewing was undertaken after careful 
non-probability purposive and chain-referral sampling of relevant top-policy makers in 
Bulgaria and Greece, operating on regional, national and European level. 25 Bulgarian 
and 25 Greek Members of European Parliament, ministers, local mayors from different 
political parties, NGO activists involved in Bulgaria-Greece Cross-border cooperation, 
academics, etc., were interviewed through semi-structured open-ended interviews 
mostly during 2006-2009.
2
 They were asked question, exploring their ideas, 
opinions/values, feeling, knowledge, sensory and background to the past and present 
attitudes towards the neighbor, appropriateness of cooperation with that neighbour, how 
they felt about the infrastructure projects (our three sub-cases) between the two 
                                                 
1 Berman, The Social Democratic, p. 33. 
2 Non-probability purposive and chain-referral sampling and justification for its application are elaborated in the 
empirical Chapter 6: Transport Infrastructure 2000-2010. 
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countries, if the EU had to do with the change of perception towards the neighbour (if 
there was such) and why it was able to do that; 
 
Process tracing requires the collection of data concerning key political decision-making 
and activity, often at the highest political level, and elite interviews will frequently be a 
critical strategy for obtaining this required information. In our case the elite interview 
subjects were selected using a combination of reputational and positional criteria– that 
is, interview respondents were chosen not just by virtue of their political positions and 
their known involvement in the process of interest, but also by virtue of their reputation 
among their peers.
3
 The goal of collecting data from elite interviewing was to confirm 
information collected from documentary sources.  Documents, memoirs, newspaper 
articles and other secondary sources provide an initial overview of the events or issues 
under examination, interviews with key players were used to corroborate the early 
findings. In this way, interviews contributed towards the research goal of triangulation, 
where collected data is cross-checked through multiple sources to increase the 
robustness of the findings.
4
 
 
After we have found policy change and linked it to ideational change, the 2000-2010 
chapter concludes with analysis what made EU-idea so much more powerful than 
previous ‗weaker‘ ideas that were not able to significantly change nationalist 
programmatic beliefs. 
Infrastructure and Traditional Ideology in SEE 
 
Situated ‗at the periphery of Europe, a gateway to three continents, with shores washes 
by six seas and the second longest European river the Danube, the Balkans are one of 
the world‘s greatest crossroads.‘5 Such location has influenced the region‘s history and 
determined the great geopolitical stake concentrated on its relatively small territory.  
Historically, ‗infrastructure in the Balkans has meant much more than mere roads, rails, 
pipelines or bridges. Infrastructure has been the material expression of the region‘s 
striving for Europe; it has meant channels of communications, modernity, culture, ideas, 
fashions, etc.‘6  As Nikova commented people from the Balkans still say ‗I take the train 
to Europe‘ when traveling to Vienna or Paris. Paradoxically,  this attitude has not helped 
but has strongly impeded the actual construction of infrastructure in the region as what 
and how was built depended on normative perceptions what was feasible rather than 
based on most-rational routes. 
 
When the Romans, Byzantines and Ottomans dominated the region, it represented one 
geographical and political entity and infrastructure has been created in the course of 
centuries along vectors of long lasting links between commercial, industrial or cultural 
urban centers within the Empires. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, ‗the small 
area of the peninsula was divided between the national states, most of the time hostile 
and isolated from each other, but always eager to reach the developed part of the 
                                                 
3 For more on Process tracing via elite interviewing, see Oisín Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case 
for Non-probability Sampling, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. 
4 Philip H. J. Davies, ‗Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of 
the Intelligence and Security Services‘ in Politics, Vol.21, No.1, 2001 in Oisín Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite 
Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling, Nuffield College, University of Oxford 
5 Ekaterina Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting, Roads Dividing: on Infrastructure in South East Europe‘, Institute of Balkan 
Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Etudes Balkanique, 2007, N1, p. 4. 
6 Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting‘, p. 10. 
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continent.‘7 Since then the question of infrastructure direction was entirely political. 
Their competitive instincts led them to block roads to one another in favour of road and 
rail routes linked with their allies or Great Power sponsors. Indeed certain projects were 
obstructed not only due to narrow national interest planning, but also by the intervention 
of Great Powers. 
 
Towards the mid-nineteenth century, the British were pushing for the construction of 
Ruse-Varna rail line connecting the Danube with the Black Sea, while the Russians 
pushed for Russe-Sofia line. Similarly, Austria-Hungary was pushing Serbia to 
construct the Nis-Skopje-Thessaloniki line, while Hungarians blocked the Zagreb-
Vienna rail construction to hinder Austria‘s economic performance.8 Rail connection 
between Sofia and Skopje was always blocked, opposed and even destroyed by 
mistrustful neighbours, motivated by the fear that Bulgaria might want to liberate, 
infiltrate and incorporate Macedonia, in line with the former‘s ideational contexts, 
which interpret Macedonians simply as western Bulgarians. Even today, Sofia and 
Skopje are the only Balkan capitals, not connected by rail, no matter that the distance 
between them is less than 200 km. Great Power intervention and traditional 
programmatic beliefs of friends and enemies have contributed to the perception of what 
roads, rails and tunnels to build, between the states rather than pure economic 
sufficiency. 
 
The infrastructure discord in the Balkans was exacerbated by Communism, which added 
new ideological divisive lines to the already existing national prejudices, with 
nationalism taking precedence over other ideology, when in conflict. As discussed in the 
ideational mapping chapters, for Greece, the traditional programmatic belief was 
‗Danger form the North‘ and mistrust towards Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey, while 
keeping warm relations with Yugoslavia, regardless of the ideological differences 
during most of the XXc., as explored in the previous chapters. In line with such 
programmatic beliefs that shaped normative criteria, that transport cooperation with the 
Northern neighbours was not appropriate, Greece has constantly worked to bypass 
Bulgaria and build European Route E-5, re-routing traffic from the historic Great 
Diagonal [Istanbul-Sofia-Vienna] to Nish- Thessaloniki. The isolation of Bulgaria was 
further confirmed by the refusal of Yugoslavia to build a simple [65 km] road from 
Pirot to Kalotina [at the Bulgarian border], which later Bulgaria built…at its expense. 
So the country remained practically capsuled for almost 50 years.‘9 Having previously 
fought against all its neighbours,  Bulgaria did not mind such development, dominated 
by the idea that all neighbouring countries conspire against her to preserve the status-
quo and believing that as a country surrounded by hostile states from everywhere it has 
to make as little connections with the ‗world outside‘ as possible. Indeed such ideology 
is closely reflected by the development of a so-called ring infrastructure, where all main 
cities were connected in a circle and very little roads were constructed towards the 
periphery regions of the country. Even nowadays Bulgaria has only 22 crossing points 
on its 1808 km long borders; there is a border crossing point at each 82 km, while 
France and Germany before Schengen had similar crossings at each 7 km.
10
 Therefore, 
                                                 
7 Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting‘, p. 6. 
8 Michael Palairet, The Balkan Economies 1800-1914: Evolution without Development, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) and John R. Lampe & Marvin R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950: From Imperial 
Borderlands to Developing Nations, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981) 
9  Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting‘, p. 9. 
10 Milena Chervenova, ‗Transportni experti podgotviha programa za granichnite prehodi‘ (National programme for 
cross-border points development), Stroitelstvo. Gradut Online Magazine, N30, July 2007 
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the communist regime built large-scale infrastructural projects, but of the wrong kind 
and in the wrong place to serve current purposes of extensive exchange with neigbours. 
EU‟s main  policy tool in SEE during 1990s: The TEN Networks 
 
The ‗idea of Trans-European Networks (TEN) emerged by the end of the 1980s in 
conjunction with the proposed Single Market.‘11 In 1990, the Portuguese presidency 
developed the proposal for a European infrastructure agency to coordinate the national 
plans and make the network infrastructures interoperable. Some countries like UK, 
France, Germany and Italy did not favour such move, since they were concerned that 
such agency would reduce their ‗planning autonomy‘. The agency was never 
commissioned, but ‗the idea, the name and last not least the logo of Trans-European 
Networks (TEN) had such a strong appeal in Europe that the TEN kept alive and a 
variety of additional networks followed on the track of the first approach which were 
also called―Trans-European.‖‘12 
 
They are also seen as essential is the objective of ensuring economic and social 
cohesion of the EU is to be achieved, and they will also play a vital role in the 
programme to transform the economies of the CEE and reorientate them westwards‘13 
According to the White Book of the European Commission for Development, 
Competitiveness and Employment the reasons dictating the construction of the TENs, 
which as well consist their aims, were the following, 
 
 • Financial development 
 • Improved operation of the European market 
 • Improved competition 
 • Improved financial and social coherence 
 • Improved quality of life 
 • Decreased pollution 
 • Easier integration of new members in the European Union 
 • Improved relationship between the European Union and its neighbors 14 
 
The TEN idea was officially institutionalized by Articles 154-156 of the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992), with the aim of fostering the creation of an internal market and the 
reinforcement of economic and social cohesion in the European Union. Indeed the 
fundamental values of the union were based on the freedom of movement of goods, 
people and services. Therefore, a mechanism was required to coordinate the 
development of a modern and efficient infrastructure to adequately connect the various 
regions and national networks within the union. This was seen as a basic precondition to 
create functioning internal market, boost economic growth and create employment. In 
other words the idea behind TEN was promoting interconnection and interoperability of 
national networks as well as access to such networks. To meet these goals, the 
Community developed ‗guidelines covering the objectives, priorities, identification of 
                                                 
11 European Commission-official site, Trans-European Networks, http://ec.europa.eu/ten/index_en.html, last accessed 
August 2008. 
12 Pilsoo Jung, ‗Annex III,  EU common Transport Policy: Trans-European Networks‘, United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacifics, 
http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/Publications/TFS_pubs/pub_2354/pub_2354_ann3.pdf, last accessed August 2008, p. 67. 
13 R. H. Williams, European Spatial Policy and Planning, (London: Paul Chapman Publishing, 1996), p. 168.  
14 Andrianos Theodoros, Michalis Karakotsoglou, Rizos Charalampos, ‗Egnatia Highway and Pan-european Corridor 
8: Complementarity or Competition?‘, paper presented at 46th Congress of the European Regional Science 
Association: Enlargement, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean August 30th – September 3rd, 2006, pp. 1-3. 
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projects of common interest and broad lines of measures for the three sectors concerned 
(Transports, Energy and Telecommunications). The European Parliament and the 
Council [normally] approve… [such] guidelines after consultation of the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.‘15 The Maastricht treaty defined 
three classes of networks, and namely, 
 
 Trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) 
 Trans-European Energy Network (TEN-E or TEN-Energy) 
 Trans-European telecommunications network (eTEN) 
 
This research will concentrate on the TEN-T network development and its 
implementation in the EU and SEE in particular. At the Essen European Council 14 
TEN-T ‗specific‘ projects were endorsed drawn up by a group chaired by then 
Commission Vice-President, Henning Christophersen. Those were the project of utmost 
importance to the Union and had to be commissioned first. In 1996, The European 
Parliament and Council adopted Community guidelines for the development of the 
TEN-T with Decision N° 1692/96/EC.
16
 These guidelines ‗carry the bulk of the long 
distance traffic and bring the geographical and economic areas of the Union closer 
together.‘17 This meant that for the first time in the history of the European Union ‗there 
exists a framework for national transportation planning which sets a future vision and 
priorities for the development of a common transport infrastructure in the Union.‘18 In 
2001 the TEN-T guidelines were amended to encompass seaports, inland ports and 
intermodal terminals.
 19
 Presently the Trans-European transport network consists of nine 
components- road networks, rail networks, inland waterway networks and inland ports, 
maritime ports, airports, networks for combined transport, management and information 
networks for maritime transport, air traffic management networks and satellite positioning and 
navigation networks.
 20
 
 
Interoperability within TEN-T network means that the provision of the infrastructure 
allows for activities of many operators regardless of their territorial origin. The time 
framework to complete the network was set at 2010.  At the end of 2003, the 
Commission revised the TEN-T guidelines and extended the deadline for completion to 
the 2020 ‗in view of the time which has passed since the initial proposal was presented 
in October 2001 and also the time it will take to build the transport infrastructures‘ and 
adopted a list of 30 priority projects (including the original 14).
21
 Based on that ‗new 
outline plans for 2020 will be drawn up with the aim of efficiently channelling future 
                                                 
15 European Commission-official site, Trans-European. 
16 Decision No 1692/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 on Community guidelines 
for the development of the trans-European transport network (Official Journal of the European Communities No L 228 
of 9 September 1996) . 
17 European Commission-official site, Trans-European Transport Networks “Ten-T”, Community Guidelines,  
http://ec.europa.eu/ten/transport/guidelines/index_en.htm, last accessed August 2008. 
18 Pilsoo Jung, ‗Annex III‘, p. 67. 
19 Corrigendum to Decision No 1346/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
amending Decision No 1692/96/EC as regards seaports, inland ports and intermodal terminals as well as project No 8 
in Annex III (OJ L 185 of 6.7.2001) . 
20 Pilsoo Jung, ‗Annex III‘, p. 68. 
21 Commission of the European Communities, 01/10/2003, Extended Impact Assessment of the proposal amending 
the amendable proposal for a decision amending decision No 1692/96/EC on the Trans European Transport Networks, 
SEC(2003) 1060.  
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trans-European flows in the enlarged Union.‘22 By 2020, ‗TEN-T will include 89 500 
km of roads and 94 000 km of railways, including around 20 000 km of highspeed rail 
lines suitable for speeds of at least 200 km/h.The inland waterway system will amount 
to 11 250 km, including 210 inland ports, whilst there are a further 294 seaports and 
some 366 airports.‘23 
 
Transport Infrastructure Needs Assignment (TINA) Initiative 
 
In 1995, at the time of the adoption of the TEN Community guidelines for the fifteen  
Member states, a common initiative for analysing the needs of future transport 
infrastructure in the accession countries has been launched. Transport Infrastructure 
Needs Assessment (TINA) in CEE was devised to be the extension of TEN-T in 
Western Europe. A key task of these corridors is to interconnect not only the central and 
eastern European countries, but to establishing connections between the main economic 
centres in EU and non-EU countries. Under the TINA Initiative, three Pan-European 
Transportation Conferences were held in Prague (1991), Crete (1994), and Helsinki 
(1997). In Prague was decided that the accent must be placed on a corridor-based 
approach. In Crete, nine transportation corridors were proposed and confirmed three 
years later, when the so-called Helsinki corridors or Pan-European corridors were 
officially defined, in order to connect the EU‘s Trans European Networks (TEN-T) with 
the infrastructure of Eastern Europe (see Fig. 15). On the third Transportation 
Conference in Helsinki, ‗as a consequence of the [Greek] lobby that the Balkan 
countries made for a better connection between the Western Europe and the Balkans, a 
tenth corridor was added to the network bringing additional connectivity in the 
Balkans.‘24 As planned, at its final stage the TINA Network should comprise of ‗18,683 
km of roads, 20,924 km of railway lines, 4,052 km of inland waterways, 40 airports, 20 
seaports, 58 river ports and 86 terminals (out of which, 20 are situated in seaports and 
river ports, and 66 stand alone)‘ and should be fully integrated into the already existing 
Trans European Networks (TEN). The EU has set 2015 as an objective for reaching that 
goal. The estimated budget for the whole project by the year 2015 is 90 billion EUR, as 
for the Balkan part of the project, nearly 11 billion EUR.
25
 
 
                                                 
22 Commission of the European Communities, 01/10/2003, Extended Impact Assessment of the proposal amending 
the amendable proposal for a decision amending decision No 1692/96/EC on the Trans European Transport Networks, 
SEC(2003) 1060, p. 54.  in Enza Petrillo, Trans European, p. 4. 
23 European Commission, DG Energy and Transport, Trans-European Transport Network, TEN-T Priority Axes and 
Projects 2005, Brussels, 2005, pp. 6-7. 
24 Traceca Online, Traceca Program-Reconstruction of the historical Silk Road, Pan European Transport Corridors 
(Helsinki Corridors),  http://www.mt.ro/traceca/english/maps.html#a5, last accessed August 2008. 
25 Pilsoo Jung, ‗Annex III‘, p. 71. 
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Fig. 15 Map of TINA Network-the 10 Pan-European Transport Corridors in CEECs.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Source: TINA Vienna Transport Strategies GmbH,  
http://www.tinavienna.at/index.php?p_id=64&last_id=64&l_id=en&s_id=4d714bdccad2bb119b7c4cba17e68c7d, 
accessed October 2008. 
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An analysis of the Commission‘s documents on TEN and TINA from the 1990s to 
present indicates that the EU considers the Pan-European multimodal corridors as one 
of its main tools for promoting Europeanization and democratization in SEE. They are 
closely related with the enlargement process and the mechanism of conditionality. The 
European Commission ties the construction of the Corridors to a whole series of internal 
reforms in the states concerned. EU promotes creating, upgrading and linking 
infrastructure, guided by the belief that infrastructure promotes development. Road, rail, 
electricity, and telecommunication networks with old member states is a necessary 
condition for extending the EU to countries of Central and South-East Europe. By 
creation of such multimodal network, the EU aims to ‗create the base for a new 
economic upturn and a peaceful social integration of countries with very different 
history, ethnical roots and economic performance.‘27 In this sense, TENs are intended to 
facilitate the Europeanization of national economies, to improve mobility by promoting 
the exchanges and the flows of capitals of the member states and to create a ―Europe of 
networks‖. 28 
 
Funding is mainly through the Structural and Cohesion Funds.  Only for the period, 
2000–06 around EUR 20 billion have been contributed to TEN-T projects, in particular 
in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Additional Structural Funding has been allocated 
to the new Member States, including EUR 2.48 billion in pre-accession support. For  the 
period 2004–06, EUR 4.24 billion and EUR 2.53 billion are committed from the 
Cohesion and Structural Funds respectively. Beyond 2007, both the Cohesion Fund and 
Structural Funds will remain a major source of funds for TEN-T projects in regions with 
weaker economic performance and in SEE in particular.
 
Additional funding is provided 
by the European Investment Bank (EIB), which has lent EUR 50 billion for TEN-T 
projects in the period 1995-2005 and is expected to lend as much for 2005-2010. The 
EC has allocated a separate TEN-T budget, which is estimated at EUR 3 billion for 
2007-2013.
29
 The remaining funds should be generated by regional, national 
governments and the private sector. 
                                                 
27 Pilsoo Jung, ‗Annex III‘, p. 73. 
28 Enza Petrillo, Trans European Network (TENs) V in Slovenia: EUization or strategic planning, p. 1. 
29 Trans European Transport Networks, Ten-T Priority Axes and Projects 2005, European Commission, DG TREN, 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005), p. 8. 
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Fig. 16 Map of Pan-European Transport Corridors in the Balkans.
30
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Source: Secretariat of the Corridor VIII,  http://corridor8.org/index.php, accessed October 2008. 
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TINA in the Balkans 
 
The prospect of EU membership ‗puts an end to the vulnerability and scuffle of the 
small Balkan countries, of their fear of the Great Powers‘ interventions or the 
―treacherous‖ neighbours‘mischief. In a longer perspective the region is facing a 
historic opportunity to advance toward genuine peace and development. A real 
breakthrough is in the making. The Balkan countries are learning how to overcome 
problems and coordinate national priorities, how to lead a more open and dynamic 
political dialogue
31
 For the first time in modern history  Balkan infrastructure 
completion could follow a strategy, which is above any national strategy with simple 
and clear criteria: shortest and most profitable routes, situated according to where the 
natural geographical morphology of the Balkans is most facilitating to such projects. As 
Hristo Genchev writes ‗these should be linkages among industrial and demographic 
centres, long established by geographical and historical factors, such as crossroads, 
water resources, favourable climate, rich hinterland, labour force.‘32  For the first time 
there is an overarching idea that could challenge and displace old ideational contexts. 
 
As a backbone of its Europeanization policies the EU is extending the trans-European 
networks for energy, transport and telecommunications to the South East of Europe. 
Promoting infrastructure is part of the EU‘s normative agenda, since it is ‗not only a 
technical, but an all-embracing process, which includes harmonization of legislation, 
regulations and standards, emphasis on open markets, competition, and last but not least 
on the ability to compromise and cooperate regionally.‘33 As a part of the Trans 
European Networks and the TINA Initiative, six out of ten Pan-European multimodal 
Corridors are planned to pass through South Eastern Europe (Corridor IV, V, VII, VIII, 
IX and X) and integrate them into a pan-European space (see Fig. 16). In addition, the 
strategic geopolitical location of the Balkans positions them on the route of a system of 
great transcontinental projects, aiming to connect the EU with the Middle East, 
Caucasus and Central Asia such as TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe – Caucasus 
– Asia). A system of planned oil pipelines like Bourgas-Alexandroupolis, Bourgas-
Vlore and the gas projects South Stream and Nabucco bringing gas and oil from the 
Caspian shelf and Central Asia to Europe are believed to be the EU‘s great projects of 
the century. This is all to say that ‗infrastructure is said to be for South Eastern Europe 
what coal and steel were for Western Europe.‘34 Only such thinking could provide for 
the best investment of the limited local and external funds for these projects. However 
this requires the supplanting of path dependent nationalist ideas by internalization of the 
EU normative agenda by Balkan political elites. 
 
In our case, implementation of the all-European infrastructure projects between 
Bulgaria and Greece was very slow during the 1990-2000 period. While it is true that 
the process depended on powerful external institutions and international financiers, it is 
also true that the main obstacles were not the lack of funding or external support, but 
                                                 
31 Regional Infrastructural Projects in Southeastern Europe, Sofia, Institute for Regional and 
International Studies, 1999 in Ekaterina Nikova, ‗Roads‘, p. 11. 
32 Hristo Genchev, ‗Geography-Arbiter in the Rivalry Called Balkan Cooperation‘ in Makedonia Newspaper, 34 (1997), 
8. 
33 Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting‘, p. 12. 
34 Ekaterina Nikova, ‗Regional Cooperation in the Balkans Revisited‘, Institute of Balkan Studies, Bulgarian Academy 
of Sciences, Etudes Balkanique, 2002, N 1, p. 30. 
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were created by local governments, still trapped between the traditional national context 
mentality ‗fear your neighbour‘ and the integration and cooperation normative agenda 
coming from outside. During the 1990-2000 period traditional programmatic beliefs of 
Bulgarians/Greeks as enemies continued to inform governments that cooperation with 
the other was not appropriate and led to the situation of a decade-long impasse between 
the infrastructure projects between the two states. This also corresponded to popular 
ideas at that time, thus bringing legitimacy inside the country.  At the same time that 
same governments had to follow Brussels‘ objectives to gain external legitimacy. 
However, during the 2000-2010, Bulgarian and Greek governments were increasingly 
becoming aware of the inadequacies of their existing understandings of the other as an 
enemy, under the EU pressure for cooperation and the popular pressure at home, which 
came to see the transport cooperation as bringing very tangible benefits, especially in 
the cross border regions. This led to change of ideas and normative contexts and in turn, 
to change in policies. 
Subcase Studies: The politics of infrastructure 
 
Out of the six Pan-European multimodal Corridors planned to pass through South 
Eastern Europe, three pass through Bulgaria and Greece (Corridor IV, IX and X). They 
form the basis of the two sub-case studies. The third sub-case study looks at Corridor 
VIII (Bulgaria) and its Greek alternative Via Egnatia. 
In short, the sub-case studies deal with the following development: The EU develops a 
policy on transport infrastructure that it sees as vital for binding the new and old 
Europe. SEE, and Bulgaria and Greece in particular, are primary location of such policy 
but it is complicated by a) historic conflicts of interest and the ideational perception of 
historic ‗friends‘ and ‗enemies‘ and normative criteria, shaped by such ideas; and b) 
conflicts based on more recent events (break-up of Yugoslavia) and its aftermath. 
According to such historic ideas Greece and Bulgaria see themselves as historic foes 
and cooperation among them as inappropriate. The result is conflict over transport 
routes during the period 1989-1999, when nationalist attitudes were still stronger than 
EU ideas. However, in the second period, after 2000, the impact of the EU can be seen 
in these conflicts being modified by the EU‘s normative agenda and conditionality 
criteria due to a series of overlapping events in the period 1997-1999, such as end of the 
Yugoslav Wars, election of truly democratic governments in both countries and 
introduction of the new enhanced conditionality policy of the EU in 1997. Such 
developments, changed external contexts dramatically and Bulgarian and Greek 
governments were increasingly realising the inadequacies of their programmatic beliefs 
through the discursive selection of the context and namely the EU and inside popular 
pressure for implementing the infrastructure projects. As a result of such developments 
nationalist ideology was significantly challenged for the first time in modern history, 
which led to change in policies over transport infrastructure, where the decade long 
impasse was overcome after 2000, evidenced by increasing of financing and speeding of 
the projects construction after that period. The result is a slow growth of cooperation 
between Greece and Bulgaria as members of the EU or in other words we observe 
policy change. 
 
The three sub-case studies explored below are Sub-case Study 1: Via Egnatia vs. 
Corridor VIII, Sub-case Study 2: New Check Points between Bulgaria and Greece and 
Case Study 3: Corridor VIII vs. Corridor X. In the first years after the democratic 
changes Balkan elites seemed to conform much more to traditional nationalist contexts 
at home, rather than the integration impetus, coming from outside and the declared 
commitment to the EU normative agenda. As an example, despite the clear agreement 
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on where the corridors should pass, and the generous funding Corridor VIII, was in its 
infancy stage, obstructed by Greece, while overlapping alternative routes (Via Egnatia), 
not recognized by the EU as transcontinental projects, were being developed (see Fig. 
16). Each country perceived the other corridor as overlapping and competing, rather 
than complementary within a broader European framework. However, after 2000, the 
projects started to be regarded as complementary, Greek obstruction was removed and 9 
vertical axes were planned to connect the two previously competing corridors. This is 
explored in the first sub-case study. 
 
The second sub-case study deals with the situation where Greece and Bulgaria have a 
land border of 494 km with only two border crossing points, located at the extreme ends 
of the border, a legacy of the troubled historical relations between the two countries in 
the past. Similarly for 282 km border between Greece and Albania even nowadays there 
is one border crossing. In 1995 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by 
Bulgaria and Greece, with a provision to open three more border points within a period 
of three years.
35
 
 
 However, the first new border point was opened thirteen years later in 2008, followed 
by one more in 2010. During the 1990-1999, acting on its programmatic beliefs and 
searching for an excuse not to open the border points, the Greek side demanded that a 
500 metre-long tunnel be built to protect ‗the reproduction of a family of brown bears‘ 
in Greece. As a result, it took thirteen years and EUR 4 billion to complete this new 
border crossing between the already two EU member states. Like the first sub-case, this 
also confirms that in line with traditional institutionalized ideas, explored in the 
previous chapters, Bulgarian and Greek governments of the period had their ‗own, 
inward oriented infrastructural priorities…often reluctant to go beyond the scope of 
national strategic planning, to see the Balkans as an integral part of a broader region and 
become part of global economic plans. Intra-regional rivalries remain[ed] strong, the 
willingness to compromise – weak.‘36 However, the two recently-opened border points 
and the 3 nearly-ready, indicate that such policies remained in the past. 
 
Sub-case study 3 looks at the situation, when during the Yugoslav Wars, Corridor IV 
was devised as a bypass route from Turkey and Greece via Romania and Bulgaria, to 
Western Europe, since at the time all the roads through Serbia were not accessible. In 
spite of the clear EU instruction, pressure, financial support and urgent need of the 
countries involved and the EU itself, the Corridor‘s commissioning did not even start 
during the 1990s, when it was most needed. Moreover, on the Transport Conference in 
1997, Greece lobbied for the adoption of a tenth corridor (Corridor X) as an alternative 
to Corridor IV, from Greece via Serbia to Western Europe. Peculiarly enough, such 
proposal came in the height of the Yugoslav Wars, the Embargo and the fact that  
Corridor IV from Greece via Bulgaria to Western Europe has already been adopted in 
1994 (Fig. 16). After the end of the war, Corridor IV was included among the 30 
priority axes of utmost importance for the Union, which should be completed first. 
While Greece did not stop constructing Corridor X even during the Wars and NATO 
bombing of Serbia, construction of Corridor IV, which passed entirely through EU 
member states (Bulgaria, Romania), started only after 2000. 
                                                 
35 Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agreement on the Opening of Three New Border Posts and Arterial Road Links 
between Greece and Bulgaria (Sofia 22/12/1995),  
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/enUS/Policy/Geographic+Regions/SouthEastern+Europe/Balkans/Bilateral+Relations/B
ulgaria/, last accessed August 2010. 
36 Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting‘, p. 11. 
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Having explored the traditional programmatic beliefs of Bulgaria and Greece in Chapter 
3 and 4, we could provide answers to the puzzling cases of obstruction during the 
1990s, despite new cooperation context. In the Corridor VIII vs. Egnatia sub-case, the 
commissioning of Corridor VIII along the East-West axis in the Balkans (Bulgaria-
Macedonia-Albania) was perceived by Bulgaria as a chance to economically and 
culturally reconnect itself to Macedonia in line with the beliefs that the latter was part of 
the Bulgarian polity in the past.  Greece has historically been suspicious of such East-
West infrastructure among its ideational foes and worked for commissioning of 
alternative Via Egnatia project and the North-South infrastructure through ‗friendly‘ 
Serbia. Therefore in the 1990s, similar to previous periods, new ideas (this time EU), 
still could not challenge the traditional perception between Bulgarians and Greeks. This 
is evidenced by the documentary research on speeches of policy makers of that time and 
corroborated by the elite interviews of current policy makers, sharing how they viewed 
the neighbour during the 1990s and 2000s, respectively. 
 
Similarly in the border points case, the obstruction to opening of new border points 
between Greece on one side and Bulgaria and Albania on the other, should be regarded 
through the traditional Greek perception of possible ‗danger from the North‘ and that 
cooperation with Bulgarians and Albanians was not desirable, typical of the previous 
periods and still influential during the 1990s. 
 
Last, in the Corridor IV vs. X case, according to the Greek institutionalized national 
ideas and logic of appropriateness route from Greece to Europe should have passed 
through its ‗ideational ally‘ Serbia, rather than through EU member Bulgaria (ideational 
foe). In the 1990s still acting on its traditional logic of appropriateness, Greece was 
favouring Corridor X and obstructing the commissioning of Corridor IV, regardless of 
EU support and funding for the latter. Such Greek position was not altered even during 
the Yugoslav Wars and the embargo over Serbia, when the link was vital to whole 
Europe as a bypass route. No work was undertaken and Greece continued building 
Corridor X, unmoved by Serbia‘s distant EU perspective, or arguments in support of 
Corridor IV as shorter and economically more viable route. 
 
However, recent developments in the period after 2000, as the agreements on the new 
Danube bridge, as part of Corridor IV, the opening of  two border crossings between 
Greece and Bulgaria and the Greek consent for constructing linkages between Via 
Egnatia and Corridor VIII are a sign that policy has changed. A new ideology is in the 
making-where roads connect more than divide. That the EU had a crucial role in such 
change of perception and then policy was confirmed by the elite interviews. 
Subcase study 1: Via Egnatia vs. Corridor VIII 
 
During the European Council held in Corfu in 1994 a list of projects of immediate 
priority was approved. Egnatia Highway was among those projects as it was believed 
that it would comprise an important factor of development in the North Greece and the 
Balkan region generally. This fact was more than positive for Greece, as for several 
years such a transportation corridor was considered to be the means for serving the 
socioeconomic development and improving the connectivity between cities and regions 
in Greece and between Greece and neighboring countries as well.  Meanwhile, a second 
road corridor of immediate interest for the Balkan region was among the nine priority 
corridors, which the 2
nd 
Pan European Transportation Conference, held in Crete in 1994, 
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decided to promote. This was the so called Corridor VIII.
37
 The European Union 
insisted that the two corridors would be complementary, since they had different 
functional and technical characteristics.
38
  
 
However, through Greek and Bulgarian nationalist normative criteria during the 1990s, 
the two projects were interpreted as mutually-exclusive (especially in Greece), 
regardless of the fact they were devised under common EU framework with the aim of 
all-regional cohesion and diverting huge amounts of goods, traffic and profit to the 
whole region. As a result of obstruction towards the ‗competing‘ corridor, both projects 
were significantly delayed. That applied most to Corridor VIII, since Greece could 
capitalize on its EU-member status to hinder the project‘s development. Corridor VIII 
was devised as part of the continent-scale project TRACECA (Transport Corridor 
Europe-Caucasus-Asia). It was considered to be the modern ‗Eurasian renaissance of 
the [Great] Silk Road.‘39 Its main objective was to provide for new transport routes 
between Europe and Asia, as well as to integrate the Caucasus and Central Asian 
countries to the transport infrastructure of the EU. It should also promote political and 
economical sustainability as well as enhance cooperation between the countries along 
the corridor. The modern TRACECA corridor did not completely overlap with the 
ancient Silk Road, as it was shifted southward to circumvent the turbulent region of the 
Near and the Middle East (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc). The slightly altered route 
would create a thousand km-long diagonal of Euro-Atlantic-values-committed 
countries, passing in-between the ‗risk region‘ to the south and Russia to the north. 
 
On the financial part, the EU and the initiative for technical assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) helped to attract IFIs, such as the World 
Bank (WB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have made 
commitments to provide more than 1.7 billion Euros for the project.
40
 TRACECA is 
planned to be fully operational by 2020. At the conference in Helsinki it had been 
recognized that one of the weaknesses of the TRACECA route, in the context of the EU 
Tacis program, was the lack of linkage between the western end and the European 
market Therefore it was decided that the TRACECA corridor would be integrated to the 
pan-European Trans-European Networks (TENs) by a link on ‗corridors IV and VIII, 
via the port of Varna‘ on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. As Eric Cotte stated, ‗the 
planned development projects on the European continent scheduled for the next 20 
years depend on the building of corridors crossing the Balkans.‘41 Furthermore the 
whole feasibility of the connection between Europe and Asia (TEN and TRACECA) on 
the revived Silk Road depends on the link through the Balkans and namely: port of Poti 
                                                 
37 Theodoros, Karakotsoglou, Charalampos, ‗Egnatia Highway‘, pp. 1-5. 
38 M Chrysostomidou, ‗The European Union confirms the worries about Egnatia‘, article in Macedonia newspaper, 
Thessaloniki, 6 January 1996. 
39 In antiquity the Great Silk Road has been the shortest route between Europe and the Far East. It stretched for nearly 
7000 km, starting from the north-western provinces of China and finishing at the East Mediterranean. The Great Silk 
Road was in fact a trade route between Rome and China with mainly silk departing westward and wool, silver gold on 
the way back. However after the fall of the Roman Empire and the Great Geographical Discoveries era in the later 
centuries, the significance of this route diminished and it was neglected for the centuries to come. During the 
communist era the ancient Silk Road has been further completely blocked and such situation deformed the natural 
economical and cultural flows along this route. 
40 Traceca: 1993-2002: Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia http://www.traceca.org/rep/broshure/broshure.pdf; 
last accessed May 2008, pp. 2-4. 
41 Eric Cotte, ‗Where is the Eight Corridor?‘,  http://www.scarabee.com/article103.html,  accessed May, 2007. 
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[Georgia] in the Caucasus-port of Varna [Bulgaria] on the Balkans, how it was initially 
adopted. 
 
Corridor VIII is one of ten ‗Trans-European Corridors‘ designed to make the exchange 
of goods, people, oil and other energy supplies in CSEE easier.
42
 It is planned as the 
Balkan section of the Great Silk Road and envisioned as main ‗street‘ for exchange 
between the EU and Central Asia. Pan-European Corridor VIII is the energy and 
infrastructure axis connecting the Adriatic with the Black Sea through Italy, Albania, 
Macedonia and Bulgaria. The route of the corridor starts from the Bulgarian Black Sea 
port of Varna, passing through Sofia, Skopje, Tirana to reach the Adriatic cost at Durrës 
in Albania with a ferry connection to the Italian Adriatic ports of Bari and Brindisi (see 
Fig.17). The length is approximately 1000 km and the project encompasses road, rail 
and telecommunication links. The estimated price of the project is EU 1 billion.
43
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 This Intermodal Pan-European Corridor refers to the port, road, rail, airports when appropriate, and combined and 
intermodal transport infrastructures, including ancillary installations such as access roads, border crossing stations, 
service stations, freight and passenger terminals, warehouse, and installations necessary for traffic management, on 
the route defined above as well as the interactions of the afore mentioned features with transport activities of all modes 
on reasonably related routes. Source: Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of the Pan-European 
Transport Corridor VIII, signed in Bari on 9 September, 2002,  http://www.corridor8led.net/network-docs/index.asp, 
accessed October 2008. 
43 Марин Деведжиев (Marin Devedzhiev), Българските геополитически шансове (Bulgarskite Geopoliticheski 
Shansove), (Veliko Turnovo: Faber, 2008), p. 178. 
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Fig. 17 Pan-European Corridor 8.44 
 
Fig. 18 Greek project ‗Via Egnatia‘45 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Source: Secretariat of the Corridor VIII,  http://corridor8.org/index.php, accessed October 2008. 
45 Source: Templari, Boemondo i di Antiochia, http://www.templaricavalieri.it/boemondo_primo_di_antiochia.htm, 
accessed October 2008. 
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The corridor East-West (corridor VIII) was not only supported by the EU in Crete 1994, 
but also by the US-government. In New York (1995) four Balkan Presidents (Albania, 
Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey), in the presence of President Clinton, announced the 
South Balkan Development Initiative (SBDI). ‗The SBDI is designed to help Albania, 
Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia further develop and integrate their transportation 
infrastructure along the east-west corridor that connects them.‘46 This project received 
the strong support by Washington and later was reconfirmed by the EU at the Helsinki 
conference as Corridor VIII was proclaimed the shortest and most efficient trade route 
between Europe and Asia, which is evidenced by the economical indicators below; 
 
The length of Corridor N8, defined on the basis of the now functioning road, is 995 km 
The mutual trade of countries within the Balkan segment is USD 13 420 million for 1997, 
and of those along the continuation of the Corridor towards Central Asia - USD 34 213 
million, or totally along the whole length of the Corridor - USD 47 633 million. For most 
of the countries prognoses and trends indicate a GNP increase - in Bulgaria by 3% yearly, 
in Albania - 5%, Macedonia - 1-1,5%, Armenia - 5%, Azerbaijan - 5-6%, Georgia - 10%, 
Kazakhstan - 2%, Kyrgyzstan - 6%, Tajikistan - 3-5%, Turkmenistan - 2%, Uzbekistan - 
2%. The expected ratio between local and transit traffic, as revealed by the 
macroeconomic indexes, is 1:3 - 1:5 in favour of the transit one. It is evident that the 
parameters and qualities of the already built and functioning transport infrastructure in the 
region, as compared to those of other transport routes from East to West, lag behind in 
creating competitive conditions for attracting traffic.
47
 
 
The significance of the project was further enhanced during the Yugoslav wars of the 
1990s, when ‗both the EU and the US supported the development of Corridor VIII, in a 
bid to boost trade among these states [Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania] and off-set their 
war-related losses, while allowing NATO valuable access to their territories and 
airspace.‘48 
 
Via Egnatia, worth 6 billion Euro, passing from Istanbul, through Greek Provinces of 
Thrace and Macedonia and finishing on the Ionic Sea and from there continuing to Italy 
by ferry-connections soon after the initiative for the Corridor VIII, which circumvented 
Greece was announced in the Second Transport Conference in Crete 1994 (Corridor 
VIII with red, Via Egnatia with blue on Fig.19).
49
 The Greek project, closely following 
the ancient route of Via Egnatia encompassed a motorway: 680 km long, 24.5 m wide, 
‗1650 bridges, with a combined length of 40 km, 76 tunnels, with a combined length of 
49,5 km, 50 interchanges with the existing road network, 43 river crossings and 11 
                                                 
46 US Trade and Development Agency, ‗TDA Awards $4.3 Million in Transportation Grants In The South Balkans‘,  
http://www.tda.gov/trade/press/dec9_98.html; accessed June, 2010. 
47 Serguey Roussev, ‗Environment Management along the Road-Bed of Trans-European Corridor N8 in the Section 
between Sofia and Skopje‘, in Balkans: Politics, Economy, Security [journal on-line] 2, no. 2 (2000), 
http://www.balcanica.org/balkanreview/current/a3.html , accessed May, 2006. 
48 Polina Slavcheva, ‗Politics Thwarts Balkan Transport Revolution‘ in Anna McTaggart  and Marcus Tanner (eds.), 
Overcoming Balkan Barriers to a European Future Excellence, Balkan Fellowship for Journalistic, (Sarajevo, 2007), pp. 
35-42,  http://fellowship.birn.eu.com/movingon/movingon.eng.pdf, accessed June, 2010.  
49 The ancient Roman road Via Egnatia was one of the major transport, trade and military-purpose arteries, connecting 
the two capitals of the Empire- Rome and Konstantinopolis, stretching for 754 Roman miles (1117km) from the Adriatic 
port of Dyrrachium (near present-day Durrës, Albania) to the capital- Konstantinopolis. It was constructed in 130 BC 
and named after Proconsul Gaius Ignatius, who ordered its construction. See also: Francis Carter, A Historical 
Geography of the Balkans (London: Academic Press, 1977), p. 134. 
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railway crossings.‘50 Via Egnatia was often referred as ‗project on a scale never before 
contemplated in Greece‘ and one of the ‗largest road construction projects in Europe‘ 
(see Fig. 18).
 51
 
 
 
Fig. 19 Corridor N8 vs. Via Egnatia52 
 
During the 1990s, despite the common EU framework of the two projects, Bulgarian 
and especially Greek authorities perceived transport Corridor VIII, as Paraegnatia, 
which means ‗opposite of Via Egnatia‘. Typical speech of the time is when President 
Papandreou corrected Albanian journalist during a visit to Albania -‗in Greece Corridor 
8 is named differently ‗ParaEgnatia.‘53Furthermore Axel Stiris Wallden in Greece and 
the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities writes that Corridor VIII and Via 
Egnatia (marked with red and blue colour in Fig. 19) are mutually exclusive and try to 
prove their EU partners that the Greek project is much more feasible.54 The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Greece declares that ‗Via Egnatia is perhaps the most vital road 
project for the country [...] to link western and southern Europe with the East.‘55 It is 
clear that for Greece the ancient Silk Road should be diverted from Corridor VIII, 
adopted in Helsinki in 1997 to Via Egnatia. Some Greek intellectuals went even further 
                                                 
50 Egnatia Odos, ‗The Egnatia Motorway Project‘ (2003),  http://www.egnatia.gr/flash/en/project_about_en.html, last 
accessed October 2008. 
51 Egnatia Odos, ‗The Egnatia‘. 
52 Source: Author. 
53 Albi Qeli, Road ‗Egnatia‘ and ‗Corridor 8‘ are two different things, Koha Ditore, 90/1999. 
54 Axel Stiris Wallden, ‗Greece and the Balkans: Economic Relations‘, in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and 
Andre Gerolymatos, eds., Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities (New York: Pella Publishing 
Company, 1999) quoted in Greece‘s New Geopolitics, Ian Lesser et al.(Rand, 2001),82. 
55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Foreign Policy, ‗Transportation‘  
http://www.mfa.gr/english/greece/today/transportation/highways.html, accessed May 28, 2007 
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portraying the idea of connecting the Black Sea and the Adriatic from Varna to Dures as 
resurrection of  Adolf Hitler‘s ideas of the 1940s for an East-West axis.56 
 
On 22 October 1995, during the 50
th
 Session of the UN General Assembly in New 
York-Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey signed a declaration for Transbalkan 
cooperation in transport, energy and telecommunications. The main proposed project in 
the declaration was the construction of a Transbalkan highway Adriatic-Black Sea 
(Corridor VIII); they declared that such a link would stimulate their economic 
prosperity by fulfilling the centuries-old hopes of the European countries for a short and 
direct route to Asia, Middle and the Far East. They also declared that increasing 
multilateral cooperation aims to facilitate peace on the Balkans. 
 
Three days later, Greece fiercely objected to the declaration and Greek Foreign Minister 
Karolos Papoulias commented ‗when there are two parallel axes in a close proximity to 
each other, priority should be given to the one, which is not a matter of a political 
discussion‘.57 He also stated the same year that ‗work on a major inter-European road 
network, the Egnatia Highway, planned to span the breadth of Greece from west to 
northeast and possibly extending to Istanbul, effectively cancelled out plans by four 
Balkan nations to construct a similar road link through the region.‘58 The same year 
Greek Transport Minister Evangelos officially dubbed Corridor VIII as the ‗para-
Egnatia Highway‘ and expressed his concerns that the suggested highway would run 
parallel to the Egnatia Highway already under construction in Greece. He described the 
declaration as an ‗abstract and precocious diplomatic effort lacking funding and without 
a concrete future‘, while stressing that the Egnatia Highway being constructed on Greek 
territory, was an EU priority following the Essen summit, and ‗in essence nullifies a 
parallel route at the same exact points‘. In the same line of arguments government 
spokesman Telemahos Hytiris said the government did not attribute special significance 
to the announcement of plans for a ‗para-Egnatia‘, saying the project lacked solid 
foundation and ‗the project exist[ed] [only] in words‘, attributing the presence of EU 
external relations commissioner Hans van den Broek at the joint press conference after 
the four-states declaration to simple EU ‗public relations‘ activity. 59 The spokesman 
also said the European Union had not made any decision to either fund such work or 
finance a feasibility study on Corridor VIII, while Egnatia Highway would be ready in 
four years‘ time, with sections of the road going into circulation earlier. 
 
What is interesting in this case is the Greek political elites‘ perception of the two 
projects as mutually exclusive and the four-states-agreement of 1995 to build Corridor 
VIII as a conspiracy against Greece, regardless of the fact that one year earlier in Crete, 
together with the adoption of Via Egnatia, the corridor VIII was adopted by the EU as a 
trans-continental project of immense significance. It was devised as Europe‘s shortest 
link to Central Asia and the Caucasus. At this early stage Greek governments, perceived 
Via Egnatia as the only possible East-West axis and anything different was considered 
‗threat‘, ‗fake‘, ‗economically unsustainable‘, ‗EU‘s public relations action‘. This 
documentary finding was reconfirmed by majority of the elite interviews of Greek 
policy makers. Efstathios Politis, Vice President of the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of the city of Serres said ‗Only ten years ago we thought in either-or dimension 
                                                 
56 M. Douroudi, Egnatia Highway. Graduate Thesis, Technical Educational Institute of Serres, 1998. 
57 Marin Devedzhiev, Bulgarskite, p. 185. 
58 Athens News Agency Bulletin (724), ‗Greece dismisses plans for 'para-Egnatia' highway, Egnatia Highway a major 
priority for EU‘, 25 October, 1995. 
59 Athens News Agency Bulletin (724), ‗Greece‘, 25 October, 1995. 
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when we are talking Corridor VIII and Via Egnatia. Only recently we came to believe 
that they can function perfectly well together.‘60 Thomas Margaritis, mayor of border 
city Drama noted that ‗during the 1990s, the whole rhetoric of Via Egnatia was in 
substance defense rhetoric against Corridor VIII, rather than promoting the benefits of 
Egnatia‘s completion‘.61 
 
As explored in previous chapters, their traditional programmatic beliefs dictated that 
Bulgarians and Albanians were enemies. Therefore any project connecting Albania to 
Bulgaria was regarded with greatest suspicion, regardless it was not  bilateral, but rather 
multilateral effort to minimise the regional and European losses from the Yugoslav 
Wars and in that respect, it would have helped Greece as well.
62
 Programmatic beliefs 
provided normative filter through which they could not see the act as an attempt towards 
regional cooperation, but perceived the project as clearly detrimental to their own 
project and by all means competing, since it included traditional foes Bulgaria and 
Albania. This is evidenced by Papoulias statement ‗the para-Egnatia route is part of the 
ulterior motives of certain parties‘ to the North.63 Instead of accepting the existence of 
both Via Egnatia and Corridor VIII as complimentary projects within a broad EU 
framework, the Greek government responded by increasing the funding and speeding 
the construction of Via Egnatia, hoping that this will make Corridor VIII obsolete. Even 
slowing down of the construction was considered national betrayal and the signing of a 
declaration for Corridor VIII was described by foreign minister Papoulias as a ‗warning 
shot‘ to Greece‘s ‗sluggishness‘, while expressing hope that the pace of construction of 
the Egnatia Highway would be sped up.
64
 Greek policies and public statements during 
the 1990s failed short of creating a culture of cooperation in the Balkans, in contrast to 
the country‘s declared commitment to EU values and norms. Furthermore, many Balkan 
analysts suspected that Greece was sabotaging Corridor VIII, using its privilege position 
as the only EU-member in the region. Albanian intellectual Arben Kola writes, 
 
However, while the Albanians were most ardent supporters of the Corridor, until recently 
the Greeks have been its greatest opponents. Athens was afraid that the construction of 
this Corridor might reduce the importance of the port of Thessaloniki. Being a member of 
the European Union, which will be the main investor in the Project, Greece tried hard to 
postpone its realization.
 65
 
 
Polina Slavcheva, a Bulgarian analyst writes that ‗Greece wielding regional clout as a 
longstanding EU and NATO member, Corridor VIII has been allowed to lag behind the 
other Pan-European corridors that the EU envisaged as links to Southeast Europe.‘66 
 
To understand even better how Greece and Bulgaria again selected policies of 
obstruction, we need to explore the perception of the two projects through the traditional 
programmatic beliefs about the other in the two states. Promoting Via Egnatia and 
opposing Corridor VIII during the 1990s, was not an ad-hoc improvised act, but part of 
a Greek strategy for transport development in the Balkans, created decades ago. Such 
                                                 
60 Efstathios Politis, Personal Interview, Vice President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the city of 
Serres, Serres, 12.01.2008, [in English]. 
61 Thomas Margaritis, Personal Interview, Mayor of Drama, Drama, Greece 14.01.2010,[in English].  
62 Theodoros, Karakotsoglou, Charalampos, ‗Egnatia Highway‘, pp. 12-18. 
63 Albi Qeli, Road ‗Egnatia‘ and ‗Corridor 8‘ are two different things, Koha Ditore, 90/1999. 
64 Athens News Agency Bulletin (724), ‗Greece‘. 
65 Arben Kola, ‗Corridor Eight: Dreams and Interests‘  http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/199804/80426-
005-trae-tir.htm; accessed May 2007. 
66 Polina Slavcheva, ‗Politics Thwarts Balkan‘, pp. 35-42. 
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strategy was developed in line with Greek national contexts explored in previous 
chapters. Upon its completion, Via Egnatia would be the first major infrastructure 
project in Greece along the East-West direction. For decades the country‘s transport 
infrastructure has been developed in the North-South direction from Athens through 
Thessaloniki to Belgrade and Western Europe. (Corridor X-Fig. 2) As an implication of 
Greece‘s dedication to its traditional preference to the North-South direction via 
friendly Serbia (1997), Greek delegation on the Transport Conference in Helsinki, 
managed to persuade EU partners to adopt a new Corridor X (Salzburg, Ljubljana, 
Zagreb, Belgrade, Nis, Skopje and Thessaloniki). On the same conference Romania 
pushed for corridor IV to divert to Constanta, as an alternative to the already-planned 
route through Vidin-Calafat to Thessalonica. These three developments and namely, 
Greece‘s project Via Egnatia (opposed to Corridor VIII, see Fig.19), Corridor X as an 
alternative to the southern direction of Corridor IV (see Fig. 19) and the alternative 
Romanian Corridor IVa to Constanta (Fig.19), all of which ardently supported by 
Greece suspiciously coincide with one Greek geopolitical program, formulated thirty 
years ago from the Athens Centre of Ekistics. The project Ecumenopolis 2080 (see 
Fig.20).
67
 defined which Balkan territories should be subject of modernizing, 
industrializing and urbanizing (marked with black clusters of dots) with three level-
scale of investment intensity.
 68
 According to the Greek hypothesis from 1969, in the 
time horizon of 2080 the transport directions East-West and North-South should pass 
through Greece, Serbia and Romania and circumvent Bulgaria, Turkey and Albania.  
According to this strategy the role of the diagonal projection, the ancient Via Militaris 
from Istanbul, through Belgrade to Vienna (red diagonal line on Fig.5) that has always 
been attracting the large amounts of the trade flows between Asia and Europe, even in 
the Cold War era, should be weakened through the building of the Belgrade-
Thessalonica route, Via Egnatia and the Constanta-Budapest road. In this respect, Greek 
transport strategy was entirely shaped by the traditional programmatic beliefs of friends 
and enemies, explored in the previous chapters. In Geography-Arbiter in the Rivalry, 
Called Balkan Cooperation, Hristo Genchev reflecting on Ecumenopolis 2080 in the 
early 1990s wrote, 
 
I always believed that similar appropriations of geography could only exist only under 
exclusive circumstances, such as the Cold War. The idea that a single Balkan country-
Bulgaria-could be intentionally isolated, seemed to me horrific, but the geopolitical 
project Via Egnatia, which was planned as a component of the Balkan range of 
Ecumenopolis 2080  [...] began to be realized precisely in the years after 1989
69
 
 
 
                                                 
67 ‗Ecumenopolis 2080‘, ACE Newsletter, 5, no. 5, (December 1969) quoted in Hristo Genchev, ‗Geography-Arbiter in 
the Rivalry Called Balkan Cooperation‘ in Makedonia Newspaper, 34 (1997), 8. 
68 Hristo Genchev, ‗Geography-Arbiter in the Rivalry Called Balkan Cooperation‘ in Makedonia Newspaper, 34 (1997), 
8. 
69 Hristo Genchev, ‗Geography‘, p. 8.Translation from Bulgarian. 
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Fig. 20 Ecumenopolis, 2080: Greek Programme for Development, Urbanizing and 
Modernizing70 
Although such fears might have been somehow exaggerated, as a proof that during the 
1990s this ideas were not abandoned is the fact that the Athens Centre of Ekistics, 
published an updated map of Ecumenopolis in the article of Professor John G. 
Papaioannou.
 71
  The new time horizon was the year 2100. From the segment of the map 
in the article could be seen that the project Ecumenopolis has not changed much even 
after the global geopolitical transformations after the Cold War and the adoption of Pan-
European Transport Corridors. The areas that had to be developed on the Balkans were 
again Via Egnatia, Thessalonica -Belgrade and Constanta-Budapest routes, 
circumventing the Great diagonal Istanbul-Belgrade-Budapest. Greek governments 
during the 1990s, supported exactly those projects, described in the Ecumenopolis 2080 
and Ecumenopolis 2100. 
 
Bulgaria in the ‗opposite camp‘ was engaged in developing its own paramount project, 
and namely ‗The gigantic infrastructure project [...] Corridor N8, [which had to] be 
finished by 2020‘ according to the prognosis of the American Trade and Economic 
Development Agency. Bulgaria perceived the intensification of the construction works 
of the Greek Via Egnatia project as an impetus to further increase the speed of the 
works on its part of Corridor VIII.
72
 After Bulgarian diplomatic efforts on Sep, 9
th
 2002 
                                                 
70 Source: Hristo Genchev, ‗Geography-Arbiter in the Rivalry Called Balkan Cooperation‘ in Makedonia Newspaper, 34 
(1997), 8. 
71 John Papaioannou , ‗Environment and the Role of Ekistics‘ , Athens Centre of Ekistics, 
http://business.hol.gr/~bio/HTML/PUBS/VOL2/gb-papai.htm, accessed May, 2007 
72 Roussev, ‗Environment Management‘. 
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Memorandum for the Completion of Corridor VIII was signed in Bari, Italy, where 
Bulgaria has again declared that Corridor VIII is a major project of paramount 
importance for its economy. Although the country insisted that it was lacking funds for 
construction of the other pan-European corridors it constantly secured funds from the 
state budget and international donors, such as EIB to exclusively invest in the route 
Sofia-Burgas, which is part of Corridor VIII. The estimated budget for the project is 
about 2.2 billion dollars and the section through Bulgarian territory requires 1.2 billion 
BGN (700 million dollars). On March 16, 2003 Regional Development Minister 
Valentin Tserovski opened the construction of the new section of the Thrakia motorway 
[Bulgarian name for the part of Corridor VIII, crossing the country] between Orizovo 
and Stara Zagora. ‗The project is worth about EUR 54 M, eighty percent of which are 
provided by the European Investment Bank and the rest of the money will come from 
the state budget. About 3000 workers will be employed in the construction, which is 
expected to finish in 30 months.‘73 
 
In other words, the rivalry between Corridor VIII and Via Egnatia during the 1990s was 
again shaped by the institutionalized ideational legacies of two incompatible ideologies. 
If constructing Via Egnatia, the road leading to ‗Constantinople‘ was the ‗megale 
project‘ for Greece, Bulgarians were likewise captured by the vision to build an East-
West multimodal corridor, connecting them to their always unfulfilled dream 
Macedonia. Even, if the great city was forever lost for Greeks they could live their 
dream by resurrecting the ancient road leading there. If Bulgarians have ultimately been 
denied of reuniting with Macedonia, they strived for a better passage to their 
‗cousins‘.74 
                                                 
73 ‗Construction of Orizovo-Stara Zagora Trakia Highway Section‘, Novinite.Com,  
http://novinite.com/view_news.php?id=20437, accessed May, 2007. 
74 The railway between Sofia and Skopje is the major missing link along Corridor VIII on the Balkans. It is also the 
most politicized link in the region. More than hundred years after first plans were drawn there are still no trains between 
Bulgaria and Macedonia.  The project was obstructed by Great Powers and suspicious neighbours and never 
accomplished.  Bulgaria‘s ambitions to annex Macedonia were unwelcome to several Great Powers, which explains 
their reluctance to allow a railway running from the Bulgarian capital, Sofia, to Skopje, in Macedonia. Instead, they 
insisted on a line running from Sofia to Niš in southern Serbia, a line that nowadays forms part of Europe‘s transport 
Corridor X. An expression of Bulgaria‘s pretentions towards Macedonia, the line has always been effectively sabotaged, 
blocked and even destroyed by its neighbours. Within the Ottoman Empire, construction of the line started in 1876 in 
the direction Skopje-Kyustendil. 
 
 After the Bulgarian independence, work was stopped by the Ottomans. Bulgarians completed their section to the 
border at Gyueshevo on the eve of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) in line with their ideational contexts that Macedonia 
was the sacred land where Cyrillic alphabet was created, the Bulgarian Jerusalem, the most Bulgarian of all lands that 
still needed to be liberated. After losing the war and the region‘s incorporation in Serbia (later Yugoslavia) works were 
discontinued. During World War I, under the short-lived Bulgarian administration (1941-1943) the construction is 
renewed and more than 58 tunnels and 60 bridges completed. During the Cold War the remaining 64 km (63km in 
Macedonia and 1 km in Bulgaria) could not be finished. After the democratic changes Bulgaria pushed for the line 
construction once again.  
 
The Bulgarian government was first in the world to recognize an independent Republic of Macedonia in 1992. However, 
Bulgaria failed to recognize the existence of Macedonian language and nation, separate than Bulgarian. This revived 
fears that Bulgaria still aspired to incorporate the country and work on the project was interrupted again. The two 
countries have sorted their outstanding disputes in 1999 by signing a declaration on the official languages of both 
countries, thus diplomatically avoiding to name the language of the declaration, as either Bulgarian or Macedonian. At 
the same time the rail between Sofia and Skopje was proclaimed as the backbone of Corridor VIII and Transcontinental 
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Subcase Study 2: New Border Points between Bulgaria and Greece 
 
Fighting on the side of the Central Powers in World War I, Bulgaria lost its outlet to the 
Aegean to Greece by the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919. Of all the lands lost, the cutting 
away from the Mediterranean (through the Aegean) was particularly painful for 
Bulgaria. At places the border was drawn some 15 km away from the sea nearly that 
close that it ‗could be smelled‘ (see fig 21).75 The country reoccupied the region during 
World War II but had to withdraw fighting on the losing side again. Paris Peace Treaties 
confirmed the territory had to be returned to Greece and some 150 000 Bulgarians were 
expelled to Bulgaria. The local autochthonous population of Slavic origin that remained 
on the other side of the border was subjected to a policy of Hellenization. Since then the 
border was sealed and from 1944 till 1988, the 500 km common Bulgarian-Greek 
frontier was served by only one border check point, and namely Kulata-Promahonas on 
the direction Sofia-Athens (marked with N1 on Fig. 21). As a comparison the average 
distance of border check points between historical foes Germany-France was 7 km. 
Such policies were consistent on one side with the traditional Greek/Bulgarian 
nationalist programmatic beliefs of the other as enemy and on the other reinforced by 
the communist ideological divide. Till the 1990s, informed by such ideas, precluding 
any form of cooperation, the two countries simply pretended the other just did not exist. 
A second check point Petko Voyvoda-Ormenion was officially opened at the other 
extreme of the border, only on November 5, 1988. (marked with N5 on Fig.21)
76
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Corridor Europe-Asia (Traceca) by the EU and the TINA initiative. Seemingly there were no more obstacles and nothing 
could hinder the project this time since it was out of the Balkan politics realm and was elevated to a supranational level. 
However, the line is still not operational. Bulgarians tend to ascribe the delay to Macedonia‘s indecision about its 
priorities. Since the creation of Macedonia there have been only two or three years when the state was interested in 
working on this axis. Although a relic of the past, the thinking of part of the Macedonian elite is still that the country can 
develop either along the Serbia-Greece [Corridor X] or Albania-Bulgaria axis [Corridor VIII]‘, Marin Lessenski, of the 
Sofia Institute for Regional and International Studies, IRIS, says.  
 
Whether these two strategic alliances are complimentary to one another, however, is doubtful, according to Lessenski: 
If you have Serbia and Greece as friends, Albania and Bulgaria are your enemies. Still dominated by its Serbian-
educated elite, Macedonia preserves the ideational status quo for North-South infrastructure linking her to Serbia and 
Greece respectively. At the same time the East-West connection, promoted by the EU and the US promises to attract 
‗huge amounts of ores, gas and other goods expected to flow from the Caucasus region to Western Europe will use the 
railroad through Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania, as this would be by far more viable than using motorways. If Skopje 
further delays the construction traffic might be diverted to other corridors going to Austria through Serbia. Elites in 
Skopje, similarly to Greece and Bulgaria are trapped between EU ideas and nationalism. If in the foreseeable future a 
train from Sofia terminates at the Skopje station we would know that Balkan political elites will not be ‗catching the train 
for Europe‘ anymore, since they will be Europe. The journey would have taken 200 km for 132 years. 
 
75 Ekaterina Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting‘, p. 9. 
76 Apostolos Hristakoudis , ‗Bulgarian-Greek Cooperation in the Sphere of Transport Infrastructure‘, International 
Relations, 3 (2001), 103. 
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Fig. 21 Border check points between Bulgaria and Greece. Planned and existing.77 
 
In 1995 the foreign ministers Papolias and Pirinski concluded historic agreements 
including the opening of border checkpoints between the two countries, the waters of 
the river Mesta (Nestos), the employment of seasonal workers and an agreement on 
relocating people. Bulgaria managed to negotiate the opening of the old Roman passes 
through the Rhodopes at three new crossings in exchange for a guaranteed debit of the 
waters of the river Mesta for the Greek side (marked with red on Fig. 21). This meant to 
restore five (two existing and three new) out of seven border points that were used 
between the two wars of last century and also to adapt them to the modern flow of cars 
and tourists. Papoulias commented that three new border checkpoints –Ilinden, Elidzhe 
and Makaza (N2, N3 and N4 on Fig.21) between the cities Drama-Goce Delcev, Xanthi-
Roudozem and Komotini-Kurdzhali - would give a new impetus to the movement of 
people and goods and they will strengthen border trade and bilateral trade and economic 
relations.
78
 The agreement explicitly stated that the three new checking points should be 
commissioned within three years and not later than the end of 1998. The program 
PHARE donated DM 24 million exclusively for the fast completion of the Ilinden check 
point, where the interwar infrastructure was much in place and seemingly only minor 
efforts were required on both sides to complete the remaining 2 kilometres and erect a 
new customs building. With funds provided by the EU and a clear agreement between 
the two countries it seemed nothing could hinder the project. In addition it was 
beneficial for both countries to speed construction due to the Yugoslav Wars and the 
European need for routes bypassing Yugoslavia. 
 
However by 1999, works on the crossings had still not even started.
79
 It should not be 
disregarded that in the Balkan context, even the local fauna could be a crucial player. 
                                                 
77 Egnatia Odos, Driving on the Egnatia Motorway,  http://www.egnatia.gr/page/default.asp?la=2&id=49, last accessed 
October 2008. 
78 Athens News Agency Bulletin (724), ‗Major bilateral agreements with Bulgaria will be signed by year‘s end‘, 25 
October, 1995. 
79 B.K, A.C, T.T, Representatives of Egnatia Odos Transport Company, Personal Interviews, Thessaloniki, 08.03.2008, 
[in Greek]. 
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The Greek ecology organization Arktouros sent a protest-letter to the EU Commission, 
where it expressed its concern that the new Goce Delchev-Drama check point disturbed 
‗the ecological harmony in the region and threatened reproduction of a family of local 
brown bears.‘80 As a consequence the project was significantly delayed, as Brussels 
required new route of the checking point in compliance with the environment. Surely 
ecological concerns are something not to be disregarded. In this particular case 
ecological arguments were used to intentionally delay the opening of the new check 
point Ilinden, as in that region there was hardly any brown bear population. 
Commenting on the case, the German magazine Spiegel wrote, 
 
Greeks had just invented something to delay the commissioning of the checking point. 
They said that tens or even hundreds of bears passed through exactly that spot…and the 
automobile traffic would disturb them… on the contrary… in the region there are two or 
three bear families at most and in the exact spot of the point a single bear has not been 
mentioned for years…81 
 
After two more years of arguments, the new ‗ecologically-correct‘ project provided for 
a 600 meter-long tunnel, between the two borders. It took another two years and four 
billion euro to build a special tunnel for the bears.
82
 The Special Coordinator for the 
Stability Pact Bodo Hombach commented that this bear-tunnel is ‗senseless‘.83 Many of 
the elite interviews with Bulgarian policy makers indicate their belief that he real 
motive behind such obstruction was the fear of the Greek side that eventual new border 
point would provide for the increased communication between Bulgarians and the 
Slavic speaking minority in Northern Greece (population considered as ‗Slavic-
speaking Greeks‘ by Athens), divided by new state borders after the Balkan Wars 1912-
1913.
84
 This is confirmed by some of the elite interviews, for example with Anastasios 
Vavaciklis, Mayor of Komotini, who said that ‗the Slavic-speaking population divided 
by the border has always made Greece suspicious to any opening of that border.‘85 On 
Bulgarian side the concerns from the new check point opening were connected with the 
fact that the Bulgarian border region‘s economically deprived population might 
emigrate to the Greek labour market. Bulgarian policy makers also accused Greeks that 
the decade- delay of the new border points was an intentional policy, since ‗Greeks did 
not want to let Bulgaria reach the free Aegean, which was only 20 km from the border‘ 
and often reminded that this was a Bulgarian territory till 1920.
86
 In one of the elite 
interviews, Anton Antov, a Bulgarian expert at the Ministry of Transport, discussing the 
Bulgarian-Greek transport relations during the 1990s, complained ‗The Greeks 
instinctively did not aim at having contacts with Bulgaria, just as the Romanians didn‘t 
want bridges over the Danube.‘87 
 
                                                 
80 Ekaterina Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting‘, p. 9. 
81 ‗Tunnel für Meister Petz: Zwischen Bulgarien und Griechenland werden für den Tierschutz Unsummen aus EU-
Steuergeldern verbuddelt‘, Spiegel, 48, (2000) quoted in Makedonia Newspaper, 2 (2001). 
82 Ekaterina Nikova, ‗Roads Connecting‘, p. 9. 
83 ‗Tunnel für Meister Petz‘, p.2. 
84 Kostadin Kostadinov, Personal Interview, Deputy Chair of VMRO Party, Sofia, 13.08.2009, [in Bulgarian], Angel 
Dzhambazki, Personal Interview, Sofia Town Councillor on The Security and Defense Committee, Sofia, 15.08.2009, 
[in Bulgarian], Dora Yankova, Personal Interview, Mayor of Smolyan, Smolyan, 05.04.2009, [in Bulgarian]. 
85 Anastasios Vavaciklis, Personal Interview, Mayor of Komotini (2002-2006), Komotini, 12.12.2008, [in English]. 
86 Aleksandar Kravarov, Personal Interview, Mayor of Bansko, Bansko, 17.08.2008 [in Bulgarian]. 
87  Anton Antov, Personal Interview,  Senior expert at the Ministry of Transport-Bulgaria, Sofia, 30.05.2008 [in 
Bulgarian]. 
 149 
During the 1990s, regardless of the Bulgarian status as an acceding EU-state and 
Greece‘s as an established EU-member state nationalist mentalities of the previous 
times were still very much alive and the dominant culture was ‗fear your neighbour‘, 
which resulted in reluctance to open new border points between the two states, rather 
than engage in overall political, social and economic cross-border cooperation. 
Subcase Study 3: Corridor IV vs. Corridor X 
 
 
Fig. 22 Corridor IV vs. Corridor X: Rivalries over the North-South Direction88 
 
 
During the recent Yugoslav Wars, experts evaluated the traffic interruption as a 
European ‗traffic heart attack‘.89 The Balkans were cut from communication with the 
West. The whole traffic from the Middle East to Europe had to be redirected through 
Romania, instead of Serbia. However, Bulgaria and Romania, peculiar enough, 
possessed a single bridge across their 500 km river border and this facility was their sole 
rail connection.
90
 In comparison, in Budapest alone there were nine permanent bridges 
spanning between the two shores of the river
91. Furthermore ‗along the total [European], 
Danube navigable length, 104 bridges are built at an average distance of 21.38 
kilometres. The distance between the Danube Bridge at Ruse and the next bridge in 
                                                 
88 Source: Author. 
89 Nationalism - Blood and Belonging: The Road to Nowhere – Yugoslavia (documentary, 1993), at 
http://movies2.nytimes.com/gst/movies/movie.html?v_id=198086, accessed October 2008.  
90 The bridge at Ruse-Giurgiu, or ‗The Bridge of Friendship‘, as it was called, was opened in 1954 and served the trade 
relations between the socialist Balkan countries and the USSR. The bridge was a significant element in region‘s 
infrastructure, comprising of road, rail, gas and oil connections, serving the north-eastern trade flow, facilitating cultural 
and military interaction between the states in the region and the USSR. 
91 Tourism Office of Budapest, Bridges,  http://www.budapestinfo.hu/en/sights/hidak.html, accessed May, 2003 
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Romania - Veke Bridge is 556.42 km.‘92 That is 40 times lower than the average density 
in the upper part of the river. Moreover the only existing bridge (‗Bridge of Friendship‘ 
as it was called) was serving the former export orientation towards the USSR and was 
inconveniently located at the extreme eastern part.  After the collapse of communism 
trade flows were reoriented towards the European Union and the significance of the 
ancient trade route Via Militaris Istanbul-Sofia-Belgrade-Vienna (green on Fig. 23) 
increased dramatically as the shortest land connection between the Near East, Middle 
East and Europe. The new international regimes and geopolitical order positioned the 
European Union as the new major trade partner for the Balkan economies. Another 
reason for redirection of traffic to the Via Militaris route was that lying just south of 
Bucharest but about 300 kilometres (200 miles) east of Sofia, the Danube bridge‘s 
location was inconvenient to access Central Europe through Romania. (see Fig. 23) 
 
 
 
Fig. 23 Corridor IV vs. Corridor X and the location of the two Danube bridges between 
Bulgaria and Romania93 
 
As a result, most Bulgarians, as well as most travellers from Asia Minor and Middle 
East, took the route through Serbia. However the Yugoslav wars ‗virtually made 
unusable Via Militaris, the shortest route from Western Europe to the Balkans and 
Asia.‘94 Such a state of affairs provoked a frantic search for an ‗alternative route to the 
EU that circumvents Serbian territory‘ as the losses that the Balkan economies suffered 
from the embargo on Yugoslavia and the blocked routes amounted billions of dollars.
95
 
                                                 
92 Yordanka Gancheva, ‗The Second Danube Bridge: Where is the Problem Actually?‘, Institute for Market Economics,  
http://www.ime-bg.org/pdf_docs/papers/bridge.doc, accessed May, 2003, 1. 
93 Source: Author. 
94 Gergana Dimitrova, The Road to Europe: The Symbolic Economy of Self-Representation in the Balkans, PhD 
Research Project- work in progress, IRES Department, Central European University, Budapest (2001-2003). 
95 Gergana Dimitrova, The Road to Europe, p. 24. 
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By 1996, for Bulgaria alone, the figure was estimated at USD 4 bln losses.
96
 During the 
Yugoslav Wars trucks and cars had to drive many extra miles and reluctantly start using 
the Ruse-Giurgiu bridge again, lining in kilometer long lines and incurring huge 
financial losses from the increased transit. At the All European Ministerial Conferences 
on Transport held in Crete in 1994, the map of the Pan European transport corridors was 
proposed. It was decided that Corridor IV should be commissioned as an alternative 
bypass route of the old Via Militaris to secure European flows in case of further 
Yugoslav conflicts. The Corridor IV (orange on Fig. 22 and 23) links Dresden 
(Germany) to Istanbul (Turkey) via Prague, Bratislava, Gjor, Budapest, Arad, Crajova, 
Sofia and Plovdiv. Ways diverge to provide links to Nuremberg, Vienna, Bucharest and 
Constanta (Corridor IVa). Corridor X (brown on fig 22 and 23) crosses Salzburg 
(Austria), Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Nis, Skopje, Veles and Thessaloniki (Greece). 
 
The idea to build a second Danube bridge at the west part of the border looked pretty 
obvious. Negotiations started in 1995 when Bulgaria and Romania decided to build an 
alternative route to Western Europe, creating a ‗strategic bridge that could link the 
countries of Southeast Europe afflicted by the crisis with the European transport 
system.‘97 Work was ‗put off for eight years while Bulgaria and Romania engaged in a 
lunatic battle about its location. Bulgaria wanted an upstream site in compliance with 
European demands and Romania a site downstream, in spite of the already existing 
bridge at that part of the river. In mid 1990s, the two countries still shared a culture of 
‗mistrust your neighbour‘ mentality during the negotiations and chose not to cooperate 
incurring significant financial losses from missed opportunities to attract trade flows 
and bigger transit costs. 
 
Romania was supported by Greece, which at the third Pan-European Transport 
Conference in 1997, lobbied for the adoption of a tenth corridor (Corridor X) as an 
alternative to Corridor IV, from Greece via Serbia to Western Europe. Peculiarly 
enough, such proposal came in the height of the Yugoslav Wars, the Embargo and the 
fact that a convenient corridor from Greece via Bulgaria to Western Europe (Corridor 
IV-orange on Fig. 22) has already been adopted in 1994. Greece also introduced a 
second initiative that undermined Corridor IV and namely the project, later known as 
the ‗Dalmatian‘ corridor (red on Fig.22). 
 
During the wars, due to its vital significance Corridor IV was included among the 14 
TEN-T specific projects of utmost importance for the Union, which should have been 
completed first and would be allocated most funding. However, in spite of the clear EU 
instruction, pressure, financial support and urgent need of the countries involved and the 
EU itself, the Corridor‘s commissioning did not even start during the 1990s, when it 
was most needed. While Greece did not stop constructing Corridor X, linking her to 
Serbia, even during the Wars and NATO bombing during the Yugoslav Wars, 
construction of Corridor IV, which passed entirely through EU member states (Bulgaria, 
Romania), started only after 2000 after a decade of intentional delay. The reason was 
the ‗fear your neighbour mentality‘ and traditional nationalist contexts which had their 
own logic, different than the clear cut European agenda. 
 
While Corridor IV was regarded by EU Commission as a project of utmost importance 
during the Yugoslav conflicts as a conflict-bypass route, its relevance significantly 
diminished at the end of the crisis. However to safeguard from possible dependence on 
                                                 
96 About Bulgaria, ‗Economy‘,  http://www.geocities.com/abstract_f/aboutbulgaria.html, accessed May, 2003. 
97 Arben Kola, ‗Corridor Eight: Dreams and Interests‘. 
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a single route, the corridor was once again reconfirmed its significance, putting it on the 
list of the 30 priority projects (including the original 14) in the Revised TEN-T 
guidelines and financial regulation adopted in 2004. After the fall of Milosevic, Greece 
continued developing the alternative route of Corridor X, despite the fact that this 
corridor is not on the EU priority list, while construction on Corridor IV via Bulgaria, 
reconfirmed as a project of utmost importance for the EU was not yet to start till 2000s. 
 
The second Greek initiative, that undermined Corridor IV was the project, later known 
as the ‗Dalmatian‘ corridor (marked with red line on Fig.22) linking the Italian port of 
Trieste to the Greek city of Igoumenista, following closely the Adriatic coast via 
Albania, Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Croatia, a project proposed in middle 1998 and 
estimated to 3 billion dollars.
98
 What Athens and Bucharest did not take into account 
was that after the war conflicts in Yugoslavia were over, the natural trade flows would 
return along the shortest Via Militaris route from Istanbul-Sofia-Belgrade-Vienna 
(green on Fig. 23), circumventing both Romania and Greece excluding them from the 
trade flows geopolitical game. After the normalization in Yugoslavia, the EU, the 
SPSEE and other international actors were less inclined to financially support a bridge 
over the Danube, as a replacement of the traditional Via Militaris route. As Gergana 
Dimitrova wrote the project ‗might seem to be losing its outward significance after the 
end of the Kosovo crisis and the disappearance of the pariah Yugoslavia‘. 99 The two 
countries have missed substantial opportunities to attract some of the trade flows of the 
Via Militaris route, receive generous support to implement the project from outside 
donors (such as EIB, the PHARE program in the period 1995-2000), at the time when 
the project was of high priority for the international community as an alternative route 
to the one through troubled Yugoslavia due to the old nationalist mentalities dominating 
transport policies at that moment.  Much of the detrimental effects to the economies of 
all three countries, cause by the traffic blockade would have been offset if the second 
Danube bridge project (as a link of pan European Corridor N 4 from Thessalonica to 
Budapest) had been accomplished during the Yugoslav Wars. 
 
Last, in the Corridor IV vs. X case, according to the Greek institutionalized national 
ideas and logic of appropriateness route from Greece to Europe should have passed 
through its ‗ideational ally‘ Serbia, rather than through EU member Bulgaria (ideational 
foe). In the 1990s still acting on its traditional logic of appropriateness, Greece was 
favouring Corridor X and obstructing the commissioning of Corridor IV, regardless of 
EU support and funding for the latter. Such Greek position was not altered even during 
the Yugoslav Wars and the embargo over Serbia, when the link was vital to whole 
Europe as a bypass route. No work was undertaken and Greece continued building 
Corridor X, unmoved by Serbia‘s distant EU perspective, or arguments in support of 
Corridor IV as shorter and economically more viable route. 
 
Based on the documentary research on government publications, newspaper articles, 
international memorandums, public speeches, transport doctrines, etc., we have found 
that during the 1990s, obstruction over the EU-backed cross-border infrastructure 
projects (Corridor VIII and Via Egnatia, Corridor IV and X, cross border points) was 
linked to old programmatic beliefs that still shaped normative criteria that cooperation 
between Greece and Bulgaria was not appropriate. Tо corroborate the findings, the elite 
interviews asked 25 key top-policy makers in Greece, operating on regional, national 
and European level, the following questions: 
                                                 
98 Eric Cotte, ‗Where is the Eight Corridor?‘. 
99 Gergana Dimitrova, The Road to Europe, 28. 
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 Was cooperation with Bulgaria appropriate before 1990s? 
 Was cooperation with Bulgaria appropriate during the 1990s? 
 
Their 25 relevant Bulgarian counterparts were asked similarly: 
 
 Was cooperation with Greece appropriate before 1990s? 
 Was cooperation with Greece appropriate during the 1990s? 
 
The 25 Bulgarian and 25 Greek Members of European Parliament, ministers, local 
mayors from different political parties, NGO activists involved in Bulgaria-Greece 
Cross-border cooperation, academics, etc., selected through non-probability  purposive 
sampling, were interviewed through semi-structured open-ended interviews mostly 
during 2006-2009. The analyzed data yielded the following results: 
 
92% (23) of the Greek policy makers claimed that cooperation with Bulgaria was 
simply unthinkable and not appropriate in the years prior to 1990. 4% (1) were neutral 
about the issue, and 4% (1) insisted that cooperation was possible in that period. This 
reconfirms what we found about that period, exploring Greek programmatic beliefs 
about Bulgarians through documentary research in the ideational chapters. However, 
after the 1990s, when traditional programmatic beliefs of the other as an enemy were 
gradually challenged by EU-cooperation ideas, indicate shift of perception. 52% (13) of 
the Greek policy makers still claimed that cooperation with Bulgaria was not 
appropriate during the 1990s, but already 36% believe it was neither good, nor bad, 
while 12% (3) believed that in that period, cooperation between the two states was 
already deemed appropriate and well-accepted by the public opinion. What is interesting 
is that policy actors, working on the European and regional level, much faster shifted 
their ideational set-up from obstruction to cooperation, while actors working on the 
national level still viewed that during the 1990s, cooperation with Bulgarians was just 
not appropriate (see Fig. 24). 
 
 
Fig. 24 Result of elite interviews of 25 Greek policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 1: Was cooperation with Bulgaria appropriate before and 
during the 1990s? 
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Similarly 88% ( 22) of Bulgarian policy makers perceived that cooperation with Greece 
was not appropriate, before the 1990s, 4% (1) was neutral and 8% (2) thought it was 
possible. The elite interviews corroborated the documentary research findings of the 
ideational chapter on Bulgarian programmatic beliefs towards Greeks prior to 1990. 
During the 1990s, 40% (10) said cooperation was not possible, already 36% (9) were 
not sure and 24% (6) believed it was already appropriate and a good thing (see Fig. 25). 
 
Fig. 25 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 1: Was cooperation with Greece appropriate before and 
during the 1990s? 
Conclusions 
 
The chapter explored that during the 1990s, political, economic and social cooperation 
between Bulgaria and Greece (operationalized through three concrete sub-cases of EU-
backed cross-border infrastructure projects) could not materialize. The projects were in 
a situation of impasse, regardless of EU pressure, secured financing and obvious 
benefits if completed. Bulgaria and Greece adopted competing polices, rather than 
complementary within a broader European framework, regarding the other as a rival, 
rather than an ally over the commissioning of the projects.  Such policies were linked to 
old programmatic beliefs that still shaped normative criteria during that period that 
cooperation with the neighbour was still not appropriate. This was evidenced by the 
documentary research on government publications, newspaper articles, international 
memorandums, etc. and corroborated by elite interviews of current Greek and Bulgarian 
policy makers and their views of that period. 
 
In other words, Greek and Bulgarian elites during the 1990s were so reluctant to 
cooperate since they still identified obstruction as the normatively appropriate behaviour 
than instead of calculating the return expected from alternative choices, which 
corresponded to the normative guidelines and criteria provided by the ideas that 
Bulgarians/Greeks were enemies and cooperation with the other was at best suspicious.  
 
The following 2000-2010 -chapter demonstrates how after the 2000, cooperation 
suddenly emerged and very intensive work on the infrastructure projects was 
undertaken. The immense power of EU-idea and EU‘s normative agenda was making 
traditional policies of obstruction ever more inadequate. Bulgarian and Greek elites 
were increasingly feeling the pressure of regional and supranational levels informing 
them that continued lack of cooperation in the new condition would produce very 
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undesired results. If nationalist ideas and obstruction were crucial for their 
legitimization, popular support and integrity during previous periods, in the new 
conditions continuation of such policies could have even cost them losing their 
legitimacy abroad and at home.  
 
To find policy change, the data was collected through archival and documentary 
research on government publications, memorandums, agreements, transport strategies 
and programmes, reports, newspaper articles. To link such historic policy change to 
ideational change, as a result of EU leverage, the documentary research is 
complemented by primary research data of elite interviews. 
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Chapter 6. Second Phase 2000-2010: Europeanization  
 
Introduction 
 
The first hypothesis of the study, that Greek-Bulgarian policies of obstruction are 
shaped by path-dependent institutionalized ideas, was tested in the ideational mapping 
chapters of Greece and Bulgaria. The task of the two empirical infrastructure chapters is 
to test the   second hypothesis that EU with its normative agenda and conditionality 
could be such a powerful idea to effectively challenge, for the first time, traditional 
national-interest mentalities in Bulgaria and Greece and lead to change in obstruction 
policies. 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that during the 1990-2000, political, social and 
economic cooperation between the two states was still rather wary and reluctant, as 
justified by the common EU large infrastructure projects that were in a state of impasse 
for a decade, in spite of secured EU funding, proven economic benefits and clear 
technical specifications. Documentary research, corroborated with elite interviews 
indicated that decision makers in Bulgaria and Greece still tended to identify and 
interpret the challenges they faced within the old normative guidelines and criteria and 
matched problems with solutions they had applied in the past, rather than searching for 
politically or economically optimal solutions in the new EU-promoted cooperation 
environment. In other words during that first period traditional programmatic beliefs, 
although challenged could not be displaced by EU-ideas, as happened many times 
before. Elite interviews indicated that during the 1990s policy makers at regional and 
supranational level adopted the appropriateness of cooperation ideas much faster than 
those, operating at national level. 
 
However, only during the second period (2000-2010), a true breakthrough in 
obstruction policies occurred. Cooperation between Bulgaria and Greece started to 
emerge in the economic, political and social sphere and gradually increased with each 
year, since old ideas and policies of obstruction were yielding more and more 
unintended results, such as increasing pressure from EU and regional level and they 
seemed increasingly inadequate in the light of the powerful idea of EU-common 
membership and normative criteria. That was also manifested by starting work on the 
long-delayed infrastructure projects and even commissioning some of them towards the 
end of the period. If the previous chapter found that traditional programmatic beliefs 
still influenced obstructionist policies over the cross-border infrastructure projects, the 
task of this chapter is, first, to explore if change of obstruction policies between 
Bulgaria and Greece occurred between 1990s and 2000s. Second, to link such historic 
policy change to ideational change through the documentary sources and elite 
interviewing. Third, to explore why this time, it happened. What made EU-idea so much 
more powerful than previous ‗weaker‘ ideas that were not able to significantly change 
nationalist programmatic beliefs?  
 
Data was collected through archival and documentary research on government 
publications, memorandums, agreements, transport strategies and programmes, reports, 
newspaper articles. To link such historic policy change to ideational change, as a result 
of EU leverage, documentary research is complemented with primary research data of 
elite interviews. After we have found policy change and linked it to ideational change, 
we conclude the 2000-2010 chapter with analysis what made EU-idea so much more 
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powerful than previous ‗weaker‘ ideas that were not able to significantly change 
nationalist programmatic beliefs. 
 
Sub-case Studies: The politics of infrastructure during the 2000s 
 
Sub-case study 1: Via Egnatia vs. Corridor VIII  
 
If breakthrough in nationalist mentalities was in progress ever since the end of the Cold 
War, only after the end of the Yugoslav Wars policies have really started to change.  
Greece has continued to energetically construct Via Egnatia through the Greek 
government, EU, EIB and the Community Support Framework funding.
1
 In the period 
from February 2000 to early 2006, 480km of the motorway was opened. There are 
165km of motorway sections still under construction. The final date for completion is in 
end of 2010 when the full route should be open to traffic.
2
  
 
The big change was when the project was taken out of narrow national planning 
contexts and put under an EU framework as a result of discussions carried out between 
the Greek Government and the European Community during the preparatory phase of 
the INTEREG II (CSF II) (1994-1999).  It was jointly decided by the Greek 
Government and the EU that the materialization of large infrastructure projects 
supported by EU funds could not become a reality without modernizing the Greek 
public works production structures. As a result, the responsibility for the materialisation 
of the Egnatia Motorway project was assigned to the Egnatia Odos AE Company in 
February 1997. At that time, the Company also undertook the responsibility for all the 
works that were currently in progress.
3
 At a meeting between the transport ministers of 
Italy, Greece, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bulgaria in 
September 2003 was accepted the proposal by Greece for priority to be placed on the 
opening of two vertical axes linking Corridor 8 with the Egnatia motorway at the 
sections between Krystalopigi-Siatista (with Albania) and Ormenio-Alexandroupoli 
(with Bulgaria).Within the broader European framework and controlled by the EU, the 
Egnatia Odos Company adopted in 2006 seven more vertical axes to connect Via 
Egnatia to Corridor VIII after negotiations with the governments of Albania, Bulgaria 
and Turkey (Fig. 20).
4
 
                                                 
1 The Company Egnatia Odos was established under the provisions of art. 5, L. 2229/94. It is a legal entity governed by 
private law in the form of a Société Anonyme with the Greek State (Ministry for the Environment, Physical Planning and 
Public Works) being the sole shareholder. The public Sociétés Anonymes were instituted by Law 2229/94 (article 5).  
Source: Asterios Liolios, ‗The Case of Egnatia Odos Motorway in Northern Greece‘, Design and Construction of 
Highways in Greece, http://www.ssm.org.yu/congress2007/doc%202007/Liolios_EGNATIA_Profile_2007_round-
table.pdf, accessed  September 2008. 
2 ‗Egnatia Odos Motorway, Greece‘, Roadtraffic Technology,  http://www.roadtraffic-
technology.com/projects/egnatia/specs.html, accessed September 2008. 
3 Asterios Liolios, Design and Construction, pp. 6-7. 
4 Adrianos Theodoros, Michalis Karakotsoglou and Rizos Charalampos, ‗Egnatia Highway and Pan-European Corridor 
8: Complementarity or Competition?‘, Conference Paper, 46th Congress of the European Regional Science Association: 
Enlargement, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean August 30th – September 3rd, 2006 University of Thessaly, 
Volos, Greece , p. 12. 
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Fig. 26 Via Egnatia (red) and Corridor VIII (blue), connected by nine vertical axes5 
 
Fig. 27 The vertical corridors of Egnatia-Image.6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Source: Egnatia Odos Motorway, Greece, The Egnatia Motorway Vertical Axes and Their Significance,  
http://www.egnatia.gr/page/default.asp?la=2&id=30, accessed October 2008. 
6 Source: Adrianos Theodoros, Michalis Karakotsoglou and Rizos Charalampos, Egnatia, p. 13. 
 159 
This was the high point of EU efforts to install a culture of cooperation. In 1995 Balkan 
states (Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria vs. Greece) perceived that Via Egnatia and 
Corridor VIII were mutually exclusive and each country opposed the alternative project. 
In 2005 political elites were building vertical axes to connect the two corridors in an 
effort to attract more flows, develop their periphery regions and increase cooperation 
among them, perceiving that the two projects could work under a common EU 
framework, and together could bring substantial traffic, funds and benefits to the region. 
This is also supported by the elite interviews, presented later in the chapter. 
Nu
mber  
Vertical Corridor  Length (in Km)  
                       1  Ioannina – Kakavia  
(Borders with Albania)  
62  
2  Siatista – Krystalopigi  
(Borders with Albania)  
72  
3  Kozani – Florina – Niki  
(Borders with FYROM)  
94  
4  Thessaloniki – Evzoni  
(Borders with FYROM)  
78  
5  Thessaloniki – Serres – 
Promachonas  
(Borders with Bulgaria)  
107  
6  Drama – Nevrokopi – Exochi  
(Borders with Bulgaria)  
40  
7  Xanthi – Echinos  
(Borders with Bulgaria)  
48  
8  Komotini – Nimphea  
(Borders with Bulgaria)  
23  
9  Ardanio – Ormenio  
(Borders with Bulgaria)  
134  
In Total  658  
 
                                      Fig. 28 The vertical corridors of Egnatia
7
  
As another example of policy change, compared to the 1990s, Greece has joined the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of Pan European Corridor VIII, also signed by 
Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece and Italy in Bari on 9 September 2002, 
giving way to the realization of the Corridor. The Memorandum of Understanding 
between governments of the region spelled out details of cooperation at the national 
level. The Stability Pact played a role in coordinating international donor aid for 
Corridor VIII as it did for other infrastructure projects throughout the region. Such act 
of Greek political elites was something unthinkable previously, when seven years 
earlier, the four initial signatories were perceived as nothing less than conspiring against 
Greece.  
On 22 April 2008, foreign minister Dora Bakoyannis announced that Greece has offered 
to donate EUR 75 million to Macedonia for construction of Corridor 8 road 
infrastructure, business investments as well as for gradual visa waiver after the name 
                                                 
7 Source: Adrianos Theodoros, Michalis Karakotsoglou and Rizos Charalampos, Egnatia, p. 13. 
 160 
dispute between the two states has been resolved.
8
 Not only had Greek political elites 
joined the MoU for Corridor VIII‘s construction six years ago, but were now offering 
financial assistance to another country to facilitate the completion of its section. 
 
The early post-communist years in Bulgaria and Greece are characterized with paying 
lip service to EU and external impetus for integration. Nationalist attitudes still 
prevailed over Europeanization ideas, evidenced by the elite‘s position and policy 
outcomes on the construction of Corridor VIII and Via Egnatia. However, after the end 
of the Yugoslav Wars and the first truly democratic government taking office in Sofia in 
1997, for the first time elites started to accept and internalize the EU normative agenda. 
This is not to say that new ideas have completely displaced the traditional ones, but it 
was [and is] a process in the making. The decision of Bulgaria and Greece to build nine 
vertical axes connecting Corridor VIII and Via Egnatia, Greece joining the 
Memorandum of Understanding for the Corridor‘s construction and mostly the financial 
aid, granted to Macedonia to complete its section of the route are all a sign that policies 
are changing. Policies are changing as a result of challenged prejudices, as a result of 
change in perception, change of ideas. The two corridors are gradually perceived by 
both countries as complimentary within a broad European Framework. They are not 
necessarily ‗mutually exclusive‘ anymore.  A great ideational change has taken place in 
the span of only ten years. Greek political elites have realized that the corridor is not 
necessarily a threat to their own project and is much more tangible than a mere EU 
public relations hoax.  
 
During the 2000s, Greek public discourse did not use the ‗para-Egnatia‘ (opposite to 
Egnatia) rhetoric anymore, when referring to Corridor VIII.  The latter was finally 
named with its real name. As an implication of the new complementary thinking of the 
two projects, Theodoros, Michalis and Charalampos wrote in 2006, that if one‘s 
destination is ‗the region of Caucasus, the Pan-European Corridor 8 is expected to be 
used… if the destination is Middle East or North-eastern Africa, then Egnatia Highway 
is likely to be considered as the best choice.‘9 They also stated ‗the rise of accessibility 
in the regions which the two corridors will cross is expected to lead to the tightening of 
relations between the states of Balkan Peninsula. Specifically the commercial 
transactions will be greatly profited from such a development…at the same time, the 
manufacture of the vertical axes that will link these two corridors might terminate the 
status of isolation for several regions. Moreover, the complimentarity of the system of 
the two axes will be obvious intensely in the case where the origin and the destination of 
inter-Balkan movements are not on the same axis and do not have direct contact with 
any of the vertical corridors. This fact ―imposes‖ the use of both axes.‘ 10  
Subcase Study 2: New Border Points between Bulgaria and Greece 
 
As discussed in previous case, real change in obstructionist policies between Bulgaria 
and Greece, started to gradually take place after the Yugoslav Wars in 1997, as a result 
of internalization of EU normative ideas, which led to change in perceptions and later 
policies. From a bilateral agreement between Bulgaria and Greece, the opening of the 
three border points was included in the broader EU supported framework of connecting 
                                                 
8 Macedonian Information Agency, Athens and Skopje enter in a feud , 22 April 2008,  
http://www.mia.com.mk/default.aspx?mId=125&vId=42747649&lId=2&title=euro-atlantic+integration, last accessed May 
2010. 
9 Adrianos Theodoros, Michalis Karakotsoglou and Rizos Charalampos, Egnatia, p. 15. 
10 Adrianos Theodoros, Michalis Karakotsoglou and Rizos Charalampos, Egnatia, p. 16. 
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Egnatia Highway with the Pan-European Corridor 8 with the construction of nine axes. 
The construction of the border points was supported also through the EU‘s INTERREG 
II programme, through which subsidies were granted to Greece with special emphasis 
on integrating remote regions and those which shared external borders with the 
candidate countries.
11
  Greece and Bulgaria were involved in the INTERREG III A 
programme. Under the programme between 2000 and 2007 six Greek prefectures 
(Thessaloniki, Drama, Kavala, Xanthi, Rhodope, Evros) and four Bulgarian districts 
(Blagoevgrad, Smolian, Kardjali, Khaskovo) were given EUR 264.593.332 million, out 
of which Euro 186.095.123 were ERDF funds. An additional amount of 5.436.000 €, 
was allocated to the Programme by the European Union according to the decision C 
(2002) 1703/26-7-02 as ‗Special strengthening of regions bordering the Candidate 
Countries‘.12  
 
Despite the generous funding, and EU pressure, it took Bulgaria and Greece ten years to 
complete the first crossing point at Ilinden in 2006. The ‗tunnel of friendship‘ as it was 
named linked a road from Ilinden on the Bulgarian side with Exohi in Greece. The two 
villages were only about 10 kilometers, or 6 miles, apart, but until now were separated 
by a four-hour drive because the only border crossings were located at the extreme ends 
of the 494-kilometre border.
13
 The event, widely publicized and attended at the highest 
level, was portrayed as an example of new culture of cooperation in the region. 
Bulgaria‘s president, Georgi Parvanov commented ‗In this troubled region we are 
creating truly European relations‘, while president of Greece, Karolos Papoulias, 
praised the opening as progress ‗on the road to our European family‘.14 Are such 
speeches just ticking boxes for external legitimating purposes or a true normative 
change in policy? Is the opening of the Ilinden crossing more an exception, a reluctant 
act to please Brussels and justify EU funding or part of a policy to truly integrate the 
region. To answer such questions, we should explore the state of progress and 
implementation of the other two negotiated border crossings.  
The crossing Kurdzhali-Komotini through Makaza is part of the route of Pan European 
Corridor IX. As of 2008, the Bulgarian part has reached the Greek border and the 
infrastructure is completed (see Fig. 29). 
15
 The Greek section of the Makaza crossing 
point has been been recently undertaken by the Greek state owned EGNATIA ODOS 
AE, awarded on December 15, 2006 with a budget amounting to EUR 85 million. The 
contractor has been installed and the project is already under construction, starting with 
the preparation of the tunnel faces (Fig. 29 Green on the map indicates ‗national road 
under construction‘). As said the axis is part of Pan-European Corridor IX and has a 
total length of 24 km. To date, the northern part of the axis has nearly been completed 
on the first 4 km long and will be upgraded in the framework of the new construction 
                                                 
11 Interreg III is a Community initiative which aims to stimulate interregional cooperation in the EU between 2000-06. It 
is financed under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). This new phase of the Interreg initiative is 
designed to strengthen economic and social cohesion throughout the EU, by fostering the balanced development of the 
continent through cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation. The Operational Programme Interreg III Α / 
PHARE CBC Greece Bulgaria 2000-2006 was approved by the European Commission on 20/07/2007 according to the 
E.C. decision number E (2007) 1687 as it was modified by the decision  E(2007)1687 COR.  Source: Interreg III, 
Community Initiative Interreg,  http://www.interreg.gr/default.aspx?lang=en-GB&page=237, accessed September 2008. 
12 Interreg III, Community Initiative. 
13 Matthew Brunwasser, ‗Greece and Bulgaria open bear-friendly crossing‘, International Herald Tribune,  9 December 
2005, available http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/09/news/border.php, last accessed June 2010. 
14 Matthew Brunwasser, ‗Greece and Bulgaria‘. 
15 Milena Chervenova, ‗Transportni experti‘, Stroitelstvo. Gradut Online Magazine, ‗Transportni experti‘. 
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contract. The remaining section up to the Greek-Bulgarian borders, 20 km long, the 
Greek Ministry for the Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works has prepared 
designs that EGNATIA ODOS A.E. has undertaken for review and completion. The 
project is estimated to be completed in the summer of 2010.
16
 The Greek side started 
building their part in July 2007, twelve years after the agreement in 1995. However, 
both Bulgarian and Greek experts believe Greece will have to meet its latest 2010 
deadline to complete its section of Corridor IX, especially as Bulgaria is now a fellow 
EU member. It is a remarkable change of policy. Bulgarians were frustrated by the fact, 
that by 2010 it would have taken Greece 15 years to build only 24 km of highway. The 
popular belief was that ‗the Greeks instinctively do not aim at having contacts with 
Bulgaria, just as the Romanians don‘t want bridges over the Danube‘.17 Fortunately, old 
stereotypes and ideas are challenged by the real breakthrough in transport infrastructure 
policies. Very recently, one more border point between Zlatograd and Termes was 
inaugurated on 15 January 2010. It is not intended for heavy trucks, but it was open to 
mostly stimulate people exchange and tourism. The high profile event was attended by 
Greek and Bulgarian Prime Ministers Boyko Borisov and Georgios Papandreou, who 
did demonstrate very warm feelings. Papandreou said, that ‗this new border point 
symbolized that in United Europe, we are breaking all walls of the past that separated us 
and open new roads for cooperation.‘18 
 
 
                                                 
16 Egnatia Odos, ‗The Progress of the Project, VA Komotini-Nimfea-Greek-Bulgarian borders‘ ,  
http://www.egnatia.gr/page/default.asp?la=2&id=254, last accessed October 2009. 
17 Anton Antov in Polina Slavcheva, ‗Overcoming‘, p. 8. 
18 Eva Tosheva, Otkriha Granichnia Punkt Zlatograd-Termes (Zlatograd-Termes Border Point Open), available at 
http://www.lev.bg/view_article.php?article_id=34361, 10.06.2010.  
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Fig. 29 Makaza and Elidzhe Check Points. State of Readiness-August 2008 19    
Regarding the Elidzhe crossing point on the Bulgarian side the works are nearly 
completed and the road is expected to be finished by the autumn of 2008 (Fig. 23 Red 
coloured roads on the map indicate ‗national road in the stage of design‘). On the Greek 
side the axis, including Xanthi bypass and the link road to the motorway, is 
approximately 60 km long. Actual work has not started, but EGNATIA ODOS A.E. has 
undertaken the preparation of designs. The project is to be included in the Interreg IV 
Programmes with funding provided for 2007-2013. 
Similar to the Via Egnatia/Corridor VIII case, progress on the border check points 
between Bulgaria and Greece was made possible, only after a normative change in the 
political contexts of the two countries. Such change was facilitated by the policies of 
EU conditionality, coupled with delegating the execution of the project to an institution, 
managed at a supranational level (in this case Egnatia Odos). However, this was only 
possible after elites in both countries were convinced that cooperation is appropriate and 
‗the right thing to do‘. Only after internalizing such ideas, change of policy occurred. As 
a practical implication of the signed Memorandum of Understanding of 2002, Greek 
government delegated to EGNATIA ODOS A.E. to undertake the management of 
design and construction of three core Vertical Axes out of the nine serving the main 
axis. The first axes that were adopted for construction was the ones, where border points 
were already existing and they were less likely to be opposed by any side, since the 
works were mostly reconstruction and improvement, rather than building a new 
infrastructure. 
                                                 
19 Source: Egnatia Odos, ‗The Progress of the Project‘, http://www.egnatia.eu/page/default.asp?la=2&id=32, last 
accessed October 2008. 
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 Siatista – Ieropigi/Kristalopigi (Albania – Pan-European Corridor VIII).  
Total length: 72km. Construction cost: 320M€ 
 Thessaloniki – Serres - Promachonas (Bulgaria – Pan-European Corridor IV).  
Total length: 96km. Construction cost: 310M€ 
 Ardanio - Ormenio (Bulgaria – Pan-European Corridor IX). 
Total length: 124km. Construction cost: 240M€20 
However, in July 2006, the Greek government has delegated to EGNATIA ODOS A.E 
to undertake the design and construction of two more Vertical Axes: 
 Komotini – Nimfea – Greek-Bulgarian Borders (Bulgaria – Pan-European Corridor 
IX)  
 Xanthi – Echinos – Greek-Bulgarian Borders (Bulgaria) 
Those two axes were precisely the ones, leading to the long delayed border points 
between Bulgaria and Greece, negotiated back in 1995. Such act indicates a significant 
change in policy in comparison to the years 1995-2006 and real determination of the 
two project‘s completion, indicated by the fast progress on the projects explored above. 
Moreover, the process is self-enforcing. In November 2007, during a meeting of 
Bulgarian Minister of regional development Dimcho Mihalevski with entrepreneurs 
from Bulgaria and Greece was announced that the two countries were negotiating the 
opening of three more border check points by 2011, in addition to the three existing and 
the two, already under construction. He also stated that the agreement for the opening of 
the three newest check points (Zlatograd-Termes,  Gorna Arda-Paranesti and Avren-
Mitriski)  would be signed by the two countries by the end of 2008 or early 2009. This 
if accomplished, would mean the reopening of all natural cross points that were used 
before the Balkan Wars.
21
 As noted above the first one Zlatograd-Termes was already 
opened on 15 January 2010. 
 
Mihalevski announced that the Bulgarian government has allocated EUR 250 m for the 
completion of the border check points and road infrastructure till 2011. Greek 
government has allocated EUR 30 m under the Hellenic Plan for the Economic 
Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB) to improve the infrastructure in the Bulgarian 
districts, adjacent to the border.
22
 Lessons learned from the Balkans indicate that the 
                                                 
20 Egnatia Odos, ‗The Progress of the Project, The Egnatia Motorway Vertical Axes‘. 
21 До 2011 влагат 250 млн. Евро в граничната инфраструктура, (Do 2011 vlagat 250 m. EUR v granichnata 
infrastruktura), Строителство. Градът онлайн (Stroitelstvo. Gradut Online Magazine), N42, November 2007, 
http://www.stroitelstvo.info/show.php?storyid=394280, accessed October 2009 [ in Bulgarian]. 
22 Having undertaken certain obligations as a member state of the European Union and a member of the OECDs 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Greece committed itself to annual increase of its international development 
assistance with a view to ultimately achieving the target of 0.33% of its Gross National Income (GNI). Within this 
framework, the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB), was drawn up for the period 
2004-2011. HiPERB is an effort on the part of Greece in its capacity as a donor country to incorporate certain individual 
initiatives of development assistance into one single plan, and thus promote an integrated development policy. This 
Plan is, first of all, aimed at political, economic and social stability in Southeast Europe, whereas its ultimate goal is to 
modernise infrastructure, promote production investments, support democratic institutions and the rule of law, 
modernise public administration and local government, strengthen the welfare state, redress economic inequalities, and 
offer professional training to workers and scientists in the recipient countries. The total budget for the Hellenic Plan for 
the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB) comes to 550 million. Source: Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
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target 2011 would most likely not be met. However, what is important is the idea for 
opening of further check points comes under a new approach to regional projects and 
new policies on the part of Balkan elites and most likely it will take much less than 
fifteen years to complete this newest crossings. 
Subcase Study 3: Corridor IV vs. Corridor X 
 
Bulgaria and Romania signed an agreement to build the Vidin-Calafat Bridge in 2000 
(see Fig. 11). This bridge was the major missing link over the route of Corridor IV. 
However, tenders for construction were put out only in March 2005. After twelve years 
of mistrust, obstruction, strenuous negotiations, construction officially began on 13 May 
2007 in Vidin in the presence of Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev and Special 
Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Erhard Busek.
23
 The 
project‘s cost was estimated at EUR 236 m.24  The construction is planned to finish in 
2012, with most of the construction done by Bulgarian subcontractors. An evidence of 
the changing mentalities is the Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev speech 
during the construction start ceremony: ‗The bridge is important not only for Bulgaria 
and Romania, but also for the European Union, as it is definitely a bridge of the reunion 
of the European continent.‘25 Greece supported Bulgarian-Romanian negotiations and 
significantly helped two sides to reach agreement over the project‘s commissioning. If 
during the 1990s, Greek policy makers favoured Corridor X through Serbia and 
significantly delayed their part of Corridor IV, during the 2000s they were already 
helping Bulgaria and Romania, overcome their outstanding issues, in an effort to 
commission the project as soon, as possible. As a sign of the new attitude towards the 
project, Michalis Stelianidis, Mayor of border town of Xanthi in Greece, claimed that 
‗Corridor IV and the new bridge at Vidin open a whole new dimension for the people of 
Xanthi and adjacent regions in Greece‘. He also stated that ‗Before we had to use the 
much lengthier route via Corridor X, and we never complained, since Bulgaria was a 
‗black hole‘ for us. We somehow instinctively did not look for routes through Bulgaria. 
Now this has changed. We can reach the Danube and Western Europe much more 
efficiently through Corridor IV and as a sign of our desire for faster commissioning of 
the project, our government is undertaking sustained efforts to lobby in the EU  and the 
region for that project.‘ 26 
 
Representatives of the European commission visited Vidin, Bulgaria on 26 and 27 
September to inspect the construction of the Vidin-Calafat bridge. At a session of the 
                                                                                                                                               
Greece in the World, HiPERB,  http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/HiPERB/, accessed 
October 2008. 
23 ‗Станишев направи първа копка на Дунав мост 2‘,(‗Stanishev napravi purva kopka na Dunav most 2‘),  News.bg, 
13 May 2007, Assessed October 2008 [in Bulgarian]. 
24 70 million euro of the total amount will be granted by the ISPA program. The European investment bank grants a 
credit for 70 million euro. The German bank KFW offers credit and free help. 5 million euro free support will be granted 
to our country by the French agency for development. The Bulgarian part in the project will be 60,8 million euro. 10 
million euro is planned for before- project studies. After the contract is signed the winner of this auction should construct 
it for 38 months. Source: ‗Ministry of Transport and Communications opened the offers for the project‘, Bulgarian 
Properties, 2 October 2006,  http://www.bulgarianproperties.com/bulgaria-
article.php?IID=70&long=News+aboout+the+construction+of+the+Danube+bridge+between+Vidin+and+Calafat, 
accessed October 2008. 
25 ‗Danube Bridge 2, Bulgaria‘, Roadtraffic Technology,  http://www.roadtraffic-
technology.com/projects/danubebridge/#danubebridge_18486, accessed October 2008. 
26 Michalis Stelianidis, Personal Interview,       Mayor of Xanthi, Xanthi, 23.11.2007 [in English]. 
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Joint Bulgarian-Romanian committee on the project, which was held in the Bulgarian 
town of Ruse on 1-2 October was decided to create a joint Bulgarian-Romanian 
structure of management of the bridge by the end of 2009. A bilateral agreement for the 
future joint organizational structure for the management of the bridge has been prepared 
during the meeting. The adoption of this document gives opportunity for the second 
tranche of the advance payment under the ISPA program to be made.
27
 Similar to the 
border check points and Via Egnatia vs. Corridor VIII cases, breakthrough was only 
possible when the project was incorporated in a supranational framework, closely 
monitored by the EU, and controlled through the conditionality mechanism. 
 
At national level ‗fear your neighbour mentality‘ was still very much dominant in the 
1990s Balkans. At grassroots, at least, it was a very different story. In the municipalities 
on both sides of the border, there was no sign of historic animosities between ordinary 
Greeks and Bulgarians. In fact, they have been on increasingly good terms since 1991. 
EU funds for cross-border initiatives have allowed them to collaborate on a variety of 
business and cultural initiatives, so that, now, the buses they lay on to transport people 
to one another‘s festivals are packed, as are the courses where they learn each other‘s 
languages. 
28
 The problem was that ‗local governments are not eligible for larger EU 
grants that can be invested in infrastructure. And central governments are not always 
understanding of border communities‘ needs and wishes. ―We feel things differently,‖ 
says Konstantinos Tatsis, prefect of the Drama–Kavala–Xanthi region in northern 
Greece, complaining that Athens and Sofia view these matters ―from a bird‘s eye‖‘.29 
Ideational change 
 
 
The three sub-cases, presented in the beginning of the chapter, based on archival and 
documentary research on government publications, memorandums, agreements, 
transport strategies and programmes, reports, newspaper articles provided an initial 
overview that as a result of EU leverage, obstruction policy-patterns between the two 
states have significantly diminished to give way to gradual and steady cooperation 
during the 2000s. This is evidenced by the intensive work carried on the cross-border 
projects and the overall public discourse of policy makers during that period. To 
confirm the initial documentary findings that policy change was linked to ideational 
change and that the EU-role was critical in that process, I complement the documentary 
research with primary research data of elite interviews. Interviews with key players 
were used to corroborate the early findings. In this way, interviews contributed towards 
the research goal of triangulation, where collected data is cross-checked through 
multiple sources to increase the robustness of the findings. The interviews yielded the 
following results: 
 
Analysis of the elite interview-collected data with 25 Greek key policy 
makers  
 
Greeks decision makers were asked the following set of questions: 
                                                 
27 Olga Yoncheva, ‗Bulgarian-Romanian Committee manages ―Danube Bridge-2‖‘, news.bg, 3 October 2008,  
http://international.ibox.bg/news/id_1985998835, accessed July 2010, [in Bulgarian]. 
28 Polina Slavcheva, ‗Overcoming‘, p. 7 
29 Konstantinos Tatsis, Personal Interview, Prefect of the Drama–Kavala–Xanthi region, Northern Greece, Drama, 
Greece, 17.01.2010 [in English]. 
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 How did you view Bulgaria and Bulgarians before the 1990s? More like friends 
or like rivals? 
 How did you view Bulgaria and Bulgarians during the 1990s? 
 How do you view Bulgaria and Bulgarians nowadays?  
 
Nearly the whole sample, 96% (24), claimed that they perceived Bulgaria and 
Bulgarians as ‗enemies‘ in the years prior to the democratic changes (see Fig. 30). This 
reconfirms what we found about that period, exploring Greek programmatic beliefs 
through documentary research in the ideational chapters. Half of respondents 52% (13) 
were active in politics during that time and claimed that was their inherent belief at the 
time, the other half (mostly younger politicians) claimed that  they were taught that it 
was like that in school, by media and the general discourse. They also confirmed they 
unquestionably believed such claim. One person was neutral on the issue. Those 96%, 
that believed Bulgaria and Bulgarians were their enemies before 1990, were asked why 
did they feel/believe so? The semi-structured interviews provided for open answers, but 
most of them could be summarized with the following five most typical answers: ‗that 
was natural‘, ‗it has always been like that‘, ‗this was appropriate‘, ‗there was no other 
way‘ and they were ‗historical foes.‘ 0% (0) of the sample claimed that Bulgaria/ns 
were friends at that time. 
 
Going to the 1990s, when EU ideas started to challenge traditional programmatic 
beliefs, the perception of Bulgaria/ns as enemies was still predominant, but has shrunk 
twice in comparison to the previous period 48% (12) (see Fig. 30). Such finding 
correlates with our documentary observation in the previous chapter on infrastructure 
during the 1990s that traditional beliefs and obstructionist attitude still prevailed during 
that period. 40% (10) were not sure, or had mixed feelings and 12% (3) already viewed 
Bulgarians as friends. Most of the sample 88% (22) respondents were already active in 
politics during that period, unlike the previous period, when only half of them claimed 
so. While 96% of respondents said that they felt very strong about their position before 
1990s, during 1990s, 40% (10) were ‗confused‘, ‗not certain‘ and ‗in a process of 
changing opinion‘, and only 60% had firm opinion (mostly enemies, some friends). The 
48 % (12) that have switched their views to either neutral or positive were asked ‗Why 
did you change your beliefs?‘ The answers could be grouped along the following 
statements -‗the EU-idea changed my mind‘, ‗there will be no boundaries soon‘, ‗we are 
forced to cooperate, we have no choice‘, ‗the idea of friends and enemies changed‘, ‗old 
beliefs were proving increasingly inadequate‘, ‗obstruction produced undesired results.‘ 
 
Remarkably during the 2000s, 80% (20) of the Greek policy makers perceived 
Bulgaria/ns as friends, 8% (2) were neutral or confused and only 12% (3) still regarded 
them as enemies (see Fig. 30). All respondents were politically active during that 
period. Half of those who had positive views and all that had negative views had very 
strong opinion. The other 10 with positive view claimed they are ‗much more likely to 
view Bulgarians as friends, than to be neutral‘ on the issue. 
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Fig. 30 Result of elite interviews of 25 Greek policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 1: How did you view Bulgaria and Bulgarians before, 
during and after the 1990s? More like friends or like rivals? 
 
 
Compared to the period before 1990, 80% (20) have switched their beliefs from enemies 
to friends. Those respondents were asked a follow-up question,  
 
 Do you think the EU has contributed to such change of perception? 
 
Remarkably, 95% (19) confirmed that the EU-idea and ‗common future within the EU‘ 
was instrumental in changing their perception. 5% (1) claimed that it was ‗now 
appropriate‘ without giving a specific explanation, why such change occurred (see 
Fig.31). 
 
Fig. 31 Result of elite interviews of 25 Greek policy makers. 
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Follow-up to Set of Questions 1: Do you think the EU has contributed to such change of 
perception? 
 
In turn, the 19 decision makers that confirmed EU leverage, were asked second follow-
up question, 
 
 ‗Why do you think EU was able to do that?‘ 
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The answers of national policy makers could be summarized with the following 
arguments ‗we realized obstruction was yielding very negative consequences from local 
regions and the EU itself‘, ‗as Bulgaria also entered the EU, old policies were hard to 
justify‘, ‗the EU changed stereotypes‘, ‗under the EU framework old ideas looked more 
and more inadequate‘, ‗we had to work within same institutions under the EU 
framework‘. Decision-makers at the local and EU level were more direct. For them ‗the 
EU, just offered new agenda which made traditional policies hard to justify and seem 
very outdated‘.  
  
After the first set of questions confirmed that policy change during the 2000s is 
correlated to change in traditional programmatic beliefs, the second set of questions 
probed if programmatic beliefs were related to the normative criteria of appropriateness 
of cooperation with Bulgaria/ns.  
 
Greeks decision makers were asked the second set of questions: 
 
 Was cooperation with Bulgaria appropriate before 1990s? 
 Was cooperation with Bulgaria appropriate during the 1990s? 
 Is cooperation with Bulgaria a good thing today? 
 
92% (23) of the Greek policy makers claimed that cooperation with Bulgaria was 
simply unthinkable and not appropriate in the years prior to 1990. 4% (1) were neutral 
about the issue, and 4% (1) insisted that cooperation was possible in that period (see 
Fig. 32). However, after the 1990s, when traditional programmatic beliefs of the other 
as an enemy were gradually challenged by EU-cooperation ideas, indicate shift of 
perception. 52% (13) of the Greek policy makers still claimed that cooperation with 
Bulgaria was not appropriate during the 1990s, but already 36% believed it was neither 
good, nor bad, while 12% (3) held that in that period, cooperation between the two 
states was already deemed appropriate and well-accepted by the public opinion. During 
the 2000s, only 12% (3) maintained the position cooperation with Bulgaria/ns seemed 
out of place, 4% (1) were neutral and for 88% (22) it was apt to work together (see 
Fig.32). These results confirmed that traditional Greek programmatic beliefs for 
Bulgarians are highly correlated with the appropriateness of cooperation with 
Bulgaria/ns. This is valid for all periods. Nearly all respondents that viewed 
unfavourably their neighbours, shared normative prescriptions that co-action was not 
fitting. Vice versa, when they shifted opinions, suddenly co-action seemed appropriate. 
Such empirical finding reconfirms our documentary evidence from ideational chapters 
that linked programmatic beliefs of friends/enemies shaping normative criteria of 
appropriateness of cooperation, which in turn shape respective policies. 
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Fig. 32 Result of elite interviews of 25 Greek policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 2: Was cooperation with Bulgaria appropriate before, 
during and after the 1990s? 
 
 
What is interesting is that policy actors, working on the European and regional level, 
much faster shifted their traditional beliefs of Bulgarians as enemies and their ideational 
set-up from obstruction to cooperation, while actors working on the national level were 
much slower in such normative change. Of those 20% that still did not view Bulgarians 
as friends and 16% that did not think it was suitable to work together, during the 2000s, 
all were decision makers at the national level. Vice versa, those 12% that first switched 
their opinion favourably to their neighbours were Greek actors from the regional or 
European level. This indicates that national elites have been subjected not only to 
external EU pressure to cooperate with neighbours, but also such pressure was exerted 
from Greek local and supra-national actors. 
 
The last set of questions directly probed the 25 decision makers‘ opinion on the three 
sub-cases under investigation and how they interpreted the projects during the 1990s 
and 2000s to again link documentary findings with empirical data. 
 
 
 How do you view Corridor VIII and Corrdior Egnatia? Competing of 
complementary? 
 Do you favor opening of new border points between Bulgaria and Greece in the 
1990s and in the 2000s? 
 Do you think Corridor IV and Corridor X are competing or complementary? 
 
In the 1990s, 80% (20) believed Corridor VIII and Via Egnatia were competing and that 
favouring one, necessarily meant neglecting the other. Only 20% (5) regarded them as 
complementary, under a common EU framework and that both could have functioned 
together (see Fig. 33). 
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Fig. 33 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers 
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. Answers to Set of Questions 3: How did you view Corridor VIII and Corrdior Egnatia 
during the 1990s? Competing of complementary? 
 
 
In the 2000s those favouring that projects were competing shrunk to 36% (9), and 64% 
(16) believed in their mutual use and existence under a common EU framework (see 
Fig. 34). 
 
Fig. 34 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: How did you view Corridor VIII and Corrdior Egnatia 
during the 2000s? Competing of complementary? 
 
Similarly, in the second sub-case during the 1990s, 68% (32) were against new border 
points with Bulgaria, while 32% were in favour (see Fig. 35). Only ten years later 88% 
(22) thought of such move as a good development and only 12% (3) still opposed it (see 
Fig. 36). 
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Fig. 35 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: Did you favor opening of new border points between 
Bulgaria and Greece in the 1990s? 
 
Fig. 36 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: Did you favor opening of new border points between 
Bulgaria and Greece in the 2000s? 
 
In the last sub-case, like the other two, most respondents significantly changed their 
opinion between the two periods. If during the 1990s, 60% (15) thought the two projects 
were competing and mostly favoured Corridor IV through Serbia, during the 2000s, 
24% (6) maintained such position and 76% favoured commissiong of the two corridors 
(see Fig. 37 and Fig. 38). 
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Fig. 37 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: Did you think Corridor IV and Corridor X were 
competing or complementary in the 1990s? 
 
Fig. 38 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Complementary
Competing
 
Answers to Set of Questions 3: Do you think Corridor IV and Corridor X are competing 
or complementary in the 2000? 
 
 
Analysis of the elite interview-collected data with 25 Bulgarian key policy 
makers  
 
The procedure for Bulgarian key policy makers was similar. They were asked the 
following set of questions: 
 
 How did you view Greece and Greeks before the 1990s? More like friends or 
like rivals? 
 How did you view Greece and Greeks during the 1990s? 
 How do you view Greece and Greeks nowadays?  
 
Similar to the Greek sample, 72% (18) of Bulgarian policy makers claimed that they 
perceived Greece and Greeks as ‗enemies‘ in the years prior to the democratic changes 
(see Fig. 39). This reconfirms what we found about that period, exploring Bulgarian 
programmatic beliefs through documentary research in the ideational chapters. Those 
72%, that believed Greece and Greeks were their enemies before 1990, were asked why 
did they feel/believe so? The semi-structured interviews provided for open answers, but 
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most of them could be summarized with the following most typical answers: ‗they 
always betrayed us in the past‘, ‗it was not easy to trust the Greeks‘, ‗Beware of 
Danayans bearing gifts', ‗we just knew they were historical enemies.‘ 16% (4) were 
neutral or did not want to answer and 12% (3) of the sample claimed that Bulgaria/ns 
were friends at that time. Like the Greek case, most interviewees were taught by media, 
school and public discourse to believe in such position. 
 
Going to the 1990s, when EU ideas started to challenge traditional programmatic 
beliefs, the perception of Greece/ks as enemies was still predominant, but has shrunk 
twice in comparison to the previous period with 40% (10) (see Fig. 39). Such finding 
correlates with our documentary observation in the previous chapter on infrastructure 
during the 1990s that traditional beliefs and obstructionist attitude still prevailed during 
that period. 32% (8) were not sure, or had mixed feelings and 28% (7) already viewed 
Greeks as friends. This is twice as much as Greeks‘ friendly attitudes towards 
Bulgarians during that time. It seems Bulgarians were faster in switching attitudes than 
Greeks, which might be explained by the much greater leverage of EU pressure and 
conditionality towards Bulgaria. The 48 % (12) that have switched their views to either 
neutral or positive were asked ‗Why did you change your beliefs?‘ The answers could 
be grouped along the following statements -‗the EU membership perspective‘, ‗there 
will be no boundaries soon‘, ‗it is time to finally work together‘. The following answers 
corresponded to Greek policy makers‘ answers- ‗the idea of friends and enemies 
changed‘, ‗old beliefs were proving increasingly inadequate‘, ‗obstruction produced 
undesired results‘, that confirms our theoretical presumption that the discursive 
selection of the context and the unintended consequences of certain actions contributed 
to ideational shift and in turn to shift in policies. Policy makers were more and more 
getting aware of the inadequacies of their old beliefs. 
 
Remarkably during the 2000s, 80% (20) of Bulgarian policy makers perceived 
Greece/ks as friends, 12% (3) were neutral or confused and only 8% (2) still regarded 
them as enemies (see Fig. 39).  
 
Fig. 39 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 1: How did you view Greece and Greeks before, during and 
after the 1990s? More like friends or like rivals? 
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Compared to the period before 1990, 68% (17) have switched their beliefs from enemies 
or neutral to friends. Those respondents were asked a follow-up question,  
 
 Do you think the EU has contributed to such change of perception? 
 
All of them confirmed that the EU-idea and ‗common future within the EU‘ was 
instrumental in changing their perception (see Fig. 40).  
 
 
Fig. 40 Result of elite interviews of 25 Greek policy makers.                                            . 
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Follow-up to Set of Questions 1: Do you think the EU has contributed to such change of 
perception? 
 
In turn, the 17 decision makers that confirmed EU leverage, were asked second follow-
up question, 
 
 ‗Why do you think EU was able to do that?‘ 
 
Similar to their Greek counterparts, majority of Bulgarian respondents claimed ‗under 
common EU framework, they gradually realized such policies produced undesired 
results and they were under increasing pressure domestically and internationally to 
discontinue them‘. Also ‗the EU agenda slowly, but inevitably made our decade-long 
beliefs seem ever more displaced and not appropriate‘. We not only were losing money, 
but also popular support, since people did not believe in the Greek ‗enemy‘, after the 
EU was able to tell them a much more plausible story‘. 
 
After the first set of questions confirmed that policy change during the 2000s is 
correlated to change in traditional programmatic beliefs, the second set of questions 
probed if programmatic beliefs were related to the normative criteria of appropriateness 
of cooperation with Greece/ks.  
 
Greeks decision makers were asked the second set of questions: 
 
 Was cooperation with Greece appropriate before 1990s? 
 Was cooperation with Greece appropriate during the 1990s? 
 Is cooperation with Greece a good thing today? 
 
88% (22) of the Bulgarian policy makers claimed that cooperation with Greece was 
simply unthinkable and not appropriate in the years prior to 1990 (see Fig. 41). 4% (1) 
were neutral about the issue, and 8% (2) maintained that cooperation was possible in 
that period. However, after the 1990s, when traditional programmatic beliefs of the 
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other as an enemy were gradually challenged by EU-cooperation ideas, indicate shift of 
perception. 40% (10) of the Bulgarian policy makers still claimed that cooperation with 
Greece was not appropriate during the 1990s, but already 36% (9) believed it was 
neither good, nor bad, while 24% (6) held that in that period, cooperation between the 
two states was already deemed appropriate and well-accepted by the public opinion. 
During the 2000s, only 8% (2) maintained the position cooperation with Greece/ks 
seemed out of place, 4% (1) were neutral and for 88% (22) it was apt to work together 
(see Fig.41). These results confirmed that traditional Bulgarian programmatic beliefs for 
Greeks are highly correlated with the appropriateness of cooperation with Greece/ks. 
Similarly, to the Greek case, such correlation is valid for all periods. Nearly all 
respondents that viewed unfavourably their neighbours, shared normative prescriptions 
that co-action was not suitable. Vice versa, when they shifted opinions, suddenly co-
action seemed appropriate. Such empirical finding reconfirms our documentary 
evidence from ideational chapters that linked programmatic beliefs of friends/enemies 
shaping normative criteria of appropriateness of cooperation, which in turn shape 
respective policies. 
 
Fig. 41 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 2: Was cooperation with Greece appropriate before, during 
and after the 1990s? 
 
 
In Bulgaria, even faster than the Greek case, policy actors, working on the European 
and regional level, shifted their traditional beliefs of neighbours as enemies and their 
ideational set-up from obstruction to cooperation, while actors working on the national 
level were much slower in such normative change.  
 
The last set of questions directly probed the 25 decision makers‘ opinion on the three 
sub-cases under investigation and how they interpreted the projects during the 1990s 
and 2000s to again link documentary findings with empirical data. 
 
 How do you view Corridor VIII and Corrdior Egnatia? Competing or 
complementary? 
 Do you favor opening of new border points between Bulgaria and Greece in the 
1990s and in the 2000s? 
 Do you think Corridor IV and Corridor X are competing or complementary? 
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In the 1990s, 60% (15) believed Corridor VIII and Via Egnatia were competing and that 
favouring one, necessarily meant neglecting the other. 40% (10) regarded them as 
complementary, under a common EU framework and that both could have functioned 
together (see Fig. 42). 
 
Fig. 42 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: How did you view Corridor VIII and Corrdior Egnatia 
during the 1990s? Competing or complementary? 
 
 
In the 2000s those favouring that projects were competing shrunk to 28% (7), and 72 % 
(18) believed in their mutual use and existence under a common EU framework (see 
Fig. 43). 
 
Fig. 43 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: How did you view Corridor VIII and Corrdior Egnatia 
during the 2000s? Competing or complementary? 
 
Unlike in Greece, in the second sub-case during the 1990s, only 12% (3) were against 
new border points with Greece while 88% (22) were in favour (see Fig. 44). Ten years 
later already 100% (25) thought of such move as a good development (see Fig. 45). 
Such difference with the Greek case, where 68% were against the new border points is 
not inconsistent with our theory and documentary findings in the other sub-cases, 
because it was not a result of friendly attitudes towards Greece. Vice versa, Bulgarians 
perceived the unwillingness of Greeks to open the border points as a proof of their 
unfriendliness, since it was Bulgarians that needed to get access to the Aegean open sea 
that was only 20 km away from the closed border. Bulgarians during that period did not 
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want opening of the border points, because they wanted cooperation with Greeks, but as 
said because they wanted to reconnect with the Aegean Sea and with the Slav 
population, split by the border, as evidenced by the interviews. Therefore, in this case 
correlating Greek position with Bulgarian expectations to open the border points 
(explored above) is regarded as a proof of ideational change. 
 
Fig. 44 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: Did you favor opening of new border points between 
Bulgaria and Greece in the 1990s? 
 
Fig. 45 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers. 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: Did you favor opening of new border points between 
Bulgaria and Greece in the 2000s? 
 
In the last sub-case, like the other two, most respondents significantly changed their 
opinion between the two periods. If during the 1990s, 64% (16) thought the two projects 
were competing and mostly favoured Corridor X, during the 2000s, only 20% (4) 
maintained such position and 80% (20) favoured commissiong of the two corridors (see 
Fig. 46 and Fig. 47). 
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Fig. 46 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: Did you think Corridor IV and Corridor X were 
competing or complementary in the 1990s? 
 
Fig. 47 Result of elite interviews of 25 Bulgarian policy makers 
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Answers to Set of Questions 3: Do you think Corridor IV and Corridor X are competing 
or complementary in the 2000? 
 
Why the EU-idea was able to challenge traditional path-dependent 
programmatic beliefs? 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, we identified historic change in the Greek-Bulgarian 
traditional obstructionist policies (operationalized with the three sub-cases) between the 
1990s and the 2000s. The interview data reconfirmed the documentary findings that 
there are signs of very significant change in traditional Greek-Bulgarian attitudes and 
such change is directly linked to the change in policies. The key explanatory variable 
accounting for the change is the involvement of the EU in the region generally, the EU 
normative agenda and the perception that the Bulgarian accession compels Greece and 
Bulgaria to work together. After we have found policy change and linked it to ideational 
change, the chapter concludes with analysis what made EU-idea so much more 
powerful than previous ‗weaker‘ ideas that were not able to significantly change 
nationalist programmatic beliefs in similar critical times in the past, explored in the 
ideational chapters. 
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As reflected in the theoretical chapter, Hay developing the dialectical relation of 
ideational and material, argued that ‗for particular ideas, narratives and paradigms to 
continue to provide cognitive templates through which actors interpret the world, they 
must retain a certain resonance with those actors‘ direct and mediated experiences‘ or in 
other words ‗…for our ideas and cognitions to continue to inform behaviour they must 
find and maintain a certain resonance with our experience.‘30 Operationalized with our 
case, the traditional Greek and Bulgarian programmatic beliefs that the other was an 
enemy and the cognitive templates they provided –meant cooperation was impossible 
resulted in certain policies of obstruction (denationalization of the minority of the other, 
negative propaganda and lack of political, social and economic cooperation). The 
results of such policies maintained resonance with the traditional programmatic beliefs 
of political actors for decades to come. For example, in Greece policies of Hellenization 
towards the Slav minority (1913-1974), explored in the ideational chapters, resulted in 
its emigration to Bulgaria, or assimilation into the Greek nation. Such outcome was in 
complete resonance with the programmatic beliefs of Greek policy makers at the time 
that Bulgarians are enemies and the Bulgarian Slav minority in the country is the 
‗enemy within‘ the country. Such resonance of ideas with the experience provided 
information that the existing programmatic beliefs were appropriate and reinforced 
them. Another example, negative propaganda towards the other in Greek or Bulgarian 
media, school and public discourse resulted in consolidation of the respective 
population and increasing the hatred towards that neighbour. Such outcome was desired 
since it directly corresponded to actors‘ ideas and expectations, and was a predicted 
outcome of a specially selected policy 
 
Hay also argued ‗strategy is forged in a context which is strategically selective, 
favouring certain strategies over others as means to realize specific intentions. Yet, 
actors have no direct knowledge of the selectivity of the context they inhibit. Rather 
they must rely upon understandings of the context (and the selectivity it is likely to 
impose on strategy) which are, at best, fallible. Nonetheless, some understandings are 
likely to prove more credible given past experiences than others.‘31 In this sense, 
traditional Bulgarian and Greek understanding of the context that the other was an 
enemy, based on the Megale and San Stefano perceptions might have been fallible in 
regards to optimal outcomes but they proved very credible. For example, as a result of 
such understandings Bulgaria always sided against Greece during the Balkan and the 
World Wars, instead of making sound judgment of the relative power of competing 
sides, and was always on the losing side. 
 
‗In this way the context comes to exert a discursive selectivity upon the understandings 
actors hold about it. Thus, although the relationship is never likely to be one of direct 
correspondence, there is always some relationship between the context itself and the 
ideas actors hold about that context. However accurate and inaccurate, such 
understandings inform strategy and that strategy in turn yields both intended and, 
inevitably, unintended consequences. Unintended consequences, in particular, provide 
an opportunity for strategic learning, offering a clue to the inadequacies of existing 
understandings of the context and inviting revisions.‘32 Traditional Bulgarian and Greek 
understandings of the other as enemy and the policies of obstruction selected during 
most of the XX c. and especially after the 1944, yielded mostly intended consequences. 
                                                 
30 Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 212-214.. 
31 Hay, Political Analysis, p. 212. 
32 Hay, Political Analysis, pp. 212-213. 
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The resulting lack of social, economic and political cooperation was in resonance with 
the programmatic beliefs of elites. In times of crisis, such as the Balkan Wars, Smyrna 
Crises, World Wars, Cold War, even though there were new ideas about Greeks or 
Bulgarians they could not install a new paradigm in Bulgarian or Greek institutions, 
because old ideas and cognitions that informed behaviour were in resonance with 
actors‘ experiences during those periods and such new ideas could not make already 
existing understandings inadequate. For example, no political party in Bulgaria could 
adopt a friendly stance towards Greece, reading the press or observing the assimilation 
and propaganda policies against Bulgarians undertaken in that country. Another 
example, during the Cold War, no political party in Greece could come to see 
Bulgarians as friends as such idea completely clashed with reality. Therefore, for 
ideational change to possibly occur, we need to have at least two factors working 
simultaneously, 
 
 Old ideas must constantly yield unintended consequences 
 There is new idea, that makes existing understandings inadequate 
 
 
Thus, during most of the XX c. during times of crisis, there were new ideas but they 
could not make traditional understandings inadequate. There was no powerful ideational 
carrier that could make others receptive and institutionalize his/her ideas, since the 
contexts did not provide for such ideational change. Also, during most of the XX c. 
there were cases when old ideas yielded unintended consequences (for example, the 
already discussed Bulgarian persistent war siding against Greece, resulting in permanent 
losses for Bulgaria). However, Bulgarian politicians did not interpret that such 
unintended consequences were result of inadequate beliefs, because there was no new 
powerful idea that could have made old beliefs that Greeks were enemies inadequate. 
 
 However, only after the 1990s with the EU-idea and leverage in SEE, both pre-
conditions for possible ideational change were met. Broadly such new powerful idea in 
the case of post-communist SEE originated from the crystallization by regional 
cooperation organizations and mainly by the EU of a normative agenda, based around 
the articulation of market, liberal-democratic ideology as part of a state-building 
programme.   The key dimensions of this new normative framework, aimed at  Central 
European and South East European countries, encompass the Europeanization, 
‗normalisation‘ and becoming ‗EU approved‘ states by promoting sustainable liberal 
democracy , the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, 
functioning market economy and intensive regional economic, social and political 
cooperation. It also encompasses institutional building and restructuring as well as 
general economic and social well being. Very important parts of the normative agenda 
are institution building and regional economic, political and cultural cooperation. The 
regional cooperation condition, as set out by the EU, conveyed to local political elites 
one of the most powerful and influential ideas, and namely-EU membership is only 
possible, if Balkan countries start to cooperate in all spheres, as current Member states 
do.  
 
Also, as discussed, powerful new idea, that makes existing understandings inadequate 
should be brought in by prominent carriers that are able to make others receptive and it 
should get institutionalized to continue to exert influence. In the EU-case, the EU is the 
ideational carrier of the powerful EU normative agenda and at the same time is the 
institution, where such agenda is institutionalized. 
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Namely, during the 1990s and especially during the 2000s, old policies of obstruction 
between Bulgaria and Greece started to constantly yield unintended consequences. For 
example, the decade-long impasse over the infrastructure projects started to inform 
elites that they incur significant economic, moral, credibility, etc. losses from such 
policies. The delay of the opening of the mutual border points was adequate before, but 
under common EU framework, it seemed more and more lunatic with every day passing 
and harder to justify externally and internally. Bulgarian and Greek national policy 
makers were pressured by local policy makers that much faster switched attitudes than 
their national peers. That was justified by the elite interviews. For example, 
Konstantinos Tatsis, prefect of the Drama–Kavala–Xanthi region in northern Greece, 
claimed ‗At grassroots, at least, it‘s a very different story. In the municipalities on both 
sides of the border, there is no sign of historic animosities between ordinary Greeks and 
Bulgarians. In fact, they have been on increasingly good terms since 1991. EU funds for 
cross-border initiatives have allowed them to collaborate on a variety of business and 
cultural initiatives, so that, now, the buses they lay on to transport people to one 
another‘s festivals are packed, as are the courses where they learn each other‘s 
languages.The problem is that local governments are not eligible for larger EU grants 
that can be invested in infrastructure. And central governments are not always 
understanding of border communities‘ needs and wishes. We feel things differently and 
Athens and Sofia view these matters ―from a bird‘s eye‖. The local authorities are at 
least keeping up the pressure. It is as a result of our deep collaboration that we managed 
to help governments complete some trans-border projects faster.‘33                                .  
 
The internal pressure to national key makers came not only from local level actors, but 
from Greek and Bulgarian actors, working on the EU-level. Last, but not least, such 
policies were ever harder to justify in front of EU and European partners. Therefore, old 
programmatic beliefs and policies they informed were in great dissonance with 
experience during the 1990s and even more during the 2000 with the gradual integration 
of Bulgaria in the EU. Such growing unintended consequences, more and more 
informed national policy makers of the inadequacies of their existing beliefs. The new 
powerful EU-idea (normative agenda), provided opportunity for strategic learning, 
offering a clue to the inadequacies of existing understandings of the context and inviting 
revisions, gradually making old perceptions of enemies and friends obsolete.  
 
Hay noted ‗in this way ideas about the context and the strategies they inform evolve 
over time. Whether this results in a process of cumulative learning, as might be 
reflected, say, in more effective policy-making, in an empirical question can be 
answered only on a case-by-case basis.‘34 In our case, it seems such cumulative learning 
has resulted in policy shift, as evidenced by the documentary and empirical research of 
the transport infrastructure chapters during the 1990-2010 periods. 
Conclusions 
 
After the fall of the communist regimes, Balkan political elites continued to perceive 
their neighbour as an opponent, as a ‗subject‘ of fierce rivalry. Alternative projects were 
being proposed, regardless of economic efficiency, technical parameters and geography. 
The major criteria for policy formation was how a certain neighbour was interpreted 
through the long held nationalist attitudes which were dictating that cooperation with 
                                                 
33 Konstantinos Tatsis, Personal Interview, Prefect of the Drama–Kavala–Xanthi region, Northern Greece, Drama, 
Greece 17.01.2008 [in English]. 
34 Hay, Political Analysis, p. 215. 
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certain neighbours is appropriate and with others was simply ‗not right‘ thing to do. In 
the period, 1990-2000 national governments and business elites on the Balkans were 
still reluctant to go beyond the scope of national strategic planning, to see the Balkans 
as an integral part of a broader region and become part of global economic plans. Intra-
regional rivalries remained strong, the willingness to compromise – weak. 
 
However, during the 2000s, we identified historic change in the Greek-Bulgarian 
traditional obstructionist policies (operationalized with the three sub-cases) between the 
1990s and the 2000s. Documentary evidence of policy change, based on archival and 
documentary research on government publications, memorandums, agreements, 
transport strategies and programmes, reports, newspaper articles, etc. was cros checked 
with empirical data through elite interviewing. The data reconfirmed the documentary 
findings that there are signs of very significant change in traditional Greek-Bulgarian 
attitudes and such change is directly linked to the change in policies.  
 
The second hypothesis that after the 1990s, the  EU was such a powerful idea, that for 
the first time since the Independence revolutions, started to successfully challenge old 
institutional settings in the region, that have persisted for decades, even centuries has 
been confirmed by Chapters 5 and 6 through documentary research and elite 
interviewing. 
 
The key explanatory variable accounting for the change was the involvement of the EU 
in the region generally, the EU normative agenda and the perception that the Bulgarian 
accession compeled Greece and Bulgaria to work together. After we have found policy 
change and linked it to ideational change, the chapter concludes with analysis what 
made EU-idea so much more powerful than previous ‗weaker‘ ideas that were not able 
to significantly change nationalist programmatic beliefs in similar critical times in the 
past, explored in the ideational chapters. Namely, the EU and its normative framework 
were able to satisfy two conditions that no other new idea could do during critical 
junctures in the past. Namely, to provide such paradigm through which old ideas 
constantly yielded unintended consequences and to make existing understandings 
increasingly inadequate. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
 
There are no longer any barbarians. 
And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? 
Those people were a kind of solution. 
(Constantine P. Cavafy, ‗Waiting for the Barbarians‘) 
 
 
In the introduction, we started this research with the danger of Britain becoming 
Balkanized. To come to a full circle some day Balkanization of Britain might not be 
considered a bad omen but a good intention. Only if it changes meaning and instead of 
splitting into small hostile parts becomes a symbol of cooperation and integration. That 
would represent a complete change in ideas. This study was all about influential ideas 
and their operationalization as an independent variable, explaining political behaviour. 
It explored how some of them were able to become and remain a powerful force in 
politics and looked at how different conditions enable certain ideas to achieve political 
salience and take on a life of their own, influencing political behaviour over an extended 
period.  
 
The main task of this research was to outline the objective historical impediments to 
Balkan regional cooperation, explain why obstruction policies have been so remarkably 
persistent, regardless of external change and explore if cooperation might be attainable. 
The introductory chapter identified that large body of literature was devoted to 
demystifying the Balkan political ‗irrationality‘ puzzle and the persistence of such 
irrationality. Some authors explained the failure to cooperate through genetic 
predispositions, ancient hatreds, eternal bloodshed and propensity for perpetual war. 
Others largely blamed the region‘s problems to the direct and hidden leverage of the 
Great Powers or to the West negative stereotypes internalized by local people, while 
fourth school of thought blames the unattainable, late and uneven modernization of the 
Balkans. Most of the above approaches taken on their own facilitated greatly our 
understanding of the Balkans, but many questions still remained unanswered and the 
region still remained as unpredictable and as lunatic as before we approached it.  
 
To address properly the persistent patterns of obstruction in the Balkans, we needed 
more than ‗ancient hatreds‘, Great Power meddling in regional affairs and late 
modernisation explanations. Although most of them offered excellent explanations, a 
more holistic approach was needed.  
 
To create such approach we had to address problems of ontology. The leverage of Great 
Powers, ancient hatreds and unattained modernization approaches all pointed at 
structural or agency-related impediments to regional cooperation. We needed to adapt 
an ontological assumption positioning ideas and culture as factors in their own right 
alongside structure and agency. The research explored the casual role ideas play in 
shaping political behaviour. Path-dependent institutionalized ideas facilitated answers to 
questions such as why in the region nationalist attitudes proved stronger than other 
political ideologies, why certain countries in the region have persistently cooperated 
with one another, regardless of the various changes in external conditions (even when 
belonging to opposite ideological camps) and vice versa, other countries in the region 
could not establish fruitful cooperation among themselves, regardless of the fact they 
belonged to the same ideology and the outside pressure for cooperation. Last, we were 
 185 
able to see what motivated such selectivity and how regional cooperation could take 
place after all and how. 
 
The theoretical chapter justified why historical institutionalism, amplified by ideas was 
advanced as best fit to the case study of path-dependent political behaviour on the 
Balkans. This study employed the theoretical framework of Sheri Berman‘s, The Social 
Democratic Moment to explore path-dependent political behaviour in the Balkans, as it 
represented an exemplary research which acknowledged the transformative power of 
ideas within historical institutionalist framework. 
 
Through Berman‘s ideational theory and historical institutionalism, the research offered 
a new way of understanding decision making and path dependence in the Balkans 
during the XXth century. Ideational theory predicted that actors strive to make decisions 
consistent with preexisting beliefs; also, appropriateness (rather than, say, maximization 
of benefit) is the most important factor, contributing to the choice of policy alternatives. 
Since what is appropriate remained reasonably constant within a given set of ideas, 
ideational explanations predicted that a particular actor will make similar choices over 
time, even as the environment changes. Also change is possible, when new ideas are 
powerful enough to challenge or supplant political elites‘ own particular ideas about the 
way the world works.  Since actors perceive the constraints and opportunities of the 
environment through the prism of their ideas, we should find actors with different ideas 
evaluating similar situations in different ways, judging the feasibility of different 
alternatives accordingly. Ideational explanations predicted, therefore, that actors with 
different ideas will make different decisions, even when placed in similar environments. 
 
Based on Berman‘s ideational theory, explained above, and operationalized with respect 
to that case, the study looked at two major research questions and advanced two 
hypotheses presented below. After we have derived two hypotheses from Berman‘s 
ideational theory, we tested them in the four chapters that were the framework of our 
Greek-Bulgarian empirical case. The Greek and Bulgarian ideas and behaviour chapters 
(Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), reflected on the first research question to test the hypothesis 
that Bulgarian and Greek modern states‘ remarkably persistent mutual obstruction 
during most of the XX c., regardless of changing external factors and outside pressure 
could be properly understood by exploring the crucial role, played by path dependent 
institutionalized ideas (programmatic beliefs) in shaping policy outcomes. The second 
question and hypothesis if EU idea could lead to ideational and policy change was 
tested in the two empirical chapters (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) on transport 
infrastructure during the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
 
 Research question 1: Why and how nineteenth century emerging modern 
Bulgarian and Greek states, relatively similar in size and population, sharing 
the same religion, revolutionary ideas, and historical development, having 
similar political and social conditions, have developed highly antagonistic path-
dependent policies of obstruction towards each other, that remained remarkably 
persistent, regardless of changing external factors during the early XX c., the 
two Balkan Wars, two World Wars, the Cold War and the 1990s? 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Bulgarian and Greek modern state‘ mutual obstruction, regardless 
of changing external factors and outside pressure could be properly understood 
by exploring the crucial role, played by path dependent institutionalized ideas 
(programmatic beliefs) in shaping policy outcomes. From the very formation of 
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their modern states, Bulgaria and Greece had clashing ideas for development of 
their states and such institutionalized ideas later informed political elites that 
cooperation with the other was highly inappropriate.  
 
Path dependence and Obstruction 
 
This first hypothesis was tested in Chapters 3 and 4. Each of the two chapters started 
with a discussion how the idea for the other as an enemy emerged, who were the 
intellectual carriers of such idea and how it became institutionalized in the institutional 
set-up of the modern Greek and Bulgarian state respectively. Then each chapter 
explored how such programmatic beliefs played a crucial role in structuring actors‘ 
views that cooperation with the neighbour was not appropriate and reconstructed the 
process through which the Greek and Bulgarian political actors, shaped by such 
normative guidelines and criteria decided on the policies of obstruction towards the 
other during key periods of the XX c., regardless of changing environment. This, in 
conjunction with a comparative study of the distinctive historical and structural contexts 
of Greece and Bulgaria uncovered the most important factors influencing the 
development and decision making of respective political elites during these years. 
 
To acquire data about the programmatic beliefs about the neighbour in Greece and 
Bulgaria, the two chapters relied on documentary research, using published and 
unpublished government publications, laws, published national doctrines, strategies and 
programmes, historical documents, letters, reports, newspaper articles, memoirs, 
biographies, etc. The data was analyzed through the method of ideational mapping. To 
collect data about the normative guidelines and policies towards the neighbour during 
the XX c., both primary (participant observation and elite interviews) and secondary 
(documentary research) were used. The data was analysed through process tracing and 
focus on decision-making-during-crisis methods. We operationalized obstruction 
policies with more concrete policies of denationalization of the minority of the other 
and negative propaganda campaign in the domestic policies (existing/non existing)  and 
policy of political, social and economic obstruction (existing/non existing) in the 
foreign policy during the different periods explored. 
 
The chapters explored if in critical periods, like the two Balkan Wars, two World Wars, 
the Cold War, the Fall of Communism, etc. (when ideas are most likely to change), we 
observed a significant change of the given set of ideas in Bulgaria and Greece about the 
other. Then we correlated ideas with the policies between Greece and Bulgaria in that 
historical moment. In general, if the given set of ideas did not largely change, we could 
not have expected significant change in the existing policies of obstruction 
(denationalization of the minority of the other, negative propaganda and lack of 
political, social and economic cooperation). However, if we have found policy change 
(no denationalization, negative propaganda and existing political, social and economic 
cooperation) that most likely meant that there was change in the given set of ideas. The 
analysis yielded the following results: 
 
In Greece the dominant idea was the Megale. It was a crystallized national ideology 
with a goal of uniting all former territories of the Medieval Byzantine Empire into a 
modern Greek state. Korais and Velstinlis revived the ancient glories and provoked the 
interest towards Greek history. Zampelios and  Paparregopoulus introduced a tripartite 
examination of Greek history, ancient Hellenism, medieval Hellenism and modern 
Hellenism, claiming that Modern Greeks were direct descendants of ancient Greeks and 
the Byzantium Empire. The ideas of Korais, Feraios, Zampelios and Paparrigopolous 
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achieved political salience among so many competing ideas through their prominent 
status in Greek society. They were able to make others ‗listen‘ through their position as 
government officials, university professors and intellectuals and prolific writers.  
 
Moreover, they were very persistent during their long careers in articulating their beliefs 
and manoeuvring the forming intellectual elite of the young Greek state toward the 
adoption of particular nationalist stances. Korais could do that through his position as 
university lecturer in Paris and through his numerous literary contributions, sponsored 
by the Chios merchants. Feraios could make others listen to his ideas through the 
Greek-language newspaper, Ephemeris, published in Vienna through his Revolutionary 
Maniphesto and published poems and books about Greek history that became widely 
popular. Paparrigopolous could maintain the importance of his ideas through his unique 
position as the greatest historian of modern Greece, his longevity as ideational carrier 
through his books, school textbooks, published magazines, university lectures, 
government appointments, combined with his uncommon talent of writing style. By 
virtue of such particular talents and long tenure as a public figure, he could exert 
unparalleled influence over the development of the national narrative of the forming 
modern Greek state. Megale Idea and not some other idea was adopted  since Korais, 
Feraios, Paparrigopolous and Zampelios were successful through their professional 
positions and literary scholarship to build a consensus that the most suitable (only 
appropriate) development course of the modern Greek state is in line with the Megale 
Idea.  
 
The particular historical and ideational context, in which Megale Idea crystallized, 
clashed with the crystallizing national programmes of Bulgarians-San Stefano, since 
both people were claiming the same lands, mostly in Macedonia. San Stefano and 
Megale were mutually incompatible. As a result Bulgarians were viewed as enemies 
through the prism of the Megale Idea and such idea were institutionalized in the modern 
Greek state and shaped the normative prescriptions that cooperation with Bulgarians 
was not appropriate, which in turn shaped policies of obstruction during most of the XX 
c. During the early XIX c. Megale Idea was put to practice and since Bulgarians were 
perceived as enemies over the future spoils of the Ottoman Empire, cooperation with 
them was not appropriate and this was the period when in Greece the first policies of 
obstruction towards Bulgaria were officially adopted as a result of such ideas. The 
polices included the Hellenization of the Slavs in Macedonia, the negative propaganda 
against Bulgarians in Greece and among the population of Macedonia and the total lack 
of political, economic and social cooperation between the two states.  
 
The Smyrna catastrophe marked the end of Megale in its classical form, but it did not 
alter the already institutionalized beliefs of Bulgarians as an enemy, neither had it 
changed the normative criteria that cooperation with them is not appropriate, regardless 
of the very changed external context. During the Balkan Wars, WW I and WW II, 
Greek political leaders chose to side against Bulgaria, following their logic of 
appropriateness that precluded any form of political, economic and social cooperation 
with the latter. The chapter confirmed that during those periods, policies of 
Hellenization and negative propaganda against Bulgaria intensified. During the Civil 
War, the ideas that KKE crystallized did strongly challenge traditional Greek 
programmatic notions of friends and enemies. Furthermore, they challenged the whole 
existence of Greek polity. However, they were not able to displace traditional 
programmatic beliefs due to the short period, intellectual carriers had to propagate their 
ideas and to the lack of institutionalization in the Greek organizational set-up. During 
the Cold War the perception of Bulgarians as enemies according to nationalist ideology 
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was joined by the perception of Bulgarians as enemies according to communist 
ideology. The period is characterized by complete lack of communication, intense 
propaganda and continued assimilatory policies. 
In Bulgaria, San Stefano is the crystallized national ideology that the Bulgarian state 
would only be complete by encompassing the three historic provinces of Moesia, 
Thrace and Macedonia, since those were the ethnic territories of the Bulgarian nation, 
justified by two criteria: Bulgarian language and adherence to the Bulgarian Exarchate. 
This idea was reconfirmed through the short-lived San Stefano Treaty that created large 
state for couple of months, before it was dismembered by the Berlin Treaty. Paisius 
crystallized the idea that Greek educational and ecclesiastical influence was detrimental 
to Bulgarian people and they needed to overthrow it. He justified that with the glories of 
the Medieval Past, when Bulgarian people had their own Empire and did fight with the 
Greeks to preserve it. Paisius was followed by a number of others and most notably by 
Sophronius of Vratsa (Sofroni Vrachanski) (1739-1813).  Therefore, the whole 
Bulgarian nationalism was born with the idea of Greeks as ‗enemies‘ The ideas of 
Paisius of Hilendar influenced the second wave of ideational entrepreneurs such as 
Neofit Bozveli and Ilarion Makariopolski (1812–1875). They followed Paisius‘ ideas 
and started to propagate the need for Bulgarian ecclesiastical organization independent 
of the Greek Patriarchate. Similar to the Greek case, the ideas of Paisius, Sofronius, 
Bozveli and Makariopolski achieved political importance among so many competing 
ideas through the latter‘s prominent position in society. They were able to render others 
receptive to their ideas through their position as ecclesiastical officials, intellectuals and 
prolific writers. Moreover, they were very persistent during their long careers in 
articulating their beliefs and manoeuvring the forming Bulgarian intellectual elite‘s 
views toward the adoption of particular nationalist stances. Makariopolski influential 
ideas were maintained through the newspapers Dunavski lebed (Danube Swan), 
Budushtnost (Future), Branitel (Defender), Bulgarska starina (Bulgarian heritage), 
published in Novi Sad, Belgrade and Odessa between 1855 and 1865.  
Similar to the Greek case, Sofronius, Paisius, Bozveli and Makariopolski were better 
positioned to ensure that their ideas remain a force in politics even after they have left 
the scene because they were able to build a consensus that the most suitable (only 
appropriate) development course of the modern Bulgarian state is in line with the 
educational and ecclesiastical emancipation from Greeks and adherence to the Bulgarian 
Exarchate. 1870-1878 is the critical juncture, when most of the institutions of the new 
Bulgarian state were founded and the ideational legacy of carriers that largely shaped 
the San Stefano idea was institutionalised. And namely, the intellectual entrepreneurs, 
Paisius of Hilendar and Sophronius of Vratsa influenced profoundly not only the pre-
independence network of schools, but their ideational legacy was institutionalised 
through the schooling system of the young Bulgarian Kingdom. Similarly, the powerful 
ideas of Neofit Bozveli and Ilarion Makariopolski  were institutionalised through the 
first Bulgarian independent institution, namely the Bulgarian Exarchate and later passed 
in the ecclesiastical organization of the modern state. Nearly the entire Bulgarian 
Enlightenment (1732-1878) was marked by the movement to overthrow Greek influence 
in church and school. Not surprisingly, such ideas passed in the modern Bulgarian state, 
through carriers and institutionalization, becoming programmatic beliefs, shaping the 
normative guidelines of Bulgarian political actors that cooperation with Greeks is not 
appropriate or normatively acceptable explaining obstruction policies during subsequent 
periods. In the period 1878-1913, as a result of the normative criteria of Greeks as 
enemies, the Bulgarian state formulated obstruction policies towards the Greek 
Patriarchate by creating a dense network of schools and churches in Macedonia and by 
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supporting the cheta (bands) in their armed struggle against the Greek andarts. In 
addition, the state organized negative campaign against Greece in Bulgarian press and 
supported campaign against the Greek minority in Bulgaria-Greeks were forced to leave 
the country and their economic activities were suppressed by the campaign not to buy 
Greek merchandise.  
During the Balkan, WWI and WWII, Bulgarian political leaders persistently chose to 
side with the factor that was against Greece, following their logic of appropriateness 
that precluded any form of political, economic and social cooperation with the latter. 
The Communist period nationalism was blended with Marxist discourse, blended with 
national ideology further reinforced traditional programmatic beliefs for Greeks as the 
enemy since now they were enemies not only according to the nationalist but according 
to the communist ideology as well. This cemented the normative guidelines and criteria 
that cooperation with them is inappropriate. The lack of any contact and the anti-Greek 
propaganda in the educational system, media, books, political rhetoric, are typical 
examples of the obstruction policies of the time. 
To summarize at successive historical junctures the dominant ideational framework has 
been challenged, but traditional programmatic beliefs of mistrust towards each other 
have remained unchanged. The national ideology has included more than one discourse 
and has displayed remarkable adaptability to different ideologies and regimes for 
legitimizing purposes, but perception of the other as an enemy and the inappropriateness 
of cooperation from the early XX c. to the 1990s did not change. As a result policies of 
obstruction during that period did not change as well. The first hypothesis that 
Bulgarian and Greek modern state‘ mutual obstruction, regardless of changing external 
factors and outside pressure could be properly understood by exploring the crucial role, 
played by path dependent institutionalized ideas (programmatic beliefs) in shaping 
policy outcomes has been confirmed. That specific nationalist attitudes of Bulgarian 
and Greek political elites would most likely be path-dependent regardless of the 
different changes of external environments, if such changes do not produce an idea 
powerful enough to supplant old ideas and beliefs of what is deemed appropriate was 
confirmed as well. 
 
 
Ideational Change and policy change 
 
 
Research question 2: Could nationalist attitudes and decades-long path dependent 
mutual obstruction between Bulgaria and Greece could be successfully challenged by 
new EU agenda and the idea of European integration? 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
 
Only when ideas change-does policy changes happen. EU with its conditionality 
policies, normative agenda in addition to the processes of marketization and 
liberal democracy could be such a powerful idea- to effectively challenge, for the 
first time, traditional national-interest mentalities in Bulgaria and Greece and 
lead to change in policies and make cooperation possible.  
 
The second research question and hypothesis, were tried in chapters 5 and 6 on transport 
infrastructure in SEE during the 1990s and 2000s, respectively. The justification for 
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such selectivity was backed by the observation that a significant difference between the 
two periods in terms of political, social and economic cooperation could be observed.  
 
The empirical chapter on transport infrastructure during the 1990-2000 outlined that 
political, social and economic cooperation between the two states was still rather wary 
and reluctant, as justified by the common EU large infrastructure projects that were in a 
state of impasse for a decade, in spite of firmly-secured EU funding, proven economic 
benefits and clear technical specifications. Documentary research, corroborated with 
elite interviews indicated that decision makers in Bulgaria and Greece still tended to 
identify and interpret the challenges they faced within the old normative guidelines and 
criteria and matched problems with solutions they had applied in the past, rather than 
searching for politically or economically optimal solutions in the new EU-promoted 
cooperation environment. In other words during that first period traditional 
programmatic beliefs, although challenged could not be displaced by EU-ideas, as 
happened many times before. Elite interviews indicated that during the 1990s policy 
makers at regional and supranational level adopted the appropriateness of cooperation 
ideas much faster than those, operating at national level. 
 
After the 1990s, traditional obstructionist programmatic beliefs between Bulgaria and 
Greece were gradually challenged by the EU normative agenda. Greek and Bulgarian 
political elites could only start cooperating, only after an idea powerful enough (EU-
idea) was able to challenge old programmatic beliefs of friends and enemies and old 
normative criteria if cooperation was possible, in spite of the fact that impetus for 
cooperation and possible benefits from such cooperation were often an available option 
long before the 1990s. However, that was very hard to materialize in the old ideational 
set-up. This is not to say that ‗Europeanization‘ ideas have completely displaced old 
ideas, rather it is a process in the making. This was possible due to the role of the EU as 
a powerful ideational carrier, longevity of such ideational pressure, the appeal of such 
EU idea making old beliefs increasingly inadequate and the undesired results old 
policies and ideas started to increasingly cause. 
 
Such increasing unintended results were a consequence of the fact that during the 1990s, 
Greek and Bulgarian political elites had to engage in a multiple level game-Euro-
Atlantic solidarity and conformity on the international arena and nationalist discourse, 
according to old ideas on the domestic. In Bulgaria, during the 1990s, governments 
(mostly former Communist Party in power) informed by traditional nationalist ideas 
payed lip service to EU‘s demands for reforms and did not engage in completion of 
common infrastructure projects or any form of cooperation with the only EU-neighbour 
country, Greece. However, only with the election of a truely democratic government in 
1997, the supranational and national level could converge towards a common agenda, 
when the normative criteria of the EU and EU conditionality started to influence 
Bulgarian polity at regional, domestic and international level. This also challenged the 
programmatic beliefs of Greeks as enemies and the normative ideas cooperation with 
them is not appropriate due to the latter‘s membership in EU and NATO, so coveted by 
Bulgarian governments of that time. Similarly, in Greece it is not until the involvement 
of the EU in SEE in the 1990s and the Bulgarian perspective for EU-membership that 
there emerged a normative/ideational challenge with sufficient power to challenge the 
traditional attitudes displayed by the Greek elites towards Bulgaria. After a decade of 
ideational struggle between the discourses of nationalism and Euro-Atlantic 
supranationalism, by late nineties political elites in the region started to increasingly 
translate and promote the Euro-Atlantic agenda into their domestic contexts. Institutions 
also started to feel the ideational challenge. This was evidenced by the fact that after 
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1999, all Bulgarian political forces reached an agreement on the Euro-Atlantic‘s agenda 
centrality in the Bulgarian geopolitical aims and started EU accession negotiations.   
 
Such developments correspond to the Greek case, discussed in the previous chapter, 
where by late nineties, there was an ideational turn towards perception of Bulgarians as 
possible allies within the EU and NATO and its normative framework started to 
significantly challenge old nationalist contexts and displace decades-old national ideas. 
Such change in perception, as evidenced by the documentary research and elite 
interviews in the following chapters was to a large extent possible through the appeal of 
the EU membership idea and the imposing of the EU‘s normative agenda. Unlike in 
Bulgaria, Greek elites were not subjected to such direct conditionality, but they were 
indirectly taught to cooperate. Both Bulgarian and Greek elites were increasingly 
feeling the pressure of regional and supranational levels informing them that continued 
lack of cooperation in the new condition started to produce undesired results and was 
making traditional policies of discord ever more inadequate. For example, Bulgaria‘s 
EU entry was delayed for the failure to satisfy conditionality, while Greek governments 
were ever more being criticized both by supranational EU-level and domestic regional 
level for the lack of progress of infrastructural projects between Bulgaria and Greece, 
the delay of the opening of new border points and economic backwardness of the border 
regions. 
 
The three sub-cases, presented in the two transport chapters, provided an initial 
overview, based on archival and documentary research on government publications, 
memorandums, agreements, transport strategies and programmes, reports, newspaper 
articles, that as a result of EU leverage, obstruction policy-patterns of the 1990s have 
significantly diminished to give way to gradual and steady cooperation during the 
2000s. This is evidenced by the intensive work carried on the cross-border projects and 
the overall public discourse of policy makers during that period. To confirm the initial 
documentary findings that policy change was linked to ideational change and that the 
EU-role was critical in that process, I complemented the documentary research with 
primary research data of elite interviews. Interviews with key players were used to 
corroborate the early findings. In this way, interviews contributed towards the research 
goal of triangulation, where collected data is cross-checked through multiple sources to 
increase the robustness of the findings.  
 
Elite interviewing was undertaken after careful non-probability purposive sampling of 
relevant top-policy makers in Bulgaria and Greece, operating on regional, national and 
European level. Why non-probability sampling was selected? When the goal of a study 
is to generalise from a sample to the wider group the sample is drawn from, then some 
form of probability sampling is essential for the robustness of such generalisations. 
Without the randomness that probability sampling entails, it would be impossible to be 
certain that the sample was not selected in a biased manner, and that the selection rule is 
not in some way related to the variables being used in the study.  However, when such 
interviews are employed not to generalise about the characteristics, beliefs or actions of 
the full population of relevant actors, but rather to use the testimony of those who were 
most closely involved to construct a theoretically informed narrative of the process of 
interest then the subjective judgements in the selection of the sample is a plus. While the 
sample should be representative of the wider population to the extent that it does not 
systematically exclude a set of actors who played an important role, it does not need to 
be drawn from the population through random selection as the purpose is not to 
generalise findings from the sample to the population. When ‗using process tracing, the 
most important issues to consider when drawing the sample are that the most important 
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and influential actors are included in the sample, and that testimony concerning the key 
process is collected from the central players involved. In such circumstances, random 
sampling will be a hindrance rather than a help, as the most important actors of interest 
may be excluded by chance. Instead, the goal with process tracing is to reduce 
randomness as much as possible, and work to ensure that the identities of the most 
important actors are established, and that they are approached directly for interview.‘35 
In our case, probability sampling enables us to interview key actors in Bulgaria and 
Greece that shaped decision making vis-à-vis the other in regards to political, social and 
economic cooperation in the period 1990-2010. Through elite interviews based on non-
probability sampling, policy change could be linked to possible change of ideas of 
actors directly, involved in the decision-making of the explored process. This is used to 
corroborate the documentary findings. Among the types of non-probability sampling, 
each has varying rules for selecting the final sample. 
 
25 Bulgarian and 25 Greek Members of European Parliament, ministers, local mayors 
from different political parties, NGO activists involved in Bulgaria-Greece Cross-border 
cooperation, academics, etc., were interviewed through semi-structured open-ended 
interviews mostly during 2006-2009. They were selected through purposive and chain-
referral sampling. Purposive sampling is a selection method where the purpose of the 
study and the researcher‘s knowledge of the population guide the process. The basic 
assumption of purposive sampling is that with good judgement and an appropriate 
strategy, researchers can select the cases to be included and thus develop samples that 
suit the needs of the study. 
  
The chain-referral, sampling method involves identifying an initial set of relevant 
respondents, and then requesting that they suggest other potential subjects who share 
similar characteristics or who have relevance in some way to the object of study. This 
second set of subjects is then interviewed, and also requested to supply names of other 
potential interview subjects. The process continues until the researcher feels the sample 
is large enough for the purposes of the study, or until respondents begin repeat names to 
the extent that further rounds of nominations are unlikely to yield significant new 
information. One of the dangers with snowball sampling is that respondents often 
suggest others who share similar characteristics, or the same outlook, and it is thus also 
incumbent on the researcher to ensure that the initial set of respondents is sufficiently 
diverse so that the sample is not skewed excessively in any one particular direction. In 
our case, 10 Bulgarian and 10 Greek key policy makers were selected through purposive 
sampling based on their position and the other 15 in each case respectively were 
recommended through chain-referral sampling of their peers, based on their relevance 
for the case explored.  
 
The 50 Bulgarian and Greek key decision makers were asked probing, theoretically-
driven questions, exploring their ideas, opinions/values, feeling, knowledge, sensory 
and background to the past and present attitudes towards the neighbor, appropriateness 
of cooperation with that neighbour, how they felt about the infrastructure projects (our 
three sub-cases) between the two countries, if the EU had to do with the change of 
perception towards the neighbour (if there was such) and why it was able to do that. 
 
The data reconfirmed the documentary findings that there are signs of very significant 
change in traditional Greek-Bulgarian attitudes and such change is directly linked to the 
change in policies. The key explanatory variable accounting for the change is the 
involvement of the EU in the region generally, the EU normative agenda and the 
                                                 
35 Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing, p. 11. 
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perception that the Bulgarian accession compels Greece and Bulgaria to work together. 
After we have found policy change and linked it to ideational change, the chapter 
concludes with analysis what made EU-idea so much more powerful than previous 
‗weaker‘ ideas that were not able to significantly change nationalist programmatic 
beliefs in similar critical times in the past, explored in the ideational chapters. 
 
 
Why EU could challenge old perceptions? 
 
Operationalized with our case, during most of the XX c., the traditional Greek and 
Bulgarian programmatic beliefs that the other was an enemy and the cognitive templates 
they provided that cooperation was impossible resulted in certain policies of obstruction 
(denationalization of the minority of the other, negative propaganda and lack of 
political, social and economic cooperation). The results of such policies maintained 
resonance with the traditional programmatic beliefs of political actors for decades to 
come. For example, in Greece policies of Hellenization towards the Slav minority 
(1913-1974), explored in the ideational chapters, resulted in its emigration to Bulgaria, 
or assimilation into the Greek nation. Such outcome was in complete resonance with the 
programmatic beliefs of Greek policy makers at the time that Bulgarians are enemies 
and the Bulgarian Slav minority in the country is the ‗enemy within‘ the country. Such 
resonance of ideas with the experience provided information that the existing 
programmatic beliefs were appropriate and reinforced them. Another example, negative 
propaganda towards the other in Greek or Bulgarian media, school and public discourse 
resulted in consolidation of the respective population and increasing the hatred towards 
that neighbour. Such outcome was desired since it directly corresponded to actors‘ ideas 
and expectations, and was a predicted outcome of a specially selected policy 
 
However accurate and inaccurate, such understandings inform strategy and that strategy 
in turn yields both intended and, inevitably, unintended consequences. Unintended 
consequences, in particular, provide an opportunity for strategic learning, offering a clue 
to the inadequacies of existing understandings of the context and inviting revisions.‘36 
Traditional Bulgarian and Greek understandings of the other as enemy and the policies 
of obstruction selected during most of the XX c. and especially after the 1944, yielded 
mostly intended consequences. The resulting lack of social, economic and political 
cooperation was in resonance with the programmatic beliefs of elites. In times of crisis, 
such as the Balkan Wars, Smyrna Crises, World Wars, Cold War, even though there 
were new ideas about Greeks or Bulgarians they could not install a new paradigm in 
Bulgarian or Greek institutions, because old ideas and cognitions that informed 
behaviour were in resonance with actors‘ experiences during those periods and such 
new ideas could not make already existing understandings inadequate. For example, no 
political party in Bulgaria could adopt a friendly stance towards Greece, reading the 
press or observing the assimilation and propaganda policies against Bulgarians 
undertaken in that country. Another example, during the Cold War, no political party in 
Greece could come to see Bulgarians as friends as such idea completely clashed with 
reality. Therefore, for ideational change to possibly occur, we need to have at least two 
factors working simultaneously, 
 
 Old ideas must constantly yield unintended consequences 
 There is new idea, that makes existing understandings inadequate 
 
                                                 
36 Hay, Political Analysis, pp. 212-213. 
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Thus, during most of the XX c. during times of crisis, there were new ideas but they 
could not make traditional understandings inadequate. There was no powerful ideational 
carrier that could make others receptive and institutionalize his/her ideas, since the 
contexts did not provide for such ideational change. In addition, during most of the XX 
c. there were cases when old ideas yielded unintended consequences (for example, the 
already discussed Bulgarian persistent war siding against Greece, resulting in permanent 
losses for Bulgaria). However, Bulgarian politicians did not interpret that such 
unintended consequences were result of inadequate beliefs, because there was no new 
powerful idea that could have made old beliefs that Greeks were enemies inadequate. 
 
 However, only after the 1990s with the EU-idea and leverage in SEE, both pre-
conditions for possible ideational change were met. Namely, during the 1990s and 
especially during the 2000s, old policies of obstruction between Bulgaria and Greece 
started to constantly yield unintended consequences. For example, the decade-long 
impasse over the infrastructure projects started to inform elites that they incur 
significant economic, moral, credibility, etc. losses from such policies. The delay of the 
opening of the mutual border points was adequate before, but under common EU 
framework, it seemed more and more lunatic with every day passing and harder to 
justify externally and internally. Bulgarian and Greek national policy makers were 
pressured by local policy makers that much faster switched attitudes than their national 
peers. That was justified by the elite interviews. In the municipalities on both sides of 
the border, there was no sign of historic animosities between ordinary Greeks and 
Bulgarians. In fact, they have been on increasingly good terms since 1991. EU funds for 
cross-border initiatives have allowed them to collaborate on a variety of business and 
cultural initiatives, so that, now, the buses they lay on to transport people to one 
another‘s festivals are packed, as are the courses where they learn each other‘s 
languages. And central governments were not always understanding of border 
communities‘ needs and wishes. Respondents claimed they felt things differently and 
Athens and Sofia view these matters ―from a bird‘s eye‖. The local authorities were at 
least keeping up the pressure.      
                                                .  
The internal pressure to national key makers came not only from local level actors, but 
from Greek and Bulgarian actors, working on the EU-level. Last, but not least, such 
policies were ever harder to justify in front of EU and European partners. Therefore, old 
programmatic beliefs and policies they informed were in great dissonance with 
experience during the 1990s and even more during the 2000 with the gradual integration 
of Bulgaria in the EU. Such growing unintended consequences, more and more 
informed national policy makers of the inadequacies of their existing beliefs. The new 
powerful EU-idea, provided opportunity for strategic learning, offering a clue to the 
inadequacies of existing understandings of the context and inviting revisions, gradually 
making old perceptions of enemies and friends obsolete.  In our case, it seems such 
cumulative learning has resulted in policy shift, as evidenced by the documentary and 
empirical research of the transport infrastructure chapters during the 1990-2010 periods. 
The second hypotheses that  after the 1990s EU was such a powerful idea, that for the 
first time since the Independence revolutions, started to successfully challenge old 
institutional settings in the region, that have persisted for decades, even centuries was 
confirmed in Chapters 5-6 through the documentary research and elite interviewing. 
 
We could conclude that the two hypotheses formulated in the theoretical chapter were 
largely confirmed by Chapters 3 through 6 and provided a good evidence of the 
predictive power of ideational theory as tool for explaining political behaviour. 
Independent power of ideas was demonstrated by exploring persistence of ideas 
 195 
regardless of changing external environments. The research argued new way of 
understanding Balkan politics and regional discord in general, through the power of ideas, 
creating a coherent framework explaining both continuity (chapter 3 and 4) and change 
(chapter 5 and 6). In addition to explaining persistent discord the project concentrated in 
the often overlooked pattern of persistent cooperation. Therefore the research explored 
not only ‗deviant cases of obstruction‘, but ‗deviant cooperation‘. This research provided 
an answer as to why some actors in the Balkans and other region‘s could ‗irrationally 
cooperate‘ according to their internalized logic of appropriateness regardless of external 
events. Competing explanations were struggling to account for certain ‗irrational‘ policies 
that were beyond explanation and often attributed to lunacy, genetic hatreds and even 
doomed geography. Such new understanding of the casual role path-dependent ideas 
played in shaping policies in the Balkans could possibly be used as a map to decipher 
other regions‘ intricacies by making seemingly lunatic policies very rational according to 
ideational contexts dominating certain society. Not only such approach advances our 
understanding of Balkan or other region‘s impediments to regional cooperation but it 
could also help us understand the development of modern states. The research applied 
historical institutionalism to understand political behaviour and decision making in a new 
way by incorporating ideas within the HI framework, allowing accounting better for 
explaining stability and change. HI has rarely been applied to both nationalism studies 
and Europeanization theories and this research is a step in that direction. However further 
research is needed, since positioning of ideas and culture as major explanatory factors 
alongside structure and agency opens the door for a new interpretation of political 
behaviour and decision making for scholars on nationalism and Europeanization. The 
research was not only an endeavour to study the EU‘s role in the Balkans, but to 
contribute to the understanding of evolution of modern EU states.  
In addition the analysis encompasses the period until late 2010, where the situation on 
transport infrastructure discord was gradually being overcome and some of the projects 
were already in their final stages towards completion. The research predicted that based 
on new EU cooperation institutionalized ideas the cooperation over such projects would 
be enhanced. Further research could explore the progress of the three case studies and 
related projects and if their development would further prove the theory. Another 
research testing the theory with different cases, time, place and contexts is needed and if 
the predictive power of the theory is confirmed, this would facilitate comparative 
research studies on nation building and state building, cooperation and discord through 
the role of ideas. For example, this theory could be tested by a study exploring 
Bulgarian and Serbian traditional programmatic beliefs. It would be interesting to 
observe if Serbia, that is behind its EU-ization process would still be likely to give 
preference to old beliefs, rather than EU-ideas, that would further give credibility to the 
EU‘s instrumental role in rooting out old beliefs. Such hypothesis is confirmed by a 
recent article, published in one of the most influential Serbian newspapers, describing 
attitudes towards neighbours. Describing Bulgaria, it says ‗Well, it is a historical fact 
that Bulgaria, during the two World wars, was on the opposite side of Serbia and during 
the First World War tangled in the most difficult moment by blocking the corridor for 
the withdrawal of Serbian troops and thus, the following folk tale appeared: ―Son, when 
there is war and you do not know which side to take, hit Bulgarians, this way- you will 
never be wrong‖.  
The historian Serdzhan Tsvetkovich says it is not all difficult to find the vertical line in 
the Bulgarian-Serbian enmity because since the late 19
th
 century the two countries have 
always been enemies in all wars…The Macedonian question from its onset, brought 
Bulgaria and Serbia into numerous wars and these relations, practically, continue today.   
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The most difficult moments were during the Second Balkan War when Serbian forces 
came out victorious in the battle of Bregalnitsa. Serbia took predominantly Bulgarian –
populated Macedonia and since then Bulgaria feels damaged.‘ The article supports the 
thesis‘ findings that the root of present Balkan politics could only be seen by ideational 
mapping of historical ‗friends‘ and ‗enemies‘ and precisely by mapping out, how such 
ideas originated in a critical period in the past and how after their institutionalization, 
they continued to affect policy makers for decades to come. Only with the EU-idea, we 
had such a powerful idea that increasingly rendered old perceptions of enemies and 
friends inadequate and contributed to policy change. 
One more interesting phenomenon emerged in the Balkans, during the writing of this 
study, which could present another opportunity to test historical institutionalism plus 
ideas, accounting for stability and change. Namely, that is the name dispute between the 
Republic of Macedonia and Greece, where one idea was used in such a way that it 
completely changed policies and ideas of enemies and friends. While Macedonia was part 
of ‗friendly‘ Yugoslavia it was considered friend since it was loyal to Serbia and 
Macedonians were not claiming ancient history, sticking to their Slav origin. However, 
after 1992 and the independence of FYROM, Macedonians needed to legitimize their new 
state, surrounded by states with century-old historical narratives and introduced the idea 
that they are direct descendants of Alexander the Great and ancient Macedonians. This 
was perceived by Greece as ultimate threat, since the latter still had large partially 
Hellenized Slav minority in Northern Greece. By appropriating such ancient past 
ideology and appropriating Greek symbols, Macedonians not only liquidated their 
inferiority historical complex, but could directly claim back the minority in Northern 
Greece. The lunacy in Skopje to erect ancient statues in front of the Pariament building, 
to look for ancient king‘ descendants in Pakistan and rename their airport to Alexander 
the Great, provoked complete change in Greek perception of enemies and friends. Greeks 
during Yugoslavia times were supporting the Serbian theses as Macedonians distinct 
from Bulgarians, in line with ideology of Bulgaria as the historical foe. However after 
Skopje started to incorporate Greek history and symbols, Greece started to publicly speak 
that Macedonians are Bulgarians and are stealing both Bulgarian and Greek past, which 
was unthinkable in the decades before. 
 
At the end of the twentiethth and the beginning of the twenty first century, the Balkans 
are entering a new era. The situation in the region in the aftermath of the Cold War and 
the Yugoslav Wars is principally new. In a unifying Europe and a globalizing world the 
Great Powers of the past are gone. The very algorithm of Balkan history has changed. 
The prospect of EU membership puts an end to the vulnerability and scuffle of the small 
Balkan countries, of their fear of the Great Powers‘ interventions or the 
‗treacherous‘neighbours‘ mischiefs. In a longer perspective the region is facing a 
historic opportunity to advance toward genuine peace, cooperation and prosperity. Such 
progress will not come easily or quickly. The challenge ahead is to get rid of the 
nineteenth century phobias, manias and provincialism, to forget the long list of 
historical grievances, the legacy of hatred and distrust and confrontation and be ready to 
sacrifice them for a better future. A future, when the Balkan ghosts would finally be put 
to rest. 
 197 
Appendices: 
N1.  Sample logic of 50 key policy makers in Bulgaria and Greece, 
interviewed through elite interviewing 
 
Sampling logic:  
 
25 Greek and 25 Bulgarian Members of European Parliament, ministers, local mayors 
from different political parties, NGO activists involved in Bulgaria-Greece Cross-
border cooperation, academics, etc., operating on regional, national and European 
level were selected through careful non-probability purposive and chain-referral 
sampling. Initially 10 Bulgarian and 10 Greek key policy makers were selected through 
purposive sampling based on their position, while remaining 15 in each case, were 
recommended through chain-referral sampling of their peers, based on their relevance 
and influence over the case explored. 
 
Type of interviews:  
Mostly standardized semi-structured open-ended interviews, plus some informal, 
conversational interviews; 
 
Types of topics in questions: 
The 50 Bulgarian and Greek key decision makers were asked probing, theoretically-
driven questions, exploring their ideas, opinions/values, feeling, knowledge, sensory 
and background to the past and present attitudes towards the neighbor, appropriateness 
of cooperation with that neighbour, how they felt about the infrastructure projects (our 
three sub-cases) between the two countries, if the EU had to do with the change of 
perception towards the neighbour (if there was such) and why it was able to do that. 
 
Timeframe: 
 
Interviews, held between 23.11.2007 and 17.01.2010 (most in 2008 and 2009); 
 
N2. Protocol of the elite interviews 
 
1
st
 Set of  Open-ended Questions 
 
 How did you view Bulgarians/Greeks before the 1990s? 
 
 Regardless of the answer ask three follow-up questions: Were you active  
                        in policy making during that time? 
 How firm were your positions at that time? 
 What contributed to your perception? How your position crystallized? 
 
 
 How did you view Bulgaria/Greece and Bulgarians/Greeks during the 1990s? 
 
 Regardless of the answer ask three follow-up questions: Were you active     
                        in policy making during that time? 
 How firm were your positions at that time? 
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 What contributed to your perception? How your position crystallized? 
 
 
 How do you view Bulgaria/Greece and Bulgarians/Greeks nowadays? More like 
friends or like rivals? 
 
 If answer ‗Friends‘ today and answer ‗Enemies‘ before, a follow-up 
question: Do you think the EU has contributed to such change of 
perception? 
 
 If answer ‗Yes‘, a follow-up ‗Why do you think EU was able to do that?‘ 
 
 Regardless of the answer ask three follow-up questions: Were you active  
                        in policy making during that time? 
 How firm were your positions at that time? 
 What contributed to your perception? How your position crystallized? 
 
2
nd
 Set of Open-ended Questions 
 
 Was cooperation with Bulgaria/Greece appropriate before 1990s? 
 
 Regardless of the answer ask three follow-up questions: Were you   
            active in policy making during that time? 
 How firm were your positions at that time? 
 What contributed to your perception? How your position crystallized? 
 
 
 Was cooperation with Bulgaria/Greece appropriate during the 1990s? 
 Regardless of the answer ask three follow-up questions: Were you active  
            in policy making during that time? 
 How firm were your positions at that time? 
 What contributed to your perception? How your position crystallized? 
 
 Is cooperation with Bulgaria/Greece a good thing today? 
 
 Regardless of the answer ask three follow-up questions: Were you  
                        active in policy making during that time? 
 How firm were your positions at that time? 
 What contributed to your perception? How your position crystallized? 
 
 
3
rd
 Set of Open-ended Questions 
 
 How did you view Corridor VIII and Corridor Egnatia during the 1990s? 
Competing of complementary? Why? 
 How did you view Corridor VIII and Corridor Egnatia during the 2000s? 
Competing of complementary? Why? 
 
 Regardless of the answer ask three follow-up questions: Were you active   
                        in policy making during that time? 
 How firm were your positions at that time? 
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 What contributed to your perception? How your position crystallized? 
 
 
 Did you favor opening of new border points between Bulgaria and Greece 
during the 1990s? Why? 
 Did you favor opening of new border points between Bulgaria and Greece 
during the 2000s? Why? 
 
 Regardless of the answer ask three follow-up questions: Were you active     
                        in policy making during that time? 
 How firm were your positions at that time? 
 What contributed to your perception? How your position crystallized? 
 
 Did you think Corridor IV and Corridor X were competing or complementary 
projects during the 1990s? Why? 
 Did you think Corridor IV and Corridor X were competing or complementary 
projects during the 2000s? Why? 
 
 Regardless of the answer ask three follow-up questions: Were you active  
                        in policy making during that time? 
 How firm were your positions at that time? 
 What contributed to your perception? How your position crystallized? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N3. Secret Report of the Greek Security Service on the need of a new 
institution to facilitate the assimilation of the Slav minority in Northern 
Greece; 
 
Security Service 
HELLENIC REPUBLIC 
Top secret 
 
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY 
NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE 
 
Athens, 16 February 1982 
 
……….. 
 
Number of protocol 6502/7-3042…. 
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(…..)  INTRODUCTIONS 
 
a.        The Skopians' activities for the autonomy of Macedonia may be efficiently 
confronted mainly by wiping out the use of the idiom, in the regions near the borders. 
This opinion is based on the realizations that also other regions that in older times were 
the center of "Macedonism", like Kastoria, are not hit by the Skopian propaganda, 
because there the use of the idiom has been almost wiped out. 
 
b.        This element by itself would be enough to exclude any thoughts of repatriation of 
the P/R (political refugees) who now reside in Yugoslavia and who have been brought 
up with the "Macedonian idea", the "Macedonian language and culture", independently 
of their participation or not to the organizations SNOF, NOF and activities taken for 
detaching Greek territories, during the period 1946-1949. 
 
c.        As for the above it is imperative to: 
 
1.        The creation of a state institution that will depend from the Prefectures of the 
regions near the borders, lined with the suitable and specially trained to the "Plot against 
Macedonia" subject, personnel. This institution will engage itself only with this subject, 
with the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will collaborate closely, but 
in secret, with the Security Authorities and all the public services (Tax office, Schools, 
Army, Church, etc.). 
 
2.        In the public services and especially in the educational institutions the employees 
who will be in service have to be ignorant of the local idiom. 
 
3.        The establishment of special enlightenment seminaries, for all the public service 
employees and the clergy who are in service in the sensitive region of Macedonia. 
 
4.        The establishment of motivations for the obligatory residence of the public 
servants and other employees, in the quarters of their service (example: payment of the 
rent, extra pay, etc.). 
 
5.        Establishment of Cultural Association, like "ARISTOTELIS" in Florina and 
economic help to them, for the realization of events and the publishing of books, 
newspapers, magazines, etc. and afterwards these will be sent to the Diaspora abroad 
who has origins from the regions of the senders. This will boost their national sentiment 
and they will be protected from the anti-Hellenic propaganda that is been practiced by 
S/M (Slavmacedonians) organizations. 
 
6.        Insertion of various obstacles (non-recognition of diplomas, postponement of 
military service, etc.) for the Greek students who wish to study in Skopje. 
 
7.        Marking  in each village of persons who, due to their kin bounds and their 
personality, influence a large circle of co-villagers and with any means (even with 
money payments) get close to them and use them properly so they will behave as the 
fighters of the use of the idiom in their circle. To this direction a very positive and 
effective role can be that of the Youngers of the political parties, by the judgment and 
coordination of the Government, when a between parties agreement will be reached. 
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8.        Recruitment in the Armed Forces, in Police Bodies, in the public services and 
Organisms of employees with origins from Florina region, by exception, and their 
obligatory location in other areas of the Country. 
 
9.        The encouragement, by the leadership of the Army, of meetings and marriages of 
Army officers, who are on duty there and have origins abroad, with women that speak 
the idiom. (…) 
 
THE CHIEF DIMITRIS KAPELARIS ANT/GOS 
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N4. Notes on the ethnic macedonian national minority of northern greece, 
published by Party of the Macedonian Slav Minority in Northern Greece -
Rainbow (Vinozhito), member of Federal Union of European Nationalities 
(FUEN) and the European Free Alliance - European Political Party (EFA-
EPP). Source: Office of Rainbow-Lerin(Florina), presented at the OSCE 
Conference „Human Dimension Implementation Meeting‟-Warsaw, 29 
September-10th October 2008. 
 
1. Greek government attitude towards the ethnic Macedonian Slav minority 
 
The Greek state denies the existence of a Macedonian minority within its borders. 
Moreover, in line with Greek nationalist ideology, successive Greek governments have 
failed to acknowledge the existence of a distinct Macedonian ethnic identity and 
Macedonian language. The attitude of Greek authorities to the very concept of minority 
rights deserves particular attention. For example, on one occasion an official Greek 
government representative, Mr Georgios Ayfantis, when asked before a PACE 
Committee why Greece has yet to ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities, stated that Greece considers that the FCNM was "a useful tool 
for the disintegration of the Soviet Union" and for the "bringing down of the Milosevic 
regime" but is irrelevant today (Note: it should be noted that the FCNM did not exist at 
the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union). He also added that if Greece were to 
ratify the FCNM, ".there would be no improvement for the man on the street just more 
work for the Greece in the Council of Europe." On must agree that in today's Europe, to 
view the implementation of minority rights as a laborious task is not only disappointing, 
but also of great concern. 
 
2. The denial of the right to freedom of association 
In 1990, a group of Greek citizens decided to form a non-profit making organisation 
called the "Home of Macedonian Culture" in the town of Florina/Lerin. The group 
proceeded to register the association with the Florina Court of First Instance. The court 
rejected application asserting that the objective of the association was to promote the 
idea that ".there is a Macedonian minority in Greece, which is contrary to the national 
interest an subsequently contrary to the law". A subsequent appeal to the Salonika Court 
of Appeal also failed. In 1994 the highest court in Greece upheld the decision of the 
Court of Appeal. The applicants then appealed the matter to European Court of Human 
Rights. In 1998, the court found that there was a violation of Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the case of Sidiropoulos and Others vs. Greece, 
ECtHR, 57/1997/841/8107. Following the Strasbourg ruling the applicant tried once 
again to register the association but again failed. On December 12, 2003, the local court 
in Florina again refused to register the association on the same grounds as previous - 
there is no Macedonian minority, etc. The matter was then appealed the regional court 
which just a few months ago decided to uphold the decision of the Florina court, again 
ignoring the Strasbourg ruling. So deplorably, almost ten years after the Strasbourg 
judgement and more than 17 years after the initial application, the Home of Macedonian 
Culture, remains unregistered. Thus, the Greek state is denying members of its ethnic 
Macedonians the right to freedom of association. 
 
3. Discriminatory laws targeting ethnic Macedonian refugees from Greece 
During the Greek Civil War (1949-1949) thousands of Greek citizens fled Greece. 
Following the end of the war, all those who left Greece during this period were stripped 
of their Greek citizenship and property. In 1982 the Greek government passed an 
amnesty law (Law no. 106841) which declared that political exiles who fled during the 
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Civil War and were stripped of their citizenship are allowed to return provided they are 
"Greeks by genus". In 1985, Law 1540 was enacted which granted political exiles who 
fled during the Civil War to reclaim confiscated property, provided they are "Greeks by 
genus". The term "Greeks by genus" is a reference used by the Greek government for all 
those who identify themselves as ethnic Greeks. Hence, ethnic Macedonians and others 
who left Greece under the same conditions as the ethnic Greeks and had their 
citizenship and property confiscated are excluded from enjoying the rights granted 
under these laws. This severely questions the very standing of the laws based on the 
grounds of equality and fairness. Moreover, the construction of the wording as relating 
to these laws is not benign, it has a clear intent to discriminate against all those who 
belong to the category of people classified as political refugees and who are not "Greeks 
by genus". Given that ethnic Macedonians predominantly make up this category of 
people, it is indisputable that they have been the ones targeted by this exclusivist 
definition and the ones who have suffered the most. The individuals excluded by these 
two laws mostly reside in the Republic of Macedonia, Australia and Canada. The term 
"Greeks by genus" in these two laws (which are still in force today) are in breech of the 
fundamental principle of non-discrimination. 
 
4. Absence of Macedonian language education 
Despite the existence of a Macedonian speaking population northern Greece, the 
Macedonian language is not recognised by the Greek state and thus children of 
members of the Macedonian-speaking minority do not enjoy the right to learn the 
Macedonian language within the framework of the Greek education system. Members 
of the Macedonian linguistic minority have written to the Greek Ministry of Education 
on several occasions requesting a meeting to discuss the issue however the Ministry has 
refused to even acknowledge receipt of the correspondence, let alone even meet with 
them. 
 
5. Denial of linguistic rights with respect to the use of traditional names 
The recognition of traditional place names, the rights of minorities to use their first 
name and surname in their own language is currently prohibited by the Greek state. In 
the period between World War 1 and World War 2, Greece enacted a number of laws 
which replaced all non-Greek names of towns, villages, rivers and mountains with 
Greek names. These traditional toponyms, which still exist in unofficial use among the 
population, are not given official recognition by the Greek state. Also during the inter-
war period, during the 1930s, the personal names of the Macedonian-speaking 
population were also forcibly changed. Macedonian personal names were replaced with 
Greek ones. One family whose name was changed was the Filipov family whose name 
was changed to "Voskopoulos". In April 2005, Mr Pavlos Voskopoulos made an 
application to the local prefect in his home town to change my surname back to my 
family's traditional Macedonian name "Filipov". The Prefect (local government 
authority) consulted with the Greek Ministry of Internal Affairs which issued a written 
opinion on the matter: 
 
"The change of the applicant's surname from a Greek to a "foreign" name should be 
rejected because to allow such an act might result in confusion as to the nationality of 
the applicant and thus might result in difficulties in matters and contacts between the 
applicant and Greek authorities." 
 
Thus my application was rejected due to the "advice" of the Greek government." The 
matter is now before the Supreme Court of Greece. Applications concerning other 
individuals have also been rejected by Greek authorities. 
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6. The need for a national census regarding linguistic and ethnic diversity 
In various international forums, Greek government officials have repeatedly conceded 
the existence of individuals in Greece of a non-Greek ethnicity, culture, or language. 
For example, on 22 November 2005, the Greek representative in the Council of Europe 
claimed that "there is a small number of people speaking a Slavic dialect or idiom in 
northern Greece" referring to the Macedonian speaking community. Furthermore, there 
is a tendency on the part of the Greek government to equate the size of the Macedonian 
minority with the political affiliation of the citizens as expressed in the elections That is, 
to say that the number of votes for the European Free Alliance - Rainbow (a political 
party of the ethnic Macedonian minority of Greece) is equivalent to he number of ethnic 
Macedonians in Greece. However Macedonian speakers vote for many parties and not 
just exclusively for EFA-Rainbow. The most democratic and accurate way to measure 
the number of persons belonging to a linguistic or national minority is not through 
elections but through the national census. Unfortunately the right to express one's 
linguistic or national identity is not possible through the Greek census. The Greek 
government should be strongly encouraged to make this possible at the next census in 
2011. 
 
7. Refusal of the Greek government to engage in dialogue 
Some of the above mentioned issues have been addressed in many reports monitoring 
Greece's compliance with international human rights standards. One of these reports 
was that of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, which in 
December 2003 made the following recommendation: 
 
"ECRI strongly recommends the Greek authorities to open a dialogue with the 
Macedonians' representatives in order to find a solution to the tensions between this 
group and the authorities, as well as between it and the population at large, so that co-
existence with mutual respect may be achieved in everyone's interests." 
 
Sadly however, no such dialogue has been opened. EFA-Rainbow has attempted on 
numerous occasions to meet with Greek government authorities to discuss the above 
mentioned issues. Since the election of the Karamanlis government in March 2004, 
EFA-Rainbow has written to the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Communication and Mass Media, and 
Greek State Television, however all correspondence requesting meetings (sent by 
registered mail for which evidence exists) has and continues to remain unanswered. 
This is a conscious effort on the part of the Greek government to exclude and 
marginalise the party and the minority. 
 
Twice in 2005 EFA-Rainbow sought an intervention on the part of its European partner 
organisations, namely the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN) and the 
European Free Alliance - European Political Party (EFA-EPP). On 5 September 2005, 
General Secretary of FUEN wrote to the Greek Ministry of Education and Religious 
Affairs requesting a meeting to discuss linguistic diversity in Greece. On 3 November 
2005, the Ministry responded and agreed to a meeting. On 4 November 2005, the 
Secretary General of FUEN thanked the Ministry for its positive reply and informed it 
that at the meeting, the FUEN delegation would be accompanied by representatives of 
the Greek member organisation, Rainbow. Three days later on 7 November 2005, the 
Ministry responded by stating that: 
 
"At no point did the Ministry accept the participation to the said meeting of 
representatives from "Rainbow". We consider Rainbow to be neither a relevant 
participant nor a valid interlocutor to a discussion regarding linguistic diversity in 
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Greece. We are not prepared to accept any member or representative of "Rainbow" to 
the scheduled meeting." 
 
In a similar incident, Bernat Joan I Mari, a Member of the European Parliament together 
with a delegation from the EFA-EPP visited Greece on a fact finding mission with 
regards to the situation of the ethnic Macedonian minority. A meeting was requested 
with Greek government representatives from the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace. 
While, Mr Bernat MEP and the EFA-EPP delegation was accepted, "the representatives 
of the Rainbow-Vinozhito party were not allowed to participate in this meeting". Thus, 
members of EFA-Rainbow were not permitted to meet with our own government. EFA-
Rainbow is a legal registered political party. EFA-Rainbow is not a separatist party, nor 
has ever engaged in acts of violence, therefore there is no legitimate reason not to meet 
or to start a dialogue with them. The policy of the Greek government to refuse to engage 
in basic dialogue with EFA-Rainbow as particularly alarming. 
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